

Tuesday, 10 September 2024

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(10.00 am)

(Proceedings delayed)

(11.00 am)

THE CHAIR: Thank you.

MR GRIFFIN: Good morning, Chair. Chair, today is World Suicide Prevention Day. This was established by the International Association for Suicide Prevention in conjunction with the World Health Organization. 10 September each year aims to focus attention on the issue, reduce stigma and raise awareness.

Chair, we are starting a little later this morning than planned because of difficulties on the trains. We're grateful to Ms Islam who will be speaking a little out of turn and we'll come to her just in one moment. What we plan to do is to hear from Ms Islam, even though she may be a little brief, we will break at that stage and come back for the second opening statement after that. So with that, on behalf the three Integrated Care Boards, I would introduce Zeenat Islam.

THE CHAIR: Thank you very much. Thank you for saying you will go now. That is helpful.

Opening statement by MS ISLAM

MS ISLAM: Thank you very much.

Good morning, Chair. As has been indicated, I appear on behalf of the Mid and South Essex,

1 Hertfordshire and West Essex and Suffolk and North East
2 Essex Integrated Care Boards, which I'll refer to as the
3 ICBs. The ICBs would like to, at the outset of this
4 opening statement, express their deepest sympathy to all
5 of those who have lost loved ones and who have been and
6 remain affected by the matters that this Inquiry is
7 examining.

8 It is hoped that the Inquiry's robust investigation
9 will provide the answers that many have been waiting
10 for for a long time. The ICBs would like to recognise
11 the courage of those engaging with this process, despite
12 their loss and suffering.

13 The ICBs are committed to engaging with the Inquiry
14 in full openness and transparency to assist it in
15 discharging its Terms of Reference. The ICBs recognise
16 the considerable work being done by the Inquiry team and
17 are keen to establish an ongoing dialogue to ensure that
18 the ICBs can be as helpful as possible.

19 To date, the ICBs have provided a draft Rule 9
20 statement, with accompanying documents, and stand ready to
21 respond to further requests for evidence. The ICBs have
22 been proactive in beginning a scoping exercise of
23 potentially relevant material and by putting in place
24 structures to ensure they can engage with and respond to
25 the Inquiry as effectively and efficiently as possible.

1 The ICBs are grateful for the opportunity to
2 participate, to listen to those impacted and to learn
3 the necessary lessons for the future. The ICBs are
4 committed to better understanding and responding to the
5 needs of people accessing mental health services in
6 their areas of responsibility.

7 Throughout the remainder of this statement, I will
8 provide a brief overview of the role and functions of
9 ICBs and some background to the changing landscape that
10 led to their establishment, which I hope will assist
11 the Inquiry and those listening to better understand
12 where the ICBs fit within the context of the Inquiry's
13 areas of consideration.

14 The ICBs were established in July 2022 as part of
15 wide-ranging reforms introduced by the Health and Care
16 Act 2022. The Act legally established integrated care
17 systems comprising of ICBs and integrated care
18 partnerships. The 2022 Act abolished clinical
19 commissioning groups, known as CCGs, and consequently
20 ICBs took on commissioning functions of CCGs as well as
21 some of NHS England's commissioning functions, which was
22 formerly known as the NHS Commissioning Board.

23 The 2022 Act outlines the various general duties of
24 ICBs, which include improvement in quality of services,
25 reducing inequalities, promoting the involvement of

1 patients and carers, enabling patient choice and
2 promoting the integration of health services.

3 A core function of ICBs is commissioning. Their
4 statutory duty is to arrange for the provision of health
5 services to such extent as it considers necessary to
6 meet the reasonable requirements of the people for whom
7 it has responsibility. NHS England defines
8 commissioning as follows:

9 "Commissioning is the continual process of planning,
10 agreeing and monitoring services. Commissioning is not
11 one action but many, ranging from the health-needs
12 assessment for a population, through the clinically
13 based design of patient pathways, to service
14 specification and contract negotiation or procurement,
15 with continuous quality assessment."

16 In summary, commissioning involves a range of
17 activities including assessing needs, planning services,
18 procuring services and quality assessment.

19 There is an important distinction between the
20 provision of health services and their commissioning.
21 Whilst the particular statutory duties have changed over
22 the years, the duty has been of one of arrangement
23 rather than direct involvement in patient care, which is
24 delivered by care providers such as an NHS trust.

25 The commissioning arrangements are designed to

1 enable the efficient provision of services under
2 existing contracting arrangements to best meet the needs
3 of the population. The arrangements recognise that
4 expertise in care, treatment and clinical
5 decision-making in individual cases is at the provider
6 level rather than the commissioning level. In cases
7 where individuals have complex needs and require bespoke
8 commissioned care, systems exist enabling commissioners
9 to work collaboratively with providers to deliver this.

10 As the Inquiry is undoubtedly aware, significant
11 reforms have taken place throughout the time period
12 under examination. At the beginning of the year 2000,
13 NHS providers were funded by health authorities and GP
14 fund holders. Primary care trusts, known as PCTs, began
15 to be established throughout 2000 and 2001, reflecting
16 a desire to shift the balance of influence of services
17 towards local communities. PCTs became the lead NHS
18 organisation in assessing needs, planning and securing
19 all health services and improving health.

20 Strategic health authorities were established to
21 replace health authorities and to lead the strategic
22 development of the local health service and
23 performance-manage PCTs and NHS trusts.

24 In 2010, there was a shift to changing the role of
25 the Department of Health to become more strategic while

1 empowering clinicians to have a greater say in
2 commissioning as part of a move towards becoming more
3 outcomes-focused and responsibility for public health
4 moving to local authorities. PCTs were formally
5 disestablished and replaced by clinical commissioning
6 groups, as I've already said, following the Health and
7 Social Care Act 2012. CCGs were responsible for
8 commissioning most NHS services supported by and
9 accountable to the NHS Commissioning Board.

10 Responsibility for some specialist services
11 transferred from PCTs to the NHS Commissioning Board.
12 As I have outlined, as a result of those 2022 reforms,
13 CCGs were disbanded and ICBs, together with NHS England,
14 formerly known as the NHS Commissioning Board, became
15 responsible for commissioning NHS services.

16 The various legislative and policy changes that have
17 led to several structural changes over many years
18 presents a complex picture. It is hoped that this brief
19 overview provides a useful introduction in understanding
20 the changing landscape and the current picture in
21 respect of ICBs. The ICBs look forward to providing
22 further explanation and evidence as the Inquiry
23 progresses.

24 To conclude, the ICBs would like to reiterate their
25 firm commitment to supporting the Inquiry in its

1 investigation. In particular, the ICBs would like to
2 highlight their willingness to reflect on key learning
3 that emerges from the Inquiry to enable them to ensure
4 that the people they are responsible for can safely and
5 confidently access mental health services in future. As
6 such, the ICBs will listen carefully to the evidence and
7 contributions from other core participants and look
8 forward to the Inquiry's reports and recommendations in
9 due course.

10 THE CHAIR: Ms Islam, thank you very much.

11 MS ISLAM: Thank you very much.

12 MR GRIFFIN: Thank you. Chair, we are still waiting for
13 some people to arrive. They have been interrupted by
14 problems with the trains, so may I invite you to rise
15 and we'll reconvene at 11.30.

16 (11.10 am)

17 (A short break)

18 (11.32 am)

19 MR GRIFFIN: The second opening statement this morning is on
20 behalf of INQUEST and will be given by Lily Lewis.

21 Opening statement by MS LEWIS

22 MS LEWIS: Thank you. Chair, I along with Ms Morris King's
23 Counsel, Ms Haworth Hird and Ms Ooi of Bhatt Murphy
24 Solicitors represent the organisation INQUEST, and
25 I make this opening statement to you on their behalf.

1 INQUEST is a charity and a non-governmental
2 organisation which provides expertise on state-related
3 deaths and their investigation to bereaved people,
4 lawyers, parliamentarians and the wider public, with
5 a particular focus on deaths in custody and detention.
6 As a result, INQUEST has extensive experience and
7 understanding of the deaths of those detained under the
8 Mental Health Act 1983 and in psychiatric inpatient
9 settings.

10 INQUEST specialist case work service has worked with
11 numerous bereaved people whose loved ones have died
12 whilst under the care of mental health services,
13 providing support from the outset through the
14 investigation by the relevant NHS trust or private
15 provider and then the inquest.

16 Since 2008, the charity has worked on over 49 cases
17 involving the deaths of those in the care of Essex
18 mental health services, as well as several further cases
19 falling within the Inquiry's definition of an inpatient
20 death, as set out in the Note on Scope. Those deaths
21 are marred by repeated failures that INQUEST have
22 identified through case work with families. We heard
23 details yesterday of just some of the appalling failures
24 and abuses from Mr Snowden King's Counsel who spoke on
25 behalf of a number of bereaved families and patients.

1 INQUEST shares their horror and concern at the fact
2 that, despite countless investigations, inspection
3 reports and inquests highlighting these failures,
4 preventable deaths have continued.

5 INQUEST has supported many of the bereaved families
6 and friends who have fought over many years for an
7 adequate investigation into these deaths and, Chair, as
8 has already been rightly acknowledged, without their
9 courage, persistence and determination, this Inquiry
10 would not have come into existence.

11 We do not underestimate how difficult it is for many
12 of those affected to be here today, either in person or
13 remotely, and to participate in this intensely difficult
14 process. We commend their courage and perseverance,
15 although it should not have been necessary.

16 Chair, it should not fall to bereaved families,
17 friends, patients and former patients to ensure that
18 such serious and repeated state failings are properly
19 investigated. Yet, instead of openness and honesty in
20 response to deaths and serious incidents, the default
21 position of the relevant Trusts appears to be
22 defensiveness, denial and delay.

23 INQUEST has seen first-hand the way in which bereaved
24 families have been disbelieved, patronised and lied to
25 when attempting to draw attention to the ways in which

1 the care and treatment of their loved ones has fallen
2 below expected standards.

3 Chair, we therefore invite this Inquiry not only to
4 describe in the clearest possible terms what has been
5 happening to patients in the care of Essex mental health
6 Trusts in the relevant period, but also to answer
7 a fundamental question: how can we ensure that failings
8 are properly recognised and acted upon in the future at
9 the earliest possible stage? Chair, put another way,
10 what work must be done so that we see no more
11 preventable deaths?

12 INQUEST hopes to bring its considerable experience
13 and expertise to assist the Inquiry in its
14 investigations and to answer this critical question.

15 Chair, against this background, I will use the time
16 I have this morning to address you on the following
17 topics.

18 First, Chair, I'll draw your attention to the key
19 themes that we say should run through your Inquiry and
20 all of its investigations, evidence and findings.

21 Second, I'll focus on the critical topic of candour,
22 identifying the central role that a lack of candour and
23 institutional defensiveness has played in allowing
24 failings to go unchallenged.

25 My third and final topic is possibly the most

1 important. It goes to the heart of how this Inquiry and
2 future inquiries can bring about the change that is
3 needed. It is the pressing need for a national
4 oversight mechanism to ensure that the recommendations
5 identified by critical investigations into deaths such
6 as this one are acted upon.

7 Turning then to themes. Chair, you and your team
8 have very helpfully provided core participants with
9 a detailed provisional list of issues. In line with
10 that list and with the Inquiry's Terms of Reference, we
11 highlight a number of common failures in care and
12 treatment at paragraph 4 of our written opening
13 statement which have repeatedly arisen in INQUEST's work
14 with affected families.

15 Mr Snowden KC also powerfully drew your attention
16 yesterday in his opening statement to a number of issues
17 identified by families and patients. We do not seek to
18 repeat those lists and entirely understand that the
19 Inquiry is still in the early stages of gathering and
20 hearing evidence. However, we do wish to highlight some
21 key themes that relate to a number of issues under
22 consideration by this Inquiry and of which INQUEST has
23 significant experience through its case work with
24 families.

25 In highlighting these themes, we do not seek to

1 suggest they're more important than other issues that
2 have been identified but rather to draw attention to
3 them now because, in our submission, it is important
4 that the Inquiry considers their relevance from a very
5 early stage in its investigations.

6 The first of those themes is the engagement of
7 family members in patient care and in investigations.
8 Chair, the involvement of family members in patient care
9 cross-sects a number of issues, as identified in your
10 provisional list, and touches on care planning, care
11 management and basic patient safety. INQUEST have heard
12 from many families through their case work in Essex over
13 the years who have experienced being excluded from the
14 care of their loved one once they've become an
15 inpatient, a concern which is particularly acute in the
16 care of young people. Indeed, INQUEST's national
17 research and consultation with families shows that this
18 is a pervasive issue in the deaths of individuals
19 experiencing mental ill health and is often both
20 symptomatic and causative of a range of other failings
21 in care and treatment, as we expect to see on the
22 evidence in this Inquiry.

23 Families have shared their anger and frustration at
24 inadequate systems and policies on information-sharing
25 prior to their relative's death, difficulties in

1 discussing medical needs with clinicians and nursing
2 staff and broader concerns around relatives' treatment.
3 Many tried to inform medical professionals about
4 inappropriate treatment, deterioration in their
5 relative's mood and concerns about behaviour that they
6 knew to be indicative of unhappiness and isolation. In
7 some cases family were met with indifference, in others
8 hostility. This approach continued in many cases
9 following patients' deaths.

10 The families that INQUEST has spoken to, Chair, are
11 broadly in agreement that the fundamental principles
12 that should underpin the investigation process - namely
13 quality, independence and impartiality - are too often
14 absent. As one person has said about trusts, they're
15 marking their own homework. They report a distinct
16 failure to support families with information on what the
17 processes following their family member's death would be
18 and what to expect of investigations and inquests.

19 Chair, we submit that it is important for your
20 Inquiry to recognise that a failure to provide
21 information at an early stage has the potential to
22 impact on the rest of the post-death investigation.
23 Without prior knowledge of their rights, families are
24 potentially denied insight into the cause of death of
25 their loved one. It is clear to INQUEST that families

1 are rarely central to the process and without grit,
2 determination and perseverance, they can be excluded all
3 together.

4 A further important theme, in my submission, is
5 structural discrimination. We submit that understanding
6 the role of discrimination and structural racism is
7 absolutely essential to any analysis of deaths in
8 custody and has been a central theme in INQUEST's work,
9 as we set out in some detail in our opening statement in
10 writing. This was also an issue to which we drew your
11 attention, Chair, in our response to the provisional
12 list of issues, and we welcome the announcement by
13 Counsel to the Inquiry, Mr Griffin King's Counsel,
14 yesterday that the Inquiry team is minded to add to the
15 list of issues and to include demographics, patient
16 backgrounds and ethnicity and whether this influenced
17 the treatment received by patients. Chair, we take this
18 to mean that the Inquiry will consider and record
19 patients' protected characteristics in order to
20 understand whether they impacted on the standard of care
21 and treatment provided and whether this was a relevant
22 factor in inpatient deaths.

23 We would wish to highlight today that groups that
24 require particular consideration, including the role
25 played by structural discrimination, include young

1 people, especially those transitioning from CAMHS to
2 adult care, women and girls who have experienced sexual
3 violence and abuse, young transgender people, black and
4 racialised people, and the experience of neurodiverse
5 and learning disabled patients.

6 Within this particular theme, INQUEST is aware of
7 a number of individuals who died as inpatients under the
8 care of the relevant Trusts who were identified as or
9 likely to be autistic and yet did not have their needs
10 as autistic people met. This is also an issue that has
11 been repeatedly highlighted by coroners and is
12 particularly acute for those with intersecting
13 vulnerabilities, such as young people with autism.

14 We invite you, Chair, and your legal team to
15 specifically seek to identify whether -- where a patient
16 was identified as autistic, whether care pathways and
17 planning were sufficiently autism informed and autism
18 focused, including adequate consideration of how
19 environmental factors and staffing should be adjusted to
20 meet the needs of autistic patients.

21 Chair, with that in mind, we urge the Inquiry to
22 seek to obtain data from patients' medical notes and
23 other sources on protected characteristics in order to
24 understand whether discriminatory treatment on account
25 of one or more characteristic, and the intersection and

1 interaction of these, took place and whether it was
2 a relevant factor in mental health inpatient deaths.

3 We would also ask you, Chair, to consider obtaining
4 expert evidence on this crucial issue as, for example,
5 Lady Hallett has done in modules 1 and 2 of the Covid-19
6 Inquiry on the particular issue of structural
7 discrimination. This is also an issue on which INQUEST
8 has particular expertise across a range of custodial
9 settings, and so we'll gladly assist the Inquiry in this
10 exercise where appropriate.

11 Turning then to a third theme, and that is
12 patient-centred care and a trauma-informed approach.
13 INQUEST is aware from its case work within Essex, and
14 nationally, of deaths where the patient's unique needs,
15 identity, appearance or protected characteristic were
16 not taken into proper consideration in care planning,
17 resulting in inadequate care, treatment and risk
18 assessments.

19 In analysing the degree to which patients' unique
20 needs were assessed and understood within the inpatient
21 setting, we urge you, Chair, to adopt a trauma-informed
22 approach. By this we mean that it will be important for
23 the Inquiry to recognise that very few people present as
24 in need of assessment for inpatient treatment under the
25 Mental Health Act without having experienced some form

1 of trauma, whether it be within a domestic,
2 institutional or societal context. For example, many
3 patients are admitted during an acute crisis,
4 a relationship breakdown or have become vulnerably
5 housed, been exploited or abused. Many have been
6 separated from loved ones, partners, parents or children
7 for the first time. Some have put themselves and/or
8 others in danger whilst unwell. Some patients are
9 brought to assessment under section 136 of the Mental
10 Health Act by police officers or following arrest and
11 detention. This intervention can cause intense trauma
12 for patients. All patients carry their trauma into the
13 inpatient setting.

14 Chair, you will need to carefully analyse, when
15 exploring the evidence, whether mental health clinicians
16 were appropriately aware of and trained in methods of
17 mental health assessment and treatment which understood
18 and provided therapeutic support to patients' trauma.
19 We say, Chair, that you must also consider, when
20 examining clinical practices, whether they were likely
21 to expose patients to further trauma in themselves, for
22 example by the use of restraints, the delivery of
23 medication without consent and the use of seclusion and
24 isolation. On that point, we welcome the proposed
25 addition to the Inquiry's list of issues on the risk of

1 adverse therapeutic outcomes arising from coercive
2 treatment such as confinement.

3 As part of your assessment, Chair, on whether
4 patients felt safe on mental health wards, we urge you
5 to understand the impact on patients of being in an
6 acute setting and suffering abuse, being subject to
7 restraint or witnessing the abuse or self-harm of
8 others.

9 I turn then to the important topic of candour. This
10 was a topic that we heard emphasised by Mr Snowden KC on
11 behalf of families and patients yesterday and, in my
12 submission, is central to the Inquiry's work. INQUEST
13 remain concerned that the default position by Trusts in
14 response to deaths and evidence of failings tends to be
15 one of institutional defensiveness and a lack of
16 candour. This has been particularly acute around deaths
17 in Essex and has been one of the reasons why this
18 Inquiry was established.

19 We note and welcome the observations of Essex
20 Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust at
21 paragraph 55 of their written submissions that they see
22 this Inquiry as a space for openness and transparency
23 and that they're willing to be accountable and to take
24 action that exceeds the reputations of cultures or
25 individual organisations. This is the right approach if

1 implemented in practice, not least in an inquiry whose
2 beginnings have been marred by failures in candour.

3 Even now, Chair, it is staggering that the public
4 bodies providing mental health services in Essex have
5 not yet been able to provide the Inquiry with a full and
6 accurate figure for the total number of deaths in the
7 relevant period.

8 Chair, we note your indication yesterday that the
9 figure is likely to be far in excess of 2,000. The fact
10 that it has taken a statutory inquiry to even begin to
11 uncover the true extent of deaths points, in my
12 submission, to an abject failure in candour, data
13 collection and governance on the part of the relevant
14 Trusts. And, whilst admissions are welcome, we wish to
15 emphasise that the failures in candour and resistance to
16 accountability go far beyond the Trusts' participation
17 in this Inquiry and its predecessor, and without full
18 recognition of this fact there can be little hope of
19 rehabilitation.

20 It is now 2024 and the full scale of failings in
21 Essex have yet to be fully uncovered. Without candour
22 and openness, the public can have no confidence that
23 there is learning from failings, and the bereaved will
24 be denied the truth of their loved ones' deaths. We
25 welcome, Chair, your assurance yesterday that you will

1 not hesitate to use your statutory powers where
2 necessary, and your expectation is enshrined in the
3 Terms of Reference of complete candour in this Inquiry.
4 It is hoped that with the powers that it now has
5 available to it that this Inquiry will finally uncover
6 the truth.

7 Chair, it is absolutely central to your
8 investigations and to the recommendations that you will
9 make that you seek to understand how a serious and
10 enduring lack of candour prevailed in Essex for so many
11 years. There are significant questions for state core
12 participants to answer. Were senior leaders in the
13 Trust aware of the significant and repeated failings
14 since identified by the Parliamentary Health Service
15 Ombudsman and others?

16 Did they purposefully hide evidence of failings from
17 the public and from investigators?

18 Was the information that was provided misleading by
19 omission?

20 How did Trusts approach inquests?

21 Were coroners given the full picture?

22 Were concerns raised by patients and the bereaved
23 properly responded to or were they dismissed and
24 underplayed?

25 What assurances were given to patients, the

1 bereaved, the public and regulators in the relevant
2 period?

3 Were these assurances true?

4 Where changes and improvements have been promised,
5 did they materialise?

6 It seems clear now that defensiveness flowed from
7 the very top. For example, when, in October 2019, then
8 Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Mental
9 Health, Suicide Prevention and Public Safety,
10 Nadine Dorries MP, was asked whether the Government
11 would announce a public inquiry into failings in mental
12 health services in Essex, she said that she'd been
13 advised by the Department for Health and Social Care
14 that, and I quote:

15 "... Public inquiries do not happen for individual
16 cases. They tend to happen where there is a systemic
17 problem or there are multiple cases. In this case
18 a public inquiry is not an appropriate response because
19 we're talking about two cases."

20 By October 2019 it was patently clear that the
21 problems in Essex were about more than two cases. By
22 this date, INQUEST had already worked with at least 17
23 families whose loved ones had died as inpatients under
24 the care of Essex mental health Trusts. Multiple cases
25 had been publicly reported and there was ample evidence

1 of systemic failings at that stage. Yet the extent of
2 the problem was not only being downplayed by those
3 within the heart of Government, but it appears that the
4 calls for a public inquiry were being actively resisted
5 by those at the top of the Department for Health and
6 Social Care.

7 As we heard from Mr Snowden KC on behalf of families
8 and patients yesterday, we now know that in 2020
9 Ms Dorries sent appalling messages to then Health
10 Secretary Matt Hancock, informing him of her plans to
11 isolate Melanie Leahy and undermine her calls for
12 a public inquiry. Sadly, these revelations are the
13 latest in a pattern of defence and denial which has
14 characterised the response of Government to
15 state-related deaths.

16 Sir Brian Langstaff, in his report into the Infected
17 Blood Inquiry this year, identified that a particular
18 theme apparent in the multiple failings that he
19 uncovered was institutional defensiveness from the NHS
20 and in particular from Government and a lack of
21 transparency and candour. He found that these factors
22 drove the response of Government over the decades.

23 The WhatsApp exchange between Ms Dorries and
24 Mr Hancock was seven years after the report of
25 Sir Robert Francis' Inquiry into the failings in

1 Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust which set out in
2 2013, and I quote:

3 "The Department of Health should promote a shared
4 positive culture by setting an example in its
5 statements, by being open about deficiencies, ensuring
6 those harmed have a remedy, and making information
7 publicly available about performance at the most
8 detailed level possible."

9 Whether the actions of the Government in response to
10 deaths in Essex lived up to this expectation will be
11 a matter for this Inquiry to consider.

12 Chair, candour matters because it enables a full
13 understanding and identification of issues at
14 operational and systemic levels and is, therefore,
15 crucial to the state's discharge of its obligations
16 under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human
17 Rights, including the identification of deep-seated
18 cultural issues in the provision of care and treatment.

19 A lack of candour goes hand in hand with poor and
20 unsafe care. Closed and defensive cultures allow
21 problems to go unaddressed, to take root and become
22 systemic. To this end, INQUEST, together with the
23 Essex, Grenfell, Hillsborough and countless other
24 bereaved family groups, have been at the forefront of
25 the campaign for a statutory duty of candour and have

1 high expectations that the work of this Inquiry and of
2 Government could finally lead to the codification and
3 embedding of candour across public institutions.

4 I turn then to my fourth and final topic, and that
5 is the national oversight mechanism. Chair, INQUEST
6 would invite the Inquiry to consider the case for
7 a national oversight mechanism, a new independent body
8 with singular responsibility for collating, analysing
9 and following up on recommendations arising from
10 investigations into state-related deaths. INQUEST is
11 determined to ensure that crucial learning and
12 recommended changes which come from inquiries such as
13 these are not lost and are enacted in time to prevent
14 further deaths.

15 The lack of candour, accountability and meaningful
16 change cannot continue. It should not fall to the
17 bereaved and to organisations such as INQUEST to carry
18 out a monitoring role and seek to ensure that change is
19 embedded.

20 As we have heard, despite the many inquests which
21 highlighted failings in Essex and the need for urgent
22 action to prevent future deaths, the same problems in
23 care, treatment and basic safety recurred again and
24 again. Although coronial investigations can and do make
25 a vital contribution to the prevention of future deaths

1 and social harms, the current system for learning and
2 implementing changes arising from inquests is not fit
3 for purpose.

4 There is no framework or co-ordinated response
5 required from public bodies to ensure that inquest
6 outcomes lead to concrete action. Similarly, for public
7 inquiries, there remains no national mechanism to hold
8 those subjected to recommendations accountable or to
9 ensure that meaningful steps are taken. As a result,
10 many crucial recommendations are simply forgotten or
11 dismissed.

12 In the 2022 report of the independent investigation
13 into maternity and neonatal services in East Kent,
14 Dr Bill Kirkup characterised the issues as follows, and
15 I quote from his report:

16 "This Investigation is simply the latest to focus on
17 failings in an individual NHS trust. The list is now
18 a long one, going back at least as far as the 1960s ...
19 The pattern is now sadly familiar: detailed
20 investigation, lengthy reports, earnest and
21 well-intentioned recommendations -- all part of
22 a collective conviction that this must be the last such
23 moment of failure, with the lessons leading to
24 improvement, not just locally but nationally.
25 Experience shows that the aspirations are not matched by

1 sustained improvement. Significant harm then follows,
2 with almost always patients and families the first to
3 raise the alarm."

4 Chair, a national oversight mechanism would help to
5 ensure that life-saving recommendations can no longer be
6 ignored, and failings are properly recognised and acted
7 upon in the future at the earliest possible stage. It
8 is a crucial next step in ensuring that there are no
9 more preventable deaths.

10 Finally then, before closing, we wish to raise
11 a number of discrete issues arising on matters raised
12 yesterday.

13 Firstly, on private providers. We note that the
14 Inquiry will consider the actions of private providers
15 to the extent that they're in scope. Chair, we would
16 invite you to ensure that care and treatment provided to
17 Essex patients by those providers is considered even
18 where placements are not funded by Essex Trusts, so, for
19 example, where placements, either in Essex or out of
20 area, are funded by national bodies, such as
21 NHS England, but are relevant to the care provided to
22 patients whose cases meet the criteria for investigation
23 under your Terms of Reference, Chair.

24 Then on regulators. We wish to note that bodies
25 with responsibility for commissioning, oversight and

1 regulation cannot be left out of the picture of the
2 Inquiry's investigations, and their role in protecting
3 patients and addressing failures in Essex over such
4 a long period of time must be investigated. This
5 includes the role of bodies such as the CQC and the
6 adequacy of its response to evidence that patients were
7 at risk in the relevant period.

8 Then on recommendations. Chair, as you are well
9 aware, one of the most important expectations of this
10 Inquiry is that it should aim to change the systems that
11 gave rise to the tragedies in the first place and to
12 prevent recurrence. For that reason, Chair, INQUEST
13 welcome your commitment to the making of robust
14 recommendations in order to effect systemic change at
15 a national level wherever you see fit. INQUEST are
16 clear that this should not take away from the particular
17 failings as seen in Essex and the evident toxicity of
18 the culture there.

19 Although the nature of final proposals will of
20 course be subject to the evidence heard, we highlight in
21 our written opening statement some key areas in relation
22 to which change is long overdue in order to improve the
23 systems for preventing avoidable deaths.

24 One such area relates to difficulties faced by this
25 Inquiry and its predecessor in collating data on numbers

1 of deaths of those detained under the Mental Health Act.
2 INQUEST ask you to identify, through your Inquiry, how
3 a lack of data has contributed to a lack of learning by
4 these and other Trusts, and to carefully consider how an
5 independent body could properly collect and collate this
6 important data. We anticipate, Chair, that the case for
7 change will be strengthened by the important work of the
8 expert statistician which the Inquiry intends to
9 instruct.

10 Then on urgent statements. Chair, as you have
11 yourself made clear, the work now needed is careful work
12 but it is also urgent. Since the first iteration of
13 this Inquiry was announced in January 2021, at least 19
14 people under the care of mental health Trusts in Essex
15 have died. We therefore welcome your commitment to
16 issue an urgent statement where the Inquiry identifies
17 systemic matters that require urgent attention. In
18 light of the history of institutional inability or
19 unwillingness on the part of the relevant Trusts in
20 Essex to effect necessary changes, we would invite you
21 to closely monitor the implementation of any of those
22 changes recommended or specified in your urgent notices
23 through the lifetime of this Inquiry in order to provide
24 ongoing monitoring.

25 Chair, in closing, INQUEST commits its expertise and

1 experience to assist you and your team with this
2 Inquiry. Our ask of the Inquiry is that it adopts an
3 open and collaborative approach with core participants
4 and, in particular, is led by the experiences of the
5 bereaved as well as those of current and former
6 patients. Chair, INQUEST's work with the bereaved over
7 decades shows that, unfortunately, their interactions
8 with investigatory processes are often characterised by
9 a sense of exclusion. In order to ensure that that does
10 not happen in this case, we ask that the Inquiry
11 undertakes advance engagement and collaboration with
12 those who are involved in its processes on important
13 topics such as disclosure, experts and timetabling.
14 Without that, there is a risk that trust is lost.

15 Finally, we reaffirm our commitment to the bereaved
16 who have walked this long journey to discover the truth
17 about what happened to their loved ones in the hope,
18 Chair, that you can provide them with the answers that
19 they deserve as well as the change that they and all
20 patients so badly need.

21 THE CHAIR: Ms Lewis, thank you very much indeed. Thank you.

22 MR GRIFFIN: Thank you.

23 Chair, that is it for today, for reasons that
24 I explained yesterday. We are back here tomorrow
25 morning at 10.00 for the final morning of opening

1 statements.

2 (12.03 pm)

3 (The hearing adjourned until

4 Wednesday, 11 September 2024 at 10.00 am)

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