

Tuesday, 6 May 2025

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(10.05 am)

THE CHAIR: Good morning.

MR GRIFFIN: Good morning, Chair. Chair, today we will be hearing evidence from Sir Rob Behrens, the former Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. I will be asking Sir Rob about the PHSO report entitled Missed Opportunities. It found that there had been a series of significant failings in the care and treatment of two vulnerable young men who died shortly after being admitted to NEPT.

The report considered the death in 2008 of a person referred to as "Mr R", and the death in November 2012 of Matthew Leahy. It identified multiple failings surrounding both deaths. The report also identified systemic issues at the Trust, including a failure over many years to develop the learning culture necessary to prevent similar mistakes from being repeated.

Chair, we won't be looking in particular detail at the deaths of Mr R and Matthew Leahy but we will be looking at what missed opportunities the report says about both and it's troubling. Sir Rob will also provide figures for complaints received relating to mental health and specifically in relation to the Essex Trusts.

1           Later today, you will hear from my colleague,  
2           Dr Tagbo Ilozue, and he will be providing an overview of  
3           evidence received on the mental health services provided  
4           to Essex patients. Whilst he won't be referring to  
5           specific deaths, he will provide the picture over the  
6           period covered by the Inquiry of local wards and  
7           services.

8           So today's evidence may be distressing and difficult  
9           to listen to and, for some, it may not be possible to  
10          sit through the session. I would like to make it clear  
11          again that anyone in this room is welcome to leave at  
12          any point and, again, I would like to remind everyone  
13          that emotional support is available for all those who  
14          require it.

15          The well-being of those participating in this  
16          Inquiry is extremely important to the Inquiry. We have,  
17          again, support staff from Hestia, an experienced  
18          provider of emotional support, here today and for each  
19          day of this hearing and there is a private room  
20          downstairs where you can talk to them if you require  
21          emotional support at all throughout this hearing. The  
22          Hestia support staff are wearing orange-coloured scarves  
23          and lanyards and I know there is at least one in the  
24          room today.

25          Would you just mind raising your hand? Thank you.

1           Or if you want to you can speak to a member of the  
2           Inquiry team and we can put you in touch with the Hestia  
3           support staff, and we are wearing purple lanyards.

4           If you are watching online, information about  
5           available emotional support can be found on the Lampard  
6           Inquiry website at [lampardinquiry.org.uk](http://lampardinquiry.org.uk) and under the  
7           "Support" tab, near the top right-hand corner. Chair,  
8           we want all those engaging with the Inquiry to feel safe  
9           and supported.

10          So, Chair, we move now, please, to the evidence of  
11          Sir Rob Behrens. I am going to ask that he come and  
12          take his place at the table.

13                               SIR ROBERT BEHRENS (sworn)

14                               Questioned by MR GRIFFIN

15   MR GRIFFIN: Sir Rob, have you provided the Inquiry with two  
16               statements, one dated 21 March and one dated 1 April of  
17               this year?

18   A. That's correct.

19   Q. Can you confirm that the contents of both are true and  
20               accurate?

21   A. I confirm that.

22   Q. Do you have your statement in front of you?

23   A. I do.

24   Q. You are welcome to refer to them if you need to. Your  
25               statements and the evidence that you provided by way of

1 exhibits stand as your evidence and I will not be asking  
2 you about everything in your witness statement or all of  
3 the exhibits as a result.

4 Can I just make sure that you are comfortably  
5 installed. There are, to your left, two big binders  
6 with documents in them. We can remove those if you need  
7 more room.

8 A. I can move them. Thank you. Can I just check about the  
9 sound. Is it possible to turn it up a little bit?

10 Q. I will speak a little bit more loudly but I think we are  
11 arranging for the volume to be increased.

12 A. Thank you.

13 Q. Please, at any time, if you are having difficulty in  
14 hearing what I say, just let me know?

15 A. Sure.

16 Q. Sir Rob, were you Parliamentary and Health Service  
17 Ombudsman, or PHSO, between April 2017 and March 2024?

18 A. I was.

19 Q. Does that mean that you have actually been out of the  
20 role for a little over a year?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. Did Rebecca Hilsenrath KC take over from you in that  
23 role?

24 A. She became the Acting Ombudsman for a year from the end  
25 of March 2024.

1 Q. In what capacity are you giving your evidence today?

2 A. I am giving it in an entirely personal capacity, though

3 I have had help from the office in obtaining relevant

4 papers.

5 Q. I think you have provided some statistics and

6 information that we will come on to look at later?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. We are at an introductory stage of this Inquiry and part

9 of that introduction is to look at matters of concern

10 that gave rise to this Inquiry?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. That includes concerns raised by your work.

13 A. (The witness nodded)

14 Q. The intention at this stage of our hearings is not to

15 consider in detail any of the tragic deaths that fall

16 within the scope of the Inquiry but I will be asking you

17 about your report Missed Opportunities --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- which, as we have just heard, addresses significant

20 failures in relation to Matthew Leahy and the person you

21 refer to as "Mr R".

22 Can we start though by looking at the PHSO role?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Can you give a brief outline of what that role entails?

25 A. So there are 150 national ombudsman schemes throughout

1 the world. The UK was in the second strand of national  
2 ombudsman institutions created, and the Parliamentary  
3 element was created in 1967 and, a bit later, the health  
4 element was created and the two offices, which operate  
5 under separate legislation, have been joined together  
6 in -- in one post, which is known as the Parliamentary  
7 and Health Service Ombudsman.

8 Q. So we are interested in the Health Service Commissioner  
9 for England role. Is the relevant law there the Health  
10 Service Commissioners Act of 1993?

11 A. Well, there are two Acts. The Act of 1993 was  
12 amended -- this is very significant for this Inquiry --  
13 in 1996 to enable the Ombudsman to look at clinical  
14 issues, which a number of my counterparts in other  
15 countries can't look at. And this gives enormous  
16 opportunity to look at the clinical failures in cases,  
17 which are looked at with the help of independent  
18 clinical advisers who brief our case handlers.

19 Q. Thank you. What is the PHSO's relationship with  
20 Government and the NHS?

21 A. The Ombudsman is a Crown appointment. The Ombudsman is  
22 appointed by fair and open competition. The candidate  
23 is then selected and has to be approved by the Prime  
24 Minister.

25 There is then a Parliamentary hearing --

1 pre-appointment hearing and, if that goes  
2 satisfactorily, Parliament votes on the Ombudsman and  
3 the Crown then makes the appointment. So the key issue  
4 is that the Ombudsman is not -- does not report to  
5 ministers. The Ombudsman is independent of both the  
6 Government and the National Health Service and is there  
7 as an independent and impartial voice to look at  
8 complaints by users of the National Health Service.

9 Q. Is the PHSO governed by a board?

10 A. Yes. Not -- not a statutory board but, because the  
11 principle on which the Ombudsman was founded is the  
12 principle of corporation sole. Now, this gives all  
13 responsibility for every decision made to the Ombudsman  
14 alone in giving an account to Parliament. That is  
15 a constitutional fiction and it's been recognised as  
16 such so that the powers that notionally lie with the  
17 Ombudsman have been, with consent, devolved to a Chief  
18 Executive who carries financial responsibility and  
19 a unitary board which is appointed, again by fair and  
20 open competition, which brings in non-executive members,  
21 and the board advises the Ombudsman about strategic  
22 direction but has no responsibility whatsoever for  
23 individual case handling.

24 Q. Is the board therefore made up of both executive and  
25 non-executive?

1 A. Yes, it is.

2 Q. Who chairs the board?

3 A. The Ombudsman and, just for the record, when it comes to

4 a review of what the Ombudsman has done, the Ombudsman

5 steps down and the senior non-executive takes over the

6 Chair role to ensure there's proper accountability.

7 Q. How are board members appointed?

8 A. By, by an open competition. But it's a competition run

9 by head hunters under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman,

10 not by the Cabinet Office or another department.

11 Q. You have said that the board scrutinises overall

12 performance but not individual cases.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. How does the board exercise the function of scrutinising

15 overall performance?

16 A. Well, there, there are regular meetings. There is

17 a requirement that all aspects of the key performance

18 indicators of the office are put before the board.

19 There is extensive scrutiny, so the board has

20 subcommittees: it has a Finance and Audit Committee, on

21 which sits the National Audit Office, to scrutinise

22 the -- the financial and accounting performance of the

23 Ombudsman; there's a Nominations Committee, to look at

24 appointments; there is a People and Welfare Committee.

25 And all of this is used to make sure that the Ombudsman



1 gives a proper account before appearing before  
2 Parliament to give an annual account of what the office  
3 has done.

4 So each year, the Ombudsman appears before the  
5 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs  
6 Committee of the House of Commons in a challenging  
7 series of engagements, to make sure that there is proper  
8 accountability.

9 Q. Is there a subcommittee that looks at risk?

10 A. That's part of the Audit Committee, yes.

11 Q. Why does the board not scrutinise any individual cases  
12 and who does that responsibility fall to, apart from  
13 individual case workers?

14 A. That's a good question, and the answer is that the  
15 Ombudsman carries the Constitutional responsibility of  
16 making decisions about cases and, in that  
17 responsibility, there are mechanisms to make sure that  
18 the process is rigorous through the delegation, which we  
19 can come on to, to have a look at, but there's also  
20 an Expert Advisory Panel, which consisted of experts in  
21 the field like, Dr Bill Kirkup, James Titcombe, people  
22 well known in the health service field, to advise on how  
23 issues are addressed.

24 But there is a strong feeling, or at least I have  
25 a strong feeling, that accountability for decisions

1           should lie with the Ombudsman, not with the board.

2   Q.   Are you saying that there would never be a situation in

3           which a single investigation might be discussed at the

4           board?

5   A.   I am saying that.

6   Q.   Can we --

7   A.   They would be aware that decisions have been made and,

8           when I was the Ombudsman, there was a very, very serious

9           case involving eating disorders, which is a form of

10          mental health issue, that lasted for over five years and

11          at the end of it I was so concerned about the

12          implications of the case that I went to the board and

13          said that I want to set up a review of how we handled

14          that case, and we asked the Expert Advisory Panel to run

15          it, and the board were in agreement with that.

16                So they were informed but they didn't make -- have

17          responsibility for making a decision.

18   Q.   Thank you.   Can we move now to --

19   A.   Sorry, this is very important.

20   Q.   Yes?

21   A.   When I -- when I became the Ombudsman, my predecessor

22          had set up a system in which she was able to commission

23          people from outside the office on very difficult cases

24          to make a judgement to see whether or not we, the

25          ombudsman, had got it right or not.

1           In my view, that was not an appropriate mechanism  
2           because it meant that the Ombudsman was not the  
3           decision-maker of last resort, and I think that is  
4           a very important principle to uphold.

5   Q.   Moving to the remit of the PHSO: does the PHSO  
6           jurisdiction extend across England?

7   A.   Yes.   But wider than that.

8   Q.   So what is the extent of the jurisdiction?

9   A.   So there -- there are a number of elements to this.  
10          First of all, in England, the Ombudsman has  
11          responsibility for all matters complained about the  
12          National Health Service but, in addition to that, the  
13          Ombudsman retains responsibility for all aspects of  
14          non-devolved issues that are addressed by the UK  
15          Parliament.   So issues that are not devolved, like home  
16          affairs, foreign affairs, social security, are also the  
17          responsibility of the Ombudsman, and that includes  
18          issues outside of England as well.

19   Q.   Thank you.   I am going to ask now that a part of your  
20          statement is put up on our screens.   Please put up core  
21          bundle page 207 and could you expand paragraphs 5 to 7.  
22          Thank you very much.

23          This, Sir Rob, is where you provide a little bit  
24          more information about the PHSO and I would like to look  
25          at paragraphs 5 and 7.   You say at paragraph 5 that the

1 service is free for everyone and:

2 "... it investigates complaints where someone (or  
3 a group) believes there has been injustice or hardship  
4 because an organisation in jurisdiction [and you then  
5 provide the relevant piece of law about that] has not  
6 acted properly or fairly, or has given a poor service,  
7 and has failed to put things right."

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Then at paragraph 7, you say:

10 "As Health Ombudsman, the PHSO can look at  
11 administrative issues of maladministration and has the  
12 power to make judgements about clinical advice and acts  
13 of the clinicians who are complained about."

14 A. Yes. So, first of all, it's very important that, unlike  
15 courts, anyone who comes to the Ombudsman has a free  
16 service, they are not charged in any way, and that is  
17 a very significant point of access for individuals.

18 The second point is that the remit of the Ombudsman  
19 is about maladministration, which is mentioned in the  
20 legislation but is not defined in the legislation, which  
21 gives responsibility to the Ombudsman to interpret it in  
22 a way which people understand that they can -- what they  
23 can make complaints about.

24 So, originally, in 1967 there was something called  
25 the Crossman Catalogue, which defined in non-legislative

1 terms bias, neglect, delay, and so on, as being part of  
2 maladministration. But as the office has developed and  
3 expanded, it has come to be -- to be able to look at  
4 serious service failure, service failure, avoidable  
5 death as being aspects of maladministration.

6 Now, this is very important because one of the  
7 things that government departments don't always  
8 understand is that maladministration does -- is not the  
9 same thing as illegality. Things can be  
10 maladministrative and not be illegal. So there are  
11 whole aspects of service failure, for example, in the  
12 Health Service, which are unacceptable and -- but they  
13 are not illegal in that sense and, therefore, the  
14 jurisdiction of the Ombudsman is different to a court or  
15 a tribunal.

16 Q. Thank you. Can we just break down a little bit what you  
17 have put in those paragraphs. So we are looking at  
18 complaints about injustice or hardship, as we can see,  
19 arising from a failure in a service provided by  
20 an organisation that comes within your jurisdiction, and  
21 we will have a look at what those might be in a moment.

22 You say at the end of paragraph 5:

23 "... and the relevant organisation has failed to put  
24 things right."

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. So if an organisation has acted, in your view, to put  
2 things right, you wouldn't have jurisdiction to take on  
3 the complaint?

4 A. Well, there are a number of aspects to this, to be  
5 helpful. First of all, the person complaining has to be  
6 directly affected by what has happened. So, under the  
7 law, good citizenship is not enough to be able to make  
8 a complaint and I think that that is very important.  
9 You have to demonstrate that you are affected personally  
10 or in a group by what has happened.

11 Secondly, we will look at poor service. If  
12 something has -- is clearly poor service but has been  
13 addressed and, in the terminology "put right", then  
14 that's not an issue that we would necessarily take  
15 forward because we believe that the complainant has had  
16 the service that ultimately they deserve, as far as  
17 that's concerned.

18 Q. Just to --

19 A. And, thirdly, there is a defined list in legislation of  
20 bodies in jurisdiction.

21 Q. We will look in a moment at a summary of that.

22 A. Okay.

23 Q. But can I ask you about one other aspect of this, you  
24 refer, we can see in paragraph 5, to relevant  
25 organisations which have not acted properly or fairly --

1       that's the language used there -- and, as you have  
2       already said, we have also seen the use of the word  
3       maladministration; can you explain what is the  
4       difference, if any, between those two concepts?

5   A.  No, well, because there is no legal definition, not  
6       acted properly or fairly is a way of describing, in  
7       common parlance, what maladministration means.

8   Q.  Thank you.

9   A.  I mean, we -- the big problems for the Ombudsman are,  
10      first of all, that very few people understand what the  
11      term means and, secondly, if you think that's bad then  
12      ask people to define what is maladministration, and  
13      that's not a term that is used in schools today, I can  
14      assure you of that.  So we -- the organisation has  
15      a responsibility to communicate in simple terms what it  
16      can do and what it can't do.

17  Q.  Let's look at some of the organisations that are within  
18      your jurisdiction.

19  A.  Yes.

20  Q.  Please put up the exhibits bundle, page 535.  Could you  
21      highlight or expand from "For a complaint to be in  
22      remit".  Next page.  Thank you very much.

23           So can we see here, this is a summary that you  
24      provided of a much longer document that sets out the  
25      procedures of the PHSO and here you summarise, or the

1 relevant document summarises, the particular  
2 organisations that are in scope.

3 We can see:

4 "For a complaint to be in remit, we need to assess  
5 two aspects of a case:

6 "Whether the organisation is in remit  
7 "Whether the action being complained about is in  
8 remit."

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. The document then talks about the relevant legislation  
11 and the fact that that sets out which organisations can  
12 be investigated. Do we see there:

13 "... we can investigate, namely Health Service  
14 organisations, family health providers and independent  
15 providers.

16 "Health Service organisations broadly include ..."

17 Does the document then set out in a number of bullet  
18 points which organisations those are and can we see that  
19 the first one is NHS Trusts and Foundation Trusts, and  
20 the last of the three bullet points is NHS England,  
21 Clinical Commissioning Groups and Integrated Care  
22 Systems.

23 Can we see, at the bottom of the screen, that  
24 independent providers may be in scope:

25 "Any person or organisation that provides a service



1 of any kind [I think that should be 'by arrangement']  
2 with a health service organisation or a family  
3 provider."

4 So having seen this, is a complaint about a mental  
5 health trust likely to come within the PHSO's  
6 jurisdiction?

7 A. Yes. But I need to be quite careful in responding to  
8 this. First of all, the Ombudsman cannot look at issues  
9 brought by staff against the Trust or staff who have  
10 complaints about each other. That is outside the remit.

11 Secondly, as we may come on to, it has to be in  
12 time.

13 Q. We will come on to that.

14 A. Thirdly, there are a number of other bodies that have  
15 responsibility for mental health complaints.

16 Q. We will come on to those as well.

17 A. I mean, that is very, very important.

18 And my other point would be that, in comparison to  
19 other ombudsman services, the Ombudsman cannot look at  
20 independent provision of health services or mental  
21 health services, unless that is being funded by the NHS.

22 Now, this is in direct contrast to the Local  
23 Government and Social Care Ombudsman, which can look at  
24 all private providers of social care and, frankly,  
25 I think this is an unnecessary restriction on the role

1 of the Ombudsman, and my counterparts in other countries  
2 had the possibility of looking at independent health  
3 provision in the way that the PHSO can't do.

4 Q. That actually takes us quite neatly to other limitations  
5 or restriction on the PHSO role.

6 Further to the one that you have just mentioned,  
7 what, in your view, are the main limitations on the  
8 PHSO's powers?

9 A. So, first of all, the Ombudsman has the power of the  
10 High Court to call for papers, so there is no problem  
11 about securing information that might be difficult to  
12 obtain and I think that that needs to be put on the  
13 record. But the Ombudsman is operating, unlike the vast  
14 majority of its European counterparts, in being  
15 constrained to look only at those issues that are  
16 complained about by citizens and non-citizens, and  
17 I cannot emphasise enough how important this has been,  
18 particularly in the case of Essex, in limiting the  
19 Ombudsman's capacity to contribute to a greater  
20 awareness and a public service in this issue.

21 Q. Could you just expand on that: why would the fact that  
22 you can only act on a complaint limit what you could do  
23 with relation to the issues that were arising in Essex?

24 A. Because there were a small number of very significant  
25 and heartbreaking cases in Essex, where the families of

1 the people who died were brave enough to complain about  
2 what had happened, and that was the focus of our  
3 investigations. But we subsequently discovered that, in  
4 the same institution, there were a significant number of  
5 other deaths where, for understandable reasons, because  
6 of bereavement or trauma or both, the families had not  
7 complained about and the Ombudsman had no opportunity to  
8 investigate those cases.

9 If -- we will come on to it but if we had had the  
10 power of own initiative, then the resolution of these  
11 tragic issues could have been speeded up very  
12 dramatically, and I think that needs to be put on the  
13 record.

14 Q. What does it mean to be a point of last resort?

15 A. So what it means is that, constitutionally, under the  
16 law, users of the service have to try to resolve their  
17 issue by going to the frontline deliverer before they  
18 can come to the Ombudsman and, in the case of the  
19 Parliamentary remit, they then have to go to their MP.

20 But in the case of the Health Service, that doesn't  
21 apply but it means that the Ombudsman would look at  
22 issues -- does look at issues only after there's been  
23 an attempt at resolution and the complainant does not  
24 believe they have received satisfaction from the  
25 outcome.

1 Q. What if there is the possibility of a legal case to be  
2 brought by a putative complainant against a Trust for  
3 example?

4 A. Absolutely. So there is, in law, the provision that the  
5 Ombudsman would not look at a case where there is  
6 an alternative legal remedy and the Ombudsman has  
7 discretion to look at those cases to advise the  
8 complainant that they would be better off going to law,  
9 rather than coming to the Ombudsman.

10 The example I can give you is, in the close  
11 relationship we had with NHS Resolution, which deals  
12 with avoidable death and giving financial compensation,  
13 and we advised many families that, if they were looking  
14 for a significant redress in financial terms, then they  
15 would be better off going to NHS Resolution than going  
16 through the Ombudsman process.

17 Q. So we are going to hear about a number of bodies and  
18 regulators --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- operating within the health and the mental health  
21 sphere. Is there a hierarchy as between them and the  
22 PHSO as to who should take on a particular complaint?

23 A. There is no hierarchy. That's -- I mean it's colleagues  
24 seeking to do the best that they can in an overcrowded  
25 and horribly complicated situation.

1 Q. We will come on to talk about the complexity of it in  
2 a moment. Is there a time limit within which a person  
3 needs to bring a complaint?

4 A. Yes. I mean, again, the Ombudsman has discretion about  
5 whether or not to impose the time limit but, generally  
6 speaking, complainants have to come to the Ombudsman  
7 within one year of being aware of the facts which cause  
8 the complaint to be raised.

9 Now, sometimes the attempt at resolution on the  
10 front line will take longer than a year, sadly, and, in  
11 that situation, the Ombudsman will use their discretion  
12 to allow a complaint to be taken forward but there has  
13 been litigation in a judicial review where the courts  
14 have opined that the Ombudsman took too long, allowed  
15 too long for a -- that principle to be applied and that  
16 there should be a more realistic interpretation of the  
17 rule.

18 Q. Thank you, and --

19 A. Sorry, just before we go on: the Ombudsman is the last  
20 resort but it doesn't mean to say that people cannot  
21 challenge the decisions of the Ombudsman, which they can  
22 do through judicial review. And there have been a small  
23 number of significant challenges to the decisions of the  
24 Ombudsman, which have led to useful improvements in the  
25 service.

1           So it's -- you know, it's not an absolute last  
2       resort.

3   Q.   Is there any particular form in which a complaint must  
4       be made?

5   A.   Yes, and this is a reflection. I mean, I personally  
6       have been arguing for ombudsman reform for a very long  
7       time. The system is out of time, as one of my Scottish  
8       counterparts described it, and in law people have to  
9       make a complaint in writing.

10           Now, you know, in modern parlance that is outdated  
11       and that is a disincentive to some people to use the  
12       system. So --

13   Q.   Could you just expand on what you have just said?

14       A disincentive: are there particular communities or type  
15       of people for whom providing a complaint in writing  
16       would be particularly difficult?

17   A.   Absolutely. So people with mental health challenges,  
18       elderly people, refugees, marginalised and vulnerable  
19       communities, they are not necessarily of a view that  
20       a written complaint is going to be the way that they get  
21       quick access to an institution.

22           Now, we do what we can to assist there. But it is,  
23       it is a hurdle that people have to go through.

24   Q.   So you were talking about things that you'd change to  
25       make the PHSO a more effective operation. Would you

1 change the way in which complaints can be submitted?

2 A. Well, as I said, the -- first of all, the MP filter is

3 iniquitous and it is a disgrace which should be

4 removed --

5 Q. That relates to the other half of your role, if

6 I understand things correctly?

7 A. It does but I need to say that.

8 The problem for the user is that they don't know

9 where to complain because of the curious jurisdictions

10 that make up Public Service Ombudsman possibilities.

11 Q. We are going to come on to that and we will deal with

12 that in a little detail. My question was actually about

13 the way in which a complaint can be submitted because,

14 as we have just seen, it needs to be submitted in

15 writing. Is that a restriction that you would want to

16 see removed?

17 A. Yes, it is but, if you look at the evidence which we

18 have given, the office receives around 125,000/130,000

19 enquiries each year which are predominantly on the

20 telephone. They are not written down.

21 So the office is already listening to people, ear to

22 ear or face to face, without stuff going in writing and

23 I think that that's the way it should be and that

24 I wouldn't want to change.

25 Q. You have already spoken about the need to be able to

1           proceed on your own initiative --

2    A.   Yes.

3    Q.   -- on your own motion, and not have to rely on

4           a complaint being made?

5    A.   I mean, I did a big study of, for the International

6           Ombudsman Institute on ombudsman services coming out of

7           Covid in 2021. All my European counterparts had the

8           power of own initiative. In the new Ombudsman schemes

9           in the United Kingdom, in Northern Ireland and in Wales

10          there are powers of own initiative and it's absolutely

11          astounding that the Ombudsman doesn't have that power as

12          a UK Ombudsman, and it is a serious limitation on our

13          capacity to serve the public.

14   Q.   Amanda, would you take down the document on the screen.

15          I want to now move to the point that you have

16          touched on already, which is the complaints landscape if

17          I can put it in that way.

18   A.   Yes.

19   Q.   We have had the benefit of a presentation and slides

20          accompanying it given by The King's Fund. What I want

21          to do, just to introduce this topic, please, is to look

22          at one of the slides provided by The King's Fund.

23          Would you put up, please, King's Fund slide 23.

24          So here we can see "Non-NHS regulatory and

25          investigatory bodies". Can we see in the left-hand



1 column the healthcare regulatory boards, such as the  
2 General Medical Council, The Nursing and Midwifery  
3 Council and the Health and Care Professions Council? Do  
4 we also see in further columns the HSE, or the Health  
5 and Safety Executive, and then your organisation, as  
6 well as the Coroner's Service. So those are all bodies  
7 or organisations operating within the Health -- and also  
8 to a certain extent, the mental health -- sphere; is  
9 that correct?

10 A. It is correct but it's incomplete.

11 Q. Well, hold on just for one moment because we will come  
12 and look at another slide in a moment.

13 Could you put up The King's Fund slide 22, please.  
14 So this is NHS regulatory and investigatory bodies and  
15 can we see here further organisations throughout the  
16 years, including the Mental Health Act Commission, the  
17 Care Quality Commission, NHS England, and the Health  
18 Services Safety Investigations Body or HSSIB. So are  
19 these, again, further organisations that we need to be  
20 aware of in this area?

21 A. Yes, and some of it is also missing here. So we not  
22 only have the absence of the Local Government and Social  
23 Care Ombudsman. In -- one of the big defects of the  
24 system is that health and social care are not integrated  
25 in an ombudsman service, so people don't know where to

1 complain, as far as that is concerned.

2 Secondly, we now have a Patient Safety Commissioner,  
3 which is not mentioned here, who has, the own initiative  
4 to look at patient safety issues, and she does  
5 a brilliant job in doing that. And we have HSSIB, which  
6 under -- it looks at serious issues of safety but,  
7 unfortunately, it has taken away the power of the  
8 Ombudsman to look at serious issues without the  
9 permission of the High Court.

10 And I took that case to the Venice Commission in the  
11 Council of Europe, who agreed with me that this was  
12 a wrong restriction on the role of the ombudsman, but  
13 the Government took no notice of that.

14 Q. Could you take down that slide, please.

15 A. I think I would just like to say, asking members of the  
16 public to appreciate those two slides, which are  
17 simplified and wrong, is a big part of the problem.

18 Q. Well, we will look at it a little bit more because, in  
19 your second witness statement you make the point that  
20 there are more than a dozen different health and care  
21 regulators playing important roles in patient safety?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. That's something that you have raised in one of the PHSO  
24 reports called Broken Trust. Is Broken Trust a report  
25 from 2023, with the full name Broken Trust: making

1 patient safety more than just a promise?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Did that report consider reasons for continued failures  
4 to accept mistakes and take accountability for turning  
5 learning into action and improvement?

6 A. I mean, we -- everything that we said in Broken Trust  
7 applies today. We argued very strongly that the  
8 regulatory framework was over complicated and needed to  
9 be reformed.

10 Q. Can I ask you to pause there because I actually want to  
11 look at the relevant part of the report where you say  
12 that.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. Could you put up exhibits bundle, page 450, please. Can  
15 we see here part of the report. I just want to look at  
16 what it says here:

17 "Second, political leaders have created a confusing  
18 landscape of organisations, often in knee-jerk reaction  
19 to patient safety crisis points."

20 Now, is that referring to what you have just been  
21 talking about?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. "HSIB, the Patient Safety Commissioner, PHSO, NHS  
24 England, NHS Resolution and more than a dozen different  
25 health and care regulators all play important roles in

1 patient safety. But there are significant overlaps in  
2 functions, which create uncertainty about who is  
3 responsible for what. This means patient safety voice  
4 and leadership are fractured. This is not due to a lack  
5 of dedication and professionalism from those tasked with  
6 championing patient safety. The problem is structural."

7 The report goes on to say:

8 "The Government must consider the case for  
9 streamlining some of these functions, for the benefit of  
10 people who use the NHS, their families and carers. This  
11 is not about reducing investment in patient safety. It  
12 is about creating a system that is coherent and easier  
13 to navigate, based on evidence and engagement with  
14 patients, families, NHS staff and leaders."

15 So the report refers to a confusing landscape of  
16 organisations. May I ask you some questions about that:  
17 in your view, does the confusion extend to which of the  
18 various bodies has jurisdiction to consider a matter of  
19 concern?

20 A. Yes. So, to illustrate, in the field of mental health  
21 there are four possibilities of complaining: CQC has  
22 some responsibility, the Local Government and Social  
23 Care Ombudsman has responsibility, and a Mental Health  
24 Act tribunal also has responsibility, in addition to  
25 PHSO.

1           So you need to be very clever to understand where to  
2           complain about.

3   Q.   Does this overlap, for example in the bodies that you  
4           have just referred to --

5   A.   Yes.

6   Q.   -- create a general uncertainty about who is responsible  
7           for what?

8   A.   Yes, I mean, you have to be pragmatic, as Ombudsman, and  
9           one of the things that we did was to work with the Local  
10          Government and Social Care Ombudsman to create a joint  
11          working team in which the two organisations bring  
12          together investigators to look at complaints where there  
13          is overlap between the two services.

14   Q.   In fact, I am going to come on to ask you about wider  
15          cooperation in a moment. Just sticking with the  
16          complexity point if I may --

17   THE CHAIR:   Sorry, could I just interrupt?

18   MR GRIFFIN:   Of course.

19   THE CHAIR:   You have mentioned four organisations in respect  
20          of a mental health complaint that might have a part to  
21          play.

22   A.   Yes.

23   THE CHAIR:   What about other people you have identified  
24          also, like the HSIB arrangements and the Patient Safety  
25          Commissioner, presumably they too would be.

1 A. But they don't look at individual complaints.

2 THE CHAIR: I see you were referring specifically to  
3 complaints.

4 A. Yes.

5 THE CHAIR: I am so sorry, thank you.

6 A. You know, I have great respect for HSSIB and what they  
7 do. My problem with them is that, by excluding the  
8 Ombudsman from looking at their investigations, they  
9 have reduced our power to intervene in a way which is  
10 not helpful.

11 Although that has not been tested with a particular  
12 case at the moment.

13 THE CHAIR: Thank you.

14 MR GRIFFIN: Just dealing with the complexity point.

15 Is it possible, in your view, that some incidents  
16 fall through the gaps between the various bodies and are  
17 therefore not investigated when they should be?

18 A. I think that that is the case. I think there are a lot  
19 of people who simply don't know where to go. I think  
20 there is a problem which we also raised in the Broken  
21 Trust report, as you will know, saying that advocacy  
22 services, which advise people about what to do and where  
23 to go, have been on the decline because of a lack of  
24 public funding and that was one of our recommendations;  
25 that for people to be properly informed about how to go

1           about making a complaint, they very often need advocacy  
2           services and they have been scarcer.

3   Q.   Given the complexity again, what certainty do we have  
4           now that deaths in the mental health context are always  
5           properly being investigated?

6   A.   I think what the Broken Trust report showed was that, in  
7           a large -- well, more than nearly two dozen cases, where  
8           the Trust had said there was "No issue here", we, as the  
9           Ombudsman, had looked at the case and found cases of  
10          serious failure and avoidable death, and that is very  
11          worrying. And I think coroners have come to the same  
12          conclusion on the issue of eating disorders: that Trusts  
13          have been reluctant to look at issues that they should  
14          be looking at.

15                So I have no great confidence that the system is  
16          right at the moment.

17   Q.   We have looked at various bodies including the CQC?

18   A.   Yes.

19   Q.   Is there anything in particular arising from the remit  
20          of that organisation that causes difficulties?

21   A.   Well, first of all, the CQC has had serious internal  
22          problems in the last couple of years, which have been  
23          publicly reported, about its ability to carry out  
24          reviews. You know, which is a problem. This also  
25          applies to the Nursing and Midwifery Council. So the

1 regulatory partners themselves are not in optimal  
2 condition and, for example, where there is bullying  
3 taking place in an organisation like NMC, can we rely on  
4 the NMC to call out bullying in the Health Service? You  
5 know, I think, I think that it -- that is a very  
6 important issue.

7 Q. As we can see, the extract that's still on our screen,  
8 you make -- or the report made -- the case for  
9 streamlining some of the functions. What did you have  
10 in mind or what, in your view, could be done to  
11 streamline?

12 A. Well, I mean, unusually when it comes to my personal  
13 record, the Government actually listened to what we  
14 proposed in this report and they established an inquiry  
15 by Penny Dash, which is currently -- it's not reported  
16 yet, to look at this very issue, to see whether there  
17 could be a streamlining to make it more simple for users  
18 to understand the service and for there to be less  
19 overlap. For example, and you know this is my view,  
20 it's not the view of PHSO, we have a brilliant Patient  
21 Safety Commissioner who operates as a singleton,  
22 Henrietta Hughes, she does a great job and she did  
23 a brilliant job in ensuring that Martha's Rule would be  
24 implemented to allow people to get a second opinion when  
25 they are concerned about how their relatives are being



1 treated.

2 Should that be a standalone role when you have  
3 a separate ombudsman service, you have a separate HSSIB  
4 and you have a separate CQC? That's one example.

5 Another example is that we are supposed to be joined  
6 up and working together and largely that's what is done.  
7 But CQC is a body in jurisdiction for PHSO. So in  
8 addition to working together in the regulatory  
9 framework, PHSO has responsibility of oversight of what  
10 CQC does and, in a number of cases, where I found  
11 maladministration in CQC, over the fit and proper  
12 persons test in the Health Service, there was dismay in  
13 CQC that a regulatory partner would call them out in  
14 this way.

15 So, you know, it's not, it's not all roses and  
16 flowers.

17 Q. Can we move to look at ways in which the different  
18 organisations that we have been looking at do cooperate.

19 Could you take down the document from the screen,  
20 please, and I want to talk about the Health and Social  
21 Care Regulators Forum, this is paragraph 13 of your  
22 statement. Have you set out there the various bodies  
23 and organisations which are members of the Forum?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Can we see that they are the CQC; the General Dental

1 Council; the General Medical Council; the General  
2 Optical Council; the General Osteopathic Council; the  
3 General Pharmaceutical Council; the Health and Care  
4 Practitioners Council; the other ombudsman, the Local  
5 Government and Social Care Ombudsman; NHS England and  
6 NHS Improvement; the Nursing and Midwifery Council; the  
7 Professional Standards Authority; and Social Work  
8 England. Correct?

9 A. Well, there are others as well. So the Patient Safety  
10 Commissioner is now a member of the Forum and HSSIB is  
11 a member of the Forum, too.

12 Q. What is the purpose of the Forum?

13 A. To allow the regulators -- so the Ombudsman is not  
14 a regulator, it has no regulatory power, it has no power  
15 to bind decisions which are made, which regulators will  
16 do. So it has no coercive role but it is part of the  
17 regulatory framework and it is sensible and appropriate  
18 that there should be a forum for people to come together  
19 to discuss issues of common concern so that there is  
20 a general awareness about what's going on in the system,  
21 and it does perform that role and I think that's good.

22 Q. You say in your statement that NHS England used to sit  
23 on the Forum but does not do so any more.

24 Do you recall approximately when that happened and  
25 why?

1 A. No. I mean, NHS England is no more. So I -- you know,  
2 you will have to ask them about that.

3 Q. You also --

4 A. I think there is a problem about, historically, the role  
5 of NHS England being independent from, separate from,  
6 Government and, if you are going to have a regulatory  
7 forum, you need a degree of independence in order for  
8 that to have credibility. So I think that's one of the  
9 issues.

10 Q. You also refer in your statement to an Emerging Concerns  
11 Protocol.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. What is that?

14 A. So this is the ability of one of the regular --  
15 regulatory partners to say to the partners, "This is  
16 an issue of such concern that we are dealing with that  
17 we feel it should be put in the public domain through  
18 the protocol", and I think that is a good thing. The  
19 problem is that it's hardly ever been used and the only  
20 time that I am aware that it's been used was by a PHSO  
21 in dealing with the unacceptable behaviour of University  
22 Hospitals Birmingham Trust and their reluctance to  
23 cooperate with the Ombudsman over a prolonged period of  
24 time.

25 But we did it and it had the appropriate effect of

1 getting the Trust to finally take notice of what the  
2 Ombudsman had been saying. So it needs to be used more.

3 Q. In fact, there has been a development, I think, since  
4 you stopped being PHSO.

5 Chair, may I just use this opportunity to refer to  
6 information provided by Rebecca Hilsenrath, and she  
7 explains in her first statement. The reference for  
8 anyone who wants it is at core bundle page 248, at  
9 paragraph 5.2. She says:

10 "In late 2024, it was agreed to merge the Emerging  
11 Concerns Protocol Group with the Health and Social Care  
12 Regulators Forum Thematic Group."

13 Can we please put up core bundle, page 251, and  
14 could you expand paragraph 4 and 4.1, please. Here this  
15 is a second statement from Ms Hilsenrath and she was  
16 asked:

17 "What was the reasoning behind merging the Emerging  
18 Concerns Protocol with the Health and Social Care  
19 Regulators Forum Thematic Group?"

20 Her response, we can see here:

21 "On a practical level, it is hoped that bringing  
22 together the two groups will reduce the potential for  
23 duplication of discussion and encourage proactive  
24 discussion on thematic issues of interest across  
25 members. By incorporating the ECP discussions into the

1 forum, it is hoped that there will be more organic  
2 consideration of where a thematic interest area could  
3 generate an early indicator of a need to trigger the  
4 Emerging Concerns Protocol based on insight from other  
5 members."

6 Sir Rob, is that an approach that you would agree  
7 with?

8 A. I do agree with that but I also need to say, in my  
9 experience of having been an ombudsman in legal  
10 services, in higher education, in health and in  
11 Government, that I have never come across a regulatory  
12 area as complicated as the Health Service and that,  
13 without addressing the core issue of simplifying the  
14 number of regulators, 4.1 won't have as much effect as  
15 it needs to have.

16 Q. Well, that is a question I was going to ask you. To  
17 what extent does the Forum and your ability to talk to  
18 people outside the Forum as you need to mitigate the  
19 extent to which the complexity has caused problems?

20 A. Well, you know, the -- these are groups of public  
21 servants who do their very best under the circumstances  
22 which they are operating in. But the core issue is:  
23 does the public understand how the system is regulated  
24 and where they go if they want to make a complaint?  
25 Anything else is filigree and, at the moment, I have no

1 confidence that people trust the system because they  
2 don't know where to go when they want to make  
3 a complaint.

4 Q. Could you take down that document, please.

5 Can we just take stock. As we have just been  
6 discussing, if I have understood your evidence  
7 correctly, are there two general areas that you believe  
8 should be addressed: first of all, the limitations on  
9 the PHSO's powers that you have described; and,  
10 secondly, the complexity of the complaints and  
11 regulatory landscape, including specifically in relation  
12 to mental health care?

13 A. Yes. Could I just say this? I am not an aggrandiser  
14 for ombudsman power. I do understand that there are  
15 areas that you wouldn't want to go in.

16 I have heard people argue for binding powers for the  
17 Ombudsman, so at the moment, as you know, the Ombudsman  
18 can't force anybody to do anything; its recommendations  
19 are recommendations. And I know, from watching the  
20 experience in South Africa recently, that, where the  
21 Ombudsman does have binding powers, that that has led to  
22 enormous litigation in the constitutional court and  
23 below, where people have challenged the power of the  
24 Ombudsman successfully and, in fact, she was impeached  
25 as a result of these things.

1           We don't want the Ombudsman to be judicialised. We  
2           don't want to make the Ombudsman a second-class legal  
3           service. It's not that, it's separate, and I would not  
4           support binding powers.

5   Q. We are going to come on later to look at some statistics  
6           that you have provided but, with the limitations and the  
7           complexity that we have just been discussing, I want to  
8           look at caveats that we may need to apply to the  
9           statistics that we come on to.

10   A. Yes.

11   Q. In brief, does it come to this: because of the  
12           limitations of your role and because there are a number  
13           of other organisations working in the complex landscape  
14           you described, do the statistics you are able to provide  
15           actually only provide part of the picture?

16   A. I think they do only provide part of the picture because  
17           we only can look at cases where people come to us. So  
18           if the wider issue of people having grievances and  
19           complaints about a system which they don't complain  
20           about is not available to us.

21           And you may come on to it, but we did a survey with  
22           YouGov, in which we asked 3,500 people for their  
23           experience of complaining in the Health Service.

24   Q. Well, we will come on to look at that.

25   A. Okay, and what that showed, and just to make this point,

1 is that many people with mental health challenges did  
2 not want to complain, and our data doesn't cover that.

3 Q. So if this Inquiry wants to build up an accurate  
4 picture, to the extent that that's possible, of what was  
5 occurring, we will need to go to the various other  
6 organisations and bodies to seek information from them  
7 too; is that correct?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. I want to deal now with procedure, please. You cover  
10 this in some detail in your statement, and I don't  
11 propose to do that now. But the procedure that you  
12 adopt, does the process you describe involve a number of  
13 different stages: from receiving the complaint and  
14 considering whether it's within the PHSO's jurisdiction;  
15 to primary investigation and consideration whether the  
16 complaint can be resolved quickly without further  
17 investigation; through to detailed investigation for  
18 complaints that can't be resolved at the primary  
19 investigation stage; and on to provisional views shared  
20 by the PHSO with the parties to allow them to comment on  
21 them; through to formal finding, with the PHSO formally  
22 upholding or not upholding the complaint, or actually  
23 upholding it in part, and, as you have just been  
24 discussing, recommendations, which we will come on to  
25 look at.



1           You have told us that in fact you do have power to  
2           require or compel evidence and, just looking at formal  
3           findings briefly, in what form are formal findings  
4           delivered to the relevant people: are they presented as  
5           part of a report or is there some other way?

6   A.   No, they are -- they're presented in the final report  
7           that the Ombudsman issues.

8   Q.   Who is the report sent to generally?

9   A.   It's sent to the complainant and to the body in  
10          jurisdiction and, subsequently, where it's appropriate,  
11          to the co-regulators because one of the issues for  
12          a non-regulator is oversight of the implementation of  
13          the recommendations which are made, and that's why it's  
14          so important for the Ombudsman and the CQC to work  
15          together because, after a period of time, it's not  
16          appropriate for an Ombudsman to keep monitoring what  
17          a body in jurisdiction has done or not done and it's up  
18          to other bodies to make sure that that is borne in mind.

19   Q.   We will come on to aspects of that a little later on.

20          Can we come on though to look at recommendations in  
21          a little bit more detail --

22   A.   Before we do that, if I can be helpful.

23   Q.   Yes?

24   A.   The intake and the early resolution phase of what the  
25          Ombudsman does is absolutely vital, in terms of making

1       sure that citizens are listened to, and we have an early  
2       resolution team which has been set up to see whether or  
3       not it's possible when complaints are received and seen  
4       to be appropriate, whether some resolution can be made  
5       without there being a formal investigation.

6           And one of the things that I was able to do was to  
7       create a mediation team in the office to try and  
8       increase the number of complaints that are settled by  
9       talks between the complainant and the body in  
10      jurisdiction itself.

11          And this is a very important development, it's not  
12      yet to scale, but it does mean that there is  
13      a possibility of avoiding a long, drawn-out  
14      investigation going through primary and then detailed  
15      investigation, and it's something that needs to be  
16      made -- have bigger capacity.

17   Q.    So if we look at statistics, which we may do, that show  
18      that maybe quite a large proportion of complaints don't  
19      make it past primary investigation, from what you have  
20      said that shouldn't necessarily indicate that something  
21      wrong has happened. It may in part indicate that there  
22      has been appropriate early resolution?

23   A.    Yes. But to be fair, the vast majority of the reason  
24      for not taking cases further is that they are out of  
25      jurisdiction. So they are not appropriate for the

1 Ombudsman to take them forward and I think Sir Bernard  
2 Jenkin made this point when he was Chair of PACAC, that  
3 one of the unacknowledged roles of PHSO is to be  
4 an advice centre for people about what to do when they  
5 have problems in the NHS, to guide people to different  
6 complaints bodies and regulators, and that is a very  
7 important role which needs to be thought about as well.

8 Q. So if someone gets in touch with the PHSO and a decision  
9 is made that their complaint is not in your  
10 jurisdiction, your team or the PHSO team might signpost  
11 them to another organisation?

12 A. Absolutely.

13 Q. As I said, I would like to just look at recommendations,  
14 please.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So where a complaint is upheld, the PHSO considers what  
17 recommendations to make and will they be included in the  
18 report?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. What is the purpose of recommendations?

21 A. The purpose of recommendations is to make it useful for  
22 both the complainant and for the body in jurisdiction.  
23 So quite often, the thing that the complainant most  
24 wants at the end of a process is, first of all,  
25 an apology and a proper apology -- and some of the

1       apologies that I've seen aren't worth the paper they are  
2       written on; but, secondly, some element of financial  
3       redress for what has happened; and then, thirdly, and  
4       this is very vital, people say to the Ombudsman, "I am  
5       complaining not for myself but to make sure that the  
6       system learns from what has happened so that it doesn't  
7       happen to somebody else".

8               And so we make -- we made operational and policy  
9       suggestions in our recommendations to try and make sure  
10      that what occurred doesn't occur again, and that is what  
11      is so frustrating about the Missed Opportunities report  
12      that we made strategic suggestions and they were taken  
13      no notice of.

14   Q.   So let's just be clear: in Missed Opportunities, you  
15       were looking at the case of Mr R and Matthew Leahy?

16   A.   Yes.

17   Q.   In both of those cases, there was a final report at the  
18       end of the PHSO investigation --

19   A.   Yes.

20   Q.   -- and both of those reports included recommendations?

21   A.   Yes.

22   Q.   So for recommendations you have mentioned, I think,  
23       apologies, financial redress and general recommendations  
24       for learning and improvement. You mention also in your  
25       statement that a requirement or a request for

1 an explanation can also be included as a recommendation?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Which type of recommendation is made most often?

4 A. Well, I think, fundamentally, apologies are the critical  
5 issue but they tend to be associated with operational  
6 and policy recommendations to go with it because, if  
7 there's been a service failure, we want to make sure  
8 that doesn't happen again, so there are implications as  
9 far as that's concerned.

10 The financial redress comes from the body in  
11 jurisdiction, it doesn't come from the Ombudsman. It's  
12 around £500,000 a year, which is very small in  
13 comparison to what NHS Resolution pays or the Infected  
14 Blood Compensation Authority.

15 But it is important in being tangible to people that  
16 their complaint is valued.

17 Q. How often is financial redress recommended?

18 A. I think -- I have to check, I can't remember but I think  
19 it's about 1,000 cases a year there would be financial  
20 redress.

21 THE CHAIR: I know every case is different, but do you have  
22 a view about the principles of an apology that you  
23 consider ought to be evident in an apology?

24 A. Absolutely and it starts from the bad practice of public  
25 bodies saying, "If you were -- if you were upset by what

1       happened, then we are sorry"; in other words, "It's your  
2       fault that you were upset", and the apology is  
3       a put-off.

4             It has to be genuine, it has to be sincere, it has  
5       to be empathetic and we have, along with the Social Care  
6       Ombudsman and other ombudsman schemes, set out the  
7       principles of what constitutes a good apology. One of  
8       the key players in this field is Chris Gill, at the  
9       University of Glasgow, who's done research into this.  
10      So there's a big difference between different types of  
11      apology.

12   MR GRIFFIN: Do you --

13   A. Sometimes they can be very patronising and it just shows  
14      a lack of empathy.

15   Q. Do you ever recommend that a public inquiry should be  
16      instituted?

17   A. Yes, and that's a big issue. Can I take a glass of  
18      water before responding to that?

19   Q. Please do.

20   A. So this is very serious. There is legislation about  
21      public inquiries being commissioned which applies but,  
22      in my view, it is used in a -- or has been used in  
23      a very cavalier, inaccessible way, meaning that it's  
24      arcane about how inquiries, public inquiries, are  
25      commissioned. And the two examples I can give of that

1       are, first of all, the case of Robbie Powell, which you  
2       may be aware of, who was a young boy who died of  
3       Addison's disease in 1995, where there was evidence of  
4       a cover-up by the doctors who looked after him and then  
5       of fraud by the police that investigated the case and  
6       the evidence went to the Crown Prosecution Service.

7           And Mr Powell was promised by various politicians  
8       that there would be a public inquiry to look at this and  
9       he has worked for 35 years to try and get that inquiry  
10      and has been unsuccessful. And I have supported in  
11      public, along with the Welsh Ombudsman, the need for  
12      a public inquiry to look at this disgraceful set of  
13      events which Government has decided that they won't look  
14      at. So that is a concern.

15           This issue, the Lampard Inquiry, which I am really  
16      pleased to see coming about, has frankly taken far too  
17      long to come about because the Government was extremely  
18      reluctant to create a public inquiry in these issues  
19      and, despite all the evidence to the contrary it  
20      wouldn't have an independent inquiry after our report  
21      Missing Opportunities, and then it went for  
22      an independent inquiry, against the advice of many  
23      people, which, as you know, collapsed because clinicians  
24      would not participate with it.

25           And I was promised by the Cabinet Office in 2020

1       that they were looking to review the rules for public  
2       inquiries and that came to nothing. And we still have  
3       the same arcane, non-transparent approach to creating  
4       public inquiries and there was, frankly, a disgraceful  
5       exchange between two health ministers about this issue  
6       involving Matthew Leahy's mother, in which they clearly  
7       showed no public service element in their consideration  
8       of whether there should be a public inquiry.

9   Q. I think those were text messages or communications that  
10       we saw a little of at our hearing in September. Is your  
11       point, in short, that the current mechanism for setting  
12       up an inquiry, at least a statutory inquiry, which  
13       requires a minister to act, not the appropriate way  
14       forward and, twinned with that, are you saying that  
15       politicians too often call for public inquiries without  
16       actually following up?

17   A. I am saying both those things.

18   MR GRIFFIN: That's what I understood. Thank you.

19       Chair, it is time now for our mid-morning break.  
20       Could we come back at 11.45, please, so 15 minutes,  
21       thank you very much?

22   THE CHAIR: 15 minutes.

23   (11.29 am)

24   (A short break)

25   (11.45 am)



1 MR GRIFFIN: Sir Rob, we ended the last session talking  
2 about public inquiries. Is there anything further you  
3 would like to say on that point before we move on to  
4 another topic?

5 A. Yes, thank you. There is just one final point I would  
6 like to make with due respect to you. One of the big  
7 problems about public inquiries is what happens after  
8 they have reported and there -- as Dr Bill Kirkup has  
9 made the point, that time and again we have big public  
10 inquiries which make brilliant recommendations which are  
11 not implemented and, of course, politicians have to make  
12 decisions.

13 But it seems to me there needs to be a mechanism,  
14 through perhaps the National Audit Office, to monitor  
15 what happens to recommendations of public inquiries so  
16 that the public get a chance to see the impact of these  
17 inquiries on policy development.

18 Q. Thank you and, in fact, Sir Rob, recommendations and  
19 implementation of recommendations is very much on the  
20 radar of this Inquiry and we have set up, as I mentioned  
21 last week, a Recommendations and Implementation Forum to  
22 start looking at implementation, even at this early  
23 stage of the Inquiry.

24 You have spoken about some external body that might  
25 oversee implementation of recommendations and we will be

1       hearing next week from Deborah Coles of the organisation  
2       INQUEST, and she, I know, and her organisation have  
3       views about that too and they are in favour of something  
4       they refer to as a National Oversight Mechanism, so  
5       I will ask her about that as well.

6             But since we are dealing with implementation of  
7       recommendations, can we look at that topic in relation  
8       to PHSO recommendations?

9   A.   Yes.

10  Q.   You have already told us that you don't have the power  
11       to require implementation and, indeed, you don't want it  
12       or you wouldn't personally advocate it?

13  A.   Yes.

14  Q.   But how does PHSO monitor the implementation of  
15       recommendations once they are made and included in  
16       a report?

17  A.   So when a report is issued, we give the body in  
18       jurisdiction usually three months to be able to come  
19       back and explain to the office how they have gone about  
20       implementing the recommendations and, broadly speaking,  
21       that is successful, in the sense that, in routine  
22       matters, Trusts tend to accept the recommendations and  
23       to implement them. But that's not always the case and  
24       the challenge for the regulatory framework is to make  
25       sure that, even if an Ombudsman has recommended

1 something, beyond that three months, the regulatory  
2 partners make sure that it's not forgotten about.

3 Q. Does that happen at the moment: if we, say, take  
4 a report containing various recommendations issued to  
5 a Trust, once the PHSO is satisfied that those  
6 recommendations have been implemented, do you then hand  
7 over to a relevant regulator to monitor things further?

8 A. Well, a couple of things: one is when we make a -- when  
9 we issue a report, in general that is copied to the CQC  
10 to make sure they are aware of that; secondly, in  
11 serious cases, we would lay the report before  
12 Parliament, so that the Select Committee gets  
13 an opportunity to see whether or not the recommendations  
14 have been implemented.

15 And I think, as we will come on to, laying the  
16 Missed Opportunities report before Parliament and  
17 allowing the Select Committee PACAC or -- that body  
18 anyway --

19 Q. So that's the Parliamentary and Constitutional  
20 Affairs --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- Select Committee?

23 A. They conducted their own inquiry into the extent to  
24 which the recommendations which went beyond the Trust to  
25 Government in general, and they played a critical role

1 in raising awareness about the recommendations and the  
2 issues.

3 And, unfortunately, after Sir Bernard Jenkins stood  
4 down as Chair of PACAC, that ceased to happen and  
5 I think that's a retrograde step. The Ombudsman is  
6 supposed to be an officer of Parliament. If Select  
7 Committees don't take up the reports of the Ombudsman  
8 when there's been a failure to implement  
9 recommendations, that reduces the authority of the  
10 Ombudsman.

11 Q. But the mechanism you have just discussed, elevating  
12 cases beyond the Trusts, onwards and upwards up to  
13 Parliament, you can't do that in all of the cases of  
14 non-compliance, can you? I mean, there will be many  
15 instances of non-compliance where you don't seek to  
16 elevate through an additional report or putting a matter  
17 before a Select Committee?

18 A. Yes, that's true, and it's about proportionality. So to  
19 give you one example, I can recall a deeply problematic  
20 dentist who had arbitrarily excluded a patient from  
21 their list and refused to accept our recommendation that  
22 the patient should be restored to the list, despite  
23 everything we did to try and make this happen, and, on  
24 grounds of proportionality, we decided this was not  
25 something we needed to put to Parliament.

1 Q. Could we just dig down into the actual way in which PHSO  
2 checks whether a recommendation has been implemented.  
3 Is it the case worker who does that or how does it work?  
4 A. Yes, I mean, it's guided by the case worker. One of the  
5 issues to consider is that we have tended to ask bodies  
6 in jurisdiction to provide a report on what they have  
7 done in response to the recommendations rather than  
8 specifically mention issues that have to be addressed.  
9 Sometimes we will ask for a change progress report.  
10 So that element is a bit subjective about whether or  
11 not it has been implemented or not.  
12 Q. But if you are recommending, for example, some kind of  
13 financial redress --  
14 A. Absolutely -- I mean --  
15 Q. -- a written apology --  
16 A. -- those things are very clear and, in general, bodies  
17 in jurisdiction are good at delivering on those things.  
18 Q. Can I ask you this: does the PHSO check whether the  
19 complainant agrees that a particular recommendation has  
20 been implemented?  
21 A. Good question. I mean, we obviously talk to the  
22 complainant and there will be correspondence with the  
23 complainant but, formally, we don't go out of our way to  
24 ask the complainant if -- or we didn't go out of our way  
25 to ask a complainant. Maybe that's something that could

1           be done to improve the system.

2   Q.   How confident are you that the PHSO's monitoring really  
3       does identify where a recommendation has or has not been  
4       complied with?

5   A.   I'm reasonably confident because of what I've seen over  
6       a seven-year period, because the power of transparency  
7       and publicity is all important in this area and, in my  
8       time, we did a great deal to publicise what had happened  
9       in individual cases, with a whole new approach to  
10      putting summaries of cases online and, frankly, bodies  
11      in jurisdiction don't like adverse publicity.

12           So it's not about moral suasion, as the old  
13      Ombudsman writers used to say as the moral power of the  
14      Ombudsman. It is about embarrassing the bodies in  
15      jurisdiction that really has the impact that that is ...

16   Q.   So this is something you have touched on before but  
17       I want to look at it in a little bit more detail. We  
18       have heard from you that the named organisations are not  
19       obliged to carry out your recommendations?

20   A.   Yes.

21   Q.   What's the process where a case worker or someone else  
22       was in the PHSO finds that compliance has not been  
23       completed?

24   A.   They will report it to their operations manager and that  
25       will be addressed and it will come up to the Ombudsman

1           if there is continued reluctance to comply.

2   Q.   You have mentioned that, ultimately, there is a power to  
3       lay a report before Parliament?

4   A.   Yes.

5   Q.   Do we actually see that with the Missed Opportunities  
6       report that we are going to come on and look at?

7   A.   Absolutely.

8   Q.   What would you hope to achieve by laying a report before  
9       Parliament?

10  A.   Exactly what the Missed Opportunities report did.  It --  
11       the Select Committee summonsed the Government and the  
12       Health Service to give an account of what they had done  
13       in response to the very serious failures in these cases,  
14       and the Government produced its own evidence and, you  
15       know, it was deeply embarrassing for the Government to  
16       have to go through this process, and necessary.

17       We had done our bit, we passed it on to the Select  
18       Committee, and they then did their bit.

19  Q.   Thank you.  I would like to move to a new topic now,  
20       please, and that is generally complaints to your office  
21       when you were in role, looking at matters at a general  
22       level and then coming on to look at Missed Opportunities  
23       the report.

24       You have set out at paragraph 26 of your first  
25       statement statistics for the number and types of

1 complaint received by the PHSO.

2 Could you put up, please, core bundle, page 211, and  
3 expand paragraph 26, so "Number and types of complaints  
4 received". I think you have mentioned this already:

5 "In a non-Covid year, the [office] would expect to  
6 receive [over] 100,000 enquiries from the public, mainly  
7 relating to Health Service issues."

8 However, as you say there, there are a growing  
9 number of enquiries falling into the other side of your  
10 role.

11 Could you, please, go to the next page, show the  
12 full page.

13 What you have done -- and don't worry we don't need  
14 to look at these in any detail -- over a number of pages  
15 of your statement, you have provided statistics in  
16 relation to complaints and, just looking at this page,  
17 for example [page 212], can we see that, on an annual  
18 basis from -- in fact it was 2011/12, you provide  
19 figures for the total complaints received, those that  
20 fell within PHSO jurisdiction, those identified as  
21 relating to mental health and then those relating to the  
22 Essex Trusts.

23 Please could you go to the next page, just to give  
24 an idea of the amount of information that's been  
25 provided, and show the full page [page 213], and then



1 the page after that [page 214].

2 Then could we see at the bottom "2023-2024", the  
3 year that the data relates to there. Would you go to  
4 the top of the next page, please [page 215] and just  
5 expand those top bullet points, please.

6 So can we see that, over those pages, you have  
7 provided helpfully information from the 2011/12 year,  
8 right up to the year we have just looked at, covering  
9 those various areas that I was just mentioning.

10 Thank you, could you take that down, please.

11 Now, Sir Rob, the Inquiry legal team has converted  
12 the statistics we have just scrolled through there and  
13 turned them into a chart. Have you been provided in  
14 advance with the chart and have you had time to consider  
15 and check it?

16 A. I have, thank you.

17 Q. Are you happy that it -- and, in fact, we will look at  
18 one more -- adequately plots the statistics we have just  
19 seen?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 Amanda, would you put up chart 1, please?

23 So here we can see the statistics going back to the  
24 2011/12 period and up to the 2023/24 period, can't we?  
25 This is relating to health-related complaints, both

1 physical and mental, covering that period. I think it's  
2 right, or at least the Inquiry has been told by your  
3 office, that, for various reasons, you are unable to  
4 provide data before 2011/2012.

5 So can we see that this chart plots the total number  
6 of complaints relating to physical health received year  
7 by year, together with the numbers relating to mental  
8 health. So the physical health is the blue part of the  
9 bar, and the complaints relating to mental health is  
10 the -- I would say that's pink part of the bar.

11 So, first point, these are national statistics,  
12 aren't they, they don't relate to one part of the  
13 country or Essex?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Do you have any observation about the proportion of  
16 complaints relating to mental health, as opposed to  
17 physical health, that PHSO receives?

18 A. Yes. I think you can see from the chart that, excepting  
19 the Covid year, when we had to close down our operations  
20 because of the crisis in Trusts and NHS bodies, there  
21 has been a slow but significant rise in health  
22 complaints but not necessarily in mental health  
23 complaints. And this really synergises with the study  
24 which we did of service users of mental health.

25 Q. We will come on to look at that in a moment.

1 A. Okay.

2 Q. But is there any particular reason, in your view, why  
3 the proportion of mental health complaints appears to be  
4 small, compared to that relating to physical health?

5 A. Yes, because people with mental health challenges are  
6 often in a less advantageous position than other people  
7 to make complaints: (a) they are not necessarily able to  
8 make complaints themselves; (b) they may be in a very  
9 tricky confined situation, which makes making  
10 a complaint difficult; and (c) what we know is that very  
11 often -- and this is also true with elderly people in  
12 the Health Service -- that there are two dispositions  
13 which don't apply to other sectors of the community, (i)  
14 is that they don't want to bother the system and (ii)  
15 they feel that they might be victimised if they did make  
16 a complaint.

17 Q. That does take us, doesn't it, to your survey. So can  
18 we put up, please, exhibits bundle page 152.

19 You have mentioned this a couple of times, I think,  
20 Sir Rob. Is this a "Survey of experiences of NHS mental  
21 health care in England" conducted in February 2020, or  
22 at least reporting in February 2020?

23 A. (The witness nodded)

24 Q. Can we see there -- thank you very much -- that the  
25 survey asked people about their experiences of using NHS

1           mental health services in England and it included  
2           an open question that allowed participants to give more  
3           detail about their experiences?

4           Now, Sir Rob, you have referred to, I think, these  
5           responses; is that correct?

6   A.   Yes.

7   Q.   So:

8           "The key findings were:  
9           "one in five people ... did not feel safe while in  
10          the care of the NHS mental health service that treated  
11          them  
12          "over half (56%) said they experienced delays to  
13          their treatment, and four in 10 (42%) said they waited  
14          too long to be diagnosed  
15          "[Also] almost half (48%) said they would be  
16          unlikely to complain if they were unhappy with the  
17          service provided  
18          "One in three (32%) said they did not think their  
19          complaint would be taken seriously ..."  
20          I think, touching on something you have just  
21          mentioned:  
22          "... the main reason given for not complaining was  
23          that they would not want 'to cause trouble'."  
24          Does that pick up on the points that you wanted to?  
25   A.   Absolutely.

1 Q. Is there anything further arising from those bullet  
2 points that you would like to tell us about?

3 A. Well, I think, this wasn't just any old survey. It was  
4 YouGov that did it for us, so the figures are  
5 statistically reliable; they are not -- they are not  
6 just impressions.

7 Q. Thank you. I am going to ask can we go to the next  
8 page, please. In fact, what you do in the survey is to  
9 summarise key findings in another report Maintaining  
10 Momentum. Is the full title of that report Maintaining  
11 Momentum: driving improvements in mental health care and  
12 was it produced in 2018?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Do we see here summarised conveniently five themes  
15 arising from that report?

16 A. Yes, and I think, if I may say so, that point 3 is  
17 a very significant point.

18 Q. Well, let me read them out and then, by all means, make  
19 any observations that you want.

20 A. Sure.

21 Q. So the five failings identified in Maintaining Momentum  
22 are listed as, first of all:

23 "Failure to diagnose and/or treat the patient  
24 "[Secondly] Poor risk assessment and safety  
25 practices

1            "[Third] Not treating patients with dignity and/or  
2            infringing human rights

3            "4. Poor communication with the patient and/or  
4            their family or carers

5            "5. Inappropriate hospital discharge and aftercare  
6            of the patient."

7            I mean, you wanted to speak about one of those.  
8            Give us any observations you wish arising from those  
9            five key points?

10          A. Sure. I mean, they are all fundamental to the issues  
11            around safe care in the NHS. Point 4, poor  
12            communication, you know we come across that time and  
13            time again across the whole of the Health Service. The  
14            poor communication, often the lack of respect that  
15            service users receive and their families too.

16            But on number 3 and mental health, the Ombudsman has  
17            no power in law to look at human rights issues and  
18            I gave evidence before I ended my term to the Justice  
19            Select Committee in the House of Commons, who were  
20            looking at whether or not they should create a new Human  
21            Rights Ombudsman in the UK and I said that that was  
22            a nonsense to do that because what you needed to do was  
23            to incorporate -- you don't need to further create more  
24            ombudsman schemes when we have got too much already. So  
25            it would be appropriate to give a human rights mandate

1 to the existing Ombudsman.

2 There are two cases in that report where the human  
3 rights of mental health patients were flagrantly  
4 violated: one was in the case of a woman who was  
5 menstruating but had no opportunity to address that  
6 issue because everything was taken away from her; and  
7 the other was the case of a woman who had given birth to  
8 a baby, she had mental health challenges, the baby was  
9 taken away from her without any consultation or  
10 consideration of the impact for the person.

11 That -- you know, that is a fundamental human rights  
12 issue. We looked at it, it's just that we couldn't say  
13 that it was a breach of human rights in law.

14 Q. Maintaining Momentum was published in 2018. Are you  
15 able to say to what extent these five failings remained  
16 of concern up until the end of your period as Ombudsman?

17 A. I think, you know, what's interesting is that, in each  
18 of the reports that we have published, going on to the  
19 Broken Trust report and then the Discharge report, these  
20 issues don't go away. They are there time and time  
21 again. We keep talking about poor communication, the  
22 defensiveness of institutions, I don't think these are  
23 fundamentally addressed as far as things go that I can,  
24 that I could see to the end of my term.

25 Q. So you have referred to two reports there, Broken Trust:

1 making patient safety more than just a promise, which  
2 was published in June 2023 --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- and Discharge from mental health care: making it  
5 safety and patient centred, which was published in  
6 February 2024, so close to the end of your period as  
7 Ombudsman?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. These are issues that you say that we see recurring?

10 A. Well, if you look at what we reported in Broken Trust,  
11 it was about the failure to make the right diagnosis in  
12 too many cases, delays in providing treatment, poor  
13 handovers by clinicians and a failure to listen to the  
14 concerns of patients or their families. You know, that  
15 is pretty much the same as we were saying five years  
16 earlier.

17 Q. Thank you. Would you take down the document on the  
18 screen, please, and would you put up chart 2, please.

19 So this chart relates to the same data we looked at  
20 before from paragraph 26 of your first statement. So do  
21 we see here mental health related complaints over the  
22 period that we have been looking at, and this chart  
23 plots mental health complaints on a national but also on  
24 an Essex basis.

25 Can we start by looking at the national statistics,



1           the darker blue bars. Can we see in this chart that, in  
2           the period 2011/12 a total of 1,769 mental health  
3           related complaints were received nationally --  
4    A.   (The witness nodded)  
5    Q.   -- and that, by the end of the period covered, '23/'24,  
6           that figure had risen to 2,558, albeit with fluctuations  
7           along the way?  
8    A.   Yes.  
9    Q.   Your successor, Rebecca Hilsenrath, refers to a spike  
10          between 2018/19 and '19/'20, and she attributes that to  
11          the impact of the Covid pandemic. Would you agree with  
12          that?  
13   A.   Yes, I think Covid had an adverse -- a more adverse  
14          impact on people with mental health challenges than  
15          other health cases. That's true.  
16   Q.   Ms Hilsenrath goes on to say that the spike appears to  
17          have levelled off in subsequent years and should be read  
18          within the context of an increase already prevalent, not  
19          only in mental health cases but across the gamut of  
20          complaints about the Health Service --  
21   A.   Yes.  
22   Q.   -- which is not attributable to the pandemic.  
23                So I understand her as saying that there is  
24          a general overall increase --  
25   A.   Yes.

1 Q. -- even if one puts the pandemic to one side; would you  
2 agree with that?

3 A. I would, yes.

4 Q. What, in your opinion, is the main reason or are the  
5 main reasons for this overall rise in health and mental  
6 health related complaints?

7 A. Because the National Health Service has been under  
8 increasing pressure in terms of finance, in terms of  
9 staff, in terms of the morale of the staff, in terms of  
10 the reliance on bank temporary staff to cover, and it's  
11 very interesting to me that that the National Audit  
12 Office found a couple of years ago that 30 per cent of  
13 people who leave the National Health Service, as either  
14 nurses or staff, say that it's stress and mental health  
15 challenges that have caused them to do this.

16 I think we need to be very careful about  
17 stigmatising the generality of staff in the Health  
18 Service without recognising the great challenges that  
19 they have had to put up with. So one of the things that  
20 I tried to do as Ombudsman was to go round as many  
21 Health Service establishments as I could to meet with  
22 those who worked in the situations, to meet with  
23 patients, and going to mental health units was very  
24 challenging for me, and I was just there as a visitor.

25 So I don't underestimate what it takes to work in

1           these situations and that to me would be one of the  
2           reasons why there is a rise in complaints.

3           And the other reason, which is tragic but very  
4           important, is that there is a decline of public trust in  
5           the Health Service, which used to be the exception to  
6           the general decline in public trust in public services.  
7           That is no longer the case.

8   Q.   Can we look, staying with this chart, at the information  
9           relating to Essex specifically?

10  A.   Yes.

11  Q.   So that's the light blue bar.  We can see there,  
12           I think, figures fluctuating from the low 70s and going  
13           up to the mid-120s, concerning complaints relating to  
14           Essex Trusts.  In fact, you observe in your second  
15           statement that cases related to Essex were on average  
16           5 per cent of the cases related to mental health over  
17           this period.

18           Is there any significance in that level of Essex  
19           complaints, as opposed to the national picture that you  
20           can think of?

21  A.   I honestly don't think so.  I have tried to think of  
22           whether or not there is but I can't see that from the  
23           figures.

24  Q.   Thank you.  Could you take down the chart, please.  You  
25           refer in your second statement at paragraph 10 for those

1       who are following, to themes arising from the complaints  
2       the PHSO received about Essex Trusts, and I would like  
3       to just look at those themes now.

4             The first of the themes that you identify is  
5       discharge or poor discharge planning -- yes, is  
6       discharge. Can you just expand a little on what that  
7       theme encompasses?

8   A. Could you just point me to --

9   Q. It is page 7 of your second statement at paragraph 10.1.  
10       We could put it up on the screen.

11   A. Yes, please, if you would.

12   Q. Could you put up -- and this hasn't been notified, but  
13       could you put up core bundle, page 246, please. Could  
14       you expand paragraph 10 up to the end of 10.2, please.

15             So here you have been asked to confirm matters about  
16       Essex, and we can see at 10.2:

17             "... complaints received about Essex Trusts  
18       discharge is a relatively common theme ..."

19             I would just ask you to expand on what you meant in  
20       an Essex context about the discharge theme?

21   A. Yes. Thank you. I mean, I need to be careful about  
22       generalising but, as far as I can recall in the Essex  
23       situation, but it's not confined to Essex, there was  
24       a lack of consideration of the personal circumstances  
25       people were in when they were discharged, a failure to

1 listen to the families and to the patients about what  
2 would be appropriate for them and priority given to the  
3 convenience of the Trusts and the bodies in jurisdiction  
4 about how people should be discharged.

5 There was, therefore, a routinisation and a lack of  
6 empathy in dealing with that issue, which I think is not  
7 just confined to Essex.

8 Q. The routinisation or the lack of empathy is something  
9 that the Inquiry is interested in. I mean, you have  
10 already mentioned the difficult circumstances  
11 particularly in mental health units that you visited but  
12 do you have a view as to why that came about or when  
13 that came about?

14 A. Well, I think, in my experience, it was always there  
15 from the moment that I became the Ombudsman and, you  
16 know, I have great appreciation for the work that  
17 people -- clinicians in the Health Service do, and  
18 managers, too.

19 But there are two things that I recall: one is that,  
20 if I would go to a hospital, the Chair and the Chief  
21 Executive would welcome me and say, "Thank you for  
22 coming, we are all in this together and we are one big  
23 happy family", and as soon as you left them and went  
24 round the Trust and met individual clinicians, you saw  
25 that that was not necessarily the case.

1 Q. Can we be clear: are you talking about the situation  
2 nationally or in a general way, or are you talking  
3 specifically about the experience in Essex?

4 A. No, I am talking about the general situation.

5 And that was always the issue that people were  
6 working under very great stress and they felt, when they  
7 talked to me, that they didn't have the necessary  
8 development, training and profile to be able to address  
9 the issues that they were dealing with as appropriately  
10 as they might.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 Amanda, would you expand now 10.3 and 10.4.

13 This is now returning to the themes arising from  
14 Essex.

15 I'm sorry, in fact, I can see there are two 10.3s.  
16 Would you expand the paragraph that's at the top, the  
17 one above that, please. You will see that there are two  
18 10.3s. Thank you.

19 So another theme you talk about here is poor  
20 communication.

21 A. Yes. I mean, I don't want to labour the point but, in  
22 the cases that I looked at in Essex, including the  
23 Missed Opportunities one, what stands out is the scant  
24 communication between the patient and the clinician,  
25 which was disastrous for the safety of the patient and,

1           you know, even when it's not disastrous for the safety  
2           of the patient, it is a feature of the NHS more widely.

3   Q.   You have spoken already of a failure to listen?

4   A.   Yes, I mean, when we come on to Missed Opportunities, in  
5           both of the cases there, you know, there was a cavalier  
6           approach to communication which was disastrous for the  
7           survival of the two people involved.

8   Q.   Then we can see the last of the issues that you refer to  
9           is poor recordkeeping.

10  A.   Yes.

11  Q.   Again, is that an issue that you see more widely beyond  
12           Essex?

13  A.   Absolutely. I mean, as I said, I was Higher Education  
14           Ombudsman, I was Ombudsman in Legal Services. I did not  
15           expect the fabrication of documents to feature in my  
16           role as Health Service Ombudsman, and it has done, and  
17           the failure to record what has happened, both in Essex  
18           and outside Essex, has been shocking.

19  Q.   Is "shocking" a word that you use regularly in relation  
20           to your work or does this really stand out?

21  A.   I don't -- I try not to be sensationalist but I think  
22           it's an appropriate term to use.

23  Q.   Do we see that the Essex issues we have just been  
24           looking at reflect, to at least a certain extent, those  
25           key five key issues that you identified in Maintaining

1 Momentum?

2 A. They do.

3 Q. Could you take that down, please.

4 I would like to move on now, please, Sir Rob, to

5 missed opportunities and to the tragic cases of Mr R and

6 Matthew Leahy?

7 THE CHAIR: Before you go on, you have just said how

8 shocking the communication, the recordkeeping,

9 falsification was for you. Have you encountered it

10 elsewhere other than Essex?

11 A. Yes. In a number of cases, in Bristol, in the Robbie

12 Powell case, untruths were written down for the

13 convenience and the reputation of the body in

14 jurisdiction, rather than accurately describing what had

15 happened to the patient.

16 THE CHAIR: Thank you.

17 MR GRIFFIN: Chair.

18 A. Sorry, document -- in the Powell case, documents went

19 missing. They disappeared and that was brought to the

20 attention of the Crown Prosecution Service but nothing

21 came of it.

22 Q. We may be looking in a moment at some similar issues in

23 the Missed Opportunities report?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Chair, as I have mentioned, I am coming on now to talk



1       about and ask Sir Rob about Missed Opportunities and  
2       this report includes some very difficult details, and  
3       I just want to give a warning, again, to people about  
4       that, so that they are prepared, and I refer everyone  
5       back to what I said at the start of this hearing about  
6       the availability of support, being able to leave the  
7       room at any time, if you want to, and so on.

8               Sir Rob, you refer in your first statement about  
9       when the Ombudsman would become personally responsible  
10      in investigations, I could take you to the paragraph if  
11      we need to. But when would that, in general, be?

12   A. There is a body that the Ombudsman chairs which, on  
13      a monthly basis, looks at high profile complex cases and  
14      decisions are made collectively within the office about  
15      who, in a very senior position, would take  
16      responsibility for the oversight of those cases.

17              So pretty soon after something comes in and it's  
18      agreed that it's an issue to look at, a decision would  
19      be made about who will take responsibility for it. It  
20      might be the Ombudsman, it might be one of the two  
21      deputy Ombudsman leaders, or it might be someone else in  
22      a senior position.

23   Q. If, say, you became involved in a case, what would the  
24      nature of your involvement be?

25   A. Well, I would be the strategic leader of the

1 investigation. So there would be a case handler, or  
2 case handlers, a team of people, there would be  
3 an operations manager, there would be other people  
4 involved. But they would meet with me as Ombudsman to  
5 give me an update about what was happening, what needed  
6 to be done and where -- you know, what should our  
7 position be on various issues, and I would be familiar  
8 with the case and, in certain circumstances, I would  
9 meet with the families involved.

10 Q. Now, we are going to hear that you took on that role in  
11 relation to Matthew Leahy's investigation --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. -- once you had become Ombudsman. I believe that  
14 investigation started before you took up your post. Was  
15 the process that you have just described, the process by  
16 which you decided to become personally involved in that  
17 case?

18 A. I -- I created the high risk committee but there was  
19 an informal way of doing it and it became very evident,  
20 very early on, that the Ombudsman should take  
21 responsibility for this case.

22 Q. Is that for the issues that we are about to come on and  
23 discuss?

24 A. Yes, and just -- I need to put on record that I was --  
25 I had the privilege of meeting Mrs Leahy on a number of

1 occasions and she was an exemplary complainant. She had  
2 her own views, she was very well prepared for every  
3 meeting, she was courteous but assertive, she knew what  
4 she wanted out of an investigation and, given the  
5 tragedy that she had been through, it was a remarkable  
6 contribution to public life that she performed over many  
7 years, and that needs to go on the record.

8 Q. I may ask you about another aspect or aspects of Melanie  
9 Leahy's involvement in a moment.

10 But what I would like to do is to start with the  
11 case of the person we are calling Mr R?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. He died in December 2008 and the complaint, we  
14 understand, was brought to the PHSO in October 2015, and  
15 the case closed in February 2017. So these are dates,  
16 as I understand it, before you became Ombudsman?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Can I just ask you one question that we see here but we  
19 see it elsewhere as well. We have got a complaint  
20 brought in 2015 that is then closed in 2017. Is that  
21 kind of delay normal? Is there any usual amount of time  
22 it takes between a complaint being accepted and the case  
23 being closed?

24 A. It's a good question. I think that these are very  
25 sensitive cases. They will be prolonged if new evidence

1 becomes available during the course of the investigation  
2 or if the family or the body in jurisdiction brings it  
3 forward. There are always delays in waiting to receive  
4 information from the body in jurisdiction.

5 As an intimate part and parcel of both these cases,  
6 there was clinical evidence, which we commissioned from  
7 independent practitioners, which takes a long time to  
8 gather together and then to review. So with such  
9 serious cases, we don't want to make mistakes and  
10 perhaps they take too long but that is because, even  
11 when you get to the end, people may say, "I don't think  
12 you have got it right and these are the reasons for it",  
13 so we would go back and have a look at it.

14 I will say one of the things that is not often  
15 mentioned is, of course, the trauma and the tragedy lies  
16 with the families of the complainants but the stress and  
17 the trauma of the case handlers looking at an issue  
18 over -- between two and five years is very great indeed,  
19 and I personally know the people who were involved in  
20 these cases and it took a great deal out of them because  
21 of the -- the very sensitive issues that they had to  
22 deal with in a professional way.

23 Q. Well, we are going to come on and look at some of those  
24 issues in a moment. What I would like to do is --  
25 obviously Missed Opportunities includes Mr R as one of

1           the two cases, and what I would like to do with you is  
2           to look at what the report says about Mr R --

3   A.   Yes.

4   Q.   -- and the issues arising from his very tragic death.  
5           Could we please put up exhibits bundle, page 191,  
6           please. So this is just the front cover of the report,  
7           we have talked about it already several times. Was the  
8           report published in June 2019?

9   A.   Yes.

10   Q.   Could you please now, Amanda, go to page 206 and put up  
11          the whole page.

12                Can we see here the start of the report addressing  
13          Mr R's case and do we see here that, at age 20, Mr R  
14          was admitted to NEPT on 8 December 2008 to the Linden  
15          Centre as an informal patient?

16   A.   (The witness nodded)

17   Q.   I am not going to read all of this but I do want to read  
18          parts of it and, if we drop down in the left-hand  
19          column, we can see:

20                "On the evening of 28 December Mr R asked to be  
21          discharged. A short time later, he was found in  
22          an unresponsive state in his room. Attempts to  
23          resuscitate him were unsuccessful.

24                "After Mr R's death, the Trust prepared a 7-day  
25          report, followed by a Serious Incident Panel Inquiry

1           which was completed in July 2009.

2           "An inquest into Mr R's death, in February 2011,  
3           recorded a narrative conclusion: '[Mr R] ... killed  
4           himself, while the balance of his mind was disturbed,  
5           before his illness was fully diagnosed to ensure  
6           a suitable care programme to be implemented to manage  
7           his condition. These factors more than minimally  
8           contributed to [his] death'."

9           Do you then, having summarised matters in that way,  
10          set out what PHSO found in his case?

11   A.   (The witness nodded)

12   Q.   Can we see at the top right-hand corner of the page:

13          "We found failings in the care and treatment  
14          provided to Mr R, which meant there were missed  
15          opportunities to mitigate the risk of him taking his own  
16          life. Ms R, his mother, suffers the ongoing injustice  
17          of knowing this, and also knowing that he did not  
18          receive the standard of care he should have done."

19          Does the report then set out areas or failings that  
20          you had identified? Can we see failings in relation to  
21          medication; to ward leave, in that "NEPT failed to manage  
22          Mr R's ward leave in line with its policy"; in relation  
23          to physical restraint; in relation to care and treatment  
24          on 28 December 2008. It says there that:

25          "Mr R's initial care plan had not been updated, and

1 the assessment and management of risk was not adequate.  
2 Mr R had been admitted at [and would you go to the next  
3 page, please] risk of suicide but there was no  
4 mitigation plan in place other than 'as needed'  
5 lorazepam. NEPT acknowledged through its own  
6 investigation that staff had not responded adequately  
7 when Mr R threatened to harm himself on 28 December.  
8 Environmental risks were also not properly managed.  
9 An assessment in 2007 rated certain ligature points as  
10 low risk. Before Mr R's death these environmental risks  
11 had changed but had not been identified or acted upon."

12 Thank you. Could you take that down.

13 As we've established, this is an investigation that  
14 was conducted before you became Ombudsman, but do you  
15 have any observations on the points that we have just  
16 looked at in the report there?

17 A. Yes. I think time and again there were assumptions made  
18 and a failure to follow up, which were seriously  
19 problematic for the patient, and in every aspect of his  
20 care he didn't receive the detailed attention that he  
21 was entitled to which contributed to the way in which he  
22 finally died.

23 And it's, it's -- you know, in hindsight, the  
24 treatment that he was given was not checked, the  
25 implications of what the treatment -- what impact it had

1           on him weren't looked at, the ward leave was granted at  
2           the same time as his dosages were increased and staff  
3           behaved improperly when it came to physically  
4           restraining him. He deserved much better.

5           And one of the things -- I would like to say this,  
6           is that some clinicians were interviewed after he died  
7           and they had a very patronising approach to him saying  
8           that, in their view, he didn't have mental health  
9           problems at all and that he had been admitted because he  
10          wanted somewhere to live because he was homeless.  
11          I mean, that is staggering.

12   Q.   Thank you.

13   A.   It's --

14   Q.   What I would like to do now is come on to the case of  
15          Matthew, Matthew Leahy and, as you have explained in  
16          your statement, Melanie Leahy brought a complaint about  
17          Matthew's care to the PHSO in March 2015. This is  
18          paragraph 63 of your statement. And you then explain  
19          how the complaint was proceeded with, the investigation  
20          was commenced in June 2015, the scope of the  
21          investigation was subsequently extended twice and the  
22          case ultimately closed in June 2019.

23          So we can see that this was an investigation that  
24          was over four years in duration?

25   A.   (The witness nodded)



1 Q. As you have said, you oversaw this complaint and, as you  
2 have explained, you were looking at the strategic  
3 direction of the complaint; is that correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. As we have seen, or as I have just mentioned, the scope  
6 of the investigation was extended twice. Was one of the  
7 reasons that it was extended because Melanie Leahy had  
8 herself provided further information --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- to you?

11 Was she persistent in the way that she assisted with  
12 the investigation of her complaint?

13 A. Lord Scarman once used the word "persistent" in  
14 a not-very-nice way to describe the behaviour of the  
15 Metropolitan Police.

16 Mrs Leahy was persistent in the best possible sense  
17 of the term; that she was better informed than almost  
18 anybody else about the case, she was willing to put the  
19 information in the public domain and she articulated her  
20 views with precision and forcefulness. She was the  
21 model interlocutor in a case like this.

22 Q. As we will come on to see very shortly, there was a high  
23 number of findings of maladministration in Matthew's  
24 case?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Did that, in part, reflect Melanie Leahy's input and the  
2 information that she provided?

3 A. Absolutely. I mean, without her this case might have  
4 gone away, not only at the Ombudsman but after the  
5 Ombudsman. And one of the issues for all of us is why  
6 it has taken so long for this finally to become a matter  
7 of public importance in the way that it is.

8 Q. I would like now to look at missed opportunities where  
9 the report addresses Matthew's case and can we do this  
10 in the same way that we did with Mr R.

11 Could you put up please page 208 of the exhibits  
12 bundle, and the whole page, please. So we see that  
13 Matthew was 20 and on 7 November 2012 police brought  
14 Matthew to the Linden Centre as a place of safety:

15 "On 8 November [he] told staff he would hang himself  
16 if they gave him injectable medication.

17 "On 9 November he alleged he had been raped during  
18 the night.

19 "On 15 November staff found [him] hanging in his  
20 room. After attempts to resuscitate him, he was taken  
21 to A&E at Broomfield Hospital where he died.

22 "A number of investigations had been carried out [it  
23 says here in the report] into Matthew's death and the  
24 alleged failings in his care and treatment. In January  
25 2013, NEPT completed a Serious Incident Panel

1 Investigation that concluded care and treatment was of  
2 a good standard."

3 In January 2015, the report continues:

4 "... an inquest was held that considered a report  
5 from an independent psychiatrist which concluded that  
6 overall NEPT had provided an acceptable level of care.  
7 A police report commenting on the independent  
8 psychiatrist's findings said Matthew's care was  
9 appropriate at the time of his death. However [as we  
10 can see at the bottom of the page], a report by a second  
11 independent psychiatrist said the treatment provided to  
12 Matthew, 'fell below the standard of a reasonably  
13 competent practitioner'.

14 "The inquest recorded a narrative conclusion which  
15 said Matthew, 'was subject to a series of multiple  
16 failings and missed opportunities over a prolonged  
17 period of time by those entrusted with his care ...'"

18 So we see the words "missed opportunities" used both  
19 in the report as it related to Mr R and here as it  
20 related to Matthew's case and is that why you gave the  
21 report that name?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. In the same way, as you did or the report did in  
24 relation to Mr R, have you in the report also set out  
25 a summary of what you found?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. We can see here it says:

3 "We found that some aspects of Matthew's care and  
4 treatment were in line with relevant guidelines. But  
5 our investigation also identified a number of  
6 significant failings in key elements of care. Knowing  
7 Matthew did not receive adequate care has caused  
8 unimaginable distress to his family.

9 "We also found that NEPT's investigations were not  
10 robust enough and that NEPT was not open and honest with  
11 his family about the steps being taken to improve safety  
12 at the Linden Centre. When his family came to us, NEPT  
13 had not taken sufficient and timely action to put things  
14 right -- this added to the distress and frustration as  
15 there was no reassurance that things had changed for the  
16 better."

17 Do you then set out various failings or a large  
18 number of failings that the PHSO concluded had been the  
19 case with Matthew?

20 A. There were 19 instances of maladministration which we  
21 identified.

22 Q. Is that level or that number of incidents of  
23 maladministration unusual?

24 A. It is unusual.

25 Q. Is it unusual because of the number?

1 A. Well, not only the number, but the seriousness of the --  
2 of the failures.

3 Q. Can we look at them. So we can see a failing in  
4 relation to care planning or failures in relation to  
5 care planning, in that NEPT did not ensure Matthew's care  
6 was adequately planned.

7 Could you go to the next page, please, and expand  
8 the whole page. Thank you.

9 We can see there were issues in relation to risk  
10 assessment and management:

11 "The assessment and management of risk during  
12 Matthew's admission was not rigorous enough."

13 In relation to his physical health and nutrition, in  
14 that NEP did not take adequate care of Matthew's  
15 physical health.

16 Again, in relation to medication and in relation to  
17 observation and engagement:

18 "Matthew's observations were not properly managed."

19 We heard that there had been a rape allegation and  
20 a failure in response to that allegation in that staff  
21 did not take adequate action when Matthew reported being  
22 raped on 9 November.

23 Could you go to the next full page, please. Again,  
24 continuing with the areas of failure, allocation of  
25 a key worker, and that NEPT failed to properly allocate

1       one to Matthew.

2           Recordkeeping, which is a point that you have  
3       already referred to, here specifically in relation to  
4       Matthew's case:

5           "NEPT's recordkeeping was not always as robust as it  
6       should have been. Some paperwork was lost and Matthew's  
7       care plan was falsified."

8           Then NEPT's investigations, looking at the first  
9       paragraph there:

10          "Overall the investigations into Matthew's death  
11       were not adequate. NEPT's seven-day report contains  
12       inaccurate information about how Matthew's care plan was  
13       reviewed. It lacks credibility because it was written  
14       by a member of staff who was later found to have been  
15       involved in the falsification of Matthew's care plan."

16          Then we can see also failures in relation to a lack  
17       of timely safety improvements:

18          "After Matthew's death, NEPT reviewed some of its  
19       policies and practices but did not make substantive  
20       physical improvements in the Linden Centre until August  
21       2015."

22          Could you take that down, please.

23          What was your personal response to the findings in  
24       the case of Matthew's investigation, including as we  
25       have just seen, summarised in Missed Opportunities?

1 A. Well, first of all, it was a combination of the service  
2 failure and then the refusal in the serious incidents  
3 report to accept that there were issues to address,  
4 which were entirely inappropriate.

5 And, interestingly, the person who falsified the  
6 accounts, the -- the care plan was referred to the NMC  
7 but did not lose their ability to work in the Health  
8 Service afterwards, which I think is inappropriate.

9 And I did an interview for ITV News and afterwards  
10 the newscaster said, "You're very angry, aren't you?  
11 I don't see that very often in public servants". And  
12 I was a bit ashamed at the time that I -- I showed that  
13 anger. But actually, reflecting on it, this was  
14 a disgrace. This was the National Health Service at its  
15 worst and needed calling out.

16 Q. You say this in your statement. I can read it out and  
17 if you want me to I can get it put up on the screen,  
18 but:

19 "There was, in summary, a near complete failure of  
20 the leadership of this Trust certainly before it was  
21 merged. This was an indictment of the Health Service."

22 A. Yes, and I don't say that lightly.

23 As I say, we do have to accept that leaders operate  
24 in very difficult conditions and situations but this was  
25 entirely unacceptable.

1 Q. In Missed Opportunities, the report includes this.  
2 Again, we can go to it if we need to, but:  
3 "The issues uncovered demonstrated wider systemic  
4 issues at the Trust, including a failure over many years  
5 to develop the learning culture necessary to prevent  
6 similar mistakes from being repeated."  
7 Could you expand on that?  
8 A. Well, I mean, this is a structural challenge for the NHS  
9 broadly, which it still hasn't yet got to grips with,  
10 and that is to put patient safety issues above the  
11 reputation of the institution that leaders work at and  
12 time and again I've seen that to be the case.  
13 It's still the case, as far as I can see, and in  
14 this case it was absolutely clear that there was  
15 a failure of leadership, a failure to understand the  
16 importance of cultural appropriateness in organisations  
17 which treat people with dignity.  
18 Q. You refer in your statement to the different accounts  
19 given by Trust staff --  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. -- about what had happened in the last couple of hours  
22 before Matthew was found --  
23 A. Yes.  
24 Q. -- in his room and you say this:  
25 "None of the parties had a shared view of Matthew



1 Leahy's behaviour and who had said what to whom.  
2 Therefore, even on the balance of probabilities we were  
3 unable to make a decision about what really happened  
4 which we know is very difficult for Matthew Leahy's  
5 family."

6 That does lead to the question about the PHSO  
7 approach generally where there's more than one version  
8 of events. First of all, who within the PHSO makes  
9 a decision on the basis of conflicting facts?

10 A. I mean, that is -- if you have a team of people under  
11 the Ombudsman looking at cases then that will be  
12 discussed before a report is concluded. So it wouldn't  
13 be just one case handler coming to that view. I can  
14 remember it was discussed.

15 Q. You refer in your statement there to establishing things  
16 even on the balance of probabilities. Is that the  
17 standard of proof that you would apply --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- where there were factual disputes?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Why, why did differing accounts cause you to be unable  
22 to come to a view on the balance of probabilities? For  
23 example, do you normally require a consensus before  
24 coming to a view?

25 A. I think we do have to make judgements and -- but we are

1 not a court and we don't have an adversarial approach to  
2 weighing the evidence and that was the view which was  
3 arrived at. Whether it was the correct one or not, I --  
4 I don't know.

5 But it didn't take away from the complete failure of  
6 the Trust to deal with Matthew's care.

7 Q. Would you adopt a different approach to that factual  
8 dispute now?

9 A. I am no longer the Ombudsman.

10 Q. Do PHSO procedures allow a complainant to challenge  
11 a decision that's been made about a factual dispute?

12 A. They can, yes. They can say, "You have got the facts  
13 wrong".

14 Q. What would happen after that?

15 A. That would be reviewed.

16 Q. Do you know if that happened in relation to Matthew's  
17 case?

18 A. I can't remember. But I know Mrs Leahy was not happy  
19 with that particular aspect of the findings and I have  
20 respect for her view.

21 Q. I want to move on now before lunch to the  
22 recommendations that the PHSO made in relation to  
23 Matthew's investigation. So this is not missed  
24 opportunities, this is the actual investigation itself  
25 and you describe in your statement, this is

1 paragraph 70, how the PHSO, following that  
2 investigation, went on to make a series of  
3 recommendations.

4 Just summarising, did these recommendations include  
5 writing to Melanie Leahy to provide a full and final  
6 acknowledgement of the failings identified in the report  
7 of her complaint and the distress that this had caused  
8 her --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- an apology and a £500-payment for distress caused by  
11 NEPT's incorrect information about the extent of safety  
12 changes it had made --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- and writing to Melanie Leahy to provide a detailed  
15 summary of the action that had or would be taken to help  
16 prevent a recurrence of the failings identified and did  
17 the PHSO add both that copies of the information should  
18 be provided to the PHSO itself and that a copy of the  
19 investigation report and information should also be sent  
20 to the CQC?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Did EPUT accept the recommendations when they were sent  
23 to them?

24 Did you hear that?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Did EPUT accept the recommendations when they were sent  
2 to them?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. This is dealt with in your second statement at  
5 paragraph 8.3, but on what basis are you able to say  
6 that EPUT implemented the recommendations that were  
7 contained within the report?

8 A. I -- I can't remember it precisely. But what I do know  
9 is that the situation was changed by the merger of the  
10 Trust and that the new leadership which came in had  
11 a more, slightly more enlightened approach to the issues  
12 that were addressed and when CQC did a follow-up  
13 investigation they noted, they noted that.

14 Q. Well, just dealing with that very briefly if I may.  
15 Clearly you may be referring to a specific CQC  
16 investigation.

17 Can I just make sure you can hear my questions.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Yes. You may be referring there to a specific CQC  
20 investigation. Clearly this Inquiry will need to have  
21 regard to all relevant CQC investigations within the  
22 period that we are concerned with?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. You say in your statement, just in relation to the  
25 recommendations that were sent to EPUT in relation to

1 Matthew Leahy, that you were able to check that an  
2 apology had been sent and that there had been evidence  
3 of the financial remedy and of an action plan and  
4 policies and that a case worker requested clinical  
5 advice to assess compliance and that compliance was  
6 closed in October 2019?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Were you aware that Melanie Leahy gave written evidence  
9 to PACAC, the Public Administration and Constitutional  
10 Affairs Committee, which included that "The action plan  
11 provided by EPUT in relation to the PHSO report  
12 findings" -- I'm using her words -- "does not give me  
13 confidence in the timeliness or robustness of their  
14 approach to addressing their failures"?

15 A. Yes.

16 MR GRIFFIN: Chair, we are now just at lunchtime. I don't  
17 have a huge amount more to ask Sir Rob about, but  
18 I think this would be a convenient moment to rise.

19 THE CHAIR: When would you like us to come back again?

20 MR GRIFFIN: Could we come back again at 2.00, please.

21 (1.00 pm)

22 (The short adjournment)

23 (2.00 pm)

24 MR GRIFFIN: Sir Rob, I want to come on to one last topic  
25 with you at this stage at least and that is a section of

1 your statement that's entitled "Are the issues or  
2 failings confined to Essex?"

3 You have identified this morning for us themes  
4 arising in Essex and, of course, we have seen the very  
5 serious issues arising from the cases of Mr R and  
6 Matthew Leahy.

7 To what extent are the issues you have identified in  
8 relation to Essex confined to services there or are the  
9 Essex themes representative of what's happening more  
10 widely?

11 A. Objectively, I don't know the answer to that. Secondly,  
12 we have to remember that the investigations that we did  
13 were a long time ago. My sense is that Essex is not  
14 exceptional. My sense is that all the issues which have  
15 come out of the cases which I looked at you can see in  
16 other places, not necessarily in exactly the same way,  
17 but, just thinking about it, the absence of leadership,  
18 the failure to use the duty of candour, not  
19 communicating effectively with patients, the safety  
20 issues around ligature points, the failure of the  
21 serious incident review and the absence of training and  
22 development. These are still issues which the NHS has  
23 to address generally, not just in Essex.

24 Q. One of the points that you have made in relation to, for  
25 example, Matthew's case is the severity or, for example,

1 the high number of instances of maladministration?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. To what extent is that kind of level of seriousness  
4 reflected across the country or is it something like  
5 that that might make Essex unusual?

6 A. It's possible, yes. I mean, there are -- in my time,  
7 there were half a dozen very big Health Service issues  
8 where you would have the same number of serious failures  
9 and they weren't confined to Essex, they were in  
10 Bristol, they were in Wales, they were in other places.

11 What makes the Essex situation that I looked at so  
12 poignant is that all this happened with Mr R and then it  
13 happened again, when there was clear warning that this  
14 was the issue, there were lots of regulators about but  
15 nothing changed, and that is an indictment of the  
16 system.

17 And then on top of that, it took us until very  
18 recently to get to a public inquiry. You know, we  
19 were -- we were reassured that an independent inquiry  
20 would be fine and it wasn't because they refused to  
21 cooperate -- the clinicians refused to cooperate with  
22 it. Ministers tried to bat that away but, in the end,  
23 justice was done.

24 Q. You have explained to us changes that you would advocate  
25 to make the PHSO more effective.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. If there was one key area in your view, in relation to  
3 mental health services generally, that could be  
4 addressed for real improvement, what would that be?

5 A. So there are three, if I may.

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. First of all, the duty of candour does not work and,  
8 unless people are prepared to say what happens in  
9 difficult cases, clinicians, then these kinds of  
10 situations are going to repeat themselves.

11 The law doesn't work. It wasn't as Robert Francis  
12 proposed it should be in 2014; it needs to be changed.

13 Secondly and related, the law on whistleblowing  
14 doesn't work either, and I have had dozens of clinicians  
15 get in touch with me and say, "I want to raise this  
16 issue but, if I do, I am going to lose my job, I am  
17 going to lose my career". That is unacceptable. But it  
18 does need to change and it can only change by a legal  
19 change.

20 And the third thing which I think is very, very  
21 important in mental health is there needs to be  
22 continuing professional development and training of  
23 those people involved. It's not fair to expect  
24 clinicians and managers to undertake these immensely  
25 difficult supervision roles and caring roles unless they



1       have access to the professional training that they need,  
2       and one of the things that I am most pleased about when  
3       I was Ombudsman was that we introduced -- you haven't  
4       mentioned it but it is important -- we introduced the  
5       Complaints Good Practice Framework, which is a way of  
6       encouraging frontline bodies to adopt model good  
7       practice and complaints handling and provides them with  
8       professional training to do their jobs better.

9           And I think in the last year, PHSO got accreditation  
10       for 600 NHS employees, and 700 individuals participated  
11       in the training. Now that's not enough, it's a tiny  
12       fraction but it shows how important, how much thirst  
13       there is for professional development and yet we had  
14       a national report into training and development in the  
15       NHS, which was published in 2022, the Messenger Report,  
16       a good piece of work, Sir Gordon Messenger wrote it:  
17       where has it gone? It's disappeared as far as I can  
18       see. It may come again but it's not been implemented.  
19       And, without these things, it's not going to  
20       fundamentally change.

21   Q.   You have mentioned three things. May I ask you about  
22       one of them and that is whistleblowing, and you say the  
23       law doesn't work?

24   A.   Yes.

25   Q.   Could you just explain a little bit more what you mean

1 by that?

2 A. Yes. So the reason that I use the Protocol on Emerging  
3 Concerns was because I discovered, through my  
4 supervision of University Hospitals Birmingham, that the  
5 Chief Executive at the time had sent more than 20  
6 clinicians to the GMC when they wanted to blow the  
7 whistle or did blow the whistle about patient safety in  
8 Birmingham. And so the situation was -- and is -- that  
9 when good and honourable people try to raise patient  
10 safety issues the response of the NHS leadership has  
11 been to discipline them by referring them to their  
12 regulatory body, in this case the GMC. That is wrong.  
13 It should not have happened.

14 The law is weak at the moment, in comparison to the  
15 European Union and other countries. You need a lot of  
16 money in order to fight people who send you to the  
17 tribunals to resolve these issues and there is -- unlike  
18 Scotland, there is no National Whistleblowing Authority  
19 that clinicians or managers can go to, to say, "Help me,  
20 advise me what to do, give me support". In Scotland the  
21 Ombudsman has that role. In England, the Ombudsman  
22 could have that role; other people want to create  
23 a separate body.

24 But I know that these people are brave but they are  
25 lonely and they don't get the support that they need in



1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Do you recall that? You mention it in your statement.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So I think the point here is you were talking about  
5 whistleblowers --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- and the question that I have asked is directed to the  
8 fact or the point that this is something that actually  
9 has happened in one of the cases we have been looking  
10 at.

11 A. That's absolutely right and remember that I said there  
12 were three issues.

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. One of them is a duty of candour --

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. -- which was broken by the instruction to "keep schtum"  
17 on anything. So I think that's absolutely right and  
18 I accept that.

19 Q. In your Missed Opportunities report, you make various  
20 recommendations, including for -- I think it's an NHS  
21 Improvement investigation to take place.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Did that investigation ultimately take place?

24 A. No. What happened was that -- I mean, there were  
25 a number of investigations going on when we completed

1           the Missed Opportunities report. One was a police  
2           investigation, one was a Health and Safety Executive  
3           investigation. We, therefore, held back from making  
4           a recommendation for a public inquiry until we sent  
5           the -- we laid the report on Missed Opportunities before  
6           Parliament and, at that time, we said there should be  
7           a public inquiry.

8   Q.   So was that because, for various reasons, the NHS  
9           Improvement investigation had not taken place?

10  A.   Well, they, what they said was they wouldn't do it. They  
11           told Parliament this: they wouldn't do it because there  
12           was now going to be an independent inquiry which would  
13           do -- perform the same role. And, as we know, that  
14           inquiry collapsed.

15  Q.   Thank you.

16  A.   So NHS England didn't carry out what they had promised.

17  MR GRIFFIN: Thank you very much.

18           Chair, I've got no further questions for Sir Rob.

19  THE CHAIR: Sir Rob, thank you very much indeed.

20  A.   Thank you. Thank you for your courtesy.

21  MR GRIFFIN: Chair, we are now going to move to a different  
22           phase of the evidence and, with your permission, I am  
23           going to leave and I will be replaced by a colleague.

24           Sir Rob, thank you very much.

25                           (The witness withdrew)

1 DR ILOZUE: Good afternoon, Chair.

2 A. Good afternoon, Dr Ilozue.

3 MS HARRIS: Chair, as indicated by Mr Griffin, we are now

4 going to hear a presentation from another colleague in

5 the Counsel to the Inquiry team Dr Tagbo Ilozue. He is

6 going to update you on the evidence the Inquiry has

7 received so far, relating to services provided by the

8 Trusts in Essex and where those services were being

9 provided.

10 That will be then followed, we understand it, by

11 a short presentation touching on the issues raised,

12 which will be delivered by Steven Snowden, King's

13 Counsel, afterwards.

14 THE CHAIR: Thank you.

15 Presentation on mental health services provided to Essex NHS

16 patients by DR ILOZUE

17 DR ILOZUE: Chair, this presentation will provide

18 an overview of the information that the Inquiry

19 currently holds in relation to the mental health

20 services provided to NHS patients from Essex over the

21 relevant period, the period that the Inquiry is

22 investigating, and also regarding the locations of the

23 facilities through which those services were delivered.

24 My aim in this presentation is to summarise the evidence

25 that has been received from the commissioners of mental

1 health services and from the providers of those services  
2 about where, what and from whom mental health services  
3 were delivered to inpatients under the care of the Essex  
4 Trusts.

5 I will begin with a brief word about the context of  
6 the Rule 9 requests that we sent out asking for  
7 information on this matter. The Inquiry is tasked with  
8 investigating the circumstances surrounding the deaths  
9 of mental health inpatients under the care of NHS Trusts  
10 in Essex and, therefore, it is of course focused on the  
11 inpatient care delivered by those NHS Trusts in Essex.  
12 However, as set out in the Explanatory Note in relation  
13 to Scope of the Terms of Reference, the Inquiry's  
14 definition of inpatient deaths includes deaths which  
15 occurred in other settings.

16 Amanda, please would you put up the amended  
17 explanatory note in relation to scope. This explanatory  
18 note is, of course, available on the Lampard Inquiry  
19 website and, under the definition of "inpatient death",  
20 subsection (a) begins "those who died on an NHS mental  
21 health inpatient unit", but then it conditions, "or in  
22 receipt of NHS funded inpatient care within the  
23 independent sector".

24 At subsection (d), we see the definition includes  
25 those who died within three months of transfers,

1 including transfer to a physical health setting or to  
2 an out-of-area mental health service.

3 At (e) we have those who died whilst awaiting  
4 an assessment under the Mental Health Act and then at  
5 (f) those who died whilst waiting for a bed in a mental  
6 health inpatient unit within three months of a clinical  
7 assessment of need.

8 Next page, please, Amanda.

9 Then (g) and (h): (g) as recently amended, now  
10 includes those who died within three months of a mental  
11 health assessment provided by the Trusts or on behalf of  
12 Essex local authorities, which did not result in  
13 admission as an inpatient; and (h) can includes those  
14 who died within three months of discharge from any of  
15 the above units.

16 That can now be taken down, please.

17 In addition to the explanatory note, one further  
18 matter of context arises from when the Inquiry was  
19 considering Core Participant applications. Chair, you  
20 at that stage determined that the Inquiry's definition  
21 of "inpatient" includes mental health inpatients who  
22 were under the care of NHS providers in Essex but who  
23 were placed outside Essex, either because there was not  
24 enough bed space in Essex or due to needing specialist  
25 services that were not, at the relevant time, available



1 in Essex.

2 Therefore, the range of mental health services which  
3 are relevant to the Inquiry is broader than merely the  
4 services provided by Essex NHS Trusts within Essex  
5 inpatient facilities. It also encompasses the services  
6 provided by those NHS Trusts in non-inpatient settings  
7 which could or should have led to admission and/or those  
8 which were provided by those Trusts to the patients in  
9 the weeks following discharge.

10 It also encompasses the mental health services  
11 provided to patients who were admitted into NHS  
12 inpatient facilities for physical health in Essex, and  
13 it encompasses the inpatient mental health services  
14 provided by NHS Trusts outside of Essex and by  
15 independent providers both inside and outside of Essex.

16 The Inquiry, therefore, has sent requests for  
17 information to numerous organisations in order to  
18 identify what all these services were and where and by  
19 whom they were provided.

20 The Inquiry began with Rule 9 requests for  
21 information to EPUT, as the largest provider of NHS  
22 mental health services in Essex, and to the three  
23 Integrated Care Boards who are responsible for  
24 commissioning core mental health services in Essex and  
25 also for funding placements of Essex NHS patients with

1 private providers and external NHS Trusts.

2 Those Integrated Care Boards, or ICBs, are Mid and  
3 South Essex ICB, Suffolk and North East Essex ICB and  
4 Hertfordshire and West Essex ICB.

5 EPUT was asked to set out the mental health services  
6 it had provided over the relevant period and the  
7 locations at which those services were provided. In the  
8 Rule 9 request, the Inquiry used the term "Wards and  
9 Services" to refer to that location and service data  
10 that was sought.

11 EPUT was also asked to identify all the private  
12 facilities and NHS Trust facilities outside of Essex  
13 into which patients under its care had been admitted for  
14 inpatient treatment. In the request, the Inquiry used  
15 the term "Out-of-Area" to refer to this group of  
16 providers and facilities.

17 The ICBs were asked to explain the circumstances in  
18 which placements of patients outside Essex occurred and  
19 to identify all the out-of-area providers, with whom  
20 patients under the care of the Essex Trusts had been  
21 placed.

22 Then, subsequently, after those two initial requests  
23 for information, additional requests were sent to:  
24 NELFT, in a similar vein to that sent to EPUT; to the  
25 private providers, known to have inpatient facilities in

1 Essex, namely Priory, Cygnet, St Andrew's Healthcare and  
2 NEST Healthcare; and to the NHS Trusts responsible for  
3 the physical health hospitals in Essex. They were all  
4 asked about the wards and services they provided.

5 Then a list of providers was compiled from the  
6 initial response the Inquiry received from EPUT and the  
7 ICBs and all of them were asked about the inpatient  
8 facilities into which they admitted Essex NHS patients  
9 over the relevant period.

10 Finally, NHS England, who are responsible for  
11 commissioning specialised mental health services for  
12 Essex patients, was asked similar questions about the  
13 out-of-area providers of those specialised services,  
14 similar questions to those the ICB had been asked about  
15 their core mental health providers. In total, the  
16 Inquiry contacted 46 organisations asking for  
17 information on those matters. 29 of them have provided  
18 statements to date, one of them remaining in draft, and  
19 28 organisations provided details about their inpatient  
20 units. In total, the Inquiry has received so far  
21 information about 870 wards in 249 facilities.

22 The Inquiry has also received information from EPUT,  
23 NHS England and the ICBs about 66 out-of-area  
24 organisations, who had provided care to Essex patients  
25 and NEFLT and EPUT identified 175 distinct teams that

1       were responsible for providing potentially relevant  
2       non-inpatient care.

3           All of this information that the Inquiry has  
4       received on this topic is detailed and wide ranging.  
5       However, it's not yet complete. This is not merely  
6       because of the providers who failed to respond  
7       appropriately. In addition, the organisations who did  
8       respond were not all able to respond in full in the time  
9       available between the requests and this hearing. The  
10      majority of them reported limitations arising mainly out  
11      of difficulties obtaining historical information for the  
12      early part of the relevant period from paper-based  
13      records.

14           I would give two brief examples. Hertfordshire  
15      Partnership Foundation NHS Trust or HPFT referred to  
16      an archive of 20,000 boxes of paper records and  
17      a microfiche archive of 43,000 patient records, covering  
18      the period before its electronic records began in 2006.  
19      HPFT said they would need to review, one by one, all of  
20      those documents in order to identify all the admissions  
21      of Essex patients.

22           The ICBs were only able to retrieve information  
23      about providers utilised by their placement teams since  
24      2014 because the relevant information had not been  
25      collated from the records before that date. Therefore,

1 the ICBs told the Inquiry that providing complete  
2 pre-2014 information to the Inquiry would require them  
3 to undertake a manual review of nearly 5,000 individual  
4 patient records.

5 The limitations of this nature, and there were  
6 numerous of a similar nature, provide insight into the  
7 manner in which records had been created and maintained  
8 by the organisations responsible for delivering mental  
9 health care over the relevant period. They also  
10 indicate the challenges that such issues with historic  
11 record retention and categorisation will raise to the  
12 ongoing work of this Inquiry.

13 In this presentation, I will not attempt to  
14 reproduce all the information which the Inquiry has  
15 received on this topic. The witness statements and the  
16 key exhibits from each organisation have been included  
17 in the hearing bundle and the raw data is available for  
18 scrutiny, and the key exhibit in this case is an Excel  
19 template that was sent to each provider and with the  
20 request for them to populate it with the data sought.

21 What follows in this presentation are selected  
22 themes and data points, which have been drawn out and  
23 summarised, to assist those listening to develop  
24 a general appreciation of what services were delivered  
25 by what providers, where and when. All of the

1 information and data presented has been reproduced as  
2 presented by the providers. With the exception of a few  
3 postcode adjustments using publicly available  
4 information from the CQC website about facility  
5 location, there has been no attempt to verify or confirm  
6 or adjust the information. Therefore, any inaccuracies  
7 present in the underlying data will be incorporated into  
8 the summaries and analyses that I will present.

9 The presentation of that data does not signify any  
10 acceptance of the accuracy of that information by the  
11 Inquiry. The aim at this stage is simply to provide an  
12 overview of what information has been received in a form  
13 which enables some insight to be gained about nature and  
14 content of the current evidence.

15 With that, I move on to providing that overview and  
16 I will do so in four sections: firstly, I will identify  
17 the Essex NHS Trusts over the relevant period; secondly,  
18 I will describe the inpatient services that were  
19 provided by those Trusts; in the third section, I will  
20 set out other locations in which Essex patients were  
21 admitted; and, finally, I will identify some of the most  
22 relevant non-inpatient services that were delivered by  
23 the Essex NHS Trusts within Essex.

24 Turning then to section 1, who are the Trusts?

25 Amanda, would you please put up Table 1 and please

1 move on to the second page.

2 Beginning with EPUT, EPUT was formed in 2017,  
3 1 April 2017, in the final row of this table. It was  
4 formed by the merger of South Essex Partnership  
5 University NHS Foundation Trust, SEPT, and North Essex  
6 Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust, NEPT. Both  
7 NEPT and SEPT began operating early in the relevant  
8 period. We can see in row 1 and row 3 of this table  
9 that they were named Foundation Trusts in 2006 and 2007  
10 respectively but -- and now, Amanda, if you go to the  
11 first page, please -- they were both formed very close  
12 to the start of our relevant period, in 2000 and 2001,  
13 that's the second row and third row of the table, second  
14 and third columns respectively.

15 Prior to that, NEPT, which was previously called  
16 North Essex Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust, was  
17 formed as a merger of three Trusts that had provided  
18 services in northwest and mid-Essex. They were North  
19 East Essex Mental Health NHS Trust, Mid Essex Community  
20 and Mental Health NHS Trust and Essex and Herts  
21 Community NHS Trust.

22 SEPT. SEPT's immediate predecessors were Thameside  
23 Community Healthcare NHS Trust and Southend Community  
24 Care Services NHS Trust.

25 The other two providers of mental health services in

1 Essex are NELFT and the predecessors of NELFT, and that  
2 information will be provided in due course, and HPFT,  
3 who I have already mentioned, and they run a specialist  
4 inpatient and community learning disability service  
5 throughout north Essex, and they have done so since  
6 2010. HPFT is responsible for one inpatient unit in  
7 Colchester, which is called Lexden Hospital and it  
8 became a Foundation Trust in August 2007. None of its  
9 predecessors before 2010 are relevant for the Inquiry's  
10 purposes because only its activities within Essex are  
11 relevant from the perspective of naming the NHS mental  
12 health trusts.

13 Thank you. Can that come down, please.

14 So those are the mental health trusts. It is also  
15 relevant to mention the NHS Trusts who provide Accident  
16 and Emergency services across Essex. These are  
17 currently Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust, East  
18 Suffolk and North Essex NHS Foundation Trust and the  
19 Princess Alexandra Hospital NHS Trust.

20 Mid and South Essex NHS Foundation Trust, or MSEFT,  
21 operates Southend Hospital, Basildon Hospital and  
22 Broomfield Hospital in Chelmsford. East Suffolk and  
23 North Essex NHS Trust, or ESNEFT, operates Colchester  
24 Hospital, and the Princess Alexandra Hospital NHS Trust,  
25 or PAHT, operates the Princess Alexandra Hospital in



1 Harlow.

2 Trusts like these and their predecessors are  
3 sometimes referred to as "acute" Trusts, due to the  
4 emergency services they provide, and the Inquiry sent  
5 out requests for information to all three to obtain  
6 information about how mental health care was provided  
7 over the relevant period to patients with mental health  
8 difficulties who presented at their A&E departments or  
9 were admitted to their wards with co-existing physical  
10 health issues.

11 All three Trusts provided similar evidence. They  
12 have no dedicated departments or facilities for mental  
13 health services and do not provide mental health  
14 services themselves. The mental health services  
15 required by their patients over the relevant period were  
16 delivered by either EPUT, or its predecessors, or NELFT  
17 and its predecessors. The acute Trusts would treat  
18 patients for their physical conditions and then seek  
19 support from or make a referral to the appropriate  
20 mental health trust for the mental health care required.

21 PAHT also explained that, on occasion, they will  
22 have patients who are medically fit for discharge but  
23 require a mental health bed, and their discharge is  
24 delayed because there is no mental health bed  
25 immediately available. PAHT explained that those

1 patients will remain under joint care with the mental  
2 health care managed by EPUT or NELFT. MSEFT and PAHT  
3 told the Inquiry that they employ no dedicated mental  
4 health professionals. However, in the case of ESNEFT,  
5 since April 2022, that Trust has directly employed two  
6 registered mental health nurses, based at Colchester  
7 Hospital to help with the support of patients under the  
8 age of 18 years.

9 The mental health Trusts EPUT and NELFT retain  
10 responsibility for the mental health needs of the  
11 parents but ESNEFT's nurses support the care provided.  
12 They provide additional guidance, liaison and  
13 multi-agency communication during office hours on Monday  
14 to Friday. They also provide support in the emergency  
15 department if there are delays with discharge and, if  
16 the patient is admitted, they will review patients  
17 within one working day to commence care planning and,  
18 following daily reviews on Monday to Friday, they will  
19 support the care which is ultimately under the  
20 responsibility of the mental health trust, NELFT.

21 NELFT also holds responsibility for the patients'  
22 post discharge care planning and risk assessments but  
23 ESNEFT's nurses will support those discussions too.

24 Before leaving the issue of the NHS mental health  
25 Trusts, the Essex NHS Trusts, I will finally say a word

1       about the local authorities. This is because the local  
2       authorities have a statutory responsibility for  
3       arranging and managing assessments under the Mental  
4       Health Act. They employ Approved Mental Health  
5       Professionals or AMHPs, who coordinate assessments by  
6       approved clinicians and make applications for admission  
7       under the Mental Health Act on the recommendation of  
8       those clinicians.

9           Although the local authorities are, of course, not  
10       NHS Trusts, they should be noted because they are  
11       obviously public bodies and the AMHPs function is  
12       directly and importantly relevant to the work of the  
13       Inquiry. Essex has three local authorities, Essex  
14       County Council, Southend Borough Council and Thurrock  
15       Council.

16           With that, I turn now to the second section of the  
17       overview, identifying the inpatient mental health  
18       services provided by the Essex NHS Trusts. The evidence  
19       we have obtained to date indicates that the Trusts have  
20       delivered inpatient care from 120 different wards in 34  
21       different facilities over the relevant period, the vast  
22       majority of those wards and facilities were run by EPUT.

23           Amanda, please will you put up Table 2.

24           The first page of this table shows the start of the  
25       facilities that EPUT ran in the north or have run in the

1 north.

2 Please turn to page 2.

3 That continues through to the second half of the  
4 second page and then we see the start of the southern  
5 facilities, Basildon Hospital, et cetera.

6 Page 3, please, continuation of the facilities in  
7 the south.

8 Then the final page, we see only two facilities run  
9 by the other two trusts, NELFT and HPFT, Mascalls Park  
10 and Lexden Hospital. The remaining 32 were under the  
11 responsibility of EPUT.

12 Thank you, that can come down.

13 Please would you put up Video 1. This image is  
14 a map showing the location of all those 34 facilities  
15 across Essex. I will not read out the labels, just as  
16 I didn't read out each name from the table, but I will  
17 leave it up for just a moment to give everyone  
18 an opportunity to cast their eyes over the map and  
19 appreciate the distribution and clustering.

20 Thank you, Amanda. Please would you take that down  
21 now and switch to Video 2.

22 If you play that now. What we have here is the same  
23 or a similar image but this time the blue spots showing  
24 the locations have been replaced with bar charts. These  
25 charts show the exact same 34 locations. The additional

1 information they contain at this stage is they also show  
2 the specialities provided at each of those locations,  
3 and I will say a little bit more about those  
4 specialities in a moment.

5 I have referred a few times to the figure 34, not  
6 all of those facilities were in place for the entirety  
7 of the period of the Inquiry's investigation. The  
8 number of facilities has varied from year to year, and  
9 the next video that I will show demonstrates that change  
10 over time.

11 So, Amanda, if you play now, please, Video 3.

12 The date, the year, is in the bottom left, and each  
13 time the bar chart grows it shows that distribution of  
14 specialities that I will speak more on.

15 In terms of the number of facilities, the final  
16 point I make, at the start of the relevant period we  
17 know there were 23 facilities and the peak was in 2009  
18 when it rose to 27 and then, since 2019, there have been  
19 16 facilities all run in Essex. 15 of those facilities  
20 are run by EPUT and just one, Lexden Hospital, which we  
21 can see that top right of this image in yellow, is the  
22 sole facility run by a different provider, run by HPFT.

23 I will say a little bit more about the specialities  
24 now. You can see them identified in the bottom right of  
25 this image, in the legend to the bar charts. Some of

1 the specialties have been combined together to make the  
2 bar chart easier to read, easier to see. The majority  
3 of those specialties have been provided throughout the  
4 relevant period. Those are: adult mental health and  
5 PICU; mental health assessment units; CAMHS, but not the  
6 CAMHS PICU; forensic (low secure); and forensic (medium  
7 secure); and learning disability; and older mental  
8 health. Later on in the relevant period, the mother and  
9 baby unit, which is what MBU under "other" stands for,  
10 and the drug and alcohol unit and the PICU began to be  
11 provided. The MBU was provided since 2010; the CAMHS  
12 PICU since 2012; and the drug and alcohol unit since  
13 2022.

14 These are bar charts. They demonstrate the  
15 distribution of the number of beds that each speciality  
16 delivered at the location. The higher the bar, the  
17 greater the number of beds.

18 Amanda, if you take that down now and switch to  
19 Figure 1, please.

20 This figure also gives information about the number  
21 of beds in a clearer and more quantitative way. It  
22 shows how that level of inpatient service provision, the  
23 bed numbers, varied over the relevant period. The  
24 absolute figures are not accurate, they are likely to be  
25 a slight underestimate but it is likely that the trend

1 is correct and it is clear. It shows a steady and  
2 significant decline in the number of general adult and  
3 older adult psychiatry beds: older adult is depicted in  
4 purple; general adult is depicted in blue at the bottom  
5 of the graph. There has also been a reduction in  
6 learning disability beds but the remainder of the  
7 specialities have remained reasonably stable.

8 Please could that come down.

9 We also asked the providers for details about which  
10 wards were single sex and which wards were mixed sex.

11 Would you put up Figure 2, please, Amanda.

12 This second chart shows the proportion of the beds  
13 that were on single-sex or mixed-sex wards. So out of  
14 the total number of beds provided in any given year,  
15 with the year along the bottom, what percentage were  
16 mixed in purple, what percentage were male, in blue,  
17 what percentage were female, in the light red. We see  
18 an increase in the number of single-sex beds over the  
19 relevant period but, by the end, by 2003, still almost  
20 half of the NHS mental health beds in Essex remained on  
21 mixed wards.

22 Thank you that can come down.

23 I turn now to section 3 of my overview, and this is  
24 the out-of-area inpatient care delivered to the Essex  
25 patients over the relevant period. What I will do is

1 show a series of map charts to provide an overview of  
2 the geographical spread of the care provided to Essex  
3 patients in private facilities and in non-Essex NHS  
4 Trusts across the country. But before I ask for them to  
5 be shown, I must emphasise and it must be understood  
6 that this data set is very incomplete. It is based on  
7 the provider list that the Inquiry obtained from EPUT  
8 and from the ICBs, and it's based on the information  
9 that the Inquiry received from the providers who  
10 responded in time about the number of Essex patients  
11 they had admitted into their facilities over the  
12 relevant period.

13 The majority of providers were unable to provide  
14 complete figures for the entire relevant period because  
15 they did not have electronic records for that entire  
16 period and they were unable to review their paper-based  
17 records in the time available.

18 At present, the total number of out-of-area  
19 admissions from all the providers who were able to give  
20 figures currently stands at over 5,800. However,  
21 clearly, in the light of what I just said and in the  
22 light of all the issues noted previously, that figure is  
23 of limited utility at present.

24 Amanda, please will you put up item 9, Figure 3,  
25 please, before the table.



1           For those 5,800 admissions that we know about, we  
2           know they took place in 249 facilities across the  
3           country. This map shows the location of every mental  
4           health facility that the Inquiry has received  
5           information about to date.

6           Each postcode is marked in red and shaded in blue is  
7           the unitary authority responsible for the location of  
8           the facility.

9           Thank you, that can come down.

10          I will say a brief word about the reasons for the  
11          placements. It would be wrong to assume that all of  
12          those placements were inappropriate. NHS patients can  
13          be admitted into private units or into units outside the  
14          geographic area where they are registered with a GP or  
15          where they reside for a variety of reasons. A list of  
16          reasons has been compiled from the evidence received  
17          from the ICBs and from NHS England.

18          The first reason identified was where there is  
19          limited national provision for a service. There were  
20          some key specialised inpatient services which have not  
21          been provided by the NHS Trusts in Essex at any stage  
22          during the relevant period. Those are specialised  
23          eating disorder services, high secure forensic services,  
24          and inpatient personality disorder services. So where  
25          those services were required, then an Essex NHS patient

1 would need to go outside of area in order to receive the  
2 care they required.

3 Furthermore, even where there were specialised  
4 services potentially available in Essex, there may be  
5 services in another part of the country where  
6 a clinician with a special interest or an expertise in  
7 the specific mental health matter would give a benefit  
8 to the patient from the care and treatment that they  
9 could deliver and, therefore, potentially deliver better  
10 outcomes or a shorter length of stay.

11 The second reason for out-of-area placements might  
12 be patient or family choice.

13 A third would be capacity gaps in the local service  
14 due to, for example, a lack of beds or insufficient  
15 clinical capacity.

16 A fourth reason could be criminal restrictions or  
17 other matters from the Justice Department requiring  
18 placements in other areas.

19 A related fifth reason might be risk to victims or  
20 an exclusion zone or other safeguarding considerations  
21 requiring patients to be placed elsewhere.

22 A sixth reason would be potentially geographical  
23 proximity to the patient's home address or to their  
24 family.

25 Seventh, to maintain patient confidentiality, for

1       example if staff members required treatment and they  
2       were employed by a Trust within Essex, they may be  
3       placed out-of-area.

4           A further reason would be patients who are admitted  
5       as an emergency or via police arrest whilst they are  
6       temporarily in another area.

7           Finally, if patients move away but remain registered  
8       with a GP in Essex then that would also be categorised  
9       as an out-of-area placement.

10          As things stand, the Inquiry has virtually no  
11       quantifiable data on how the placements which did occur  
12       were distributed between these potential reasons, and it  
13       may well be impossible for the Inquiry ever to obtain  
14       reliable and complete data of that nature. The ICBs  
15       have said they are continuing enquiries for information  
16       which may lie with them but they have also said that  
17       other data would be with the NHS providers or is simply  
18       not compiled and merely recorded in individual patient  
19       notes.

20          On the part of EPUT -- here, please, Amanda, if you  
21       put up Table 3 -- EPUT have said they do not maintain  
22       a central log of out-of-area placements, but they did  
23       provide the following table of figures on the number of  
24       placements that occurred over the relevant period, and  
25       they separated those figures into those occurring in NHS

1 facilities and those occurring in the independent sector  
2 and then we have other. The vast majority, as we can  
3 see, are in the middle column, in the independent  
4 sector, and there seems to be an increase over the  
5 years, but the information provided isn't complete, so  
6 that is not necessarily reliable. The top of the table  
7 is, of course, the end of the relevant period.

8 Thank you, that can come down.

9 What will be shown next are a series of maps  
10 illustrating the distribution of admissions outside the  
11 country.

12 If we start with the next video, please. Pause at  
13 the beginning.

14 We see at the bottom all out-of-area facilities in  
15 the bottom left, and what this map shows is  
16 a distribution of the number of placements out of the  
17 5,800 the Inquiry has been told about. For the  
18 background shading of the unitary authorities, where  
19 that colour is darker, so in Essex and Cambridgeshire,  
20 then it shows a higher number of placements occurring in  
21 that area.

22 Where that shading is lighter, then it is a lower  
23 number, and that quantifiable data is reflected in the  
24 hot spots that you can see distributed across the map.  
25 They show the same data but now localised to the

1 postcode or the longitude and latitude of the facility  
2 into which the admission occurred. So this map shows  
3 all out-of-area facilities, excluding therefore the  
4 facilities within Essex.

5 We can see that the cluster and the heat map makes  
6 it clear that there was a concentration in the area  
7 around Essex, as one would hope and expect, but the  
8 distribution is all over the country.

9 Thank you, that can come down. If you put up the  
10 next one, please -- forgive me if you move on to the  
11 next, thank you.

12 What we see here at 2 is the NHS out-of-area  
13 facilities, and so these are NHS Trusts outside of Essex  
14 into which Essex patients were admitted, and the map is  
15 on the same basis, with the intensity reflecting higher  
16 numbers.

17 Thank you, if you move on to the next.

18 Here is the independent facilities with a slightly  
19 broader distribution, in terms of the geographic spread.

20 Thank you, the next.

21 Here we have providers of specialised services, so  
22 specialised services including the personality disorder,  
23 high secure forensic and eating disorder, I mentioned  
24 earlier, but also forensic low and medium secure and  
25 CAMHS.

1           Finally, these will be non-specialised services, the  
2           core mental health services, older adults, acute adults,  
3           PICU, et cetera.

4           Now, this evidence about the spread of these  
5           admissions is not presented in order to invite any  
6           judgement about what has been depicted. We know that we  
7           cannot reach any conclusions at present about the  
8           proportions of placements that were appropriate or the  
9           appropriateness of the place in which treatment was  
10          received. We can't draw any of those conclusions from  
11          the information currently available. The objective in  
12          providing these maps at this stage is to assist with  
13          visualising the spread of the location in which care has  
14          been delivered to those who might be within scope of the  
15          Inquiry.

16          Thank you, that can come down.

17          I conclude with the fourth section of my overview,  
18          touching on the non-inpatient services that were  
19          provided by the Essex NHS Trusts. EPUT has provided the  
20          Inquiry with a detailed account of the history and  
21          framework of the teams which hold a gatekeeping role  
22          over inpatient admissions in the Trust. These teams  
23          have responsibility for assessing patients to decide  
24          whether or not they should be admitted, and I will give  
25          a brief overview of the teams identified by EPUT. They

1 include the Crisis and Home Treatment Teams, these were  
2 introduced progressively across Essex from the early  
3 2000s.

4 The second team is the A&E Liaison Team. They  
5 provide a mental health liaison service in acute  
6 hospitals. I already referred earlier, from the  
7 perspective of those hospitals, to the fact that the  
8 care required from a mental health perspective within  
9 their facilities is provided by the mental health Trusts  
10 and EPUT have informed the Inquiry that that care was  
11 initially provided by individuals from the community and  
12 inpatients mental health teams working on rotas, but  
13 then progressively dedicated teams were introduced  
14 across Essex to provide that liaison service.

15 In some areas, the crisis team would have a dual  
16 role within acute facilities and in the community; in  
17 other areas of Essex, it was a specific and separate  
18 mental health liaison service.

19 EPUT also told us about the Crisis Response Service.  
20 This is a service that's much more recent. They have  
21 had it in place since 2020 and it receives and triages  
22 urgent calls that are made via NHS 111 option 2, if  
23 patients are in mental health crisis.

24 If thought to be required, the crisis response  
25 service can also carry out a face-to-face assessment of

1 the patient following the telephone triage, and they  
2 will have a gatekeeping role in deciding whether  
3 admission is required.

4 A fourth service, with a gatekeeping role, is the  
5 Urgent Care Department in Basildon Hospital. This is  
6 again another recent service, which has been delivered  
7 as an alternative to A&E for patients who present in  
8 crisis.

9 EPUT also told the Inquiry about a variety of  
10 dedicated Older Adult gatekeeping teams, and they told  
11 the Inquiry that the Forensic Inpatient Units and the  
12 Mother and Baby Unit carry out their own specialised  
13 gatekeeping process, which doesn't go through the crisis  
14 or any of the other teams, but requires an assessment to  
15 be carried out on the ward, on the unit, in order to  
16 determine whether admission is required.

17 In relation to CAMHS, EPUT told the Inquiry that  
18 they previously organised gatekeeping of admissions for  
19 CAMHS patients, that was over the first decade of the  
20 relevant period, and it was done in the Trust's only  
21 CAMHS unit at the time, which was Longview Ward on  
22 Turner Road in Colchester.

23 They told the Inquiry that, from 2007 in north Essex  
24 and from 2009 in south Essex, the Trust had a CAMHS  
25 Crisis Outreach Team, which undertook gatekeeping. Then



1 in 2015, EPUT informed the Inquiry that CAMHS Community  
2 Services were passed to NELFT and, following this, that  
3 admissions were arranged by direct liaison between the  
4 NELFT CAMHS Crisis Teams and the EPUT CAMHS Wards.

5 So those are gatekeeping assessments.

6 I turn now to talk about the Mental Health Act  
7 assessments. I have already noted that they fall under  
8 the statutory responsibility of the local authority.  
9 However, under Section 75 of the National Health Service  
10 Act 2006, the local authorities were empowered to enter  
11 into agreements with NHS Trusts in order to exercise  
12 their functions and, in 2006, the three Essex councils  
13 entered into such an agreement with EPUT for EPUT to  
14 provide Mental Health Act assessments between 9.00 am  
15 and 5.00 pm on Monday to Friday.

16 Accordingly, the Trust had AMHP teams, who delivered  
17 that service.

18 Outside those hours, the responsibility for the  
19 assessments remained with the local authorities who had  
20 emergency duty teams. EPUT informed the Inquiry that  
21 the Section 75 agreements for EPUT to provide those  
22 daytime AMHP services came to an end late in the  
23 relevant period. With Essex County Council, it came to  
24 an end in 2019; with Thurrock Council, it came to an end  
25 in 2021; and with Southend Borough Council, in 2023.

1       The councils took back the AMHP role centrally.

2           Information about NELFT's non-inpatient facilities  
3       will follow in due course. HPFT have not yet been asked  
4       about its non-inpatient services because the Inquiry  
5       received confirmation of its role as an Essex NHS Trust  
6       only very recently. Therefore, moving forward, further  
7       information will be sought about the learning, about the  
8       scope of the learning disability services that HPFT  
9       provides in north Essex.

10       Chair, that concludes the four sections that  
11       I wished to provide by way of overview. Moving  
12       forwards, as I noted, the data the Inquiry has received  
13       so far remains incomplete and it will be finalised. It  
14       will be finalised by gathering pending evidence from the  
15       providers who did not or could not respond in time for  
16       this hearing, and the Inquiry will also ensure that the  
17       commissioners have identified all the providers that  
18       they can practicably identify from their records, so  
19       that they can also be contacted.

20       For the reasons I have touched on already, it is  
21       unlikely to be possible to obtain a perfect record of  
22       every location in every context in which any patient who  
23       falls within the Inquiry's Terms of Reference may have  
24       been treated. However, the Inquiry will endeavour to  
25       achieve a picture that is as complete as possible while

1 giving proper regard to considerations of  
2 proportionality. The analyses that I have illustrated  
3 in this presentation will be continued and expanded in  
4 order to ensure that the data are presented in the most  
5 useful and instructive way, and the Inquiry will seek  
6 the assistance of its expert health statistician,  
7 Professor Donnelly, to complete that work.

8 The final analysis will represent important context  
9 regarding the care that was delivered to the patients  
10 within scope of the Inquiry's Terms of Reference. Of  
11 course, each of the providers will also be asked to  
12 provide information about any deaths occurring amongst  
13 the patients from Essex under their care, which may be  
14 in scope of the Inquiry's investigations, and the data  
15 may also assist in guiding the selection of the most  
16 appropriate regions to use for the comparisons that will  
17 be needed to understand how similar or divergent the  
18 care delivered in Essex was to the rest of the country.

19 Chair, that concludes my presentation to you this  
20 afternoon.

21 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much indeed, Dr Ilozue. Really  
22 clear, thank you.

23 MS HARRIS: Chair, we are now due to hear from Steven  
24 Snowden, King's Counsel. I was looking at the time,  
25 I am not sure if a 10-minute break would be appropriate

1           at this stage. I think we have been going just over  
2           an hour.

3           I see Mr Snowden is indicating he is not  
4           going to be very long perhaps.

5   THE CHAIR: Well, then we will go straight ahead. Thank  
6           you.

7           Response to presentation by MR SNOWDEN

8   THE CHAIR: Mr Snowden, good afternoon.

9   MR SNOWDEN: Chair, good afternoon. It is a pleasure to sit  
10          here for a third time. We and other Core Participants  
11          are really grateful, indeed, to my learned friend and to  
12          your Inquiry team for the update on where we've got to  
13          about the numbers who may have been treated in different  
14          places in and outside Essex as defined so far.

15          We are very grateful for the opportunity to respond  
16          and I will do my very best to make it no more than  
17          10 minutes and we can go and have a cup of tea and go  
18          home, I hope. My learned friend concluded, and his  
19          paper concludes, that it is unlikely to be possible to  
20          obtain a perfect record of every location in every  
21          context in which any patient who falls within the  
22          Inquiry's Terms of Reference may have been treated, and  
23          we suggest that begs at least three questions: first  
24          what is the purpose of gathering this data; second, how  
25          can your Inquiry do as much as is practicable and

1 proportionate to fulfil that purpose; and, third, we are  
2 going to touch on the Terms of Reference in relation to  
3 this data.

4 So the first of those three points: what is the  
5 purpose of gathering this data? We invite the Inquiry  
6 to take a step back now that substantial amounts of  
7 preliminary data have been obtained.

8 So we suggest that the purpose of gathering the data  
9 must always be sensitive to the concerns of the families  
10 and the patients and what actually happened to them. We  
11 don't need to investigate numbers just for numbers' sake  
12 we don't see that -- we respectfully suggest that's not  
13 part of your role.

14 We suggest the Inquiry should focus its efforts on  
15 the actual people, the families, the friends, the  
16 survivors, who are the interested parties before it.  
17 The questions that should drive this Inquiry's  
18 investigations, we suggest, are principally: where were  
19 they treated; how and by whom were they treated; what do  
20 they have to say about the nature and the quality of the  
21 treatment that they were given?

22 We suggest that the Inquiry's ability to make useful  
23 findings in relation to those about whom it has no  
24 firsthand evidence, so those theoretically scattered  
25 around the country, whose names we do not necessarily

1 know, who are not necessarily participants, not  
2 necessarily Core Participants, and haven't necessarily  
3 or won't necessarily give you witness statements. So  
4 your ability to make useful findings about that spread  
5 of patients will inevitably be limited, even if you did  
6 have a perfect record of how many people had been sent  
7 to various places.

8 Because we note that, as my learned friend said and  
9 in his helpful paper, the objective for providing the  
10 maps that we have just been taken to is to assist with  
11 visualising the spread of locations in which care was  
12 being delivered to those who might be within the scope  
13 of the Inquiry. We just pause there and we express our  
14 concern -- and, with respect, hoping that it will cause  
15 the Inquiry to pause and think -- that the focus on the  
16 hypothetical scope of those who might be within the  
17 scope of the Inquiry is wrong if it's pursued at the  
18 cost of those who have actually made applications for CP  
19 status, who are actually participants in the Inquiry,  
20 and we know who they are, you will know in due course  
21 where they were treated. We suggest that that is likely  
22 to be more fruitful ground for you to search,  
23 interrogate and understand how poor the treatment was  
24 than ascertaining numbers in far-flung parts of the  
25 country.

1           Clearly, it will be important, we accept, to know  
2           how many inpatient deaths occurred in Essex and that is  
3           one of the tasks for your statistician. But if it is  
4           impossible to say how many people may have been treated  
5           where or how, then, in a sense, we say: so be it. The  
6           data on wards and services is not essential to what is  
7           expressed to be one of your functions, which is to  
8           determine how similar or divergent the care delivered in  
9           Essex was to the rest of the country. Knowing the  
10          spread of where patients were treated won't necessarily  
11          answer that question for you because, for instance, if  
12          an expert in your Inquiry gives evidence in due course  
13          that a minimum standard was in place and if you  
14          determined, through the case studies, that the care  
15          provided in Essex fell below that standard, then the  
16          divergence questions falls away. You don't really need  
17          to know the numbers elsewhere and you don't necessarily  
18          need to compare how the two patients who were treated in  
19          the northwest of the country fared against the several  
20          hundreds about whom you will have real evidence in  
21          Essex.

22          So we invite your Inquiry to be clear and to engage  
23          with the Core Participants about the purpose of  
24          gathering this data and to be cautious not to elevate  
25          the data above the evidence of real experience of real

1 patients.

2 So that's the first point, the purpose of gathering  
3 the data.

4 The second: how can the Inquiry do as much as is  
5 practicable and proportionate to serve the real purpose  
6 of gathering the data? We say we invite the Inquiry to  
7 consider what to do about the gaps in the material that  
8 my learned friends kindly identified for us in  
9 conjunction with Core Participants and in conjunction  
10 with your expert statistician, and only to dig deeper  
11 into the data of who was spread where once you have  
12 received the Core Participants' accounts, once you have  
13 the full range of Rule 9 statements at your fingertips  
14 because, we suggest, it must be difficult for the  
15 Inquiry to assess now whether it's worth using your own  
16 personnel to conduct difficult research that may be  
17 important to obtain.

18 As some other inquiries have done, sent out  
19 paralegals to all parts of the country to analyse boxes  
20 of documents. Other options open to you may include  
21 dispensing with some of the areas where you don't have  
22 that detail because you may feel, when you have seen the  
23 full range of evidence and the full range of Rule 9  
24 statements from the Core Participants, that it's not  
25 necessarily to pursue to its absolute detail the



1 far-flung parts of the country.

2 The third point we would like to make on behalf of  
3 our Core Participants arising from this paper and this  
4 presentation is to do with your Terms of Reference.

5 Chair, we have already been in extensive correspondence  
6 with your Inquiry team about your Terms of Reference.

7 We now note and are grateful that you have changed your  
8 stance as to the interpretation of some of the Terms of  
9 Reference, for instance your focus on assessments is now  
10 most closely on those associated with inpatient  
11 assessments, as footnoted in the paper and as trailed by  
12 your leading Counsel to the Inquiry at the opening of  
13 these hearings.

14 We do say, we do suggest, that it is important to  
15 make sure that we are in your final version of the Terms  
16 of Reference your final version of your understanding of  
17 the Terms of Reference, when you take stock of what has  
18 transpired at this hearing, before we move forward and  
19 the Inquiry moves forward in obtaining data and  
20 analysing it. You need to know the solid footing of  
21 what you know before you decide how much more you really  
22 need to know, if I can put it that way.

23 One discrete issue though that arises about the  
24 Terms of Reference and which is illustrated by this  
25 paper and data you have heard is the geographical scope

1 of the Inquiry and, if you will allow me two minutes  
2 I will explain what I mean by that.

3 We are grateful that this Inquiry has the power,  
4 which we know you will use to make national  
5 recommendations but, at the moment, we know the Inquiry  
6 terms "Essex" to be coterminous with the local  
7 government areas of Essex, Southend-on-Sea and Thurrock  
8 pursuant to the Lieutenancies Act of 1997, and we say  
9 now that your team have gathered some of the evidence  
10 that has been summarised for you today, that definition  
11 of Essex, for the purposes for which this Inquiry has  
12 convened, is slightly arbitrary and it offers no real  
13 gains, as this paper demonstrates. Essex patients were  
14 treated in many places outside the boundaries of those  
15 three local government areas, and they have been  
16 provided for in so many places at various times that  
17 a complete list of the places they have been treated may  
18 never be ascertained.

19 So we suggest that the Inquiry should stand back and  
20 take more of an issues-based approach to the  
21 interpretation to these Terms of Reference and should  
22 decide whether to admit consideration of deaths of Essex  
23 patients at other hospitals because the evidence you  
24 have obtained so far, which we are grateful for,  
25 suggests that healthcare provision for Essex patients

1       doesn't follow the local authority boundaries.

2               We note that NHS England have provided evidence  
3       explaining that it uses the term "natural clinical  
4       flow", rather than talking about "out-of-area patients".  
5       So this seems to us to suggest a system in which the  
6       boundaries set by the Inquiry, the geographical  
7       boundaries, don't necessarily dovetail with the  
8       boundaries the authorities themselves use, the  
9       providers or the oversight bodies.

10              EPUT themselves have said they don't maintain  
11      a central log of out-of-area placements and, again,  
12      there is a risk that, if you exclude those who were  
13      treated out of area, you may be excluding some who were  
14      treated out of area at EPUT's behest.

15              So, essentially, we do say healthcare provision  
16      doesn't seem to follow those local authority boundaries  
17      and we encourage the Inquiry to be flexible about how it  
18      looks at its geographical boundaries.

19              So those are the three main points, Chair, to make  
20      arising from the presentation.

21              But if you'll permit me, there are just a handful of  
22      shorter points arising. First, to say something brief  
23      about disclosure. As with the other papers presented by  
24      Counsel to the Inquiry, we note that the information on  
25      wards and services is still substantially incomplete and

1 is recognised to be so, and we suggest that engaging  
2 with the Core Participants as to how to fill the gaps,  
3 how to obtain more material and whether it is necessary  
4 to obtain more material is important.

5 The second point is on disclosure, not to the  
6 Inquiry, but from the Inquiry to Core Participants, and,  
7 Chair, I hope you will forgive me if I repeat in  
8 a slightly different way what I said the other day  
9 because, at paragraph 16 of this presentation, it is  
10 said, "The witness statements and the key exhibits for  
11 each organisation have been included in the hearing  
12 bundle so the evidence and the raw data are available  
13 for scrutiny", and that must be scrutiny by us, the Core  
14 Participants.

15 But this isn't, in fact, the case because we see at  
16 one of the footnotes that some exhibits have been  
17 deliberately omitted from the evidence bundle because  
18 they are thought not to be so relevant for this hearing.  
19 We respectfully suggest, again, that Core Participants  
20 will feel better able to engage -- I would feel better  
21 able to comment and respond to this paper -- if we had  
22 had greater disclosure by this stage of the material the  
23 Inquiry holds.

24 It's difficult for us to attempt to verify or to  
25 comment on or to really substantially assist you with

1       this paper in the absence of full disclosure. So,  
2       again, Chair, we respectfully suggest that that means  
3       you -- rather, we invite the Inquiry to continue to give  
4       us better rolling disclosure and a platform on which we  
5       can interrogate that data.

6           Moving to the next discrete short point is  
7       a reference to local authorities, which my learned  
8       friend touched on in your paper. At a few of his  
9       paragraphs, reference is made to involvement of local  
10      authorities but no local authority evidence, as far as  
11      we know, has yet been obtained, certainly none has been  
12      disclosed to us if it has yet been obtained and clearly  
13      this is an area where you will want to do further  
14      investigation.

15          A separate short point is one in relation to mixed  
16      wards where, again, forgive me for just dotting around  
17      between points, as you have invited a response. On  
18      mixed wards, we note the position in the paper as  
19      written and as delivered. We note that Dr Karale's  
20      evidence for EPUT, in his second statement at  
21      paragraph 32, tells us that some localities have  
22      implemented what he calls a swing or a flexible system  
23      of wards and beds, so some operate a single sex when  
24      required, some don't, and then change, and we don't  
25      know, either on his evidence or from your learned

1       counsel's paper, how far this represents the practise  
2       across Essex. Again, that area, we suggest, is going to  
3       be important that it receives particular scrutiny, given  
4       the issue of sexual safety in your list of issues.

5       Finally, one comment, if I may, in relation to  
6       out-of-area placements, and we note, as your counsel  
7       noted, the difficulties you have faced in determining  
8       the reasons for out-of-area placements. This is  
9       an important area for the Inquiry to investigate, it is  
10      in your list of issues. Dr Davidson's report touches on  
11      it and it is important because, Chair, you will recall  
12      the commemorative evidence and the huge personal impact  
13      that an out-of-area placement of a patient or a beloved  
14      family member has on a family who are still here.

15      Again, we note that your learned counsel has told us  
16      that virtually no quantifiable data currently available  
17      on how the placements which occurred out of area were  
18      distributed, and it may be impossible to obtain those.  
19      Again, we suggest this highlights the need for you to  
20      gather patient notes, to gather family and patient  
21      recollections, and to analyse this area, this issue of  
22      out-of-area placements by case studies where the  
23      overarching national data is going to be difficult to  
24      obtain or difficult to understand.

25      So, Chair, moving forward, we are grateful, as

1 I say, for the delivery of the information that your  
2 Inquiry has received so far. But, if I may summarise  
3 really what I have said now and in the two previous  
4 papers really in six points: the first is we, at least,  
5 as Core Participants -- and we believe all the other  
6 Core Participants too -- would be grateful for increased  
7 greater disclosure on a rolling basis, in good time  
8 through a usable platform; we would be grateful to be  
9 involved in good time and substantial time before  
10 hearings happen; we would be grateful if there is  
11 an increased focus, as we know there will be as the  
12 Inquiry moves forward, on drawing on the experience and  
13 perspectives of the different recognised legal  
14 representatives and Core Participants; the fourth point  
15 is the involvement of your statistician early in this  
16 data gathering process -- we understand from the  
17 language used in my learned friend's presentation that  
18 the Inquiry will seek the assistance of Professor  
19 Donnelly on this material, and we are grateful for that.

20 If I may then be so bold as to put the fifth point  
21 this way: we invite the Inquiry not to be so wedded to  
22 timetables that the participation of Core Participants  
23 and their recognised legal representatives, so that's  
24 us, is rushed and last minute because we do invite the  
25 Inquiry to consider that the Core Participants will be

1       able to bring their experience and their help to you to  
2       bear better if there is a little bit more time to digest  
3       material.

4             So, finally, we do invite you to consider your  
5       timetable for hearings going forwards. I have already  
6       made some suggestions about those, we will make some  
7       more in written submissions at the end of this hearing.

8             We invite you to consider that it might be helpful  
9       to adjourn hearings that are already listed. It might  
10      be helpful to change them to different dates or to  
11      shorten or elongate the hearing spells that you have  
12      already identified. It might be a useful and  
13      cost-effective use of everyone's time and effort if the  
14      pace and the timing is driven by the evidence you obtain  
15      and the issues as they are developing, rather than  
16      necessarily sticking with a timetable which is set.

17            So, Chair, we are really grateful for those papers,  
18      we are very grateful indeed for the opportunity to  
19      engage with them and look forward to doing more of that.

20            Thank you.

21   MS HARRIS: Chair, that's the conclusion of the evidence to  
22      be presented today the Inquiry will not be sitting  
23      tomorrow but we will sit again at 10.00 on Thursday when  
24      we will hear expert evidence about the provision of  
25      mental health inpatient care.



1 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much, indeed. Thank you. 10.00  
2 on Thursday.  
3 (3.33 pm)  
4 (The Inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am  
5 on Thursday, 8 May 2025)  
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## I N D E X

SIR ROBERT BEHRENS (sworn) .....	3
Questioned by MR GRIFFIN .....	3
Presentation on mental health services .....	102
provided to Essex NHS patients by DR ILOZUE	
Response to presentation by MR SNOWDEN .....	132