

Thursday, 1 May 2025

(10.00 am)

THE CHAIR: Morning, Mr Griffin.

MR GRIFFIN: Thank you very much and good morning, Chair.

Today we'll be hearing a summary by Counsel to the Inquiry, Charlotte Godber, in relation to inquests. After that, we'll have a short break of about 15 minutes, and we will then be hearing from Fiona Murphy KC, who will present a response on behalf of the bereaved Core Participants represented by Bhatt Murphy, Bindmans, Leigh Day, Irwin Mitchell and Bates Wells. Then we'll be hearing from Steven Snowden KC on behalf of the Core Participants represented by HJA.

Chair, Ms Godber's presentation is described as a "high-level introduction" and will not consider individual deaths. However, this morning, there may be reference to individuals who have died, and consideration of bereaved families' experience of inquests and the difficulties there, and those may, in themselves, be distressing and difficult to listen to. For some, it may not be possible to sit through this session, and I want to make clear again this morning that anyone is welcome to leave the hearing room at any point.

I'd like to remind people that emotional support is

1 available for all of those who require it, the wellbeing
2 of those participating in the Inquiry is extremely
3 important to the Inquiry. We have support staff from
4 Hestia who are in the room, I'm asking them to raise
5 their hands, they're wearing orange scarves and have
6 orange lanyards, and there's a private room downstairs
7 where you can talk to the Hestia support staff if you
8 require emotional support at all during this hearing.
9 Or, if you need to, you can speak to a member of the
10 Inquiry team and we can put you in touch with them,
11 we're wearing purple lanyards.

12 If you're watching online, information about
13 emotional support can be found on the Lampard Inquiry
14 website at lampardinquiry.org.uk, and under the support
15 tab near the top right-hand corner.

16 We want all of those engaging with the Inquiry to
17 feel safe and supported.

18 Chair, with that, I will hand over to Charlotte
19 Godber.

20 MS GODBER: Good morning.

21 THE CHAIR: Good morning, Ms Godber.

22 Presentation on inquests and Prevention of Future Death
23 reports by MS GODBER

24 MS GODBER: Thank you. This paper is a high-level
25 introduction to and overview of the inquest procedure.

1 It is not intended to provide a detailed analysis of the
2 coronial process in England and Wales.

3 Where possible this paper engages again at a high
4 level with areas that are likely to have been relevant
5 to inquests arising out of inpatient deaths that come
6 within the scope of this Inquiry. The Inquiry is
7 grateful to those Core Participants who have engaged
8 with and responded to this paper, providing helpful
9 clarifications and assistance with what is a somewhat
10 complex area of law.

11 The Inquiry notes the expertise, particularly of
12 some of those who represent Core Participants, and the
13 real-life experiences of many Core Participants.

14 This paper does not seek to provide a detailed
15 analysis of the particular issues relating to specific
16 inquests or the actual real-life experiences of family
17 members and loved ones who have attended and
18 participated in inquests. That evidence is important to
19 the Inquiry but it is not explored here in this paper
20 nor does this paper seek to delve into complex legal
21 arguments. That might defeat its purpose of providing
22 hopefully a helpful overview.

23 Later in these public hearings, the Inquiry will
24 hear from the Chief Executive of the charity INQUEST,
25 Deborah Coles. She has provided a statement and

1 exhibited several reports, including submissions made to
2 Parliament and summary reports of the listening days
3 facilitated by INQUEST, all of which are of interest to
4 the Inquiry. Ms Coles is well placed to give a broad
5 picture from her experience of providing support to the
6 families and the bereaved who have attended inquests.

7 It is worth noting at this juncture, the Inquiry's
8 Terms of Reference and how inquests will be relevant
9 to the Inquiry's work, particularly 2(j), 2(k) and 8,
10 which state that the Inquiry will consider:

11 2(j) the quality, timeliness, openness and adequacy
12 of any response by or on behalf of the Trust(s) in
13 relation to concerns, complaints, whistleblowing,
14 investigations, inspections and reports (both internal
15 and external); and

16 "(k) the interaction between the Trust(s) and other
17 public bodies, (including but not limited to the
18 commissioners, coroners, professional regulators and the
19 Care Quality Commission).

20 "8. In undertaking its investigations the Inquiry
21 may consider information which is available from the
22 various published and unpublished reviews, court cases
23 and investigations which have so far concluded."

24 The majority of deaths in England and Wales are not
25 referred to His Majesty's Coroner. Of those that are

1 referred, even fewer will result in an inquest.

2 To put this into context, the latest "accredited
3 official statistics" published on the Ministry of
4 Justice website were published in 2024. They record
5 that in 2023, 581,367 deaths were registered and of
6 those, 34 per cent were referred to a coroner and, of
7 those, less than 20 per cent required an inquest. This
8 means that in 2023, there were 36,855 inquests. Those
9 figures can be further broken down to reveal that in
10 2023 across England and Wales, 492 deaths in state
11 detention were reported to coroners. This was down from
12 534 in 2022 and is reported to be driven by a 24 per
13 cent fall in deaths of those in Mental Health Act
14 detention. The Inquiry will approach these statistics
15 with caution, noting that, for example, the Care Quality
16 Commission also publish annual coronial data but adopt
17 a different methodology and use the financial year.

18 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 sets out in what
19 circumstances the coroner has a duty to investigate
20 a death. In England and Wales, an inquest is required
21 where the coroner has reason to suspect that:

22 The death was violent or unnatural;
23 Where the cause of death is unknown; or
24 Where the deceased died while in custody or
25 otherwise in state detention.

1 These types of deaths are called "reportable
2 deaths". They are referred to the coroner by the
3 police, a doctor or the Registrar for Births and Deaths.

4 To break that down a little more, "state detention"
5 includes those who died while detained under the Mental
6 Health Act 1983. The Inquiry's definition of "inpatient
7 death" is broader than that and includes deaths that
8 occurred when the deceased was not physically detained
9 at a unit or when the deceased had absconded or was on
10 leave, whether that was supervised or otherwise. Deaths
11 that occurring in these circumstances should still be
12 referred to the coroner, either by virtue of the
13 Ministry of Justice guidance, or by reference to the
14 relevant case law.

15 The Ministry of Justice guidance for registered
16 medical practitioners on the Notification of Deaths
17 Regulations states that a person's death should always
18 be notified to the coroner where there is reasonable
19 cause to suspect that the death was due to -- and here
20 "due to" meaning "more than minimally, negligibly or
21 trivially caused or contributed to by" -- any to the
22 following:

23 Poisoning including by an otherwise benign
24 substance;

25 Exposure to or contact with a toxic substance;

1 Use of a medicinal product, the use of a controlled
2 drug or psychoactive substance;
3 Violence, trauma or injury;
4 Self-harm -- which is further defined as "trauma or
5 injuries inflicted by themselves or their actions";
6 Neglect, including self-neglect;
7 The person was undergoing any treatment or procedure
8 of a medical or similar nature;
9 An injury or disease attributable to any employment
10 held by the person during the person's lifetime.
11 Each of the above are further defined in the
12 guidance but not repeated here, and many will not
13 feature in the types of inquest the Inquiry will hear
14 about but the full list is provided for completeness.
15 The Ministry of Justice guidance explains that
16 "state detention" relates to individuals being
17 compulsorily detained by a public authority, including
18 hospitals where the deceased person was detained under
19 mental health legislation. The guidance expressly
20 includes instances when the deceased person was on
21 a period of formal leave. As to the relevant case law,
22 the 2009 Court of Appeal case of *Savage v South Essex*
23 Partnership NHS Foundation Trust made it clear that
24 a death that occurs when an inpatient has absconded from
25 the inpatient facility, whether on leave or not, will be

1 treated as a reportable death within the "state
2 detention" definition.

3 That is not to say that all deaths that occur in
4 custody, in state detention, are treated equally. In
5 September 2023, the Independent Advisory Panel on Deaths
6 in Custody (IAPDC) published a report called "'More than
7 a paper exercise' -- Enhancing the impact of Prevention
8 of Future Deaths reports". The IAPDC drew attention to
9 the fact that, unlike deaths in other areas of
10 detention, those under mental health legislation do not
11 automatically attract an independent investigation, and
12 never by a dedicated independent body. The IAPDC
13 describe this as an "anomaly" and made recommendations
14 to the Department of Health and Social Care that serious
15 consideration was given to the creation of
16 an independent body for investigating the deaths of
17 those both formally and informally detained in mental
18 health settings. This is an area the Inquiry intends to
19 explore in more detail.

20 Save for those inpatients who died of natural
21 causes, for example older patients who may have suffered
22 from other physical health conditions not directly
23 related to their mental health, all of the deaths that
24 fall within the scope of this Inquiry should, certainly
25 under the current legislation, guidance and case law,

1 have been referred to the coroner and ought to have
2 resulted in an inquest. Owing to the significant
3 difficulties in determining the number of deaths in
4 scope, it may never be possible to verify which deaths
5 resulted in an inquest and which did not.

6 Not every inquest that was conducted would have
7 required the coroner to provide narrative findings in
8 terms of how the deceased died. It is also not possible
9 to assess whether the coroner would have been obliged to
10 provide a Prevention of Future Deaths report. I will
11 return to narrative findings or conclusions, as they are
12 called, and Prevention of Future Death reports shortly,
13 to provide a little more detail on what they are.

14 It is of note that, despite the significant number
15 of deaths that tragically come within the scope of this
16 Inquiry and the likelihood that those deaths would have
17 resulted in inquests, so far the Inquiry has only been
18 provided with copies of 32 Prevention of Future Deaths
19 reports and eight findings of neglect, seven from EPUT
20 and one from St Andrew's Healthcare. The Inquiry will
21 continue to seek more information on the inquests that
22 did occur and for which there must be available data.

23 The next sections of this paper will consider the
24 practice and procedure for inquests in England and
25 Wales, funding for representation at inquests, when

1 a jury is required, when Article 2 of the European
2 Convention on Human Rights is engaged, conclusions and
3 the procedure for Prevention of Future Death reports
4 (PFD reports). A summary of the evidence the Inquiry
5 has received so far is then set out.

6 While all inquests in England and Wales are
7 conducted within a singular statutory framework -- the
8 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and a framework of
9 regulations -- the practice and procedures for inquests
10 varies in different areas of the country and between
11 different coroners. In Essex, there is some information
12 available on the Essex County Council Coroner's website
13 but it is often an area of mystery for the bereaved who
14 suddenly find themselves involved in the coronial
15 process.

16 There are currently approximately 453 coroners in
17 England and Wales. They are appointed by but
18 independent of the local authority and their
19 jurisdiction is determined by geographical area. There
20 are currently 81 coroner areas across England and Wales.
21 Where the deceased's body is found will determine which
22 coroner area is responsible for conducting the
23 investigation.

24 A coroner is an independent, judicial office holder,
25 they must be a legally qualified barrister or solicitor.

1 It is also possible to become a coroner if you are
2 a fellow of the Institute of Legal Executives and
3 satisfy the judicial appointment eligibility condition,
4 which means having five years of experience whilst
5 holding that qualification. Coroners should be under
6 the age of 75 and are subject to the appointment and
7 eligibility conditions set out in the Coroners and
8 Justice Act. Some coroners, as well as being legally
9 qualified, may also be medically qualified but this is
10 not a requirement for the role. Coroners work with
11 assistant coroners and coroner's officers who assist the
12 coroner in managing administrative tasks related to the
13 inquest. Many Core Participants will have liaised most
14 directly with the coroner's officer who is responsible
15 for corresponding with relatives and witnesses,
16 collecting evidence and overseeing the running of the
17 proceedings. In a complex inquest, the coroner may also
18 appoint counsel to the inquest and solicitors to the
19 inquest.

20 When a death is reported to the coroner, an inquest
21 should be completed within six months of the coroner
22 being made aware of the death or "as soon as reasonably
23 practicable". In reality, most inquests take much
24 longer than six months to complete. A final hearing can
25 sometimes be over a year after the initial report of the

1 death and, in some cases, significantly longer than
2 a year. The latest Government statistics available for
3 2023 record the average time taken to complete
4 an inquest is 31.5 weeks, this represented an increase
5 of 1.3 weeks from the 2022 average. Those averages
6 must, however, be treated with real caution, especially
7 in respect of the types of inquests that follow
8 an inpatient death. Core Participants' legal
9 representatives would wish to bring to your attention,
10 Chair, inquests that have not been concluded, five,
11 seven and eight years after the inquest was formally
12 opened. As mentioned earlier, some of the legal
13 representatives for Core Participants have significant
14 experience as inquest practitioners. They and the
15 families they represent know all too well about the
16 intolerable wait endured by those who are grieving,
17 which, as you can imagine, compounds the distress and
18 anxiety experienced.

19 Returning to the procedure for an inquest. When
20 a death is reported, the coroner must first consider the
21 information available at the time and determine whether
22 an inquest is required. Where there is insufficient
23 information to make a decision, the coroner may open
24 a preliminary investigation before opening an inquest.
25 Where there is sufficient information and the coroner

1 determines that an inquest is required, they may open
2 the inquest and then adjourn for further investigations.

3 When an inquest has been opened and it is deemed
4 necessary to establish the "medical cause of death",
5 a post-mortem examination, or autopsy, will normally be
6 carried out in order to establish the probable medical
7 cause of death. After the post-mortem the coroner may
8 determine that an inquest is not necessary.

9 If, after receiving the post-mortem report,
10 an inquest is still required, the coroner will consider
11 whether or not they are required to suspend the inquest.
12 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 requires the coroner
13 to suspend an investigation on the request of
14 a prosecuting authority, such as the Crown Prosecution
15 Service, the Health and Safety Executive or the Care
16 Quality Commission. The inquest will normally be
17 suspended until the outcome of any other proceedings.
18 A police investigation or prosecution does not always
19 require the inquest process to be put on hold, however.
20 It may be possible, in certain circumstances, for the
21 inquest process, especially the preliminary stages, to
22 proceed alongside an investigation, including a criminal
23 investigation.

24 If a criminal investigation results in a criminal
25 conviction for murder or manslaughter, then the inquest

1 may be concluded without a formal hearing, unless "the
2 senior coroner thinks there is sufficient reason for
3 resuming [their investigation]". When a death has
4 occurred in custody, the Chief Coroner's Guidance notes
5 that the state has a "particular duty to conduct
6 a public investigation before an independent judicial
7 tribunal, in which the deceased's relatives can
8 participate", meaning that an inquest is more likely to
9 be resumed. The outcome of an inquest resumed in these
10 circumstances must be consistent with the outcome of the
11 criminal proceedings. For example, where there has been
12 a conviction for murder or manslaughter, the death will
13 be recorded as "unlawful killing". The coroner or jury
14 may also provide a narrative conclusion which
15 supplements the short form conclusion of "unlawful
16 killing", and/or they may determine that a conclusion of
17 "unlawful killing" was contributed to by neglect. Where
18 there is no conviction, the coroner will resume the
19 inquest process. It is recognised by the Inquiry that
20 whenever a referral is made to a prosecuting authority,
21 no matter the outcome of an investigation and/or
22 prosecution, the impact on the families and loved ones
23 of the deceased will inevitably involve a further
24 intolerable wait. The Inquiry has heard from families
25 about how incredibly distressing this can be.

1 Moving to the scope of the inquest.

2 The sole purpose of an inquest is for the coroner to
3 determine:

4 Who the deceased was;

5 Where they came by their death;

6 When they came by their death; and

7 How they came by their death.

8 It is often this last question, "how", that requires
9 detailed investigation and consideration by the coroner,
10 in order to understand and draw conclusions about how
11 the death came about. In Article 2 inquests, which are
12 considered in more detail shortly, the question of "how"
13 is expanded to "how and in what circumstances the
14 deceased came by their death".

15 In respect of each of these questions -- who, where,
16 when, and how -- the coroner will determine the scope of
17 the inquest.

18 The scope will determine what evidence will be
19 required, who will provide that evidence and how that
20 evidence will be presented, for example in person, by
21 way of an expert report or a written statement. The
22 coroner can appoint "interested persons" and expert
23 witnesses.

24 An interested person is broadly comparable to a Core
25 Participant at a statutory inquiry, such as this.

1 An interested person is someone the coroner is
2 considered to have a "sufficient interest" in the
3 investigation. That may be anyone the coroner considers
4 may have relevant information about the deceased and how
5 they died. Section 47(2)(f) of the Coroners and Justice
6 Act 2009 expressly includes, "a person who may, by
7 an act or omission have caused or contributed to the
8 death of the deceased, or whose employee or agent may
9 have done so". An interested person would normally be
10 legally represented at the inquest. For family members,
11 however, this is often not possible, due to the lack of
12 state funding.

13 The coroner will often invite the family members of
14 the deceased person to provide a witness statement.
15 Coroners may also invite the family to provide a pen
16 portrait to tell the coroner or jury more about the life
17 of the person at the heart of the inquest. This Inquiry
18 has adopted a similar approach to receiving
19 commemorative and impact evidence.

20 State funding, called "Legal Aid", is rarely
21 available for families in inquest proceedings, leaving
22 the bereaved to fund legal representation themselves or
23 find a legal representative who is able to provide legal
24 representation for free. Some families may be able to
25 rely on insurance policies but the charity INQUEST tells

1 the Inquiry that this is incredibly rare and that the
2 majority of bereaved families engaging in inquests are
3 left without any representation.

4 The charity INQUEST has campaigned on the issue of
5 Legal Aid funding for bereaved families in inquests
6 where the state is represented. In January 2022 the
7 availability of non-means tested Legal Aid in inquests
8 was extended but the circumstances where Legal Aid
9 funding is available to bereaved families remains
10 limited.

11 The House of Commons Justice Committee's report on
12 the Coroner Service commented on the limited provision
13 of Legal Aid for the bereaved. The Committee drew
14 attention to what they described as an unfair
15 distinction between the bereaved and public bodies in
16 terms of representation and suggested that the Ministry
17 of Justice ensure "equality of arms". The Government
18 response to the Committee in September 2021 indicated
19 that this issue would be further considered in response
20 to Bishop James Jones' report called "The patronising
21 disposition of unaccountable power" a report to ensure
22 the pain and suffering of the Hillsborough families is
23 not repeated. The previous Government responded in
24 December 2023 and committed to providing Legal Aid for
25 the bereaved following public disasters. A Government

1 policy paper committed to "seeking to further understand
2 the experience of bereaved families at other inquests
3 where the state is represented". At this time, we
4 understand, there have been no changes to the
5 availability of funding for families and the bereaved.

6 Moving now to the inquest timeline and procedure.

7 The coroner may arrange a pre-inquest review with
8 interested persons, including family members, and, at
9 that pre-inquest review, the coroner will determine what
10 the relevant issues are, what evidence is required and
11 when that evidence should be provided by. A date for
12 the inquest is then fixed and witnesses are notified.
13 In more complex inquests, including "Article 2
14 inquests", there are likely to be several lengthy
15 pre-inquest review and preliminary hearings required.

16 Where a pre-inquest review is not required, the
17 coroner/coroner's office will communicate the scope of
18 the inquest to interested persons, witnesses and family
19 members either directly or via their legal
20 representatives.

21 Section 7 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 sets
22 out when a jury will be mandatory, including when the
23 senior coroner has reason to suspect:

24 That the deceased died while in custody or otherwise
25 in state detention, and the death was either violent or

1 unnatural or the cause of death is unknown;

2 That the death result from an act or omission of
3 a police officer in the "purported execution of the
4 officer's duty"; or

5 That the death was caused by a "notifiable accident,
6 poisoning or disease".

7 A coroner may also call a jury where they think
8 there is sufficient reason for doing so.

9 Where a jury is empanelled on an inquest they will
10 be responsible for determining the conclusions of the
11 inquest. The jury do this by hearing all of the
12 evidence and with guidance from the coroner. The
13 coroner will set out the conclusions that are open to
14 the jury and set the out the legal tests which must be
15 met before they document their conclusions on the Record
16 of Inquest form.

17 Article 2 inquests.

18 Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights
19 (ECHR) is enshrined in UK law by the Human Rights Act
20 1998. It imposes substantive obligations on the State
21 "not to take life without justification and also to
22 establish a framework of laws, precautions, procedures
23 and means of enforcement, which will, to the greatest
24 extent reasonably practicable, protect life".

25 An Article 2 inquest, also called a "Middleton

1 inquest", is held when the State or its agents may have
2 failed in its negative obligation to refrain from taking
3 life, or in its positive obligation to take appropriate
4 measures to safeguard life.

5 Whether an inquest should be an Article 2 inquest or
6 not is a decision normally taken at the pre-inquest
7 review stage. The coroner may hear submissions on the
8 issue before deciding whether or not to make the inquest
9 an Article 2 inquest. Throughout the inquest, it
10 remains open to the coroner to make the inquest
11 an Article 2 inquest if there are reasons to do so.

12 The case of *Middleton v West Somerset Coroner* held
13 that, in order to comply with the State's obligations
14 under Article 2, the statutory question "how" is
15 extended to "by what means and in what circumstances the
16 deceased came by their death". The Coroners Benchbook
17 notes that "because of the wide discretion afforded to
18 coroners, even an inquest where Article 2 procedural
19 obligations are not engaged, may investigate the broader
20 circumstances of the death if the touchstone of possible
21 causation is met". As with a non-Article 2 inquest --
22 sometimes referred to as a Jamieson inquest -- the
23 findings, determinations and conclusion of the coroner
24 or jury are recorded on a Record of Inquest form and may
25 include a narrative conclusion.

1 Article 2 may be engaged where, on the evidence,
2 there are grounds for suspecting that a death may
3 involve a breach by the State by one of the substantive
4 obligations imposed by Article 2 -- often referred to as
5 an "arguable" breach of a substantive Article 2 ECHR
6 obligation. This may be in circumstances where the
7 State or its agents knew or ought to have known at the
8 time, of a real and immediate risk to the life of the
9 individual and failed to take reasonable steps to
10 preserve life. Those reasonable steps must have been
11 within its powers and considered reasonable in order to
12 prevent that risk.

13 "Risk" is defined as a significant and substantial
14 risk, rather than a remote or fanciful one. The risk
15 will be immediate if it is present and continuing. It
16 is not necessary for the risk to be apparent just before
17 death. It must be a risk to life, rather than a risk of
18 harm or serious harm.

19 "Real" is defined by what was known or ought to have
20 been known at the time.

21 Where an individual was detained by the State, in
22 custody or under the Mental Health Act 1983, and their
23 death was an "unnatural death", Article 2 will
24 automatically be engaged and it is not necessary to
25 consider whether there has been an "arguable breach" of

1 the Article 2 substantive duties.

2 As you can see, Chair, whether an inquest is
3 an Article 2 inquest or not is not always
4 straightforward and may involve complex legal
5 submissions. You may think this is relevant then to the
6 issue of whether or not families are legally represented
7 at inquests. While some of these issues fall beyond the
8 scope of your Terms of Reference, it is necessary to
9 outline them here to assist with the Inquiry's
10 understanding of the different types of inquest and the
11 types of findings that are open to the coroner or jury
12 to consider and record on the Record of Inquest form.

13 Once the coroner has determined whether a jury is
14 required, whether the inquest engages Article 2, the
15 scope of the inquest, who the interested persons are,
16 what evidence is required and has set a timetable for
17 receiving evidence, the next step is to conduct the
18 inquest hearings.

19 Inquest hearings are normally held in public, that
20 is to say that members of the public are free to attend
21 the hearing and listen to the proceedings. Since the
22 Covid pandemic, many inquests can be attended remotely
23 via a video link, there are rare occasions where it may
24 be in the interests of justice or national security for
25 an inquest to be held in private.

1 The coroner's court is one of investigation and
2 enquiry. The process for hearing evidence is
3 inquisitorial. In an inquest, there are no formal
4 allegations or accusations. While the hearings should
5 not be adversarial, we understand from listening to
6 family members and the bereaved who have attended
7 inquests, that unfortunately this has not always been
8 their experience. Again, that may be a matter that is
9 beyond the scope of this Inquiry but it is important
10 nevertheless to acknowledge those experiences which add
11 to the trauma of the bereaved.

12 During the inquest, statements and reports are
13 provided to the coroner and shared with interested
14 persons. Under Rule 23 of the inquest rules, the
15 coroner can admit some documentary evidence without
16 calling a witness to give the evidence in person. Other
17 evidence will be given "live" by witnesses.

18 The order in which witnesses give evidence is not
19 prescribed but the coroner will often hear evidence
20 first from the pathologist before then going through the
21 evidence and the witnesses in the most logical way,
22 often in chronological order of the events leading up to
23 the death. Where the coroner asks questions of
24 witnesses, the witnesses will swear an oath or
25 affirmation to tell the truth. After the coroner has

1 asked their questions, an interested person may also ask
2 questions of a witness, normally this is done by the
3 legal representative of the interested person. Where
4 there is a jury, jurors are also permitted the
5 opportunity to ask questions of a witness. All
6 questions must be directed towards assisting the
7 coroner. The purpose of the questions is not to
8 apportion blame or raise accusations. Finally, the
9 witness may be asked questions by their own legal
10 representative, unless a different order of questioning
11 has been agreed by the coroner.

12 After hearing all of the evidence, the coroner will
13 hear submissions from the interested persons' legal
14 representatives on the law, including representations as
15 to which conclusions should be considered by the coroner
16 or left to the jury. Submissions on the facts of "who
17 the deceased was and how, when and where the deceased
18 came by his or her death" are not permitted.

19 It is a common misconception that a coroner or
20 an inquest jury arrive at a verdict and/or that the
21 coroner has the power to apportion blame for the death.
22 At the end of the inquest there will, instead, be
23 conclusions.

24 After hearing all of the evidence and legal
25 submissions, the coroner or jury will then make their

1 findings on each of the four questions: who, where, when
2 and how. All conclusions will require the form of
3 words, some conclusions will simply require more words
4 a "narrative conclusion", and some will require fewer
5 words and may be dealt with by way of a "short form
6 conclusion". A short form conclusion may record one of
7 the following:

8 Accident or misadventure;

9 Alcohol/drug related;

10 Industrial disease;

11 Lawful or unlawful killing;

12 Natural causes;

13 Open, meaning that there is insufficient evidence to
14 record another conclusion. This does not mean however
15 that the case is left open, in case further evidence
16 appears. An open conclusion is a "final conclusion".
17 It should be noted that an open conclusion is to be
18 discouraged save where strictly necessary;

19 Road traffic collision;

20 Stillbirth;

21 Suicide.

22 Some conclusions may include more than one of the
23 above list and may also reference neglect, for example
24 "natural causes contributed to by neglect". Neglect is
25 not, however, considered a primary cause of death and is

1 not in itself a conclusion.

2 In a non-Article 2 or Jamieson inquest the coroner
3 may provide a "narrative conclusion" to enable the
4 coroner to briefly describe the circumstances by which
5 the death came about. This must be brief, neutral and
6 factual, avoiding expressing any judgement or opinion.

7 Whereas in an Article 2 or Middleton inquest it
8 would be unlawful for the coroner to direct a jury so as
9 to prevent them from entering a "judgemental conclusion
10 of a factual nature". Permitted judgemental words in
11 an Article 2 inquest include "inadequate",
12 "inappropriate", "insufficient", "lacking",
13 "unsuitable", "failure", "because" and "contributed to".
14 An Article 2 narrative conclusion will not necessarily
15 be lengthy, its purpose is to briefly summarise the
16 jury's factual conclusions, as stated in the case of
17 Middleton.

18 After completing the Record of Inquest and any other
19 necessary paperwork, the death can be registered. The
20 findings and conclusions of a coroner's inquest can be
21 challenged by way of Judicial Review or via Section 13
22 of the Coroners Act 1988.

23 We are told by our Core Participants that the
24 absence of a satisfactory appeals process is a matter
25 which causes real distress and frustration amongst

1 families and the bereaved.

2 Turning now to the Prevention of Future Deaths
3 reports.

4 The coroner has a duty to make a Prevention of
5 Future Deaths report where anything revealed by
6 the investigation gives rise to a concern that
7 circumstances creating a risk of other deaths will occur
8 or will continue to exist in the future, and, in the
9 coroner's opinion, action should be taken to prevent the
10 occurrence or continuation of such circumstances, or to
11 eliminate or reduce the risk of death created by such
12 circumstances. The coroner must, as per paragraph 7 of
13 schedule 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, report
14 the matter to a person who the coroner believes may have
15 power to take such action. A Prevention of Future
16 Deaths report is then made to a person, organisation,
17 local authority, Government department or agency. All
18 reports and responses must also be sent to the Chief
19 Coroner.

20 Prior to the Coroners and Justice Act 1989, PFD
21 reports were called "Rule 43 reports" in reference to
22 Rule 43 of the Coroners Rules 1984. The decision by
23 Parliament to enshrine Prevention of Future Deaths
24 reports in legislation placed a duty on coroners not
25 only to decide how somebody came by their death, but

1 also, where appropriate, to report about that death with
2 a view to preventing future deaths.

3 The Inquiry's Rule 9 Request to providers for PFD
4 reports included a request for any Rule 43 reports.

5 It is worth noting the Chief Coroner's Guidance
6 which has recognised the importance of PFDs to bereaved
7 families and the public at large. The Guidance states:

8 "PFDs are vitally important if society is to learn
9 from deaths. Coroners have a duty to decide how
10 somebody came by their death. They also have
11 a statutory duty (rather than simply a power), where
12 appropriate, to report about deaths with a view to
13 preventing future deaths. And a bereaved family wants
14 to be able to say: 'His death was tragic and terrible,
15 but at least it's less likely to happen to somebody
16 else'. PFDs are not intended as punishment; they are
17 made for the benefit of the public."

18 A PFD report is sent to the person or authority
19 which is deemed to have the power to take appropriate
20 steps to reduce the risk of further deaths. That person
21 or authority then has a mandatory duty to respond to the
22 report within 56 days, unless the coroner agrees to
23 an extension. The Coroner's (Investigations)
24 Regulations 2013 (Regulation 29(3)) requires that the
25 written response contains:

1 Details of any action that has been taken or which
2 it is proposed will be taken by the person giving the
3 response or any other person whether in response to the
4 report or otherwise, and set out a timetable of the
5 action taken or proposed to be taken; or

6 An explanation as to why no action is proposed.

7 The coroner can also refer an individual to their
8 regulator, for example a doctor can be referred to the
9 General Medical Council and nurses can be referred to
10 the Nursing and Midwifery Council. If there is
11 a criticism, then the professional person has a duty to
12 refer themselves to their regulatory body.

13 The Office for National Statistics provides annual
14 reports on data provided by coroners in England and
15 Wales. In 2023, of the 195,000 deaths reported to
16 coroners, 1 per cent of those inquests, 569, resulted in
17 PFD reports being issued. This represented an increase
18 of 41 per cent compared to 2022. These figures provide
19 a current picture, further work will be done by the
20 Inquiry to analyse the coroners' statistics which go
21 back to 1995.

22 It is also worth noting the Preventable Deaths
23 Tracker, which since 2013 has collated a database of all
24 PFD reports in England and Wales. The Inquiry is aware
25 of this valuable resource, and will consider how best to

1 use this and other sources of information on PFD
2 reports.

3 PFD reports are now published on the judiciary
4 website and, where provided, responses are also
5 published. It is noted that in 2025, for the first
6 time, the coroner published a table of "non-responses to
7 PFD reports" for the previous year. The Inquiry is
8 seeking responses and other relevant inquest material.

9 Moving now to the evidence that has been received by
10 the Lampard Inquiry.

11 Rule 9 letters on the subject of "Inquests -- PFD
12 reports and neglect findings" were sent to EPUT, NELFT,
13 the Priory Group, St Andrew's Healthcare and Cygnet, to
14 ascertain what material they held in the first instance.

15 The EPUT response is 37 pages long. It includes
16 a 25-page statement and three appendices. The statement
17 is provided by Ann Sheridan, Executive Nurse at EPUT.
18 She has been in post since 9 February 2024.

19 There are 269 exhibits to the statement.

20 EPUT states that, "the Trust does not hold a central
21 record of all PFDs and ROIs issued for the entire
22 relevant period". Ms Sheridan's statement then sets out
23 the history of data management systems used by the Trust
24 and its predecessors. She accepts that, "It is possible
25 that the Trust would have received other PFD/Rule 43

1 reports, however we have been unable to locate the PFD
2 or find indications that further reports were received
3 within our records". The searches that have been run on
4 the Trust's electronic devices have "relied upon the
5 documents being saved with the patient's correct
6 spelling of name".

7 EPUT has located 32 PFD reports. They have provided
8 the PFDs and responses for the 32 identified; supporting
9 material for 30 out of the 32; and Records of Inquest
10 for 22 of the 32. Some material is missing and
11 Ms Sheridan states that the Trust is continuing to
12 search for this information.

13 The number of PFD reports found by EPUT and provided
14 to the Inquiry is far smaller than the inquiry had
15 anticipated. The Inquiry has adopted a trauma-informed
16 approach to disclosure of this material and will
17 disclose the PFD reports, the responses and supporting
18 material where available to the families before
19 disclosing this material to all Core Participants. This
20 will allow the families to discuss these materials with
21 their legal representatives. What is set out in this
22 paper, Chair, is necessarily limited to a summary.

23 The first PFD report provided by EPUT dates back to
24 May 2001. The next PFD report is from March 2010, then
25 September 2011, there is also a report from February

1 2013 and another in June 2014. The numbers of reports
2 then increase. There are three PFD reports in 2015;
3 three PFD reports in 2016; five in 2017; one in 2018;
4 two from 2020; one in 2021; then seven in 2023; and five
5 in 2024. The Inquiry is of course mindful that the
6 numbers may be more reflective of EPUT's recordkeeping
7 and archiving of PFD reports than they are of the true
8 number of PFD reports received by EPUT since 2001.

9 The Inquiry is aware of a recent PFD report issued
10 in March 2025, which was after the response received
11 from EPUT to the Inquiry's Rule 9 Request. This recent
12 PFD report notes that a significant number of the
13 "serious causative failings" identified in it have
14 featured in previous PFD reports issued to EPUT, namely:
15 Communication; Training and Supervision; Recordkeeping;
16 Discharge Planning; Care Planning; Risk Assessment. The
17 coroner noted that these issues arose as recently as
18 October 2024 and February 2025.

19 A similar list was identified by EPUT in their
20 review of the 32 PFD reports. In a table, EPUT has
21 identified the following recurring themes:

22 Recordkeeping -- arose in 14 reports;
23 Communication -- arose in nine reports;
24 Clinical risk management -- arose in eight reports;
25 Referrals -- arose in six reports;

1 Involvement of family -- arose in six reports. For
2 the avoidance of doubt, the phrase "involvement of
3 family" is used by EPUT. The Inquiry understands this
4 to mean failure to engage with family members and loved
5 ones of the deceased;

6 Risk assessment management -- arose in four reports;
7 Medication -- in four reports;
8 Risky item -- in four reports;
9 Policies -- in four reports;
10 Care planning -- in four reports;
11 Environment -- in three reports;
12 Mental Health Act assessment -- arose in two
13 reports;

14 Electronic patient records -- arose in two reports;
15 Security -- arose in two reports;
16 Training -- arose in two reports;
17 Staffing -- in two reports;
18 Disengagement -- in two reports;
19 Observations -- in two reports.

20 EPUT have also provided information in respect of
21 a deceased patient whose death resulted in
22 correspondence with the coroner but not a PFD report.

23 70 narrative conclusions have been reviewed by EPUT
24 to identify adverse findings. 39 included adverse
25 findings against EPUT and/or its staff. Appendix B to

1 Ms Sheridan's statement details the 21 ROIs where
2 an adverse finding was made but there was no PFD report.
3 Seven returned a rider of neglect.

4 Themes across the seven conclusions were identified
5 by EPUT:

6 Failures in monitoring and observation protocols --
7 arose in three;

8 Inadequate risk assessments both at admission and/or
9 throughout care -- identified in all seven;

10 Lapses in care planning were also identified in all
11 seven.

12 EPUT set out the history so far as it is recorded of
13 their approach to responding to and learning from PFD
14 reports and to findings of neglect and other adverse
15 findings by the coroner.

16 EPUT have also set out their current approach to
17 learning lessons.

18 The Priory Group response is five pages long. It is
19 provided by Mark Rice-Thomson, Senior Investigations and
20 Inquest Manager. There are no exhibits.

21 In summary, after a review of all digitally held
22 records and paper-based archives, the Priory can confirm
23 that they have not received any PFD reports or Rule 43
24 reports, and there have been no findings of neglect
25 and/or adverse findings made at inquests in respect of

1 the Priory Group or its staff.

2 The Priory Group's statement outlines their general
3 approach and the processes they follow when they receive
4 a PFD report and/or a finding of neglect.

5 St Andrew's Healthcare's response is five pages
6 long. It is provided by Stuart Wallace, Data Protection
7 Officer/Senior Lawyer. There is one exhibit.

8 In summary, St Andrew's state that they have not
9 received any relevant PFD reports. There has been one
10 case where findings of neglect were recorded. This is
11 the case of Edwige Nsilu. The Record of Inquest and
12 statement provided to the coroner in response is
13 provided. The Inquiry has taken the same approach in
14 respect of this material, which will be provided to the
15 family before it is disclosed more widely.

16 St Andrew's have outlined their current approach in
17 respect of PFD reports in relation to other hospitals
18 not in Essex.

19 The Cygnet response is four pages long. It is
20 provided by Christian Joseph Young, General Counsel of
21 Cygnet Health Care Limited. There are two exhibits.

22 In summary, there were PFD reports identified during
23 the relevant period within the scope of the Inquiry.
24 When a PFD report is received by Cygnet, they follow the
25 "PFD process map", which is exhibited to their

1 statement. The current approach taken by Cygnet is also
2 set out in their statement.

3 Finally, Chair, some themes arise in respect of
4 inquests, the coronial process, data retention and the
5 need for oversight and monitoring of inquest findings
6 and PFD reports.

7 I opened by setting out the most recent data from
8 2023 concerning the number of inquests in England and
9 Wales and noted that of those inquests, 1 per cent
10 resulted in Prevention of Future Deaths reports being
11 made.

12 The Inquiry will consider the available data over
13 the relevant period and explore the approach to making
14 PFD reports and then how those reports are responded to,
15 not only by the relevant trusts, bodies and individuals,
16 but also by the regulators. Whether there is a gap in
17 the regulatory framework in terms of ongoing monitoring
18 and accountability is an issue this Inquiry is
19 particularly interested in.

20 MR GRIFFIN: Thank you.

21 Chair, we'll rise now, please, until 11.15.

22 THE CHAIR: Before we do, can I thank you very much,
23 Ms Godber, for your paper and your statement today, both
24 of which I have found really helpful and admirably
25 clear. Thank you very much indeed.

1 (10.55 am)

2 (A short break)

3 (11.15 am)

4 MR GRIFFIN: Chair, we now hear from Fiona Murphy KC.

5 THE CHAIR: Thank you.

6 Response to presentation by MS MURPHY

7 MS MURPHY: Chair, hello. I am, as you are aware,

8 instructed with Sophy Miles by Bhatt Murphy Solicitors

9 on behalf of the families bereaved by the tragic and

10 avoidable loss of Bethany Lilley and Edward Jackson in

11 the care of EPUT, and X4, a patient who will assist your

12 Inquiry with his lived experience of mental health

13 services in Essex.

14 This morning I will also address the perspectives of

15 those Core Participants who are represented by Bindmans,

16 Leigh Day, Irwin Mitchell and Bates Wells Solicitors.

17 Chair, you will have had sight of the detailed

18 written submissions responding to your team's initial

19 paper in relation to inquests, from my learned friends

20 Ms Sikand, King's Counsel, and Ms Profumo, on behalf of

21 the Core Participants instructing Leigh Day and Irwin

22 Mitchell; from Ms Campbell, King's Counsel, and

23 Mr Stoate, on behalf of those instructing Bindmans

24 Solicitors; and from Ms Morris, King's Counsel, and

25 Ms Lewis on behalf of INQUEST, who separately instruct

1 Bhatt Murphy.

2 It is no doubt apparent to you from those documents,
3 as it will be to your team, that the families'
4 perspectives and those of their champion, INQUEST,
5 informed by the skill and experience of colleagues at
6 the Bar and in the solicitors' firms instructed before
7 you, will prove an invaluable resource to your Inquiry,
8 and that those papers stand as a testament to the
9 importance of guaranteed rights of access to independent
10 information, advice and representation from families in
11 relation to any inquest involving public bodies, a topic
12 to which we will return.

13 We warmly welcome your Inquiry's consideration of
14 bereaved families' experience of inquests, touching upon
15 the deaths of their loved ones and your team's prompt
16 revision to its initial paper, in light of the
17 corrections as to the law, the procedure and the
18 bereaved families' experience, set out by my team and
19 colleagues.

20 We entirely support your team's intention to seek
21 out more information about the inquests that have
22 occurred and invite particular scrutiny of the evidence
23 placed before coroners in respect of lessons purportedly
24 learned at the point in time when each of those inquests
25 occurred, a topic to which we will also return.

1 This morning, we will address within the allocated
2 time, five topics. Firstly, the experience of bereaved
3 families participating in complex inquests where issues
4 of systemic and/or individual failings in mental health
5 services arise; secondly, the process towards and
6 issuing of Prevention of Future Deaths reports, PFDs;
7 thirdly the obstacles to timely identification of issues
8 of concern and achieving reliable datasets in relation
9 to inquests; fourthly, the need for an internal coronial
10 appeal process; and, finally, we will collate the topics
11 that we consider should be the focus of this aspect of
12 your investigations and recommendations that ought
13 clearly to be made, and which, in our view, are apparent
14 even at this very early stage.

15 In this presentation, we will, at times, offer brief
16 examples from the families' experiences, but note that
17 your Inquiry has sought extensive evidence from families
18 and it is also anticipated that your Inquiry will ensure
19 that evidence is placed before it in relation to the
20 providers' and oversight bodies' participation in the
21 relevant inquests. We will of course wish to offer
22 fuller observations when that material is available.

23 So our first topic, the bereaved's experience of the
24 inquest process.

25 We now know that there were an extraordinary and

1 shocking number of deaths of patients receiving mental
2 health treatment and/or seeking to access mental health
3 treatment in Essex over the last 25 years, and we now
4 know that far, far too many of those deaths arose from
5 the very same individual and system failings. From
6 neglect, and from a systematic failure to deliver a safe
7 service in Essex.

8 As your Inquiry has fully acknowledged, identifying
9 the scale of this tragedy remains a challenging and
10 important responsibility, and in your opening remarks
11 last September, Chair, you noted, "The tragedy is that
12 [your] Inquiry may never have a definitive number of
13 deaths that fall within the remit". Equally important,
14 as you have also fully acknowledged, is determining why
15 there was such horrendous delays in this systematic
16 pattern of failure being brought to light.

17 You will want to consider the barriers the families
18 faced in relation to their inquests, the providers'
19 conduct in relation to those inquests, especially
20 whether they discharged their duty of candour, the
21 providers' responses to inquest outcomes and the role of
22 the oversight bodies.

23 Chair, as your counsel, Mr Nicholas Griffin, King's
24 Counsel, also identified in his opening statement last
25 September, it was only through the determined

1 campaigning of bereaved families that this scandal was
2 brought to light and your Inquiry initiated. That
3 campaign ought never to have been necessary and it ought
4 never to have to happen again. The responsibility for
5 protecting the lives of others did not rest with those
6 families. We all share an enormous debt of gratitude
7 for their selfless and brave determination to save
8 others from the suffering they have endured.

9 The responsibility for protecting lives lies not
10 with the bereaved families but with the providers and
11 the oversight bodies, especially the Care Quality
12 Commission, whose responsibility it was to use the
13 powers vested in them to identify and remedy the
14 providers' deficiencies.

15 As I have mentioned, your Inquiry has sought
16 evidence from families concerning their experience.
17 Your Inquiry will learn of the barriers that were placed
18 in their path, of how their determination to seek the
19 truth was obstructed.

20 Sadly, the experience of bereaved families in
21 relation to mental health inquests in Essex is not
22 unique but there are particular characteristics of their
23 experience from which your Inquiry will derive
24 significant assistance, especially in understanding the
25 true causes of how this scandal came to be perpetuated.

1 All of this we know is at the forefront of your
2 considerations and that of your team.

3 The families experienced being unrepresented. Our
4 own clients, the family of Edward Jackson, who was just
5 18 years old at the time of his death, were
6 unrepresented in relation to his inquest. Others
7 experienced restrictions on securing Legal Aid, many
8 were not signposted to INQUEST, many were not assisted
9 at all with finding lawyers.

10 Lydia Fraser-Ward, represented by Bates Wells,
11 presses the important point that, "All families should
12 be made aware of their rights from the outset and
13 directed proactively to those who are best placed to
14 give effect to their rights". She felt "very largely
15 excluded" from her sister's inquest.

16 The families' experience has been of the death of
17 loved ones, "falling under the radar", and of
18 distressing and at times appalling delays.

19 Chair, my learned friend Ms Charlotte Godber has
20 helpfully highlighted some of the complexities
21 associated with identifying, especially at an early
22 stage, whether the investigative duty under Article 2
23 arises in relation to the deaths of those accessing or
24 seeking to access mental health services. As will be
25 immediately appreciated, with public funding for

1 families -- it is, of course, automatically available to
2 public bodies but, so far as families are concerned,
3 currently limited, in essence, to those inquests where
4 Article 2 is found to be engaged -- bereaved families
5 are placed in a cruel Catch-22. Without legal
6 representation, they cannot hope to navigate the
7 complexities of the legal landscape and, when this is
8 allied with a culture of institutional defensiveness,
9 families are rendered impotent when their voice and
10 their concerns ought to be at the heart of the inquest
11 process.

12 The institutional defensiveness of the providers has
13 taken many forms: in failing to place evidence of system
14 failings before the coroners' courts, in unreasonably
15 disputing the relevance of Article 2, in delaying and in
16 failing to provide disclosure.

17 The Guille family's experience was all too typical.
18 EPUT provided the disclosure in relation to Bethany
19 Lilley's inquest after the evidential phase of the
20 inquest was up and running.

21 There have also been shameful misrepresentations
22 that lessons have been learned when they have not. We
23 will return to the impact of this culture upon the
24 issuing of Prevention of Future Deaths reports in our
25 next topic.

1 These defensive behaviours caused real harm. They
2 caused the re-traumatisation of grieving families, they
3 obstruct the truth, they obstruct lesson learning and
4 they act as a fundamental bar and barrier to change.

5 An inquest, even, and perhaps especially, where the
6 death arises from systematic failures in the delivery of
7 mental health services, has the potential to have real
8 meaning for the families and to deliver important
9 learning and change. But the essential characteristics
10 of such inquests are too often absent.

11 Those essential characteristics are, first, the
12 legal representation of the bereaved enabling them to
13 seek out answers to their questions; secondly, genuine
14 discharge of the duty of candour on the part of provider
15 participants and oversight bodies; thirdly, early and
16 effective investigation of the death; and, fourthly, the
17 retention and early disclosure of all pertinent records,
18 including those held by oversight bodies.

19 A family's right to question witnesses before
20 an inquest is a longstanding and highly treasured
21 element of the inquest process. It is a right that
22 raises families from a position of impotence and silence
23 and places them, in this respect, on an equal footing
24 with the Trusts, with the providers, with the oversight
25 bodies and indeed the coroners.

1 Your counsel, Ms Godber, has highlighted the
2 similarities between Core Participants before a public
3 inquiry and interested persons before an inquest. The
4 families and those with lived experience urge your
5 Inquiry to afford them the opportunity to ask questions
6 before this Inquiry through their own lawyers: focused,
7 appropriate and non-repetitive questioning, of course;
8 questioning that would be in every way consistent with
9 your laudable goals of expedition and efficiency.

10 Chair, you will see that when the process works, the
11 content of records of inquest include truly meaningful
12 expanded narratives, often benefiting from the extremely
13 impressive perspectives of juries who bring the benefits
14 of paradigm fact finders and who can frame a record of
15 the inquest that most directly aligns with the public's
16 perspective.

17 You will wish to examine how the characteristics of
18 effective inquests can more consistently be applied in
19 relation to mental health deaths, as inquests offer the
20 potential to deliver a critically important check and
21 balance, where, as here, the extent of systematic
22 failings does not come to light from the providers or
23 from the oversight bodies' reporting, investigation,
24 auditing and inspection mechanisms. These are processes
25 that ought to complement and reinforce one another, but

1 that has not been the experience of the families we
2 represent.

3 Our second topic: reports to prevent future deaths.

4 Too often, institutional defensiveness and
5 complacency, failures to discharge the duty of candour,
6 and the submission of evidence that appropriate action
7 has been taken since the death, when it has not, mar the
8 bereaved's experience of inquests and obstruct their
9 effectiveness.

10 As identified by your counsel, in the event that
11 a coroner is satisfied by evidence that appropriate
12 action has been taken, the preconditions for the making
13 of a PFD report will not be considered to have been met.
14 Where that evidence is, in fact, inaccurate, the
15 opportunities for public accountability and the
16 prevention of future deaths will thereby be obstructed.

17 The position statement of EPUT's CEO Paul Scott to
18 this Inquiry, dated 27 March 2025 exemplifies this
19 stance of institutional defensiveness and complacency.
20 This was a statement sought by your Inquiry to afford
21 EPUT an opportunity to "reflect openly and candidly on
22 its practice and responsibilities during the relevant
23 period", to acknowledge where things went wrong, and to
24 explain the lessons learned.

25 The position statement is, by contrast, replete with

1 attempted justifications and excuses, and with vague and
2 generalised statements of confidence in an improved
3 service.

4 It serves your Inquiry ill for Mr Scott to state at
5 paragraph 25, when addressing the situation in September
6 2000 that, "The Trust already had, and continues to
7 have, a clear focus on safety".

8 Chair, we invite you to consider whether Mr Scott's
9 complacent recitation of policy change, allied with bold
10 assertions of improvement, without offering detail, and
11 the failure to address your Inquiry's request to
12 identify operational deficiencies is precisely the sort
13 of evidence that is too often placed before coroners and
14 which obstructs the discharge of their vital preventing
15 future deaths responsibilities.

16 There is an important current context to this
17 position statement. First, we have had our attention
18 drawn by your counsel to a PFD dating from as recently
19 as March 2025, which records, in relation to the
20 standard of care delivered by EPUT in October 2024 and
21 February of this year, a significant number of "serious,
22 causative failings", failings that had featured in
23 previous PFD reporting and which related to
24 communication, to training and supervision, to
25 recordkeeping, to discharge planning, to care planning

1 and to risk assessment, themes with which you, Chair,
2 will be fully familiar.

3 Secondly, we have learned from the evidence placed
4 before this phase of your Inquiry of EPUT's failure to
5 even maintain a centralised depository of records of
6 inquests and PFDs; you will note my learned colleagues'
7 expressions of a total lack of surprise about that.

8 The PFD process does, of course, have significant
9 limitations. There is an inconsistency in coronial
10 approach with variations in practice and it is dependent
11 upon the coroner's assessment as to whether, in his or
12 her opinion, action should be taken. As my learned
13 friend Ms Sikand, King's Counsel, and Ms Profumo explain
14 in the Leigh Day/Irwin Mitchell paper at paragraphs 27
15 and following, this is an entirely subjective exercise
16 and the duty does not crystallise until the coroner is
17 so satisfied. The experience is one of different
18 decisions on the same evidence, with Trust-interested
19 persons too often unreasonably weighing in to seek to
20 prevent the making of a report.

21 On this aspect the solution, we submit, and which we
22 will return in our fourth topic, is to enact the
23 intended internal appeal process.

24 A further limitation is the absence of any power
25 authorising a coroner to take any steps upon receipt of

1 an inadequate or vague response to PFD reports. For all
2 these reasons, the absence of a PFD cannot be taken as
3 evidence of an absence of a continuing risk to life, one
4 continuing since the original failing or failings and,
5 regrettably, your Inquiry can derive limited if any,
6 assistance from the absence of a PFD report in respect
7 of any particular death.

8 Preventing Future Deaths reports offer essential
9 opportunities for learning and for action. Their
10 usefulness has been undermined by institutional
11 defensiveness before coroners and inaction upon receipt
12 of reports. We look to you to make findings and
13 recommendations that will serve to strengthen the
14 effectiveness of this vital tool.

15 Our third topic: capturing issues of concern in
16 reliable datasets.

17 Chair, we acknowledge that you have identified that
18 reliable datasets are an essential driver in the
19 effecting of meaningful change. My learned friends
20 Mr Snowden, King's counsel, and Ms Campbell, King's
21 Counsel, powerfully addressed you on aspects of this
22 topic yesterday.

23 In relation to inquests, we have observed in our
24 paper that there is no cross-referencing in His
25 Majesty's Governmental statistics between deaths

1 reported to the CQC under CQC Regulation 17, that adopts
2 a term "detained or liable to be detained" and
3 notifications to the senior coroner pursuant to the
4 Notification of Deaths Regulations, Regulation 3(d),
5 which refers to the deaths of those "otherwise in state
6 detention".

7 As the CQC notifications pursuant to Regulation 17
8 capture patients under community treatment orders only
9 where they have already been re-called, there is, on the
10 face of it, no ready or adequate explanation for the
11 disparity in statistics between the two datasets.
12 Governmental statistics record 147 deaths in 2023 and
13 the CQC statistics record 264 in the financial year 2022
14 to 2023, and not even the reporting periods align.

15 Further, particular concerns arise regarding the
16 identification and notification of deaths to both the
17 CQC and senior coroner falling outside the Regulation 17
18 and Regulation 3(d) definitions, where either an issue
19 arises with regard to compliance with the systems and/or
20 operational duties under Article 2, in respect of
21 informal patients and those seeking to access services
22 in the community or, where an issue arises in relation
23 to the adequacy of a risk assessment prior to patients
24 being admitted, whether by reason of a decision being
25 arrived at not to detain, or through a bed not being

1 available.

2 Failures to reliably identify arguable breaches of
3 Article 2 compound the weaknesses in the inquest system
4 for the reasons already discussed and, as such,
5 qualitative and quantitative failings in CQC, HSE and
6 Serious Untoward Incident mechanisms have serious
7 impacts. Not only are bereaved families shut out from
8 non-means tested public funding, thus depriving them of
9 the means to remedy deficiencies in the inquest, but the
10 process is itself deprived of the benefits of
11 an expanded Article 2 inquiry.

12 Further, Section 5(2) of the Coroners and Justice
13 Act requires the expansion of the matters to be
14 ascertained, identified at Section 5(1) to include
15 avoiding a breach of any Convention rights. So we urge
16 careful scrutiny of the extent to which the Trusts, the
17 providers and the oversight bodies, adequately identify
18 and initiate Article 3 compliant investigations, in
19 respect of arguable breaches of the prohibition on
20 torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.

21 Of course, that is a duty that ought to be
22 discharged in all such circumstances and not only where
23 a death reveals a potential violation, and examples here
24 include circumstances where issues arise regarding
25 excessive restraint, restrictive practices, neglect, and

1 so on.

2 Our fourth topic: an internal coronial appeals
3 process.

4 Section 40 of the Coroners and Justice Act envisaged
5 an internal coronial appeals process. This provision
6 was not implemented at the time and was subsequently
7 allowed to lapse and eventually repealed. The
8 intention was to achieve consistency in coronial
9 approaches, including, significantly, in relation to
10 Preventing Future Deaths reports.

11 In our view, that appeal process ought reasonably to
12 include an opportunity for reconsideration of
13 contentious pre-inquest review hearings, including
14 whether Article 2 is arguably engaged -- too often
15 a highly contentious issue -- scope, disclosure, whether
16 the coroner will exercise discretion to sit with the
17 jury, all matters that lead to protracted argument and
18 delays, fuelled by institutional defensiveness and
19 a lack of consistency in coronial decision making.
20 A fast and efficient appeal process would make
21 a significant contribution to remedying those
22 deficiencies.

23 Our final and concluding topic: the matters for the
24 Inquiry's investigation and recommendation.

25 First, matters for your Inquiry's careful evidential

1 investigation. The quantitative and qualitative failings
2 in CQC, HSE and Serious Untoward Incident mechanisms,
3 and the contribution of those failings to undermining
4 coronial outcomes.

5 Secondly, the current structural failings in
6 relation to the capturing of issues of concern and
7 achieving reliable datasets.

8 Thirdly, the extent to which inquests are failing to
9 dovetail effectively with reporting, auditing,
10 investigation and inspection mechanisms.

11 Fourthly, identifying the structural barriers to the
12 identification and prioritisation of death clusters, by
13 which we mean those arising in concerning numbers, or
14 those arising from similar failings or from failures to
15 learn lessons identified in earlier inquests, and those
16 arguably arising from systematic failings.

17 Finally, scrutiny of the providers' discharge of
18 their duty of candour in their role as interested
19 persons before inquests, especially with regard to the
20 submission of evidence regarding remedial action and the
21 impact of such evidence upon the exercise of coronial
22 powers and duties to issue Preventing Future Deaths
23 reports.

24 My learned friend Ms Campbell, King's Counsel,
25 addressed you yesterday concerning the challenges to

1 testing the sincerity and authenticity of the provider's
2 promises for change. We urge you to carefully
3 scrutinise the providers' evidential contributions to
4 the Essex inquests.

5 In our view, that exercise will be probative, not
6 only of the structural barriers to effective inquest
7 processes but, more broadly, to the cultural and
8 institutional drivers for the systematic collapse of
9 acceptable service delivery in Essex.

10 As to recommendations, and with the important caveat
11 that our observations are necessarily preliminary at
12 this stage: first, implementation of Section 40 of the
13 Coroners and Justice Act, the internal appeals process;
14 secondly, endorsement of the Independent Advisory Panel
15 on Deaths in Custody's recommendation for the
16 establishment of an independent body to investigate
17 deaths of both informal and detained patients in mental
18 health settings; and, thirdly, INQUEST's call for
19 a national oversight mechanism.

20 Chair, we are grateful for the opportunity to
21 address you this morning and look forward to offering
22 the fullest possible assistance to the important work of
23 your Inquiry.

24 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much for a very thought-provoking
25 presentation. Thank you very much.

1 MR GRIFFIN: Chair, we will now hear from Steven Snowden KC.
2 We will just give him a moment to install himself.
3 Response to presentation by MR SNOWDEN
4 THE CHAIR: Good morning, Mr Snowden.
5 MR SNOWDEN: Chair, good morning again. We are very
6 grateful for a second opportunity to address you in
7 respect of, this time, of different papers from your
8 Counsel to the Inquiry.
9 I'm going to address you, it seems, to be the
10 fashion today, in five stages.
11 THE CHAIR: Yes.
12 MR SNOWDEN: First, a short introduction; second, some
13 comments on the evidence you've received so far as
14 described in that paper; third, suggestions of evidence
15 that could and should be obtained; fourth, some brief
16 comments on disclosure as between the Inquiry and the
17 Core Participants; and, fifth, some comments on the
18 regulatory framework looking forward to the sort of
19 recommendations you may in due course make.
20 So first by way of introduction, we follow my
21 learned friend Ms Murphy, King's Counsel, and we are
22 very grateful for and we endorse the views that you have
23 heard from INQUEST and all the other Core Participants
24 who we alluded to yesterday in the various papers
25 they've put before you. We specifically endorse and

1 echo their concerns at the responses of EPUT to the
2 Inquiry's Rule 9 requests.

3 We repeat their observations that the Inquiry should
4 not overlook the expertise of those recognised legal
5 representatives -- and I make it clear I'm not one --
6 who sit as assistant coroners, who can bring a unique
7 perspective to this aspect of your Inquiry.

8 We hope that our comments that I'll make in a moment
9 on the inquests paper will complement what you've heard
10 in the last 20 or 30 minutes and we hope they will
11 assist.

12 We note the comments from CTI, Counsel to the
13 Inquiry, earlier that the paper you've received this
14 morning and heard summarised is not intended to be
15 a detailed guide to the coronial process. So my
16 observations this morning will focus on those sections
17 of the paper that relate to the activities of the
18 Inquiry and the information received by it.

19 So, moving from the introduction to point 2:
20 comments on the evidence received so far.

21 Chair, like the other parties, we comment that it is
22 surprising that EPUT have no central records of all of
23 the Prevention of Future Deaths reports, and their
24 predecessors, Rule 43 reports from coroners, for the
25 relevant period. For EPUT, we point out this is all the

1 more surprising, given that Paul Scott, in his witness
2 statement, and Ann Sheridan, in her witness statement,
3 Chair, which I'm sure you've both read, say as
4 follows -- Ann Sheridan says:

5 "Since May 2023 [and we pause to wonder rhetorically
6 why so recently] the Trust has had in place a central
7 record of Prevention of Future Deaths reports which
8 consists of a catalogue and the storage of key documents
9 within the Inquest team shared drive."

10 Now, we pause to observe it's not obvious what that
11 catalogue of documents contains. We haven't seen it
12 yet. Your team has not yet disclosed it to Core
13 Participants, if indeed your team has yet received it.
14 We see no reason why it should not include all the
15 collected, historic Prevention of Future Deaths reports,
16 and their predecessors Rule 43 reports, but, more
17 importantly, why it should not also include EPUT's
18 responses to all of those going back and including the
19 Rule 43 reports.

20 Taken together, the position statement of Paul
21 Scott, the witness statement of Ann Sheridan and the
22 second witness statement of Dr Karale, all three
23 identify different committees, different policies,
24 different processes for audit and quality control but
25 none of those statements goes into any real detail about

1 what, in practice, is being done to learn lessons from
2 inquests or change things on the ground. It is not
3 immediately clear that the various new measures they
4 outline are being adhered to, or whether they are more
5 effective than the policies or leadership processes of
6 the past, and those, Chair, are matters which must
7 acutely concern you.

8 Chair, I hope you'll forgive me if I emphasise what
9 we said to you in our opening, and it's paragraph 31 of
10 our written opening, where we pointed out to you that,
11 so far as we could ascertain, whenever the Trust had
12 responded to a coroner's report in a way which was
13 publicly available then to us, the same mantra,
14 invariably appeared, which was:

15 "I would like to begin by extending my deepest
16 condolences to [the patient's family]. This has all
17 been an extremely difficult for them. I hope my
18 response provide [the patient's family] and you [the
19 coroner] with assurance the Trust has taken their loss
20 seriously and has taken action to address the issue of
21 concern raised in your report."

22 Chair, we pointed out in our opening that that
23 response is repeated again, and again, and again. Very
24 clearly, that is an issue that you will be concerned
25 about, to see whether any of those actions have ever

1 translated into words or, more importantly for the
2 future, whether, if those words are repeated again, they
3 will translate into actions.

4 Chair, in passing, we note that Ann Sheridan
5 exhibited EPUT's responses to coroners to her witness
6 statement but we, as Core Participants, have not yet
7 seen those. We have not had those disclosed to us. In
8 fact, of 269 exhibits to Ms Sheridan's statement, we
9 have seen only three, so far.

10 She summarised them, and summarised her responses to
11 the Prevention of Future Deaths reports, at Appendix A
12 of her statement but, as disclosed to us as Core
13 Participants, that has been entirely redacted.

14 Now, we do want to help, we do want to engage but we
15 do need to see the underlying material to do so
16 properly.

17 Chair, so those are my comments on the evidence so
18 far, insofar as described to us in your CTI paper.

19 Evidence to be obtained, and we hope this will be of
20 assistance to you and your Inquiry team.

21 In our opening submissions -- in the appendix to our
22 opening submissions, we set out links to each of the
23 Prevention of Future Deaths reports that we had been
24 able to find publicly before this Inquiry began, each of
25 those pertaining to our clients, at least. Not only

1 this but we also provided links to the Trust's response
2 because some of the Trust responses are provided
3 publicly.

4 Now, before publication, our chronology was, to
5 an extent, edited or redacted by your team, for reasons
6 we understand, but we have nonetheless hoped that our
7 unedited chronology would be helpful to the Inquiry and
8 that it could mean a message of triangulating or
9 verifying the sort of material you would receive back
10 from the Trusts in due course, which you have now
11 received. We hope it may still be so.

12 We hoped also it might have formed the basis of
13 particular Rule 9 questions to the Trusts, for instance
14 where we identified that a response to a particular PFD
15 report wasn't available, your team may have asked Rule 9
16 requests, or whether one was made, and, if so, could we
17 see it? Indeed, we hope that that's been done but,
18 again, as Core Participants, we don't know that it has,
19 so we encourage it to be done if it hasn't yet.

20 Sidestepping slightly, we accept, of course, it will
21 be useful to know, as a matter of what my learned friend
22 Mr Griffin, King's Counsel, describes as "high-level
23 detail", what processes the Trusts had and now have to
24 learn from Prevention of Future Deaths reports. But
25 again, we emphasise as we did yesterday, we suggest,

1 Chair, that that evidence can only be meaningfully
2 interrogated, you can only assess whether they are doing
3 it or not doing it, in the context of the illustrative
4 cases which you and your team will be choosing,
5 hopefully in collaboration with Core Participants. Did
6 the Trusts in fact do what they said they would do? Can
7 we see recent changes in their behaviour and, if not,
8 that typifies the examples of the concern that you need
9 to express.

10 So that again, Chair, we suggest, underlines the
11 need for careful selection and investigation of your
12 illustrative cases with the views of the families and
13 the patient perspective incorporated. Again, I pause to
14 make the point I made yesterday, if you'll forgive me:
15 that emphasises the need for this Inquiry to take time,
16 to be fully prepared, to use my earlier expression, to
17 triangulate the material you're receiving from different
18 sources, factual evidence, disclosure from the Trusts,
19 and to make optimal use of the next hearing. Chair,
20 again I repeat what I said yesterday, that delaying
21 a hearing would be our preferred course, so as to enable
22 it to take place more efficiently and to dig deeper
23 during the time that is allowed.

24 One final observation on the evidence received so
25 far is that your CTI paper noted that the number of PFD

1 reports submitted from EPUT was far smaller than you'd
2 anticipated. We pause to say we're not sure how you
3 formed your expectation in the first place but we all
4 concur it's a surprisingly small number over that number
5 of years.

6 But at paragraph 93 of your CTI paper, it is said
7 that you, the Inquiry, will explore the approach first
8 of all to making PFD reports, and then to how those reports
9 are responded to.

10 So we pause on the first part of that sentence and,
11 Chair, we encourage you to liaise with coroners, to
12 liaise with the Chief Coroner -- and it may be that this
13 is already in hand and, again, we'd welcome
14 encouragement to do so -- with the Coroners' Society, to
15 which all judicial office holders of coroners belong;
16 and with INQUEST itself, for information that will
17 inform you more clearly as to the making of PFD reports,
18 perhaps zoned in more closely the making of PFD reports
19 in a medical context, even closer in a mental health
20 context. We suggest that would be a useful exercise to
21 be undertaken providing helpful, we hope, evidence.

22 So that was point 3: observations on evidence we
23 suggest could usefully be obtained.

24 Fourth of my five points: disclosure from the
25 Inquiry to Core Participants. I'll be brief on this, if

1 I may.

2 We note that the Inquiry stated that it will
3 disclose the PFD reports to the families before
4 disclosing them to all Core Participants. We accept
5 that course, of course we do. But we do note that our
6 clients have not yet had such disclosure, either as
7 a family affected by that particular report or as Core
8 Participants generally.

9 These Prevention of Future Deaths reports are public
10 material and they are public material in the form in
11 which they appear in public. So, to an extent, we
12 therefore concur with the comments of Irwin Mitchell and
13 Leigh Day, which we've already read, namely that they
14 say, "Whilst conscious of the rationale for the approach
15 to redactions and disclosure adopted by the Inquiry
16 legal team, we are limited in our ability to provide any
17 informed input as to the quality and significance of
18 such evidence".

19 Indeed, we will go just a little further, if we may,
20 with the greatest of respect, and say, while we are
21 conscious of that rationale, the approach to redactions
22 seems to us potentially to border on excessive. These
23 are public documents and should be released and
24 considered by this Inquiry and by the Core Participants
25 in their public form.

1 We say importantly, the perceived need to make
2 redactions ought not to trump the need for Core
3 Participants to engage fully with the Inquiry, and that
4 enough time ought to be allowed between disclosure and
5 hearings to allow issues over redactions and disclosure
6 to be ironed out.

7 So, Chair, I move now to my fifth and final point
8 which is simply to assist, to look to the future and
9 your consideration as a regulatory framework, which your
10 CTI paper suggests you will be undertaking.

11 It is said that you're particularly interested in
12 whether there is a gap in the regulatory framework in
13 terms of ongoing monitoring and accountability. Again,
14 we say this is a key issue on which it's imperative the
15 Inquiry engages with all of the Core Participants. For
16 instance, we note that INQUEST, who are a Core
17 Participant, the Independent Advisory Panel on Deaths in
18 Custody, as noted in your CTI paper, and the Commons
19 Justice Committee have all expressed public support for
20 an independent body to monitor the uptake of coroners'
21 recommendations.

22 As against that, Chair, you will already know and
23 you will already have seen, that that should be
24 considered against other evidence gathered by your
25 Inquiry in the round, for example the Public Health

1 Service Ombudsman does not necessarily think that more
2 is better in terms of regulatory bodies and enforcement
3 bodies, and the experts you've instructed in this
4 Inquiry so far have expressed some preliminary
5 hesitation about regulation.

6 Sir Robert Behrens says more than a dozen different
7 health and care regulators all play important roles in
8 patient safety but there are significant overlaps in
9 functions which create uncertainty about who is
10 responsible for what, this means the patient's safety,
11 voice and leadership are fractured.

12 Paul Scott, we note, on behalf of EPUT says:

13 "As a Trust we faced a large number of
14 recommendations and actions from a wide range of sources
15 over a significant period of time. This led to numerous
16 action plans all delivered in isolation, with an impact
17 on the way in which change was sustained."

18 So, Chair, we see the tension between needing to
19 ensure that coroners' recommendations are heeded and
20 abided to, but also we see the risk that yet another
21 regulatory body, of itself, may not be the answer, and
22 it is a difficult question, Chair, with which you will
23 grapple in due course and, for our part, we simply say
24 we have an open mind at this stage of that issue and we
25 hope to work with you as the evidence develops.

1 But if this Inquiry does, and we know you do, want
2 to make meaningful actionable change, you need to
3 consider why the existing regulatory framework hasn't
4 worked and, if a gap does exist, identify the precise
5 nature of that gap, and the way best to fill it, and
6 that will require a lot of evidence and some very
7 careful thought.

8 So, Chair, if you'll forgive me, I'm just going to
9 summarise the five points -- four points in fact -- my
10 five paragraphs.

11 First, we look forward to ongoing engagement, and we
12 hope that you will hear from the recognised legal
13 representatives further in this area. We do want to
14 collaborate on work, particularly relating to inquests
15 and the enforcement of coroners' recommendations.

16 Secondly, we hope we will have full, early and
17 usable disclosure to the Core Participants from the
18 Inquiry itself.

19 Thirdly, mentioning briefly the point about
20 redactions, we understand some are necessary but not too
21 many, please.

22 Fourthly, I repeat our suggestion of vacating July,
23 moving things back and taking time so that we can dig
24 deeper and more effectively at the next hearing which is
25 convened.

1 Chair, I hope those observations are helpful.

2 THE CHAIR: Thank you.

3 MR GRIFFIN: Chair, that's the end of our day today. We

4 will reconvene on Tuesday next week, as Monday is a Bank

5 Holiday, at 10.00 am, when we will hear from the PHSO,

6 the Ombudsman that Mr Snowden just mentioned, Sir Rob

7 Behrens, in the morning and you'll hear some information

8 in the afternoon about local wards and services.

9 So it's until 10.00 on Tuesday.

10 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much. Thank you. 10.00 am on

11 Tuesday.

12 (12.06 pm)

13 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am

14 on Tuesday, 6 May 2025)

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