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Monday, 7 July 2025

(10.02 am)

Opening statement by THE CHAIR

THE CHAIR: Well, good morning and welcome, everyone joining us today, both here in person at Arundel House and following these proceedings virtually.

The work of the Lampard Inquiry continues apace. Much of this work occurs between public hearings and out of public view and Counsel to the Inquiry, Nicholas Griffin KC, will provide an update on the progress of the Inquiry's work during his opening statement later this morning.

I wish to take this opportunity today to speak further about my role in conducting this Inquiry.

The Lampard Inquiry is governed by the Inquiries Act 2005 and the Inquiries Rules 2006. This legal framework is intentionally flexible to allow for Chairs of all public inquiries to run their inquiries in the best way possible to meet their unique subject matter, scope and Terms of Reference.

I, as Chair, have wide discretion as to how the Lampard Inquiry will operate. Our Inquiry is different from other public inquiries, our subject matter is distinctive, ours being the first UK public inquiry into mental health care and we are investigating a wide range

1 of issues over a long period of 24 years.

2 The differences in scope between public inquiries
3 mean that, on occasion, I may not adopt the same
4 approach as others. At times, the Lampard Inquiry will
5 do things differently to other public inquiries and this
6 should be seen as a strength in our process and not as
7 a failure. It means that I have chosen, with care and
8 consideration, a particular approach because I believe
9 it to be the best and most effective way to meet my
10 duties under the Inquiries Act 2005 and the Terms of
11 Reference for this Inquiry.

12 This Inquiry will be investigating the death of
13 mental health inpatients in Essex between 2000 and 2023.
14 The core purpose of this Inquiry is to find out what
15 happened, to undertake a thorough investigation of the
16 systemic issues and failings.

17 After this investigation, I will publish a report
18 outlining the key facts, evidence and my analysis, along
19 with my findings and my recommendations for impactful
20 change.

21 I am focused on this Inquiry leaving a positive
22 legacy of change for mental health inpatients. This
23 Inquiry is here to understand what happened in Essex so
24 that I can make recommendations to help ensure that the
25 same failings do not happen again.

1 I remain mindful of the developments occurring
2 within mental health inpatient care, within the NHS more
3 widely and within Government. Just last week, on
4 3 July, the Government published its 10-year health plan
5 which sets out the Government's vision for healthcare
6 over the next decade, which includes planned changes
7 that will inevitably impact mental health inpatient care
8 and oversight.

9 I will ensure that, at the time that I make my
10 recommendations, those recommendations are applicable to
11 the most current systems, structures and setup, so that
12 the changes I recommend are as implementable and
13 impactful as they can be.

14 As Chair, I act independently. Because public
15 inquiries are inquisitorial rather than adversarial,
16 there are no sides for me to take in this Inquiry
17 process. As Chair, I must consider the views from the
18 whole spectrum of Core Participants and interested
19 parties. The Inquiry's independence is not only from
20 Government and those that are the subject of this
21 Inquiry but also from all participants. I must, and
22 I will, consider and treat all interested parties
23 fairly. They must all have a voice in these
24 proceedings. I cannot favour or promote the interests
25 of any one party or participant or group of participants

1 over another.

2 As Chair, I must be fair, independent, and
3 transparent in my actions. I give careful consideration
4 to the views of Core Participants on how the Inquiry is
5 to be conducted and I am grateful for the submissions
6 which were provided to me following the April hearing.
7 I have directed my team to take forward certain matters
8 raised in those submissions.

9 Understandably, some Core Participants have firm
10 views on their preferred way for the Inquiry to be run.
11 I do not seek or wish to cause frustration or distress
12 for participants by the way in which this Inquiry is
13 conducted but differences in opinions and expectations
14 may make it impossible for me to satisfy everyone
15 participating in this Inquiry at all times.

16 Furthermore, the Inquiries Act and the Inquiries
17 Rules do set out certain requirements for the conduct of
18 an inquiry. In particular, it is a requirement that in
19 making any decision as to the procedure or conduct of
20 this Inquiry I, as the Chair, must act with fairness,
21 and with regard also to the need to avoid any
22 unnecessary cost. For these reasons, the decisions
23 I make on the conduct of the Inquiry may not always
24 align with the views expressed by participants. This
25 should not be seen as a dismissal of those views, which

1 I will have given careful thought to, but it is
2 a reflection of my wider duties and considerations as
3 Chair.

4 I will, of course, keep the Inquiry's processes
5 under review and I will listen to the submissions of its
6 Core Participants and those engaging with it. That
7 includes the matters raised in submissions provided
8 after the Inquiry's last hearing, about which Mr Griffin
9 will say more in his opening statement.

10 Ultimately, the decisions on how to conduct this
11 Inquiry are mine and mine alone. I feel the heavy
12 weight of this responsibility but I have always and will
13 always continue to make decisions that I truly believe
14 to be in the best, most efficient and effective way for
15 this Inquiry to fulfil its Terms of Reference and to
16 enable me to make recommendations for long-lasting and
17 impactful improvements to the care of mental health
18 inpatients.

19 To end, I shall say a brief word about the duty of
20 candour. In order for this Inquiry to fully understand
21 what happened, why it happened and to make meaningful
22 recommendations for change we need those responding to
23 our requests for information and asked by us to give
24 evidence to do so with complete candour. Candour is not
25 about responding to the Inquiry's request with the

1 minimum effort possible. It's not about waiting until
2 being pushed and chased by this Inquiry before sharing
3 all the relevant information or documents.

4 Candour is about admitting where things went wrong.
5 It is about open and honest sharing so that the Inquiry
6 can learn the lessons that will improve mental health
7 care. It is about putting the public interest first
8 over and above personal reputations and organisational
9 interests. Those asked to provide evidence owe it to
10 this Inquiry, to the public and, most of all, to the
11 bereaved families to be fully transparent, even if doing
12 so is to the detriment of themselves or their
13 organisations.

14 I say it again and I will continue to say it
15 throughout this Inquiry, I will accept nothing less than
16 full candour.

17 Thank you. I will now hand over to Counsel to the
18 Inquiry, Nicholas Griffin KC.

19 Opening statement by MR GRIFFIN

20 MR GRIFFIN: Thank you, Chair.

21 This is the Lampard Inquiry's fourth public hearing.
22 In September and November last year, the Inquiry heard
23 powerful and deeply moving commemorative evidence from
24 the families and friends of those who died whilst
25 receiving mental health care from trusts in Essex. In

1 April and May this year, the Inquiry heard its first
2 tranche of evidence relating directly to its Terms of
3 Reference. Given the stage that the Inquiry had reached
4 and in light of the substantial volume of material that
5 had been received just prior to the hearing, the April
6 hearing was introductory in nature, setting out
7 background and contextual matters. The Inquiry heard
8 some very important and thought provoking evidence from
9 which there emerged common themes and clear lines of
10 inquiry.

11 In this hearing, however, the Inquiry will hear
12 evidence of a different kind. Over the course of the
13 next week or so, the Inquiry will focus solely on
14 hearing evidence from some of the bereaved family
15 members concerning the deaths of individuals under the
16 care of the South Essex Partnership University NHS
17 Foundation Trust or SEPT, North Essex Partnership
18 University NHS Foundation Trust or NEPT and Essex
19 Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust or EPUT.
20 This hearing provides a crucial opportunity for the
21 Inquiry to hear from those at the heart of its work: the
22 families who have been directly impacted by these
23 deaths.

24 The evidence shared during this hearing will also
25 help to guide the Inquiry's work and to ensure that

1 families' concerns, experiences and unique insights are
2 at the core of the Inquiry's investigations. The
3 evidence received and heard will form a key part of the
4 Inquiry's ongoing investigative process into those
5 deaths. We are extremely grateful to all of those who
6 have provided witness statements for this hearing and
7 for their courage in sharing the dramatic details
8 surrounding their family member's death.

9 In both this opening statement and throughout the
10 next week, the Inquiry will be referring to and hearing
11 about matters that will be distressing and difficult.
12 We will be hearing disturbing evidence about individual
13 deaths and experiences. The details may be deeply
14 painful as they will also resonate with the trauma,
15 grief and loss suffered by many of those who are here
16 today or watching online.

17 Indeed, after this opening statement, we will be
18 hearing from Ben Jackson and Adam Rowe about their and
19 their families' experiences in connection with the
20 deaths of Ben's brother, Ed, and Adam's mother, Mandy.

21 At the start of each day and evidence session we
22 will briefly summarise the evidence that will be heard
23 in order to give those attending, watching and listening
24 the opportunity to decide whether or not they wish to,
25 or indeed are able to, engage with that evidence. The

1 timetable for this hearing is also available on the
2 Inquiry website. As I have said, people attending or
3 watching remotely may find some of the matters I am
4 going to talk about and that we hear evidence about
5 distressing.

6 Before I go any further, I would like to make clear
7 that emotional support is available for all of those who
8 require it. The well-being of those participating in
9 the Inquiry is extremely important to the Inquiry.
10 I would like to be clear that anyone in this hearing
11 room is welcome to leave at any point. We have two
12 support staff from Hestia, an experienced provider of
13 emotional support, here today and for each day of this
14 hearing, and there is a private room where you can talk
15 to Hestia support staff if you require emotional support
16 at all times throughout this hearing.

17 The Hestia support staff are wearing orange lanyards
18 and orange scarves and are raising their hands; or if
19 you want to, you can speak to a member of the Inquiry
20 team and we can put you in touch with them. We are
21 wearing purple coloured lanyards.

22 If you are watching online, information about
23 available emotional support can be found on the Lampard
24 Inquiry website at lampardinquiry.org.uk and under the
25 "Support" tab near the top right-hand corner. We want

1 all those engaging with the Inquiry to feel safe and
2 supported.

3 The role and remit of the Inquiry is to investigate
4 mental health inpatient deaths. It's not the role of
5 the Inquiry to intervene in clinical decisions for
6 current patients or to act as a regulator or in the role
7 of the police. However, the Inquiry has a safeguarding
8 policy and takes safeguarding matters seriously. Where
9 we receive any information which meets our safeguarding
10 threshold, we will pass it on to the appropriate
11 organisation. This is something which has been done
12 since the Inquiry was established and which we will
13 continue to do.

14 I, Chair, am assisted at this hearing by members of
15 the Counsel to the Inquiry team, Rachel Troup, Kirsty
16 Lea and Kyan Pucks. They have been working very closely
17 and directly with bereaved families and, where
18 applicable, their legal representatives, particularly in
19 advance of this hearing.

20 As I have mentioned previously, the counsel team
21 also works closely with the Lampard Inquiry solicitor
22 team under Catherine Turtle. We also work closely with
23 the Secretariat Team and the Inquiry's Engagement Team,
24 who are part of the Secretariat, and with whom many of
25 those engaging with the Inquiry have been in contact.

1 I want to be clear that my Counsel to the Inquiry
2 colleagues and I have been instructed by you, Chair, to
3 assist you in your important task. We are part of the
4 Inquiry team working for you. As you have explained
5 during the course of your opening statement, we are
6 independent from all other organisations and individuals
7 involved in this Inquiry and we must be very careful to
8 ensure that we remain so.

9 I would also like once again to introduce the
10 lawyers who are representing Core Participants.

11 Representing first bereaved families and those with
12 lived experience: Bates Wells, with their instructed
13 counsel, Sophie Lucas; Bhatt Murphy, with their
14 instructed counsel Fiona Murphy, King's Counsel, and
15 Sophy Miles; Bindmans, with their instructed counsel,
16 Brenda Campbell, King's Counsel and Tom Stoate; Deighton
17 Pierce Glynn; Hodge Jones & Allen, with their instructed
18 counsel, Steven Snowden, King's Counsel, and Eleena
19 Misra, King's Counsel; Dr Achas Burin, Rebecca
20 Henshaw-Keene and Jake Loomes; Irwin Mitchell with their
21 instructed counsel, Maya Sikand, King's Counsel, and
22 Laura Profumo; Leigh Day, with their instructed counsel,
23 Maya Sikand again, Tom Stoate and Laura Profumo.

24 Representing the organisations: Bhatt Murphy for
25 INQUEST, with their instructed counsel Anna Morris,

1 King's Counsel, and Lily Lewis; Browne Jacobson for
2 EPUT, with their instructed counsel Eleanor Grey, King's
3 Counsel and Adam Fullwood; Kennedys for NEFLT, with
4 their instructed counsel, Valerie Charbit; in-house
5 representation and DAC Beachcroft, for NHS England, with
6 their instructed counsel Jason Beer, King's Counsel, and
7 Amy Clarke; the Government Legal Department for the
8 Department of Health and Social Care, with their
9 instructed counsel, Anne Studd, King's Counsel and
10 Robert Cohen; Mills & Reeve for the Integrated Care
11 Boards, with counsel Kate Brunner, King's Counsel; Jenni
12 Richards KC and Rachel Sullivan for the Care Quality
13 Commission; and Bevan Brittan for Oxehealth, with Fiona
14 Scolding, King's Counsel.

15 I would like to take the opportunity in giving this
16 opening statement to cover the following areas: firstly,
17 I will report on progress made by the Inquiry since our
18 last hearing in April and May, particularly the work
19 that is taking place outside the context of our hearings
20 and, secondly, I will turn to the very important
21 evidence that you will be hearing over the next week.

22 Starting then with the progress of the Inquiry.

23 Your team continues to progress work in a variety of
24 areas, much of which will take place outside our
25 hearings. We are undertaking specific and targeted

1 further work following the April hearing, examples of
2 which I will come on to in a moment. Chair, following
3 the April hearing, you invited Core Participants to
4 provide written comments on pertinent issues and matters
5 that arose during that hearing. A number of Core
6 Participant legal teams took you up on that offer,
7 between them representing many individual Core
8 Participants. The Inquiry's legal team has been working
9 through all the submissions sent in and considering each
10 and every one of the actions proposed, as have you,
11 Chair.

12 The actions included, amongst other matters,
13 possible lines of inquiry and investigation, potential
14 sources of evidence and proposals for how the Inquiry
15 should be run. The Inquiry was very pleased to receive
16 a number of helpful and persuasive proposals from Core
17 Participants' legal teams, including those representing
18 bereaved families and those with lived experience, as
19 well as the providers.

20 Some of the actions proposed, particularly the more
21 straightforward ones, have already been actioned or are
22 in the process of being actioned. Others are under
23 active consideration and, as part of that, I have
24 invited the counsel teams who provided submissions to
25 meetings with me to discuss those submissions.

1 Some of those meetings have already taken place and
2 they will continue into this month and a little beyond.
3 I welcome this dialogue. I will report back in relation
4 to principal points raised, once those discussions have
5 concluded. The meetings to date have proved positive
6 and helpful. I also intend to invite the teams of Core
7 Participants who did not provide submissions at the end
8 of the last hearing to meet with me.

9 Core Participants who do not have legal
10 representation form an important part of those engaging
11 with the Inquiry. We will, of course, be hearing the
12 evidence of several this week. The Inquiry will be in
13 touch with them after this hearing to offer meetings to
14 discuss the ways in which the Inquiry is operating.

15 Finally, on this point, Chair, the Inquiry team will
16 also now run a series of in-person drop-in sessions in
17 Essex. This will be an opportunity for those engaging
18 with the Inquiry to meet with the Inquiry team and to
19 ask any questions or raise any concerns which they may
20 have, face to face.

21 Work following the April hearing. Chair, by way of
22 update, the areas for more detailed investigation
23 identified by the Inquiry team and suggested by Core
24 Participants, following the April hearing, include but
25 I should stress are not limited to:

1 Investigations and information collated by
2 regulatory bodies, for example the Health Services
3 Safety Investigations Body, local Government and Social
4 Care Ombudsman and Patient Safety Commissioner;

5 The regulatory landscape more broadly, particularly
6 when there are systemic issues and failures at play;

7 Further information on the role, remit, activities
8 of the Care Quality Commission during the relevant
9 period;

10 Further information in respect of the Health and
11 Safety Executive prosecutions of EPUT and its
12 predecessor trusts, and any correlation with the CQC's
13 position and responsibilities at the relevant time;

14 Notification, monitoring and oversight of patient
15 safety concerns more widely;

16 A variety of specific topics and issues arising from
17 EPUT disclosure and the evidence of Dr Milind Karale,
18 examples include: policies and documentation, evaluation
19 and monitoring, governance, risk assessment, the use of
20 the Electronic Patient Record, neurodiversity and
21 autism, screening of referrals, challenges or
22 limitations related to assessments, psychiatric
23 medication versus psychological therapy, coercive and
24 restrictive practices, the care plan, the Care Programme
25 Approach, the community mental health framework and

1 specialist units;

2 Next, further questions following the additional
3 evidence of EPUT's Zephan Trent, relating to the use of
4 Oxevision;

5 The Culture of Care programme and the issue of race
6 equality;

7 Issues relating to the care of neurodiverse patients
8 more widely;

9 Further examination of the duty of candour;

10 The death certification process; and

11 The quality and availability of data about deaths in
12 mental health detention.

13 The Inquiry continues to engage proactively with
14 relevant organisations and individuals to secure further
15 evidence in these areas. Rule 9 requests for disclosure
16 have been sent out by the Inquiry since the last hearing
17 and we are in the process of formulating and sending out
18 further such requests. This is to ensure that the
19 various matters arising from the last hearing are
20 thoroughly and robustly followed up. The Inquiry
21 continues also to progress its work in many other areas,
22 from actively exploring issues of physical and sexual
23 safety and engaging with Essex Police, with whom the
24 Inquiry has in place a Memorandum of Understanding,
25 through to its investigation of private providers.

1 I would like to say a few words now about one of the
2 other healthcare providers the Inquiry is looking
3 closely at, the North East London NHS Foundation Trust
4 also known as NEFLT. In addition to providing extensive
5 mental health services for people living in various
6 London boroughs NEFLT provides mental health services
7 for people living in Essex and did so throughout the
8 period with which the Inquiry is concerned. Notably,
9 NEFLT currently provides Children and Adolescent Mental
10 Health Services or CAMHS to young people in Essex.

11 Dealing first with the criminal trial. Those
12 following and engaging with the Inquiry will have noted
13 that, despite being a relevant and significant NHS
14 provider of mental health services, NEFLT did not
15 feature in the Inquiry's April hearing. It had
16 originally been intended that NEFLT evidence and
17 witnesses from NEFLT would form part of the April
18 hearing. At the beginning of April, however, you
19 decided, Chair, to remove NEFLT evidence from the
20 hearing. That was because a long running criminal
21 trial -- in which NEFLT was one defendant, and
22 a previous NEFLT employee, a Ward Manager, was
23 another -- had reached a sensitive stage at the Central
24 Criminal Court. Its jury was about to be sent out by
25 the trial judge to consider its verdicts.

1 When you made that decision, the Inquiry had been
2 made aware that it was possible the jury would still be
3 deliberating throughout the time of the Inquiry's April
4 hearing and beyond. That turned out to be the case and,
5 in fact, the jury in that criminal trial did not return
6 verdicts until early June of this year.

7 Whilst in many circumstances a public inquiry and
8 criminal investigation or trial can continue alongside
9 each other, Chair, you were concerned that adverse
10 comments about NEFLT made in public at the April hearing
11 could have had the potential to prejudice the criminal
12 trial at that particularly sensitive time.

13 You therefore instructed the Inquiry to act
14 accordingly. In the event, NEFLT was acquitted of
15 an offence of corporate manslaughter, and the Ward
16 Manager was acquitted of gross negligence manslaughter
17 but both NEFLT and the Ward Manager were found guilty of
18 breaching the duty created by Section 3 of the Health
19 and Safety At Work Act 1974, in that they failed to
20 ensure others were not exposed to risks to their health
21 and safety. These criminal offences related to the
22 self-inflicted death of an inpatient at one of its
23 hospitals in the London Borough of Redbridge, in July
24 2015. In short, NEFLT had failed to remove known risks
25 to the inpatient who was able then to take her own life.

1 Moving to NEFLT disclosure. Quite separately,
2 a significant amount of material requested from NEFLT
3 was provided to the Inquiry too late to form part of the
4 bundle put together for the April hearing. The Inquiry
5 also requested a position statement from NEFLT, which
6 was returned after the extended deadline. Given the
7 volume of material received so late in the day, it was
8 not possible properly to review and include it in the
9 bundle for the April hearing.

10 The evidence from NEFLT will therefore form part of
11 a future hearing at which we will also require NEFLT's
12 CEO to attend and to address you.

13 Moving on to a new topic.

14 The Inquiry has been working hard to ensure
15 disclosure is made to Core Participants and witnesses in
16 a timely and efficient way. Up until now, disclosure of
17 large volumes of material and of hearing bundles has
18 taken place by way of upload to the Inquiry's evidence
19 portal, Exchange. The Inquiry has looked carefully at
20 how best to assist Core Participants in their review of
21 the documentation disclosed by the Inquiry and it has
22 also taken on board the representations and views of the
23 Core Participants as how they might best be assisted.

24 As a result, the Inquiry will now extend the use of
25 the Relativity platform to all Core Participants,

1 material providers and their legal representatives.
2 This will also improve the material provider review
3 process. Relativity is a disclosure platform that
4 facilitates efficient review and analysis of documents.
5 The Inquiry intends to secure access to Relativity for
6 all Core Participants no later than August, at which
7 time all material already disclosed will be accessible
8 on that platform.

9 Any future disclosure will then be made via
10 Relativity, including material relevant to the October
11 hearing and the material for future hearings in 2026.
12 Once Relativity is up and running for Core Participants,
13 the Inquiry does not intend to provide material through
14 any other means, unless of course there are
15 circumstances where reasonable adjustments are required.

16 From August onwards, therefore, all disclosure will
17 take place via Relativity, save in the case of
18 unrepresented Core Participants with whom the Inquiry
19 will be in touch individually to put into place suitable
20 and workable arrangements. The Inquiry will ensure the
21 effective deployment of Relativity by issuing detailed
22 user guidance, providing scheduled training sessions and
23 offering technical support.

24 At the same time as Relativity becomes available to
25 Core Participants, the Inquiry will provide its

1 disclosure plan. This plan will set out the Inquiry's
2 proposals for the disclosure of evidence for its
3 hearings, along with the proposals for disclosure of
4 material not connected to those hearings. The plan will
5 be provided with a timetable as to when disclosure of
6 witness statements and other materials relevant to the
7 Terms of Reference is likely to take place. This will
8 allow Core Participants to plan their work and resources
9 in advance.

10 I would like now to address the list of deceased.
11 Chair, the Inquiry continues to prioritise its efforts
12 to compile as best it can a definitive list of deaths
13 that fall into its scope. At the April hearing, you set
14 out a revised approach to two of the particulars listed
15 under your definition of inpatient death. In
16 particular, you clarified the entry at (g) of your
17 explanatory note that accompanied the Terms of Reference
18 in relation to deaths following a mental health
19 assessment.

20 An amended version of the explanatory note was
21 circulated on 10 April this year. I addressed it in
22 some detail at the start of the last hearing. Since
23 that revised approach was announced, the Inquiry has
24 sent further requests to the relevant care providers
25 requiring them to revisit the information that they hold

1 and provide the Inquiry with revised details of those
2 who died whilst under their care.

3 The Inquiry understands that, for some providers,
4 that is going to involve adopting a broader approach to
5 the disclosure of information and may take some time.

6 The Inquiry will provide further updates on this
7 important work as soon as it is able to do so. It will
8 be clear, therefore, that we still do not yet have
9 a definitive figure for the number of deaths that come
10 within the scope of this Inquiry. The Inquiry is
11 acutely aware that this number is of particular
12 interest. As you stated in September last year, Chair,
13 the Inquiry recognises that it may never be possible to
14 provide, with confidence, a final or definitive number
15 of those who died in the relevant period whilst under
16 the care of trusts in Essex.

17 The Inquiry considers, however, that it owes
18 a responsibility to those who died and to their loved
19 ones, including those who are not Core Participants, to
20 finalise the list of deceased to the very best of its
21 ability. We will provide the most accurate number that
22 we can when we have, with expert assistance, collected
23 the data we need and analysed it appropriately.

24 It's not just the number of deaths in scope that's
25 important, although that is very important. The

1 information obtained about those deaths is also required
2 to enable reliable and robust findings to be made about
3 the themes and patterns revealed by the data.

4 Chair, I would also like to make clear at this stage
5 that, until the Inquiry receives updated information
6 relating to those whose deaths fall into the scope of
7 the Inquiry, we are simply not in a position to say how
8 many of those involved serious failings or issues of
9 concern or were deaths that could have been avoided.
10 The Inquiry will continue to do all that it can to
11 provide clarity in this area. We are determined to get
12 the most accurate figure available using all of the
13 information and expertise available to us.

14 I am talking here about statistics. As I have said
15 before, as an investigative process, we do have to look
16 at information obtained in an analytical and objective
17 way to see trends, to spot issues and to make findings.
18 But we recognise that, behind the figures, each death
19 was of a person with their own life and individual
20 circumstances.

21 One of the important reasons for obtaining the best
22 information available in relation to the Inquiry's list
23 of deceased is to inform the work of Professor Donnelly,
24 the Inquiry's expert statistician, and her team. They
25 have continued their work analysing the list of deceased

1 and in helping to identify trends and matters of
2 statistical significance to further inform the Inquiry's
3 work.

4 Although it has been possible to prepare an initial
5 analysis, there remains important work to be done before
6 that output can be of assistance to the Inquiry and can
7 be shared with Core Participants. The key strands of
8 their further work include the following:

9 Firstly, as already outlined, obtaining the best
10 available evidence to ensure that the list of deceased
11 is accurate and that, where possible, it is triangulated
12 against other available data, such as records of
13 inquest.

14 Secondly, obtaining denominator data. It is
15 recognised that the list of deceased, even when
16 complete, will represent only part of the picture. To
17 draw meaningful conclusions about patterns, risks and
18 potential systemic issues, it will also be necessary to
19 obtain information about the population of patients who
20 were admitted to the same wards during the same period.
21 This data, known as denominator data, is being sought
22 but there are challenges in obtaining it.

23 Following this hearing, we intend to provide Core
24 Participants with an interim report from Professor
25 Donnelly, setting out in outline her approach and work

1 to date. Although this will not represent any final
2 analysis, we aim to share this to help inform further
3 discussions at the data discussion, which I will now
4 come to.

5 Chair, you will recall during the April hearing that
6 the Inquiry heard interesting and helpful oral
7 submissions from Core Participants touching upon the
8 topic of data, along with constructive suggestions from
9 counsel such as Fiona Murphy, King's Counsel, Brenda
10 Campbell, King's Counsel, and Steven Snowden, King's
11 Counsel, on behalf of a number of the Core Participants,
12 as to how the Inquiry might approach the questions of
13 data and data analysis in various different areas.

14 Certain of those submissions were echoed within the
15 written representations provided at the conclusion of
16 the April hearing. This is an area in which the Inquiry
17 is particularly keen to hear further views from the Core
18 Participants and is currently considering the most
19 efficient way to facilitate the sharing of those views.

20 To this end, the Inquiry intends to host a data
21 discussion involving the Inquiry and Core Participant
22 representatives. This may take the form of a chaired
23 roundtable discussion to allow constructive suggestions
24 as to avenues the Inquiry may wish to explore. Further
25 detail about the data discussion will be provided as

1 soon as possible following this hearing.

2 The Inquiry has received and is considering
3 submissions from Core Participants in respect of expert
4 evidence heard at the April hearings. A number of
5 points raised require careful contemplation moving
6 forward. Core Participant proposals include an expert
7 instruction protocol and additional ways in which Core
8 Participants may contribute prior to the instruction of
9 an expert.

10 Chair, you have firmly in mind the need for further
11 expert evidence and we are actively considering other
12 areas and other potential experts. We have, for
13 example, already identified the need to obtain further
14 expert evidence in respect of autism and neurodiversity.

15 The Inquiry is currently finalising the
16 investigation strategy by which it will examine the
17 circumstances of those who died on mental health
18 inpatient wards in Essex. This is one of the matters
19 I have been discussing and will continue to discuss with
20 Core Participant counsel. Further detail about the
21 Inquiry's investigation strategy will then be provided
22 to Core Participants.

23 As part of its investigation work, the Inquiry will
24 liaise with the families and friends of those who have
25 died, together with their legal representatives, about

1 the matters which are of key importance or concern to
2 them. The Inquiry will ensure that they are kept
3 updated of its work.

4 Chair, you have chosen to receive witness statements
5 and hear first from the families and friends. The
6 evidence they give and the concerns they raise will
7 provide the foundation for and will inform the Inquiry's
8 investigations.

9 Chair, we have reached a stage where it may be
10 convenient to take a break. May I therefore suggest
11 that we break now and reconvene at 11.05.

12 THE CHAIR: Thank you.

13 (10.51 am)

14 (A short break)

15 (11.17 am)

16 THE CHAIR: Mr Griffin.

17 MR GRIFFIN: Chair, we have had a slightly longer break than
18 we were hoping because the transcript has ceased
19 functioning. This is what we propose to do: I am going
20 to continue with my opening statement, a written and
21 hyperlinked version of it will go on the website as soon
22 as possible and if anyone feels they need it even more
23 quickly, they can contact me and I can email it to them.

24 In the interim, we hope that the transcript
25 functionality can be reinstated by the time of our first

1 witness but we will reconsider the situation over the
2 break, following this opening. My apologies to those
3 affected by the loss of the transcript.

4 So continuing my opening and I would like now to
5 talk about staff evidence. The Inquiry's investigation
6 strategy will also influence and inform the evidence the
7 Inquiry seeks to obtain from staff members who worked
8 for the healthcare providers during the relevant period.
9 It has been well reported that, in its non-statutory
10 phase, the Essex Mental Health Independent Inquiry
11 failed to secure meaningful engagement from staff who
12 had worked for the relevant trusts and private
13 providers. It was one of the most influential factors
14 in securing the Statutory Inquiry.

15 This Inquiry remains disappointed with the level of
16 staff engagement. We are very grateful to those who
17 have come forward and provided relevant evidence with
18 openness and candour. They are few in number, however.
19 The Inquiry's investigation strategy will now allow it
20 to take a targeted and focused approach to obtaining
21 staff evidence. The Inquiry's investigations, which
22 will begin with the firsthand account provided by the
23 bereaved family, will identify the key figures involved
24 in providing care and treatment to the deceased, both on
25 a ward level and those in positions of management.

1 The Inquiry will determine which staff are best
2 placed to provide evidence that assists its work,
3 particularly when looking at systemic issues. The
4 Inquiry will also continue to seek staff co-operation
5 more broadly. You will recall, Chair, that in April the
6 Inquiry heard evidence of a culture of fear amongst
7 staff working in NHS settings, a fear on the part of
8 staff to speak up at the time they were aware of
9 concerns and a fear on the part of staff to speak up
10 later when the matters were being investigated.

11 Sir Rob Behrens told the Inquiry that he had dozens
12 of clinicians get in touch with him indicating that they
13 wanted to raise issues but they feared they would lose
14 their jobs and careers. The Inquiry continues to
15 encourage any person who has information that may assist
16 the Inquiry to come forward and provide that
17 information, particularly those who worked within NHS
18 Trusts in Essex or for relevant healthcare providers.

19 Chair, you have ensured the Inquiry has in place
20 a whistleblowing protocol to provide whatever protection
21 it can for those individuals. You are seeking the views
22 of the Core Participants as to whether providers and
23 regulators should be asked again to give narrow
24 undertakings in order to facilitate the flow of full and
25 frank disclosure to the Inquiry. I referred at the

1 start of the last hearing to those undertakings.
2 Following that hearing, the Inquiry has amended the
3 proposed undertakings in order to make absolutely clear
4 what their intended purpose is and their narrow
5 remit: they seek to safeguard the interests of those who
6 would like to raise issues, they relate only to the
7 provision of material to the Inquiry and would not
8 enable any individual to avoid accountability for
9 serious misconduct.

10 Those amended proposed undertakings will be provided
11 to all Core Participants following this hearing so they
12 have a better idea of what the Inquiry is requesting.

13 Core Participants will be invited to provide views
14 in writings in the first instance. The Inquiry has been
15 invited by one of the corporate Core Participants to
16 consider organising a combined discussion with various
17 providers and regulators to discuss the undertakings you
18 are seeking. Chair, whilst your team proactively
19 engaged with providers and regulators last year on this
20 precise topic, the Inquiry remains amenable to any joint
21 and concerted effort which might assist in the
22 furtherance of its work.

23 I would like to turn now to say a few words about
24 the Oxevision evidence. During the April hearing, the
25 Inquiry was due to hear evidence about Oxevision,

1 a technology that uses infrared sensitive cameras to
2 monitor patients' vital signs, such as pulse and
3 breathing rate, in mental health settings. Chair, you
4 took the decision to postpone the corporate part of that
5 evidence on the Inquiry's receipt, very late in the day,
6 of a new witness statement from EPUT which set out
7 a material change in their approach to Oxevision. In
8 the interests of fairness, and to give all interested
9 Core Participants and the Inquiry time to review the new
10 evidence, you determined that the evidence from EPUT and
11 Oxehealth should be heard at a later hearing.

12 On 14 May this year, the Inquiry did, however, hold
13 a prerecorded evidence session with Hat Porter,
14 a representative of the campaign group Stop Oxevision.
15 As you made clear at the time, Chair, the use of
16 Oxevision remains a matter of significant interest to
17 the Inquiry. We are acutely aware that it is also
18 a matter of particular concern for a number of the
19 Inquiry's Core Participants, and I can say now that the
20 Inquiry intends to hear the delayed Oxevision evidence
21 at the start of the October hearing.

22 At the outset of the April hearing, Chair,
23 I outlined how you had directed that a Lampard Inquiry
24 Recommendations Forum should be set up and that it is
25 now referred to as the Lampard Inquiry Recommendations

1 and Implementation Forum, this is to reflect the
2 importance not only of the making of recommendations but
3 also the fact they need to be accepted and implemented.

4 All Core Participants will be able to engage with
5 the forum. We also announced in April that the Inquiry
6 has secured the assistance of a noted academic with
7 expertise in public inquiries for the forum, Dr Emma
8 Ireton. Dr Ireton will provide a paper this autumn
9 which will be circulated to its Core Participants. Its
10 purpose will be to provide a contextual briefing on the
11 framing, implementation and monitoring of inquiry
12 recommendations. In broad terms, it will cover the
13 purpose and construction of recommendations,
14 implementation and monitoring, relevant recent
15 developments and current themes in inquiry practice, and
16 a summary of recent inquiry approaches to implementation
17 and monitoring.

18 The Ireton paper will be provided to Core
19 Participants along with a paper from the Counsel to the
20 Inquiry team, which includes our suggestions for how the
21 forum should work. We will then seek the views of Core
22 Participants and other key stakeholders about the best
23 way forward for the forum.

24 May I also remind those following and engaging with
25 the Inquiry that it has in place various protocols.

1 This is with the aim of assisting those who wish to
2 engage with the Inquiry in providing the best possible
3 evidence in a way that also ensures they are supported
4 throughout the process. All documents are kept under
5 review. They include protocols on restriction orders,
6 redaction, anonymity and special measures, on vulnerable
7 witnesses, on witness statements, and principles of
8 engagement for the July hearing.

9 Chair, you have a wide discretion to put in place
10 measures to support witnesses giving evidence. We will
11 continue to work with witnesses and, where they have
12 them, their legal representatives to take
13 an individualised approach, as far as is reasonably
14 possible. The Inquiry also offers emotional support to
15 all individuals engaging with it.

16 The Inquiry has been working to finalise the
17 arrangements for how it will receive evidence from
18 witnesses with lived experience of mental health
19 inpatient services in Essex. The Inquiry has developed
20 a framework to ensure that evidence from those with
21 lived experience is obtained in a trauma-informed way,
22 which allows each witness to provide their best
23 evidence. A draft version of the Inquiry's lived
24 experience framework, along with the associated
25 questionnaire, was sent out to all relevant legal

1 representatives in April with an invitation to provide
2 observations. All comments then provided by legal
3 representatives were carefully considered and taken into
4 account. Consequently, an updated and final version of
5 the lived experience framework, along with the updated
6 and final version of the questionnaire, was sent out to
7 legal representatives last week and will be published on
8 the Inquiry's website.

9 The Inquiry will afford those Core Participants and
10 their legal representatives an extended period of time
11 in which to complete the framework questionnaire. The
12 Inquiry will then circulate a proposed timetable for the
13 taking of that evidence, once Core Participant responses
14 have been received.

15 We are grateful to the Core Participants and their
16 legal representatives for their helpful engagement in
17 the exercise.

18 I would now like to say a few words about this
19 hearing, which runs from today until Monday, 14 July.

20 As I set out at the beginning of this statement,
21 over the five days of this hearing, the Inquiry will
22 focus solely on evidence from bereaved family members.
23 The Inquiry has invited these witnesses to give evidence
24 of their recollections and concerns, and we have also
25 invited them to give their current views on what

1 recommendations should be made for change.

2 This week's evidence will therefore comprise, for
3 the most part, family members' firsthand accounts and
4 observations of what happened to their relatives.
5 Hearing this evidence from families now and in October
6 is crucial. As I have mentioned, Chair, you were clear
7 that you wanted to hear first from the families at the
8 heart of this Inquiry. This will ensure that this
9 evidence is the driving force in informing the Inquiry's
10 investigations. The Inquiry is aware that many families
11 and friends have, through their experiences, sadly
12 become experts in various different areas of mental ill
13 health, care and treatment. It values that knowledge
14 and intends to liaise with families engaging with the
15 Inquiry and their representatives in relation to the
16 investigation of systemic issues, where relevant, in
17 each case.

18 The Inquiry will not be seeking comments or analysis
19 from the witnesses on documents that relate to their
20 relative's care and treatment during the course of this
21 particular hearing nor will the Inquiry be hearing other
22 evidence relating to that care and treatment at this
23 stage. Other evidence will, however, form part of the
24 Inquiry's investigations and may form part of later
25 hearings.

1 Over the course of this hearing, Chair, the Inquiry
2 will hear oral evidence from 12 bereaved family
3 witnesses. We will hear about the following people who
4 have died:

5 Edward Jackson, known as Ed, who died on 31 December
6 2007, aged just 18. We will hear evidence from his
7 brother Ben Jackson.

8 Amanda Susan Hitch, known as Mandy. Mandy died on
9 12 February 2022, aged 59. We will hear evidence from
10 Mandy's son, Adam Rowe.

11 Terrence Joseph Pimm, known as TJ. TJ died on
12 26 August 2016. He was 30. We will hear evidence from
13 TJ's mother Karon Pimm.

14 The person known to the Inquiry as W4. He died on
15 17 February 2015, when he was 57 years old. We will
16 hear from W4's sister, Janet Carden.

17 Liam Patrick Brennan, who died four days after his
18 29th birthday, on 14 August 2012. We will hear evidence
19 about Liam from his father, Patrick Brennan.

20 Pippa Whiteward, who died on 29 October 2016, when
21 she was 36. We will hear evidence from Pippa's sister,
22 Lydia Fraser-Ward.

23 Stephen Oxton. Stephen died on 1 April 2012 when he
24 was 53. We will hear from his son Alan Oxton.

25 Frederick Peck, known as Fred. Fred died on

1 4 December 2004, at age 54. We will hear evidence from
2 Fred's daughter, Emma Sorrell.

3 Geoffrey George Toms, known as Geoff. Geoff died on
4 14 May 2015, when he was 88 years old. The Inquiry will
5 hear evidence about Geoff from his daughter, Lynda
6 Costerd.

7 Daniel Fairman, known as Dan. Dan died on 17 August
8 2018, he was 53. We will hear from his sister Jane
9 Maier.

10 Susan Spring. Susan died on 1 February 2012. She
11 was 54. The Inquiry will hear evidence from her
12 daughter, Emma Cracknell.

13 Richard Harland Elliott. Richard died on 4 May
14 2002, at age 48. We will hear evidence about Richard
15 from his sister Catherine Peck.

16 From these witnesses, all of whom have set out their
17 recollections, observations and their views on the need
18 for change with courage and clarity, the Inquiry will
19 hear about a number of the key themes it will be
20 examining during the course of its work. Those include
21 but are by no means limited to:

22 A lack of a clear or settled diagnosis;

23 Those with dual diagnoses, described as being
24 bounced around between different services with no proper
25 oversight of care and treatment;

1 Failures to adequately assess or in some cases to
2 assess at all;

3 Failures to admit or section in the face of clear
4 and clearly reported deterioration and/or suicidal
5 intent;

6 A revolving door of repeated admissions and
7 discharges, with no apparent improvement in mental
8 health and in many cases a deterioration;

9 Failures to ensure appropriate inpatient placement
10 and a lack of availability of beds, particularly in
11 mother and baby units;

12 Ward environments, variously described as a holding
13 pen, cold, sparse and inhospitable;

14 Physical injuries sustained on the ward without
15 proper explanation;

16 A lack of staff on wards;

17 A lack of psychological or therapeutic treatment on
18 wards;

19 Confusion and general mismanagement of proper checks
20 and observations on patients who were at high risk.

21 Serious failures in recordkeeping and management,
22 including in relation to failures to record properly
23 incidents of harm or injury;

24 Dismissive attitudes amongst staff at all levels and
25 at all stages of treatment, both to patients and to

1 families;

2 A woeful lack of engagement with families, friends
3 and support networks of patients at all stages and
4 across all aspects of care and treatment;

5 Failures to listen to families or to seek input on
6 patients from those who knew them best;

7 Failures to carry out proper checks, to ensure that
8 patients could not access items with which to harm
9 themselves;

10 Systemic failures in relation to ligature points;

11 Concerns in relation to medication, including
12 failures to warn in respect of side-effects and signs to
13 look out for in the case of deterioration;

14 Concerns in relation to discharge and inadequate
15 assessments prior to discharge;

16 A failure to engage with families in respect of the
17 discharge decision and process;

18 Poor responses to complaints or concerns raised;

19 Closed, defensive, dismissive and disrespectful
20 attitudes from the Trust and from Trust staff towards
21 families following a death;

22 Inadequate and error-ridden investigations and
23 investigation reports; and

24 A lack of support before, during and after inquests
25 into deaths.

1 As I have said, many families have sadly become
2 experts in some of these areas and are uniquely placed
3 to speak to these important issues in a way that no
4 corporate organisation can.

5 I should also reiterate, as I said in April, that
6 the witness statements provided for this hearing by
7 those witnesses will stand in full as their evidence.
8 I say this as the statements will not be read out in
9 full during the course of the hearing, rather the
10 witnesses will be asked careful questions about what
11 they have written. Those witness statements will be
12 published on the Inquiry's website once each witness has
13 given their evidence. The copies of the statements that
14 are published will be redacted in line with the
15 Inquiry's published approach. There are three main
16 categories where redactions may be applied:

17 Staff names. Staff names including those of junior
18 staff will generally be disclosed in the course of the
19 Inquiry. Individuals can apply for their names to be
20 withheld, however, in line with relevant law and the
21 Inquiry's protocol on restriction orders. Each
22 application for a restriction order will be considered
23 individually by the Chair. Some staff may need time to
24 decide whether to apply for anonymity and to seek legal
25 advice. While they are given this time, their names

1 will be restricted temporarily. This ensures fairness.

2 The second category, methods of self-inflicted death
3 or self-harm. Details about specific methods of
4 self-inflicted death or self-harm, as well as other
5 highly distressing content, may be redacted to protect
6 the public from potential harm. The Inquiry may also
7 apply redactions where it considers the information is
8 unusual and could instruct others.

9 The third category, other information which may fall
10 under the Inquiry's privacy information protocol. This
11 will be information which is personal in nature and
12 which, Chair, you do not consider relevant and necessary
13 to be made public. This would include details such as
14 someone's address or other personal sensitive
15 information.

16 Moving now to the timetable.

17 The Inquiry will sit on Monday to Thursday during
18 this week and again next Monday. For this hearing we
19 will generally start at 10.00 and finish by 4.00. There
20 will be a short break in the morning and in the
21 afternoon in which teas and coffees will be provided
22 free of charge for those who are attending.

23 There will be a one-hour break for lunch each day
24 which will usually be from around 1.30 to 2.30 pm. This
25 is all subject to the need for the Inquiry to proceed

1 flexibly and take more breaks or make other arrangements
2 as required to support witnesses.

3 It's not necessary to attend the hearing in person
4 to follow the Inquiry's proceedings. Core Participants
5 and their lawyers who are not attending in person can
6 watch the hearing live on a secure weblink. The hearing
7 is also being live-streamed on the Lampard Inquiry
8 YouTube channel for anyone who wishes to follow us
9 remotely. Please note, however, that this will be
10 streamed with a delay of 10 minutes.

11 Moving now to the changing mental health landscape.

12 I have previously referred to the changing mental
13 health landscape against which the work of the Inquiry
14 is taking place. Chair, you made reference in your
15 opening to the NHS 10-year Health Plan for England,
16 which includes proposed measures of relevance to the
17 work of this Inquiry. The plan, published last
18 Thursday, includes the suggestion that, and I quote:

19 "The NHS' history is blighted by examples of
20 systemic and avoidable harm."

21 It makes specific references to:

22 "... neglect and poor care of patients under the
23 care of mental health services, including Essex
24 inpatient services 2000 to 2023."

25 Reference is made to other suggested examples of

1 systemic and avoidable harm in mental health and other
2 health settings. The plan says that:

3 "The failures that underpin each are consistent:
4 incompetent leadership, toxic culture, rampant blame,
5 workplace bullying and a failure to learn from mistakes.
6 There is also a fundamental lack of transparency which
7 means low quality or neglectful care does not come to
8 light quickly, that the response is not fast or decisive
9 enough and that patient, staff and public attempts to
10 sound the alarm go unheard. It is time for the NHS to
11 learn."

12 The Inquiry is considering this and other parts of
13 the plan.

14 Recent cases. Chair, when I delivered the opening
15 statement at the April hearing, I observed how sad the
16 Inquiry had been to learn of deaths in mental health
17 settings occurring in 2024 and a death as recently as
18 April 2025. I observed that these further tragic deaths
19 may point to serious and ongoing issues in Essex.

20 The Inquiry remains deeply concerned that patients
21 are still dying. We will continue to monitor any recent
22 deaths of mental health inpatients in Essex. We also
23 continue to monitor the inquests that are taking place
24 into the deaths of those who died in the latter part of
25 the period covered by the Inquiry's Terms of Reference.

1 We are aware of a number of inquests having taken place
2 in the past few months in relation to deaths of mental
3 health inpatients in Essex in 2023 and from previous
4 years, following which the coroner has issued
5 a Prevention of Future Deaths report.

6 The recent inquest of Elise Sebastian, who died
7 under the care of EPUT in 2021, gives rise to serious
8 issues that this Inquiry is investigating. The coroner
9 has indicated that a Prevention of Future Deaths report
10 will be forthcoming.

11 Other inquests are listed for hearing later this
12 year. In short, the Inquiry has noted that recent
13 inquests have explored the same or similar failings and
14 systemic issues with which this Inquiry is concerned.

15 It is against these ever present and growing
16 concerns, Chair, that the Inquiry is determined to
17 scrutinise what has taken place in Essex over the
18 relevant period. You have made clear that you will make
19 appropriate findings of fact, ensure accountability and
20 propose robust recommendations for long-lasting change.
21 We are mindful now more than ever, Chair, that the
22 landscape into which you will be making those
23 recommendations is a changing one.

24 That brings me to the end of my opening remarks.

25 A written version of this opening statement will

1 shortly be available on the website. Chair, we will
2 rise now until 12.00, when we will reconvene to hear the
3 evidence from our first witness, Ben Jackson. He will
4 be asked questions by my colleague Rachel Troup, so
5 until 12.00, please.

6 (11.47 am)

7 (A short break)

8 (12.15 pm)

9 MS TROUP: Chair, there is one brief matter.

10 An announcement has been made to the room but, for the
11 benefit of those watching more widely, I understand that
12 there is currently a technical issue with the live
13 transcript feature and that work is being done to
14 resolve that. A transcript is being kept but it is just
15 to make those watching more widely aware.

16 THE CHAIR: Thank you. Thank you Ms Troup. Thank you very
17 much.

18 BEN JACKSON (affirmed)

19 Questioned by MS TROUP

20 MS TROUP: Thank you. Can you please state your full name
21 for the record?

22 A. Benjamin Charles Jackson.

23 Q. You are the brother of Edward Jackson --

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. -- known as Ed --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- who died on 31 December 2007 when he was 18 years
3 old?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. When Ed died, he was an inpatient on Maple Ward at
6 Severalls Hospital in Colchester?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. Yes, you would like me to refer to you throughout your
9 evidence as Ben; is that right?

10 A. Yes, please.

11 Q. And to your brother as Ed?

12 A. Yes, please.

13 Q. By way of background, the Inquiry sent to you some
14 months ago a request for evidence under Rule 9 of the
15 Inquiry Rules and, in response to that, you have
16 provided the Inquiry with a witness statement.

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. Do you have a copy of that in front of you?

19 A. I do.

20 Q. It's 42 pages long and, if you turn to page 42, we can
21 see that it is dated 27 May of this year --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- and that you made a statement of truth and then
24 signed on that same page?

25 A. That's correct.

1 Q. Have you had the opportunity to read through your
2 witness statement recently?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Is that document true and accurate to the best of your
5 knowledge and belief?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. That witness statement, as you know, will stand as your
8 evidence to the Inquiry?

9 A. (Witness nodded)

10 Q. Ben, you also provided, back in November 2024
11 a commemorative and impact account about Ed and that was
12 read for you?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. The Inquiry is extremely grateful to you for that
15 evidence, as well as for your evidence today?

16 A. Thank you. I am grateful to have the opportunity to
17 give it.

18 Q. Before we begin going through your evidence, I want to
19 make clear, as you tell us on the first page of your
20 witness statement, that you have prepared this witness
21 statement to be as full an account as you can and it's
22 based on your own recollection of events from the
23 time --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- as well as impressions that your parents had at the

1 time?

2 A. Yes, yes.

3 Q. It is also based, do I understand correctly, on your

4 consideration of some documents that you had not seen at

5 the time but you have seen more recently?

6 A. Yes, that's correct.

7 Q. It's right, I think, that Ed was two years your

8 younger --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- and, for much of the time, looking at the time period

11 between about the summer of 2005 and the end of 2007,

12 you were away at university?

13 A. Summer of 2006, just before I left.

14 Q. You were away for that last part of the events --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- we are going to go through.

17 You have explained in your witness statement, as you

18 did during your commemorative account, that your own

19 recollections from the time are not full and that your

20 memories of that period of your life are less clear --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- than they are; is that right?

23 A. Yes, that is true. It was reassuring to me that the

24 memories that I had upon reviewing documents were often

25 validated.

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. I found that reassuring, so I have confidence in my
3 memories from the time, although they obviously don't
4 cover everything.

5 Q. Yes. No.

6 But you have also, as we have said, reviewed certain
7 reports and documents that you refer to in your witness
8 statement and I think you told us, in your commemorative
9 account in November, that actually, at the time, you
10 understand now, that your parents sought to protect you
11 from some of the more distressing details about what was
12 happening for Ed?

13 A. Yes, I think that that's -- that's the truth of the matter.

14 Q. Yes, and also that there's -- you have experienced what
15 you described in November almost as a sort of a temporal
16 disassociation, that may well be trauma related?

17 A. Yes, I think so, and that specifically applies to the
18 period that covers his illness.

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. It doesn't apply to the years after that and it doesn't
21 apply to the inquest years, I don't think.

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. It was, I think, a stress-related response to him being
24 ill.

25 Q. Yes, yes understood. Ben, you also make very clear, and

1 I think this is important to note at this stage, on the
2 first page of your witness statement that you are still
3 seeking further documents in relation to what happened
4 to Ed --

5 A. Yes, that's correct.

6 Q. -- and that, in particular, you do not have a number of
7 documents relating to the Health and Safety Executive's
8 prosecution of the Trust --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- in 2020 and 2021, or medical records?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. I think it is the case, is it, that you would have
13 preferred to have prepared your witness statement and be
14 giving your evidence having seen those documents?

15 A. Yes, I think so. I think, in terms of being able to do
16 a good job, it would be nice to have the fullest account
17 of the situation at the time but also I think, for my
18 own sense of well-being, the lack of them is a little
19 bit sort of disconcerting --

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. -- on some level.

22 Q. You understand that, during your evidence today, on the
23 basis of your witness statement, what we will be taking
24 from you and what is of immense value, despite those
25 gaps that you feel in your knowledge, are your own

1 recollections and your parents' impressions and what you
2 have to say --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- about the documents that you have seen.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. I'm being asked, if you could, when you are speaking,
7 just lean slightly further forward --

8 A. No problem.

9 Q. -- just because you have got -- I think, possibly
10 a little bit difficult to hear you.

11 In any event, you have also made clear that, when
12 you are in receipt of further documents and those that
13 you consider centrally important, it's very likely that
14 you will be submitting further evidence to this Inquiry?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. Thank you. I would like to take you through, in summary
17 form, but taking you through some of the most important
18 dates and events, the background to the development of
19 Ed's mental ill health and to his care and treatment,
20 and what I would like you to do, it is a lot of me
21 speaking, I'm afraid, but you must stop me if I make
22 an error or there is something that you want to add.

23 A. I understand.

24 Q. So taking all of these matters from the information you
25 have provided to us in the witness statement, your

1 parents believe, I think, looking back, that it was in
2 the early summer of 2005 that Ed started to show some
3 signs of illness; is that right?

4 A. Yes, I think that that's fair to say. I mean, my own
5 impressions were that I was growing up with a teenage
6 brother who was difficult.

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. But I think at the beginning it was quite hard to
9 separate those two things.

10 THE CHAIR: He was about 16?

11 A. He was about 16, yes.

12 MS TROUP: Your own recollection is that Ed began to become
13 increasingly unwell in the autumn of 2005 and I think it
14 was at that time, is this right, he had transitioned
15 into a new school for Sixth Form --

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. -- and dropped out at October half-term?

18 A. As far as I remember, yes.

19 Q. You explain that, during that period, so after around
20 about October 2005, his behaviour began to change?

21 A. To the best of my recollection, my memories of him being
22 difficult in a way that I guess I didn't feel like was
23 just growing up with a little brother was pretty
24 coincident with his starting Sixth Form.

25 Q. I see.

1 A. So that was that time, yes.

2 Q. Thank you. You say that during that period, so we are
3 talking about October 2005 up to around about Easter
4 2006, his behaviour seemed to fluctuate in severity, at
5 times he was quite aggressive?

6 A. Yes, I think so. Again, it's difficult to pinpoint
7 exact times over that two-year period but, certainly,
8 there were -- there was -- we felt threatened in terms
9 of threats of violence. Ed threatened violence to
10 himself as well as to us.

11 Q. Yes, yes.

12 A. Yes, I think it would be fair to say that that was going
13 on at that time.

14 Q. Thank you. You go on to explain in your witness
15 statement that, at around Easter time in 2006, there
16 came a really marked deterioration and a change in his
17 behaviour, and I don't know if you are following it, but
18 if you want to in your witness statement this is on
19 page 4, at paragraph 3.1?

20 A. Thank you.

21 Q. You say, in fact, that your parents described this as
22 a marked deterioration and you make reference to him
23 being unable to sleep, pacing the house, speaking
24 incoherently and curling up in a fetal position?

25 A. Yes, certainly, I mean, my recollection of his behaviour

1 was that it was a marked change from, you know, the
2 person that he was up until that point.

3 Q. Yes. At that stage, as I understand it, a CAMHS mental
4 health nurse did visit at home.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. I think the night after that, Ed, under a delusional
7 belief that your parents were trying to harm him, called
8 police?

9 A. I think so, yes, and then fled the house. I think he
10 ran to a friend's house, I think he ran to a particular
11 person who he felt safe with.

12 Q. Yes. Thereafter, as I understand it, he was detained by
13 police under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act --

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. -- and an attempt was made to have him admitted to
16 a local psychiatric unit but, of course, he was a child,
17 he was 17, and they were unable to accommodate him; is
18 that right?

19 A. Yes, it seems that there wasn't a place for him in
20 Suffolk at that age at the time, on that occasion.

21 Q. Yes. So he spent that night in police custody --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- and was seen -- we are now on 16 April 2006 -- by
24 a mental health nurse and an approved social worker --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- and arrangements were made for him to be admitted to
2 Longview, which was an adolescent unit?

3 A. Yes, in Essex.

4 Q. Yes. Looking at paragraph 3.5 of your witness
5 statement, you tell us there about the admission
6 information that you have seen from his admission to
7 Longview and there is quite a long quote there --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- again reporting an inability to sleep, flight of
10 ideas, racing thoughts, paranoia, anger and
11 a preoccupation with physical symptoms.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. There is also a comment --

14 A. Sorry.

15 Q. Sorry, go ahead?

16 A. No, no, please.

17 Q. I didn't mean to interrupt you.

18 A. No, I was just going to say "yes".

19 Q. There is also a comment here that -- this is about four
20 lines down:

21 "He speaks of hearing voices, although I think this
22 is more likely an internal debate rather than true
23 hallucinations."

24 A. Yes, I suppose I don't know --

25 Q. No.

1 A. -- I don't feel qualified to say what the difference
2 between hallucination and an internal debate is.

3 Q. No. At the time, the diagnosis that was reported, when
4 he was admitted to Longview, you have set it out at
5 paragraph 3.6 was impression mixed affective disorder or
6 manic episode, either discrete or possibly with the
7 context of an emerging bipolar disorder?

8 A. That's right. So I guess that's the first sort of
9 diagnosis that Ed is going to receive. There will be
10 multiple more and they will mostly be different.

11 Q. Yes. Is it right for me to say, just setting matters in
12 context, that at the time of his death, there was no
13 definitive or settled diagnosis?

14 A. That's my understanding, based on my recollection of all
15 of the evidence from the inquest, yes.

16 Q. Yes. You tell us here about a fundamental error that
17 then took place, where, on admission to Longview, Ed was
18 needlessly and unjustifiably detained under Section 2 of
19 the Mental Health Act.

20 A. That's right. So I believe that the social worker
21 involved signed a form that was only there as
22 an emergency measure, in the event that he worsened he
23 could be admitted, presumably, like, for everyone's
24 safety.

25 Q. Yes.

1 A. But the social worker signed the form and he was then
2 detained under the Act by mistake.

3 Q. Yes. So I understand that he did formally meet the
4 criteria for detention but the key is that he had agreed
5 to the admission --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- and, therefore, he should have been admitted as
8 a voluntary patient?

9 A. And that was the understanding of the two clinicians at
10 the time, that he was not going to be detained.

11 Q. Yes.

12 A. That's right.

13 Q. Essentially, when your parents complained about that
14 matter later to Suffolk County Council, the explanation
15 given was that it was an error made without thinking.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. The form was simply signed. You go on to say there that
18 that needless detention or that error was a matter of
19 serious concern to your parents, for obvious reasons,
20 because your brother was a child at the time.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You also tell us there that it had a noticeable effect
23 on Ed. What was that, as far as you can remember?

24 A. I mean, my recollections of speaking to Ed about, like,
25 the possibility of having a mental illness at the time

1 was that Ed was really defensive about that.

2 Q. I see.

3 A. It made him angry, he didn't want it. I mean, I suppose

4 it is incredibly frightening to be told that, as

5 a child. So, I mean, there was some degree of maybe --

6 stigma is not right word but in Ed's mind that's perhaps

7 what it was and it upset him, for sure, to be considered

8 as having a mental illness at that time.

9 THE CHAIR: Would it be diagnosis or the differing but

10 possible diagnosis or was it the detention that

11 particularly upset -- the fact that he could be

12 detained?

13 A. I don't -- I don't -- I couldn't honestly tell you what

14 would have been more important to him now. I think my

15 impression is that, in general, he -- I mean, later on

16 we will go on to hear that he was defensive about being

17 diagnosed with a mental illness, so I think he found it

18 problematic being told that he was unwell, when I think

19 he perhaps believed that he wasn't and I am sure that

20 the detention was, you know, not -- played into exactly

21 those fears that he had. Does that make sense?

22 THE CHAIR: It does, so it added to his sense that there was

23 something wrong?

24 A. Yes, I think so, or maybe it was the first time that

25 that sense was brought up in him. I couldn't tell you

1 for sure.

2 THE CHAIR: Yes, yes, thank you.

3 MS TROUP: Thank you. I understand that Ed was discharged

4 from Longview on or about 14 June 2006; is what you tell

5 us?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Also that when he was discharged, no discharge summary

8 was prepared; is that your understanding?

9 A. That is my understanding.

10 Q. You now know, having reviewed some of the documents,

11 that his discharge from that unit followed a meeting,

12 a CPA or Care Programme Approach meeting, for which

13 a number of reports had been prepared?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. One of those was a medical report and one was

16 a psychological assessment and the conclusion of both of

17 those reports was that Ed was not suffering from any

18 form of mental illness?

19 A. Yes, that's correct. And that conclusion will be

20 criticised later on.

21 Q. Yes. I mean, we can speak about that a little now.

22 I understand that, in particular, the psychological

23 assessment came in for criticism when the Serious

24 Untoward Incident Panel reported?

25 A. So the basis of the psychological assessment was, in

1 part, on two psychometric tests, one of them was the
2 Rorschach test, which you might understand as the
3 inkblot test, which I think is Edwardian perhaps in
4 origin --

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. -- and the other is a -- was a drawing game of the
7 psychologist in question's own devising --

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. -- which -- I mean, I don't think it was in any way
10 validated. I think in the SUI later, we will hear it
11 has "no psychometric valuation associated with it", or
12 evaluation. So --

13 Q. It was essentially a sort of squiggle line on -- so we
14 had the -- I don't know how to say it, either, I think
15 it's Rorschach -- inkblot tests -- I had to look it up,
16 the pronunciation, I mean. An inkblot test, which is
17 a sort of image test and what do you see?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And then a drawing game or test that that particular
20 psychologist had --

21 A. Invented.

22 Q. -- him or herself devised, that was not in any way
23 externally validated?

24 A. That's my belief, yes, and then I think it's worth
25 saying that, as a result of the report of no mental

1 illness, although perhaps that was pleasing to Ed, it
2 made it harder for my parents to access care for him in
3 the coming months.

4 Q. Of course. So on that, I mean, what you go on to say is
5 that, after his discharge into the community, there was
6 essentially almost a total lack of support?

7 A. Yes, that's my understanding from reading the documents.
8 My memories from the time are quite unclear.

9 Q. I understand. I understand that because this conclusion
10 appeared to have been arrived at that Ed was not
11 suffering from any form of mental illness, as you say,
12 it was even more difficult for your parents to access
13 appropriate support?

14 A. I think that's true.

15 Q. You tell us that they visited the GP several times to
16 try to access help for him?

17 A. Yes, I mean, some of the reasons that they couldn't
18 access help for him was that the GP had their hands tied
19 in terms of they couldn't discuss Ed without Ed
20 consenting to it.

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. Because he is over 16, in a way perhaps that's fair
23 enough, but it was difficult for my parents.

24 Q. So they advised your parents -- the GP advised your
25 parents, essentially, that the request for help had to

1 come from Ed?

2 A. I understand that to be the case.

3 Q. I understand. There was one follow-up appointment from

4 the local CAMHS team in Suffolk and then when Ed,

5 essentially, disengaged from that nobody followed up

6 with him?

7 A. Nobody followed up and then, yes, that, that single

8 follow up will also be later criticised in the SUI

9 report after his death.

10 Q. Yes, the finding of the SUI Panel, in effect, was that

11 this was not a low level event where one follow-up

12 appointment --

13 A. Was appropriate.

14 Q. -- was appropriate.

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. You also tell us that after being discharged into the

17 community from Longview, Ed made the journey to an aunt

18 and uncle of yours in Yorkshire --

19 A. That's right.

20 Q. -- a long journey --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- and that, whilst he was there, his mental state

23 continued to deteriorate and he displayed out of

24 character behaviour --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- essentially?

2 A. That's true, and so my memory of that time is I guess my
3 aunt and uncle hadn't been exposed to Ed subsequent to
4 his onset of illness, at that point, so they also
5 presumably weren't sure what was happening.

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. But, at some point, did relate to us that they were now,
8 having met him, much more certain that there was
9 something wrong.

10 Q. Yes, and I think through a GP they did manage to access
11 one appointment with a psychiatrist?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. But, thereafter, essentially, Ed, for the reasons that
14 you have explained to us, disengaged?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. When Ed returned home, back to your parents' home, which
17 I think was in June 2007 --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- at that stage, as I understand it, your parents did
20 manage to secure a referral to the Early Intervention in
21 Psychosis team in Suffolk?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. During that period, so this is June 2007 onwards, there
24 were a number of home visits from social workers and
25 mental health nurses; is that right?

1 A. I understand that to be the case, yes.

2 Q. Were you by then away at university?

3 A. Yes. I was.

4 Q. Yes. Taking matters forward into October 2007,

5 I understand that on the 23rd your brother was picked up

6 by police at the side of the road?

7 A. Yes, so he would have been at the side of the A1,

8 I think, almost certainly heading back to Yorkshire.

9 Q. I see.

10 A. I imagine in an attempt to find safety again, which is

11 something that I think is going to happen to him a lot

12 in the coming months.

13 Q. Yes, attempts to flee to find safety?

14 A. I imagine that's what was going through his head, yes.

15 Q. Yes, I understand. On this occasion, he was picked up

16 near Grantham --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- and police have reported that he was so agitated that

19 tranquilisers were required?

20 A. Yes, the records report that. I'm not sure who said it

21 exactly.

22 Q. Yes, he was taken to Grantham Hospital for a check and

23 then the intention was for him to be taken to

24 a psychiatric unit?

25 A. Yes, yes.

1 Q. Another error occurred and, in fact, he was returned by
2 ambulance to your parents' home?

3 A. Which is precisely, I assume, the place that he was
4 trying to escape from, for good or not reason.

5 Q. Yes. When he arrived home, the GP attended, as did
6 police --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- and, by 25 October, so just two days later, he was
9 detained under Section 2 of the Mental Health Act and
10 police took him to Wedgwood House?

11 A. Yes, that's correct.

12 Q. Wedgwood House is where?

13 A. Bury St Edmunds in west Suffolk.

14 Q. Yes. The records show that whilst he was at Wedgwood
15 House, although Ed was ambivalent about taking his
16 medication, he did comply with it --

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. -- and that, although he denied it, he was found to be
19 at that stage psychotic or in psychosis?

20 A. Yes, and then I think this is the first mention of
21 schizophrenia as a possible diagnosis.

22 Q. Yes. I understand that there had been a mention, when,
23 Ed was with your aunt and uncle in West Yorkshire,
24 I understand that an approved social worker had made
25 mention then for the first time of possible emerging

1 schizophrenia?

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 Q. And then this is the second time that we see that

4 potential diagnosis coming up, isn't it?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You were aware at the time, you tell us -- and if you

7 are following it Ben, I'm looking now at page 10 and

8 paragraph 5.7 of your witness statement?

9 A. Okay.

10 Q. You were aware at the time that there were serious

11 concerns about Ed escaping?

12 A. Yes, for sure, I remember being told he had stolen

13 a taxi at some point and I know now from reviewing the

14 documents that there were multiple absconsion attempts.

15 Q. Yes. So I think what the records show and what you have

16 learned from them is that he did manage to escape on 3,

17 9 and 12 November --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- 2007 from Wedgwood House and that, on each of those

20 three occasions he was returned to the unit by police?

21 A. Yes, that's correct.

22 THE CHAIR: Sorry, remind me, was he under section there?

23 MS TROUP: He was.

24 THE CHAIR: Yes.

25 MS TROUP: On 6 November, a decision had been made to

1 maintain Ed's detention and, Chair, that's at
2 paragraph 5.9 on page 10.

3 During that decision, which was at a review tribunal
4 on 6 November -- I am so sorry I am looking at
5 paragraph 5.9 -- quite importantly, it was noted -- so
6 here is where we see a description of a possible
7 emerging psychotic illness and reference to
8 schizophrenia, and there is reference to his guarded and
9 suspicious nature.

10 A. I mean my -- I think possibly, if you were involved in
11 a, like, set of circumstances where multiple mistakes
12 had been made --

13 Q. Of course?

14 A. -- you might feel like being guarded and suspicious is
15 a reasonable response to the treatment that he had had
16 up to that point.

17 Q. Of course.

18 A. So I guess I find that problematic, especially to the
19 extent that that behaviour seems, to some extent,
20 justified --

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. -- but contributed to a diagnosis which may well have
23 been correct, which then would have then gone on to
24 further upset Ed.

25 Q. Yes.

1 A. So I find that sort of set of circumstances quite
2 difficult to come to terms with.

3 Q. Yes. In addition to his defensiveness, again, that we
4 might say was perfectly understandable, particularly
5 given his age, around being told that he was mentally
6 ill or a diagnosis of any kind, which is not at all
7 uncommon?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. One of the matters I wanted to note was that, during
10 this review tribunal panel, a note was made of him once
11 having told your parents that he might as well not be
12 living --

13 A. Mm-hm.

14 Q. -- and reference to knives and other sharp items being
15 found in his bedroom when they were sort of clearing it
16 or tidying it, whatever, for admission, that he had said
17 he had been using to harm himself?

18 A. Yes. So I am not clear whether or not those rooms were
19 his room at home or his room in hospital. Reading this
20 was the first -- yes, sorry, I can't -- I don't know.

21 Q. No, I am not sure either, that's a good point. In any
22 event, what is key is that we see here a clear
23 notification to staff that he had made reference at some
24 point --

25 A. To self-harm.

1 Q. -- to self-harm and to suicidal intent?

2 A. Yes, that's correct and this was the first time --

3 reading these documents was the first time that

4 I understood that he might have used knives to

5 self-harm.

6 Q. Yes. We know from the records that on 10 November 2007,

7 Ed was placed on continuous nursing observations and

8 that was due to his repeated absconsions from the ward?

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. There are also records from that date of him acting more

11 bizarrely and making threats to kill your parents?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And that his administration of anti-psychotic and

14 tranquiliser medication was increased at that stage?

15 A. That's what I understand.

16 Q. On 16 November, plans were first made to move Ed to

17 a more secure unit --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- and on the 20th, he was detained under Section 3 of

20 the Mental Health Act?

21 A. Yes, I'm not sure if -- I mean, presumably that

22 detention was based on the previous absconsions and

23 self-harm but I am not certain exactly why that was.

24 Q. Yes. Most crucial, given the concerns we are going to

25 go on to discuss, the records show that on 27 November

1 2007, Ed was found with a belt around his neck that he
2 had secured to his bedroom door by a knot?

3 A. Yes, so this is still in the same facility in Bury St
4 Edmunds in Suffolk.

5 Q. Yes, so we are still in Wedgwood House?

6 A. That's right.

7 Q. He is now detained under Section 3. That event took
8 place on 27 November --

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. -- and he is recorded of having reported to staff that
11 he -- expressing thoughts of suicide that were
12 especially intrusive when his mood was low?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. On 5 December 2007, he made a further attempt to escape,
15 literally trying to run from the premises and scale
16 a wall. At that time, he is recorded as having made
17 comments to staff, first of all, of wanting to throw
18 himself under a train --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- and, secondly, asking that his shoelaces be removed
21 from him because he didn't trust himself?

22 A. Yes. So I guess the all of those previous paragraphs
23 speak to an increased frequency in absconsion. So he is
24 more at risk, I guess, the public are more at risk
25 because he is stealing things, he has been found with

1 a ligature tied around his neck, he has talked about
2 wanting not to be here and he's expressed some specific
3 plans, to an extent --

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. -- and then he's, yes, asked for his shoelaces to be
6 taken away from him, which I mean is incredibly sad
7 and -- but also speaks to the fact that it may not be
8 that he really wants to die at that point.

9 Q. Of course.

10 A. But, okay, so there is like -- now there's built up over
11 the course of about two months, like, a high frequency
12 of quite extreme events --

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. -- in Suffolk.

15 Q. Now, my understanding, in relation to the 27 November
16 and how Ed was found and the comments that he made at
17 that time, is that your parents were not made aware of
18 that incident; is that right?

19 A. That is my understanding. It's based on reviewing the
20 documents. I don't have exceptional memory of that at
21 the time.

22 Q. Yes. As far as you are aware, were your parents made
23 aware at the time of the events of the 5 December and
24 that attempt to escape from the premises and the
25 comments he made in terms of suicidal intent on that

1 date?

2 A. I am not aware in either direction. I don't know if

3 they did or did not know.

4 Q. I understand. We know that Ed was transferred from

5 Wedgwood House to Maple Ward at Severalls Hospital on

6 7 December 2007?

7 A. That's right.

8 Q. I have now moved, Ben, to page 12 and to paragraph 6.1?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. That transfer took place under an SLA or Service Level

11 Agreement between the NHS Trust in Suffolk and NEPT,

12 yes?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. I know you are going to have further comments about that

15 agreement.

16 A. Yes, certainly my parents will discuss it, especially in

17 light of information that they received at the inquest.

18 Q. Indeed, and I think, is it fair for me to say, that many

19 of their concerns centred on what due diligence or what

20 checks were carried out in relation to that agreement

21 and the environment at Maple Ward?

22 A. Yes, so I mean the circumstances are that Ed had been

23 referred there because of the behaviour that he

24 exhibited in Bury St Edmunds, where he is about to

25 leave --

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. -- and, of course, his referral there was an attempt to
3 make him more safe.

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. That's presumably what the aim was.

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. But, in fact, the exact opposite, as we are going to
8 see, is what occurred, and that's really important and
9 obviously it was really important to my parents.

10 Q. Of course. In fact, what the records show is that the
11 reason for the transfer or the basis for the transfer to
12 Maple Ward given were the ongoing risks of absconding --
13 this is at the very bottom of paragraph 6.1 -- self-harm
14 and fleeting suicide ideation?

15 A. Yes, that's correct.

16 Q. Those were the recorded reasons for exactly, as you say,
17 moving him to a more secure unit in an attempt to make
18 him more safe, that was the intention?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. We are going to come on to talk quite a lot about Maple
21 Ward, for obvious reasons but, is this right, I think
22 you make this fairly clear in your witness statement,
23 your position, Ben, is that it is entirely possible
24 that, had Ed not been transferred to that particular
25 ward, he would not have died?

1 A. Yes, I think that's certainly fair to say. I mean, of
2 course one can't speak of then the years that might have
3 come later but, I mean, I think it's going to be
4 markedly obvious that he was transferred there and three
5 weeks later he was dead --

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. -- and that was due to serious failings and, of course,
8 my position is that, if he hadn't gone there, he
9 wouldn't be.

10 Q. Yes. You tell us in your witness statement that your
11 parents -- and you are not completely sure for the
12 reasons why -- but they were very impressed with the
13 environment at Wedgwood House?

14 A. Yes, I believe that to be the case. Again, that's from
15 reviewing the documents rather than my understanding at
16 the time.

17 Q. That, I understand, is in very stark contrast to their
18 impressions and views about Maple Ward at Severalls?

19 A. Yes. Concerns about the physical environment in terms
20 of it being an old Victorian asylum --

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. -- concerns about there being nothing to do for
23 patients there.

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. Perhaps further concerns.

1 THE CHAIR: Ben, did your parents ever talk to you directly
2 about what they had seen at Severalls? They visited him
3 there?
4 A. They visited him there often, yes.
5 THE CHAIR: Yes.
6 A. I find it really hard -- I don't have a clear memory of
7 them doing that. But I do have a clear sense of knowing
8 what it was like, so it may be that they did. But it
9 also may be that my memory was based on evidence at the
10 inquest.
11 THE CHAIR: Right.
12 A. I couldn't tell you, for sure.
13 THE CHAIR: Right, thank you.
14 MS TROUP: In summary, your parents' views, I think this is
15 right and it is as you set out, is that neither the
16 environment nor the staff on that ward were fit for
17 purpose?
18 A. Yes, I mean the staffing issues -- I am not certain how
19 much their opinion of the staffing issues were formed by
20 the inquest material that was received.
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. But, certainly, that was the opinion that they would
23 reach eventually.
24 Q. Yes. They described it as a depressing environment and,
25 as you have said, one of the things that they noted was

1 that there was almost nothing for patients to do, other
2 than watch television.

3 A. Yes, and so it is notable that Ed was referred there on
4 7 December. On the 8th, my parents visited and brought
5 him a personal CD player.

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. They weren't allowed to give it to him because there
8 was a headphone cable, so that was deemed too risky.
9 And the day after that, staff at Maple Unit returned his
10 belt to him, which I think may have been linked to
11 a change in risk assessment or a change in level of
12 observations for some reason.

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. The day after he died, they planned, before he died, to
15 be bringing him a PlayStation. So, yes, lack of
16 therapeutic activity.

17 Q. So that he had something to do?

18 A. Exactly.

19 Q. I understand. As I understand it, what they also
20 discovered was that there were no psychological or
21 occupational therapy services available?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Your parents were told that they couldn't visit in the
24 evening?

25 A. Yes, and that was factually incorrect, it was

1 miscommunication. They apparently were allowed to visit
2 in the evening but, as a result of that, they did not.

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. Then, obviously, they had limited time.

5 Q. They were both working --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- so they tried to visit in the day, if they could --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- and at weekends --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- but later discovered that they could have been there
12 in the evening, is that it?

13 A. That's correct but they were informed by a member of
14 ward staff that evening visits weren't permitted.

15 Q. Yes. Ed's key worker, you have discovered, was on night
16 shifts throughout?

17 A. Yes. Yes. I -- I am not sure completely 100 per cent
18 throughout but, yes, the -- certainly the majority of
19 the time, to the extent that disciplinary action into
20 that was recommended at the seven-day panel.

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. It was a theme of the inquest, it is the part of the
23 inquest that I remember most clearly asking whether --
24 that person whether or not them being on night shifts
25 whilst being a key worker meant that they could fulfil

1 their duties to Ed. It is something that I have talked
2 about, like, in other contexts with prior to this
3 Inquiry, so I think that's something that's really
4 stayed with me.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. So the person that was responsible for coordinating his
7 care --

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. -- was not available to him.

10 Q. Yes. All right. We will come back to that, I think.

11 The other things that your parents noted that are
12 very important and relate to the matters you have told
13 us about, about your parents trying to bring him --
14 bringing him a music player but not being allowed to
15 give him the earphone cables, so the cable wire, and
16 wanting to bring him a PlayStation. I understand that
17 Ed lost a lot of weight while he was an inpatient on
18 Maple Ward?

19 A. Yes, I think so, to the extent that his trousers were
20 falling down because he was so thin --

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. -- which was, I think, justification -- at least my
23 memory of the inquest was that was verbal justification
24 for the return of his belt.

25 Q. Yes, I understand that the records seem to show that

1 staff were concerned by the amount of weight that he had
2 lost and there was a suggestion that, because his
3 trousers were falling down, that other patients were
4 teasing him.

5 A. Yes, no, I think he did experience bullying on that
6 ward --

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. -- and, in particular, the day of his death I believe he
9 experienced some sort of bullying.

10 Q. Yes, on that day there is a record that shows that there
11 was -- and this is the 31 December, so moving forward
12 a few weeks in time, there is a suggestion that there
13 had been an altercation between Ed and a male patient
14 and a suggestion in the records that that particular
15 male patient had been --

16 A. May have been picking on him.

17 Q. -- intimidating Ed and possibly targeting him?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. We bear in mind he had just turned 18 in the spring of
20 2007, yes, and this was an adult unit?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. When Ed first arrived on Maple Ward, he was placed on
23 Level 2 observations, the records show?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. As you said, the next day, 8 December, your parents were

1 prevented from giving him a portable music player
2 because of the risk presented by the earphone cables?

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. Nonetheless, as you have told us, the next day,
5 9 December, both Ed's belt and his shoelaces were
6 returned to him.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. We will come back to this but the seven-day report found
9 that no risk assessment had been carried out?

10 A. Yes, and there was no written rationale of any kind
11 associated with that decision.

12 Q. It appeared to have come about just on the basis of
13 a sort of discussion between staff?

14 A. A sort of ad hoc discussion, yes.

15 Q. At this time, you still have no clear information about
16 who decided to return those items to your brother or on
17 what basis?

18 A. No, that's correct. I mean it -- I mean, obviously,
19 I think one of the things that one thinks about is that
20 there are no therapeutic activities available but you
21 can't have a music player but, hey, you can have your
22 belt back. It is just speaks, I think, to a sort of
23 chaotic and not coherent programme of care.

24 Q. Yes, or a coherent or consistent approach --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- to risk --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- which is a huge concern of yours that we will come on

4 to.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. On 9 December, we know that a NEPT -- well, we don't

7 know -- it is said that a NEPT risk assessment was

8 completed for Ed?

9 A. Yes. It was.

10 Q. That risk assessment is dated 9 December?

11 A. That's right.

12 Q. But I understand, and we will come on to this, that

13 there is some doubt about when that assessment was

14 actually completed?

15 A. So that assessment was not included in the electronic

16 care record programme care base.

17 Q. Yes.

18 A. It only appeared to anyone post his death.

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. So there is some, I think -- and looking into those

21 matters was recommended in the seven-day report, so

22 there is some confusion, and I think --

23 Q. Yes, we will come to that. I understand that the author

24 of the seven-day report asked for found that it wasn't

25 in the file --

1 A. That's right.

2 Q. -- it wasn't on the file, asked for it, it was said to
3 be a handwritten note that Ed's key worker said he did
4 have --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- and would be produced?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. In fact, the original was never produced, a photocopy
9 was provided on 2 January 2008?

10 A. I believe that that, at that point, it was asked to be
11 added to his file.

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. I guess on the electronic care --

14 Q. I understand. In any event, quite crucially, what that
15 risk assessment recorded, if we look at this, please,
16 this is -- you and I, if we look at this, this is at
17 page 14 and paragraph 6.8. That risk assessment
18 recorded this, that Ed has not expressed suicidal ideas
19 and no previous known attempts -- I am just going to
20 wait for a moment.

21 (Pause)

22 So sorry. I am just being reminded of the time?

23 A. That's okay.

24 Q. I told you I wasn't great on time. I will just finish
25 this section and then I think, as long as you are happy

1 and, Chair, you are happy, we will perhaps take a break
2 then, so very shortly. I am going to read that again it
3 being crucial.

4 That NEPT risk assessment recorded that Ed has not
5 expressed suicidal ideas and no previous known attempts?

6 A. Yes, so that's factually incorrect.

7 Q. Demonstrably wrong?

8 A. Demonstrably, categorically wrong.

9 Q. Yes, and, actually, we have been through all of those
10 events that --

11 A. Occurred.

12 Q. -- were notable in and of themselves but had built up
13 a picture which make that categorically incorrect?

14 A. Yes, and I mean they were over the previous two months
15 only --

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. -- and they were expressed, I understand, in
18 a comprehensive risk assessment by Suffolk --

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. -- provided to Essex upon his admission --

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. -- to Maple Ward.

23 Q. So we will come to this but my understanding is that, on
24 file, was a comprehensive nine-page report from Suffolk?

25 A. (Witness nodded)

1 Q. But of the nine staff who were interviewed for the
2 Serious Untoward Incident report, only two of them had
3 seen it?

4 A. And five of them were not aware of any suicidal risk.

5 MS TROUP: Yes, all right. So we will come on to that.

6 Ben, as long as you are happy, I think this might be
7 a good time for us to break, Chair.

8 THE CHAIR: Thank you.

9 MS TROUP: Thank you.

10 THE CHAIR: We will come back again at 2.00.

11 MS TROUP: 2.00, thank you.

12 THE CHAIR: Thank you.

13 (1.03 pm)

14 (The short adjournment)

15 (2.03 pm)

16 THE CHAIR: We have got a transcript.

17 MS TROUP: Yes.

18 THE CHAIR: Good.

19 MS TROUP: Thank you.

20 Ben, where we left off was in mid-December 2007,
21 while Ed was an initial on Maple Ward at Severalls
22 Hospital. We have talked through the NEPT risk
23 assessment that was dated 9 December 2007 --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- and just to follow this chronology through,

1 I understand, and you have understood, from the records
2 that on 12 December 2007, the records note that Ed again
3 expressed feelings that life was not worth living?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. It was recorded that he was low in mood and
6 an antidepressant was to be added to his medication
7 regime?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Yes?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. One of the things you tell us about, having been granted
12 a short period of ground leave on 19 December, you tell
13 us that a decision was taken on 21 December not to grant
14 Ed home leave for Christmas and I think you have
15 particularly strong feelings about that; is that right?

16 A. Yes, well, I mean, I think inevitably, as someone who
17 has got to have many more Christmases and New Years,
18 it's nice to spend them at home. I mean -- and I'm not
19 clear obviously on the clinical decision-making exactly
20 that went on in that case and I don't really want to
21 second guess it, but it's a little bit upsetting in the
22 context of what was about to happen.

23 Q. Of course.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Of course. Essentially, in summary, the records show

1 that Ed's mood remained low during the period up towards
2 the end of December. Your parents visited him on the
3 29th --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- and then spoke to him by phone on the 30th and that
6 was when they were discussing the PlayStation that they
7 wanted to bring to him?

8 A. Yes, that's correct.

9 Q. We know, Ben, that Ed took his life on the following
10 day, the 31st --

11 A. That's right.

12 Q. -- and that he died by ligature?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. That was the same day on which it had been recorded that
15 there was some sort of altercation with another patient
16 that we have discussed --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- and you told us in your commemorative account about
19 police attending your home on New Year's Eve to tell you
20 that Ed had died.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. I want to move on to some of the matters you have told
23 us about and some of the concerns both that you raise
24 and that were dealt with in the two reports you refer
25 to. Those are the seven-day report and the full panel

1 Serious Untoward Incident, or SUI, report?

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. I also want to talk to you about your recollections of

4 the inquest --

5 A. Okay.

6 Q. -- into Ed's death and some of your comments on that,

7 about your knowledge of the prosecution of the Trust by

8 the Health and Safety Executive much later and then

9 a little about Edward House --

10 A. Okay.

11 Q. -- before we move on to some of your recommendations.

12 My understanding is that, as we have already discussed,

13 the assessment that was carried out at Longview, which

14 was Ed's first admission and that was the adolescent

15 unit, was particularly criticised by the SUI panel?

16 A. Yes, so, for example, I mean, the final word was no

17 mental illness, which was, you know, after the fact, not

18 correct.

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. That had the effect of making it harder for my parents

21 to access care for Ed. I think it -- the findings,

22 whilst acknowledging that it's difficult to diagnose

23 maybe burgeoning psychotic illness in adolescents, the

24 very fact it is difficult to diagnose should be, like,

25 you know, a warning sign that maybe that is

1 a possibility, rather than it being discounted
2 because --

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. -- of the same reason.

5 Q. In fact, I think you tell us that clinicians consulted
6 for the purposes of the inquest concluded that, although
7 it is fair to say that it's easier to diagnose in
8 hindsight, there was sufficient evidence to suggest
9 an emerging psychotic illness, such as schizophrenia and
10 we have heard that that had started to come up and be
11 mentioned as a potential diagnosis?

12 A. Yes, and obviously that had a knock-on effect in terms
13 of -- sorry, I muddled my words somewhat.

14 Q. Not at all.

15 A. There were there was a lack of follow up post that,
16 after he left Longview, which I guess was, to some
17 extent informed, by the --

18 Q. The conclusion that they had reached that he wasn't
19 suffering from any form of mental illness?

20 A. Exactly.

21 Q. I think for those reasons, a number of recommendations
22 were made in the SUI report about reviewing the evidence
23 base for using the inkblot tests and the squiggle
24 drawing test that we have spoken about --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- auditing -- and that an audit should be carried
2 out -- if you are looking at it, I am so sorry, I am on
3 page 21, paragraph 9.5 -- that an audit should be
4 carried out of discharge summaries, that any reports
5 should be signed and dated and then, as we have just
6 discussed, that early onset psychotic illness in
7 adolescents can be very challenging to diagnose but this
8 really was about a lack of alertness to that.

9 A. Yes, absolutely.

10 Q. I think the findings were that, at Longview certainly,
11 and this is reflected in the fact that there was almost
12 no follow up, there was no indication that staff
13 recognised the cumulative events and deterioration that
14 led to what was later a very acute presentation?

15 A. Acute presentation, yes, absolutely, yes.

16 Q. Yes. The SUI report also, looking now at paragraph 6,
17 found that the referral process from Wedgwood House to
18 the Maple Ward at Severalls had been what is described
19 as haphazard and informal?

20 A. So, for example, there was no direct
21 consultant-to-consultant discussion, like, on admission
22 or as soon as possible thereafter, I think they
23 recommended. There was no indication that the ward
24 manager had any involvement in the referral process.
25 I assume that's the ward manager at the Maple Unit --

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. -- and there was no formal referral procedure, so there

3 was --

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. -- the scope for a lot of lack of clarity, I think.

6 Q. Yes. In relation to those recommendations and the ones

7 we have discussed about Longview, as far as you are

8 aware, as of this date, were those actioned?

9 A. I am not aware whether they were.

10 Q. Thank you. One of the major areas that is of concern

11 running through all of your evidence and all of the

12 points you raise is around risk assessment and the

13 adequacy or otherwise of risk assessment processes?

14 A. Yes, and that's both risk assessment, in terms of

15 patient care, but also environmental risk assessments.

16 Q. Exactly, well, if we deal with those in turn. If we

17 look, first, at risk assessment in terms of patient care

18 and, in particular, a failure to properly assess risk or

19 to acknowledge or understand the risk of suicidal intent

20 or to acknowledge properly the history of suicidal

21 intent, we know from your witness statement that the

22 first report, the seven-day report -- this is on page 17

23 at paragraph 8.2 -- essentially concluded that all

24 relevant procedures were carried out?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Now, you comment there that this is in spite of the fact
2 that all of the CPA care plans -- there were three,
3 dated 9, 18 and 21 December --
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. -- from Ed's time in Severalls Hospital failed to
6 reflect any reference at all to low mood, suicidal
7 intent or a history of suicidal intent?
8 A. Yes, and that's obviously despite evidence being
9 available to the contrary in multiple regards.
10 Q. Indeed. No new care plan was created after 12 December
11 when --
12 A. He expressed low mood.
13 Q. Yes, and an antidepressant was added to his medication
14 regime. In fact, when this matter was dealt with in the
15 full panel SUI report, a number of findings were made in
16 relation to inadequate risk assessment processes. If
17 you are trying to find it, that begins at page 22,
18 paragraph 9.8.
19 A. Thank you.
20 Q. So I think we mentioned it previously before lunch. The
21 comprehensive, nine-page Suffolk risk assessment that
22 was on file and came with Ed to Maple Ward had been seen
23 by two of the nine staff who were interviewed, yes?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Five out of those nine staff were unaware of any risk of

1 suicide?

2 A. And specifically his care worker had not seen the risk

3 assessment -- sorry, his key worker.

4 Q. His key worker had not seen the Suffolk risk

5 assessment --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- and, in fact, didn't see it until March 2008?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. It did not appear that risk had been discussed at any

10 point during admission?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Then a number of recommendations were made as a result

13 around putting in place appropriate systems of clinical

14 risk assessment, mandatory training on risk assessment

15 and ensuring that risk assessments were available on

16 Care Base, on the electronic system?

17 A. I mean, I think it's also striking to me that Ed had

18 been transferred to Maple Ward specifically because of

19 risks and it demonstrates, like, not only a lack of

20 mechanisms to, you know, have those risks available to

21 staff but also a lack of curiosity as to why he might be

22 there in the first place, which doesn't speak, I don't

23 think, to particularly high quality care.

24 Q. Yes, yes, I understand one of the baseline reasons for

25 his referral to Maple Ward having been suicidal

1 ideation?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Yes. All of this, of course -- I am so sorry -- all of

4 this, of course, feeds into the matters we have already

5 discussed about the return of Ed's belt and shoelaces to

6 him on 9 December --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- because there was what is described really as

9 a fundamental lack of knowledge amongst staff across

10 Maple Ward as to the risk that existed?

11 A. Yes, and, I mean, that date is two days after he was

12 admitted to that ward. So, I mean, it seems to me that

13 that information should still have been present in the

14 minds of whoever was making those decisions at that

15 point --

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. -- as even like a bare minimum.

18 Q. In related comments -- if you turn to page 24 of your

19 witness statement, and to paragraph 9.14 -- the SUI

20 panel found that there was very little monitoring or

21 recording of his depressive state in the notes and of

22 his mood and, in exactly the same way, that there was no

23 record of suicidal intent or a previous attempt to take

24 his own life, which would have very obviously been

25 crucial information, yes?

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 Q. You go on to talk in your witness statement about
3 staffing and about very serious concerns around staffing
4 and those are matters that obviously bring in
5 overlapping concerns around ward culture and ineffective
6 risk management. One of the first things we discussed
7 earlier today was that Ed's key worker worked night
8 shifts?

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. You pointed out then that one of the things that the SUI
11 panel concluded was that key worker primarily working
12 night shifts made that process of ongoing assessment and
13 planning particularly difficult?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. If we look, please, at paragraph 9.16 of your witness
16 statement --

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. -- you tell us there that there were comments within the
19 SUI report about the use of the bank system of staff --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- and that that did very little to alleviate the
22 pressures on the ward?

23 A. Yes, and I think possibly it may have even hindered it.
24 I recollect comments to the effect of it was possible to
25 spend two hours at the beginning of a shift trying to

1 obtain appropriate staffing levels, which was, like,
2 a waste of time and obviously not time that you would be
3 spending with patients.

4 Q. Yes. Then at paragraph 9.17, you quote from the report,
5 which actually says, looking at the second line, that
6 the concern was, and I quote:

7 "... that the current staff are unable to provide
8 the care required within a PICU environment particularly
9 in light of the repeated assertion that there is little
10 for clients to engage in on the ward."

11 A. Yes, so more reference to lack of therapeutic activities
12 but also fundamental problems with staffing levels.

13 Q. Yes. There were recommendations around supervision of
14 staff, if you go over to page 26 and to your paragraph
15 9.24. What the report, again the SUI report, concluded
16 was that, although there was a supervision structure in
17 place, it hadn't been implemented in any kind of
18 appropriate or effective manner?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. In terms of ward culture, if we look at the summary you
21 have given of the SUI panel's findings there, at the
22 bottom of page 26, the comments are in terms of -- I am
23 so sorry -- ward culture, "institutionalised and of
24 haughty superiority, with no therapeutic activity
25 available"?

1 A. Yes, which are quite damning, I would suggest.

2 Q. And tie in with your parents' impression of the
3 environment on that ward --

4 A. That's right.

5 Q. -- and their attempts to give Ed some activities to take
6 up his time?

7 A. That's right.

8 Q. Then, in fact, recommendations were made about staff
9 support, that's at paragraph 9.28, because staff
10 interviewed were reported to be angry and disillusioned?

11 A. Yes, subsequent to the debriefing session after his
12 death, I presume.

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. I don't have any further information about in what
15 specific way they were angry and disillusioned.

16 Q. Yes. You make a point -- and I am looking now, you
17 don't need to go to it but if you wanted to, at page 37,
18 paragraph 18.4 -- about what seemed to your parents to
19 be and what appears to you from the documents to be
20 a total lack of coordination of care --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- on the ward?

23 A. Yes, I mean, that's spoken to, I think, by multiple
24 lines of evidence, like, "No, you can't have
25 headphones", "Yes, you can have your belt", "No, there

1 is no risk of suicide", repeatedly, "Yes, there is
2 a risk of suicide".

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Such that, in a way, I think the way that you have
6 expressed it, is that he was essentially left to his own
7 devices --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- and left, as a very young man in an adult unit, to
10 fend for himself?

11 A. Which presumably was not conducive to his getting
12 better.

13 Q. Yes. Over on page 39, and this is at paragraph 20.5,
14 you describe your parents' concerns about the staffing
15 levels on Maple Ward being inadequate, and incompetence,
16 and that incompetence, one of the examples you give, is
17 that the SUI panel heard evidence that there were staff
18 nurses on the ward who did not know how to complete
19 a care plan or a risk assessment?

20 A. Risk assessment, yes, and that's -- I mean, I think that
21 speaks for itself, to be honest.

22 Q. Yes. Turning to environmental risk assessment and
23 looking first, if you turn, Ben, to page 19 of your
24 witness statement and then to paragraph 8. 8. The
25 seven-day report deals with the issue of ligature points

1 on Maple Ward and, essentially, in summary, tells us
2 that the last ligature risk assessment had been carried
3 out in October 2007?

4 A. That's right.

5 Q. At which time it had been decided that no further
6 remedial action was required?

7 A. That's right.

8 Q. Nonetheless, the seven-day report made four
9 recommendations and you list those at paragraph 8.9, and
10 three of those at (a) to (c) deal with fixed ligature
11 points. A review is recommended on page 19?

12 A. Yes, yes.

13 Q. Do you have it?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. A ligature review of Maple and another unit called Cedar
16 is recommended, that's at 8.9(a)?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. It is recommended that existing curtain pelmets be
19 removed and rails be replaced with suitable
20 alternatives, and then that a full SUI panel is to be
21 convened to look into the matter. When that occurred,
22 in summary, the SUI panel was given a great deal of
23 conflicting information about audits or assessments of
24 fixed ligature points on the ward; is that your
25 understanding?

1 A. Yes, that is my understanding and my understanding is
2 that, like, responses to those concerns varied from
3 concerns about pelmets have not been raised, to concerns
4 have been raised but pelmets aren't a ligature risk and
5 other concerns which didn't agree with either of the
6 first two, to the best of my recollection, as well, so
7 a really confused picture coming back from staff. And
8 the SUI, I think, also went on to recommend that
9 staffing levels in the risk management department were
10 addressed as well.

11 So, I mean, that obviously points to the possibility
12 that the risk management department itself was not
13 capable of performing its duties properly.

14 Q. Yes. In fact, the SUI panel also found that there were
15 no written records in relation to those risk
16 assessments, partly leading to this confused and
17 contradictory picture, with which they were provided by
18 interviewing staff because there were so many different
19 recollections of what have had been decided and what was
20 needed and when; is that right?

21 A. Yes, yes, and with no concrete evidence of what the
22 facts might be.

23 Q. Yes. If we go, please, to your page 25 and to paragraph
24 9.21, you make clear there that it's, this is obviously
25 a matter of significant concern for you and for your

1 family, that this picture remains unclear?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. You have sought further documents in relation to the HSE

4 prosecution, which you hope might shed some light --

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. -- on the matter, and may then, as we said at the

7 beginning of your evidence, want to give further

8 comments about this particular aspect of your concerns.

9 A. Yes, that is right. I mean, that seems not just

10 applicable to Ed's case, and it would be nice for my own

11 sense of well-being to understand most fully what had

12 happened, but it's also touches upon that as very

13 important in terms of the ability that the Trust had to

14 learn from these sorts of situations, sort of at

15 a broader level that would carry forward into future and

16 might inform, you know, future care of patients, whether

17 or not that was even possible.

18 Q. Yes, and I think, in fact, it overlaps with some of the

19 other preliminary thoughts you have on recommendations

20 for change, but one of the things you would like this

21 Inquiry to consider, is this right, is a proper

22 mechanism for learning?

23 A. Yes, that's right. I mean, we can return to it when we

24 discuss the HSE prosecution but it seems quite clear

25 that there isn't a mechanism for learning in this

1 case --

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. -- that these problems have reoccurred over a long

4 period of time and that's heartbreaking, basically.

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. I mean, there is no need for this to happen once,

7 really, but there is certainly, certainly no need for

8 similar events to happen over and over again and

9 failings and learning from them should, I think, really

10 be scrutinised why they occurred.

11 Q. Yes. One of the recommendations that the SUI panel made

12 in relation to environment risk assessment and fixed

13 ligature points was that urgent reconsideration or

14 urgent consideration be given to the re-provision of

15 Maple Ward and it is your understanding, I think, that this

16 is part of what led to the establishment of Edward

17 House; is that right?

18 A. That's my understanding, yes.

19 Q. Yes, could you tell us just, in a sentence or two, what

20 Edward House is?

21 A. Edward House, I think, is a low-secure environment for

22 people detained under the Mental Health Act that, at the

23 time of its opening, was explained to me as offering,

24 like, all of the things that Ed's care lacked --

25 Q. Yes.

1 A. -- at the time, so therapeutic activities, and I assume
2 much, like, safer environment and better staffing,
3 I assume.

4 Q. Yes. We will come back to that. I would like to ask
5 you a little bit about the HSE prosecution which took
6 place in 2020 and 2021. My understanding is that you
7 were only fairly vaguely aware of it at the time; is
8 that right?

9 A. Yes, I think that my parents mentioned that it was
10 happening to me at the time but that's the extent of my
11 memory of it. I first became aware of it at the same
12 time that I became aware of this Inquiry and --

13 Q. I see.

14 A. -- subsequently, I read the sentencing remarks after
15 finding them and those remarks are, I think, what
16 spurred me to engage with you and I think represent
17 my -- the beginning of my understanding that these
18 problems are likely systematic in nature.

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. But, at the time, I wasn't aware of it to any great
21 extent.

22 Q. Yes. You have read more about it now and, as we have
23 said, you want to -- there are documents from that
24 prosecution that you are very keen to see.

25 A. Exactly.

1 Q. Yes, I understand. Just turning for a moment to the
2 inquest into Ed's death that took place in 2011, and you
3 deal with this in Section 10 of your witness statement.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You have explained there that, as with some of the
6 earlier events, your parents sought to protect you from
7 a lot of it but you were present for the inquest; is
8 that right?

9 A. Yes, I don't think I was protected particularly during
10 the inquest.

11 Q. Fine.

12 A. I missed, certainly, the first day of it, I think,
13 because I had work commitments.

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. But I was present for all of the rest of it, I believe.
16 Yes.

17 Q. One of the things you tell us is that your family was
18 not legally represented during those proceedings but
19 that the Trust was legally represented?

20 A. That's correct. I don't know why we weren't. I retain
21 a sense of my mum's anger about that --

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. -- inequality of arms.

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. I think just a basic level of justice, what was just.

1 But then also, obviously -- yes, I think also, like,
2 she had -- I think she felt that taxpayers' money spent
3 defending an institution that had failed her was, yes,
4 unjust, I think, when she wasn't able to meet them on
5 their own terms.

6 Q. Yes, yes. That's helpful. Not able to meet them on
7 their own terms and, in fact, it is one of the matters
8 that you record in your witness statement that you feel
9 very strongly about, that that inequality of arms has
10 a very particular effect on families in those
11 circumstances?

12 A. Yes, and well, I think it has -- I think I find it
13 problematic in multiple ways. One is, I guess -- like,
14 to an extent, one feels guilty that one hasn't done the
15 best job that one could to protect others, like, that
16 may not be reasonable but it's still a feeling.

17 Sorry, could you repeat the question?

18 Q. Of course. To be quite honest, I had forgotten what it
19 was --

20 A. Me too.

21 Q. -- because I was listening to you.

22 THE CHAIR: Can I ask you something: but you shouldered the
23 burden of the engagement with the inquest process; was
24 that right? You made the submissions on --

25 A. I made the submission but we were -- as a family, we

1 shouldered the burden equally. In fact, my parents,
2 I am sure, asked more questions of witnesses than I did
3 but, as a family, we shouldered the burden of asking
4 questions of witnesses.

5 THE CHAIR: Did the coroner make that easy for you to ask
6 those questions and to make your submissions or did --
7 how --

8 A. I don't recall any sense that the coroner was acting in
9 any way that was prejudicial to our interests.

10 THE CHAIR: I was just thinking about -- I wasn't suggesting
11 that so much as whether you felt able to engage, whether
12 you felt overwhelmed by it or whether you felt
13 comfortable. How did that feel?

14 A. I can't speak to how we -- my parents felt in terms of
15 dealing with disclosure because I wasn't there. In
16 terms of the in-person events, I think we felt okay
17 about engaging with witnesses at the time. But, for
18 sure, it was burdensome. Like it's -- there was, like,
19 a -- it felt like a really large amount of dissonance,
20 one felt one was being asked to hold someone to
21 account --

22 THE CHAIR: Yes.

23 A. -- which felt unjust because one was also dealing with
24 the fact that this was incredibly painful on a personal
25 level.

1 THE CHAIR: Yes. Thank you.

2 MS TROUP: In fact, I think that's another of the matters
3 that you have listed in your preliminary thoughts on
4 recommendations for change: that a way be found to
5 alleviate the burden on families at that particular
6 time, to try to hold a state institution to account in
7 the midst of grief and hearing that evidence and all of
8 the difficulties that that brings.

9 A. Yes. I think that's -- yes, I feel strongly about it,
10 not just for my own sake but because I think that it's
11 not an efficient way of going about things --

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. -- which is important for future patient safety.

14 Q. Yes, I understand. At the time you wrote your witness
15 statement, you did not have a copy of the record of
16 inquest?

17 A. No.

18 Q. But my understanding is that that has very recently been
19 provided to you by this Inquiry and by your
20 representatives?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. So you were writing a witness statement, I am so sorry,
23 from memory.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. But we do have it and what it records in terms of its

1 conclusion is this:

2 "Edward Arthur Jackson killed himself whilst the
3 balance of his mind was disturbed. The following
4 factors more than minimally contributed to his death:
5 ineffective communication, inadequate risk assessment
6 and lack of therapeutic activities."

7 A. That's right.

8 Q. Now, you said earlier that, as you begin to see
9 documents in some ways or to a certain extent, it is
10 reassuring because it sort of validates your own memory
11 and what you had recollected.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Is that true in this case?

14 A. Completely. Yes. So apart from two of the factors,
15 I had more or less word perfect recollection of the
16 verdict as it turns out and that was -- it was
17 reassuring to know that.

18 Q. Yes. All of those are matters which you cover in your
19 evidence and which we are discussing today. One of the
20 things you tell us is that you did have to prepare some
21 submissions because representatives for the Trust at
22 inquest essentially submitted to the coroner that
23 neglect should not be left to the jury and that there
24 should not be a narrative conclusion and you, on behalf
25 of your family, prepared submissions arguing against

1 that; is that right?

2 A. That's right. So my, when writing my witness statement,
3 my recollections of the situation were based on the
4 Trust's legal representatives' verbal arguments.

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. So I remember her verbally arguing against neglect being
7 a possibility.

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. I don't remember but am now aware that they argued
10 against a narrative verdict but, I mean, we argued for
11 the possibility that the jury should be allowed to
12 decide because I think that felt most appropriate to
13 us --

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. -- at the time. Yes, and I prepared those submissions.

16 Q. Was any support provided, as far as you can recall, to
17 you or your parents before, during or after the inquest?

18 A. Vague recollection of, from some direction, pointed
19 towards therapy. But I am really not in a position to
20 comment what my parents might have received or not.

21 Q. No, fine. I understand. Could we talk a little, Ben,
22 about Edward House?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. You have described what that is and it was opened in
25 August 2013. You understood, as you said, that

1 essentially it was intended to be everything that Maple
2 Ward was not --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- modern and --

5 A. Safe.

6 Q. -- safe, indeed, light and therapeutic activities and
7 psychological services. You have set out a section
8 there from the annual report in its opening year.

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. You also tell us that, thus far, and from the exhibits
11 that this Inquiry has disclosed to you, you are not
12 aware of any deaths having taken place at Edward House?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. But you are aware of a number of what we might describe
15 as near misses and of a set of regulatory proceedings in
16 terms of staff conduct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Could you tell us a little about what effect that has on
19 you and what you are carrying, in terms of that?

20 A. I mean, to be clear, I don't think that deaths or near
21 misses at Edward House are more or less important than at
22 any other Trust ward but they are more complicated for
23 me to deal with because, obviously, it interacts with
24 the loss of my brother more specifically, and it also --
25 I suppose, it feels that it is a more explicit breaking

1 of the implicit promise of the -- of the facility, if
2 there is misconduct or a death there, to me personally,
3 but I don't -- but to be clear, I mean, there shouldn't
4 be deaths in any facility.

5 Q. Yes. Thank you.

6 Can we turn -- there is a section of your witness
7 statement where you have addressed some of the specific
8 matters that the Inquiry raised with you in its Rule 9
9 request and you start those comments on page 32 of your
10 witness statement at paragraph 14?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. The first matter that you mention there is diagnosis and
13 I think we have covered the fact that -- and you say
14 this, in fact, in paragraph 14.2 -- as far as you can
15 see it, looking back in hindsight, there is an almost
16 18-month period that appears to you to be a missed
17 opportunity to have spotted an emerging psychotic
18 illness?

19 A. Yes, absolutely, and so that -- yes, there is a lack of
20 certainty over that period that is later criticised by
21 professionals. It contributed, certainly at the time,
22 to my parents' distress --

23 Q. Of course.

24 A. -- because they didn't know what was going on. And
25 I suppose one could argue that, well, it wasn't possible

1 for anyone to know what was going on definitively but
2 that doesn't mean that it wasn't possible to have
3 a clearer understanding than they had of the
4 possibilities.

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. And I think that, on some level, they knew that at the
7 time, that was the sense that I got from them and I am
8 sure I had it, too.

9 Q. Yes. As you have explained, the other effect was that
10 it made it more difficult for your parents to access
11 appropriate support for him?

12 A. Yes, I think that that's true. I mean, it is also
13 complicated by the fact that Ed didn't want support, not
14 believing that he was ill.

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. So it is worth acknowledging that but that's also,
17 I think, probably important to be aware of in these
18 circumstances, sorts of circumstances.

19 Q. Of course, and we might think not necessarily uncommon
20 either?

21 A. Yes, for sure.

22 Q. You also raise here issues, and this is at paragraph 15
23 on page 34, around admission, and here I think really
24 what you are referring back to is the failure to
25 identify or to take into account the cumulative events

1 and the deterioration that then led to a much later --
2 a much more acute presentation?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Is there anything more that you want to say about that?

5 A. Bear with me.

6 Q. Of course, take your time. I think principally, Ben, it
7 is in relation Longview, isn't it?

8 A. It is. I mean -- yes, sorry, I am not sure.

9 Q. Please don't apologise.

10 A. I don't have anything further to add, I don't think, to
11 previous concerns about the fact that the diagnosis was
12 misleading, certainly after the fact--

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. -- that some of the criticisms of the behaviour of staff
15 at Longview, in terms of the tests, were, like, very
16 painful to have played out in a coroner's court when
17 they seem so obviously to be not good clinical practice.

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. And then obviously in a practical sense, as we have
20 already discussed, Ed found it difficult -- or my
21 parents found it difficult to access care for Ed
22 directly as a result of the care that he received at
23 Longview.

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. I believe.

1 Q. Yes. The same is true, and this is something that we
2 have noted at paragraph 16, you raise the concerns we
3 have discussed about the follow-up from CAMHS in Suffolk,
4 which you consider to have been wholly inadequate?

5 A. Well, there was one appointment, which Ed did not
6 attend, and there was no follow-up and that was
7 criticised, I think.

8 Q. Yes, and given the severity of how he was presenting at
9 the time, that therefore came in for particular
10 criticism?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Yes. In relation to -- because we have heard that when
13 the referral was made from Wedgwood House to Maple Ward
14 that was under an SLA between the Suffolk NHS Trust and
15 NEPT?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. What you have set out very helpfully in your witness
18 statement are the particular concerns that your parents
19 had about that Service Level Agreement and I think, in
20 particular, in relation to due diligence, given --

21 A. What we now know.

22 Q. Yes, given what you know now about the fact that he was
23 unsafe and the environment that they saw on Maple Ward?

24 A. Yes. So Suffolk prepared submissions for the coroner's
25 court, where I think they more or less said that they

1 weren't aware of any problems in Maple Ward, which
2 raises concerns, multiple concerns. But at the inquest
3 we heard, you know, that, well, self-evidently Maple
4 Ward wasn't fit for purpose but also it shouldn't
5 necessarily have been unknown to NEPT that that was the
6 case and --

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. -- therefore why didn't Suffolk know that as well, which
9 is an important point.

10 Q. Yes.

11 A. And I've seen correspondence from my parents to the
12 Suffolk NHS Commissioner that says -- you know, that
13 outlines all of their concerns and asks what has been
14 done about it why didn't you know, and all of this is
15 in -- my parents' motivation in doing that is clearly so
16 that it doesn't happen to anyone else --

17 Q. Yes.

18 A. -- and they sent a similar to social services in Suffolk
19 when Ed was improperly sectioned --

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. -- where they were explicit that this shouldn't happen
22 to someone else's child.

23 Q. Yes.

24 A. And, I mean, it's just heartbreaking that they were in
25 the position that they felt they had to do that, like,

1 they were holding these people to account and now it
2 seems like it didn't -- I don't know.

3 Q. Go on.

4 A. It feels a little bit like the extent of the problems
5 are such that it kind of diminishes your memory of what
6 you were trying to do at the time. Maybe I have phrased
7 that badly.

8 Q. No, I understand.

9 A. I am ad libbing.

10 Q. I don't think you phrased it badly at all.
11 I understand. These matters and the particular concerns
12 that your parents raised about the SLA and what due
13 diligence was carried out, the answer to which appeared
14 to be none, unless particularly serious concerns were
15 brought to our attention, are matters that, in your
16 witness statement, you say that you would like this
17 Inquiry to investigate, yes?

18 A. I think so. Yes. I mean, one of the things that
19 Suffolk responded with was suspending allocations to
20 Maple Ward pending the review of the SUI and its
21 recommendations, but we also now know that SUI
22 recommendations don't necessarily really help.

23 So what is the appropriate mechanism by which
24 recommendations are implemented to maximise patient
25 safety?

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. I am not convinced that it is an SUI by EPUT in the
3 2000s.

4 Q. Because, as you have pointed out, in some of what you
5 say about a mechanism for learning, there were previous
6 SUIs and those links not being made, rehashing
7 conclusions in a SUI I mean I don't want to put words in
8 your mouth but is that right? Am I --

9 A. Yes, so, so, for example, upon reading the HSE
10 sentencing remarks, there are 12 deaths and one near
11 miss. Ed is chronologically death number 3, there were
12 two previous deaths in 2004. The sentencing remarks
13 discuss that. One SUI found that the ligature used had
14 previously been identified but not removed and, for the
15 other deaths, the SUI recommendations weren't
16 implemented.

17 Q. Yes.

18 A. Ed's SUI doesn't refer to either of the previous SUIs
19 and, in the HSE prosecution alone there are nine further
20 deaths by ligature.

21 Q. Indeed.

22 A. So it speaks to a complete inability to learn from
23 previous events, with like the most tragic outcome, and
24 I don't know -- really have the words to describe how not
25 okay that is.

1 Q. Yes. Thank you. One of the other things that I wanted
2 to ask you about, we have spoken about the ward
3 environment and staffing in relation to Maple Ward and
4 Longview, in fact in terms of diagnosis and the conclusions
5 reached.

6 One of the issues you raise more generally in
7 relation to risk management and Ben, this is at page 36,
8 paragraph 18.1 --

9 A. Thank you.

10 Q. -- you talk about the missed opportunities to address
11 ligature points, to safeguard him and the failings in
12 his clinical care and management that we have discussed?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. But you also go on to make comments about counsel to
15 this Inquiry's opening statement in April, in relation
16 to Dr Davidson's and Ms Nelligan's evidence?

17 A. I do. I watched it live, I didn't have -- I haven't
18 revisited it, my recollection of the note I took at the
19 time as I stated there is no such thing there can be no
20 such thing as a risk-free environment, so on the proviso
21 that my memory is accurate, I found that really
22 troubling, that proposition, because, well, it lacks
23 nuance, to start with, but it felt to me like it had the
24 possibility of excusing circumstances that was like so
25 beyond the pale so completely unacceptable that it is

1 a distraction to dealing with those situations.

2 I mean, that was my personal feeling. I don't --
3 I mean, I didn't -- yes, it grated with me, it sat badly
4 with me when I heard it in the context what I know about
5 Ed's care.

6 Q. Yes, I understand. Thank you.

7 Ben, what I would like to do now is to take you to
8 the final section of your witness statement which is
9 titled "Recommendations for Change", but I think it's
10 important that we make clear that really, as far as you
11 are concerned, these are preliminary thoughts because
12 there is still evidence you wish to see and, of course,
13 there is other evidence that this Inquiry will hear that
14 may change your views or add to them?

15 A. That's absolutely correct.

16 Q. So if we can go through those. The first -- well,
17 actually, if we can go please to paragraph 21.3?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. There you tell us that, thus far, you have been quite
20 unassured listening to the evidence of the Trust. Tell
21 us why?

22 A. I mean, it is a gut feeling but, like, in the situation,
23 like, I think you will understand that I wanted to
24 listen to the Trust and feel like everything was going
25 to be okay.

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. Just as a natural urge and, for whatever reason,

3 I didn't, in the previous sessions, and I thought that

4 that was worth commenting on --

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. -- just from my own personal experience.

7 Q. Yes. I understand. The first thought you give at

8 paragraph 21.4 is that you consider that there should be

9 a central record of all deaths and near misses in mental

10 health settings?

11 A. I think that those data would make it so much easier to

12 be able to evaluate where things need to change or

13 whether they need to change and it just seems to be

14 a really sensible parsimonious thing to have and I note

15 that INQUEST submitted that that sort of record does

16 exist in other contexts, for example, in prisons.

17 Q. Yes, that also feeds into what you have said about

18 a mechanism for learning because a central record would

19 enable patterns to be spotted or matters to be picked up

20 in a way that it appears to you at the moment --

21 A. Aren't.

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. Absolutely.

24 Q. You say at the next paragraph, 21.5, that you support

25 the submissions that were made by INQUEST that there

1 should be a national oversight mechanism, which is
2 independent and can properly scrutinise the
3 implementation of recommendations?

4 A. Yes, I mean, I would just emphasise that the fact that
5 there seems to have been no mechanism for learning in
6 this case --

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. -- leads me to think that such a mechanism should exist
9 that it should be independent and it -- I mean,
10 I don't -- I have no comments on what it looks like
11 exactly but I have a strong feeling that learning --
12 like, the ability to learn, needs to be baked into the
13 system.

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. Such as it is.

16 Q. Yes, and part of the structure, an inherent part of the
17 structure?

18 A. Exactly.

19 Q. One of the other things we have already touched on is
20 the burden that is placed on families, following deaths
21 in these circumstances, to hold institutions and/or
22 individuals to account and to sort of take up that
23 fight, if I can put it in that way. You refer here
24 again to Ms Coles' evidence and the need to somehow find
25 a way to alleviate that burden on families.

1 A. Yes, and I think that's for two reasons: one is it seems
2 unfair to those families themselves; but also, I think,
3 that it doesn't -- the current situation is not
4 necessarily the best way to improve future patient
5 safety --

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. -- such that, like, whilst you are grieving, you are not
8 necessarily best placed to do the best job.

9 Q. Of course.

10 A. Or you may be able to but I am not sure that's always
11 going to be true in every case and it should be.

12 Q. Of course. Then at 21.7, you talk about equality of
13 arms and I think, unless there is anything that I have
14 missed in relation to that point, I think we have
15 covered it, have we?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. The other point that you raise, which I think is crucial
18 and it is at paragraph 21.8, is what I have -- in
19 summary, it is the fact that you consider that the
20 involvement of family members should be a core part of
21 clinical decision-making; is that a fair summary?

22 A. I think that that's a fair summary. I mean -- I mean,
23 just the facts of Ed's care -- I mean, my parents would
24 have done anything for him and that includes bringing
25 him different trousers, full stop.

1 Q. Of course. You talk at the next paragraph, Ben, about
2 a culture of institutional defensiveness. Can I take it
3 from the evidence you have given thus far that you are
4 talking across the board?

5 A. I am talking across the board from what I've seen in
6 this Inquiry but also specifically for example the
7 Trust's behaviour at Ed's inquest --

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. -- arguing against a neglect verdict --

10 Q. Yes.

11 A. -- arguing against the possibility that the jury should
12 be allowed to decide what caused his death.

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. I mean, such -- it seems totally at odds -- I understand
15 why you would do it, cynically, but it seems totally at
16 odds with what their concern should really have been,
17 which is the safety of all and future patients.

18 Q. Yes, and candour --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- and openness.

21 Moving on, you note here that you would welcome
22 recommendations that properly address whistleblowing
23 safeguards?

24 A. My recollection of Sir Rob Behrens' testimony was that,
25 not necessarily in Essex, but a tactic is to refer

1 whistleblowing doctors to the GMC, is my memory.

2 I was -- I hated that. That's also, in my opinion, to

3 the extent that it's true, completely contradictory with

4 patient safety.

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. So I had a gut reaction against that when I heard it.

7 Q. Yes, that's helpful. There appears to you to be

8 scope -- this is at 21.11 -- for recommendations about

9 CAMHS and transfer to adult services?

10 A. I mean that -- based on my reviewing the documents, the

11 facts of Ed's care seem to suggest that there were

12 deficiencies in CAMHS.

13 Q. Yes.

14 THE CHAIR: Can I just ask about that. You make it plain

15 that the Severalls, the Maple Ward, seemed a hostile

16 environment, as it were, for your brother. Do you think

17 that was something that was peculiarly difficult, as

18 an environment because of his age or do you think it was

19 universally a poor environment?

20 A. I would imagine -- I mean, I never saw it. I would

21 imagine it was universally a poor environment. I have

22 concerns about the fact that he had just turned 18 and

23 it was an adult ward and that he was targeted by another

24 patient there. So I imagine my answer is a little bit

25 of both.

1 THE CHAIR: Yes.

2 A. But, in terms of CAMHS, more specifically, I think the
3 concerns are more about the engagement that he had with
4 services after his first admission to hospital.

5 THE CHAIR: From Longview, yes, thank you.

6 MS TROUP: Yes, moving to the bottom of page 41, you then --
7 and I think we have covered this -- talk about concerns
8 about commissioning processes and that you would welcome
9 the Inquiry investigating that area further.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Then, last, you refer here to the Chair's opening to the
12 April hearings and her reference to the fact that the
13 Inquiry is minded to investigate the extent to which all
14 suicides are preventable.

15 A. That's right. It chimed with me and it chimed with me
16 in the sense that I would like to understand better the
17 extent to which that's true. I don't -- I am not
18 presenting you with what I believe at this point.

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. But I think that that is a really important undertaking
21 because I think it has -- understanding of that has the
22 potential to inform aspects of care and I think that
23 that's really important.

24 MS TROUP: Yes. Ben, I think that I, for now, have come to
25 the end of my questions for you and, unless the Chair

1 of 59; is that right?

2 A. Correct, yes.

3 Q. You would like me to refer to your mother as Mandy

4 throughout my questions; is that right?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. And you would like me to call you Adam?

7 A. Mm-hm.

8 Q. For the record, sitting next to you is Maxine Rowe, your

9 wife. She is sitting next to you for support and won't

10 be answering any of my questions today.

11 By way of background, the Inquiry sent a Rule 9

12 request for evidence to you on 24 January this year and,

13 in response to that request, you have provided a witness

14 statement to this Inquiry.

15 You have a copy of that witness statement in the

16 bundle in front of you, it is 21 pages long, with

17 a two-page appendix listing documents that are within

18 your possession. It is dated 14 May this year, if you

19 would like to turn to page 20 internally of that

20 statement, please, you made a statement of truth and

21 then you signed the witness statement over on page 21?

22 A. Mm-hm.

23 Q. Have you had the opportunity to read through that

24 document recently?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Are you happy that the contents are true and accurate to
2 the best of your knowledge and belief?

3 A. I am.

4 Q. Adam, that witness statement will therefore stand as
5 your evidence to the Inquiry. As you know, although
6 I am going to ask you some questions about it, I won't
7 take you through line by line today. But please be
8 assured that the Chair and the Inquiry team have read
9 and considered everything you say in that statement very
10 carefully and it will form part of the body of evidence
11 on which the Inquiry will rely.

12 I would also like to acknowledge that you provided
13 a commemorative and impact account in relation to your
14 mother, you read out that account during the hearing
15 last September, on 24 September.

16 A. (Witness nodded)

17 Q. The Inquiry is extremely grateful to you for that
18 evidence and I will ask you a couple of questions
19 arising from that account today as well?

20 A. Sure.

21 Q. I want to just remind you that I won't be asking you to
22 name individual staff members today, so please try not
23 to do so.

24 A. Mm-hm.

25 Q. Your evidence today will focus on your concerns in

1 relation to Mandy's care and treatment under the care of
2 EPUT. If at any point during your evidence you require
3 a break, please do tell me and that's absolutely fine
4 and possible. You are very clear in your witness
5 statement that the dates and events that you have set
6 out therein come from both your knowledge and also
7 a review of the medical records and inquest
8 documentation that you have in your possession and that
9 you obtained since your mother died; is that right?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. Before we begin, I would like to set out a brief
12 timeline of your mother's involvement with Essex mental
13 health services?

14 A. Mm-hm.

15 Q. As you know, I will summarise the timeline and key
16 dates, all taken from your witness statement, and, at
17 the end of my summary, I will check that you agree with
18 it, but please do stop me at any point if I summarise
19 anything incorrectly. You have your statement in front
20 of you and please feel free to refer to it as you wish.

21 I will then move on to ask you about your concerns
22 in relation to Mandy's care and treatment and your
23 recommendations for the future.

24 So, as I understand it, according to your witness
25 statement, you are now aware from your mother's medical

1 records that she had a history of longstanding chronic
2 mental health problems for which she was treated both as
3 an inpatient and outpatient for many years?

4 A. (Witness nodded)

5 Q. You first became aware of your mother's mental ill
6 health around the time of your parents' separation
7 in 2011, when you were 17 or 18 years old?

8 A. (Witness nodded)

9 Q. Thank you. I can see you nodding, which is extremely
10 helpful. If possible, would you mind also saying "yes",
11 just for the purposes of the transcript. I know it
12 doesn't feel natural.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Thank you. Mandy was admitted to the Linden Centre in
15 2015 with symptoms of psychosis and she told you that
16 she was hearing voices and thought that buildings were
17 moving and talking to her?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. From that point on, she was in and out of hospital?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. During an admission in 2017, you recall being told by
22 the medical staff that the medication she had been
23 prescribed was not having the desired effect and there
24 was nothing more that could be done?

25 A. Correct.

1 Q. On 9 July 2021 -- I am looking at your paragraph 12, if
2 you would like to refer to it --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- when your mother was being treated in the community,
5 a meeting was convened between EPUT, British Transport
6 Police, the National Rail embedded mental health nurse,
7 your mother and her partner, as her mental health was
8 deteriorating and her trips to railway stations were
9 becoming more frequent?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. In January and February 2022, Mandy attended numerous
12 outpatient appointments in relation to her mental health
13 and, on multiple occasions, she stated that she was
14 actively feeling suicidal or low in mood and visiting the
15 railway station with a view to jumping in front of
16 a train.

17 I will go through some of those key instances now
18 with you that you have set out in your statement.

19 A. Mm-hm.

20 Q. Adam, I am at your paragraph 16, if you are following
21 along?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. On 4 January 2022, she reported to her care coordinator
24 that she was going to the train station when feeling
25 suicidal and, at another appointment later that day, she

1 said to a nurse that she felt low in mood all of the
2 time.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. On 20 January 2022, during a home visit from her care
5 coordinator, she informed her she was going and sitting
6 on the train platform again?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. On 24 January 2022 you called her care coordinator
9 because you were concerned about your mother sitting at
10 train stations again, thinking if she runs and jumps
11 that will end her life.

12 A. Mm-hm.

13 Q. On 28 January 2022, your mother called her care
14 coordinator as she was struggling to sleep and it was
15 noted that her presentation had deteriorated?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. She was advised to call Crisis if the sleep medication
18 made no difference?

19 A. (Witness nodded)

20 Q. I am now at paragraph 27, Adam, if you are following
21 along.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. On 31 January 2022, your mother telephoned 111 and spoke
24 to the crisis team, as she was having thoughts of going
25 in front of a train and wasn't sleeping.

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. A Sanctuary support worker called later that day and
3 your mother disclosed an intention to kill herself that
4 night. The call was passed to a manager and your mother
5 then indicated no intention to harm herself that night.

6 A. Mm-hm.

7 Q. On 1 February 2022, your mother saw a nurse for her
8 monthly depot injection and reported suicidal intent and
9 a specific plan to end her life by jumping in front of
10 a train. She indicated she had thought about doing it
11 that day but wasn't sure of the speeds. She later
12 reported to a duty worker that she planned to jump in
13 front of a train maybe that day when she goes home from
14 seeing her friend and partner.

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. The Home First team were contacted on that occasion and
17 it's recorded that Mandy was well known so they didn't
18 accept the request for referral. Instead, the records
19 state that she would be followed up by her care
20 coordinator the next day and have the planned consultant
21 psychiatrist review the day after?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. On 2 February 2022, she was seen by the duty team and
24 reported thoughts of ending her life but denied
25 an active plan or intent to harm herself and said she

1 does not want to harm herself but reported low mood, the
2 same for eight years?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Adam, I am at paragraph 35 now.

5 A. Mm-hm.

6 Q. On 3 February 2022, Mandy was seen for her planned
7 medical review by her consultant psychiatrist. She said
8 although she would like to act upon her thoughts of
9 jumping in front of a train, she strongly denied any
10 intention to do so. The risk was recorded as low at
11 present but unpredictable.

12 This was your mother's last contact with an EPUT
13 clinician prior to her death.

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. You confirm that sadly, on 12 February 2022, Mandy ended
16 her life by jumping in front of a train, the very method
17 that she had told services about during her contact with
18 them in the weeks prior to her death?

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. Adam, are you happy with that summary of the key
21 chronology of dates and events --

22 A. Yes, I am.

23 Q. -- that I have taken from your witness statement?

24 A. Yes, I think there were some other admissions that were
25 in that time but yes.

1 Q. I will now ask you some questions about your concerns in
2 relation to your mother's care and treatment.

3 Firstly, I am going to ask you about your mother's
4 diagnoses. You state in your witness statement at
5 paragraph 5, if you would like to refer to it, that your
6 mother's initial diagnosis was bipolar affective
7 disorder and resistant depressive disorder. You further
8 state that a further diagnosis of enduring personality
9 changes following mental illness was made later down the
10 line?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Were you aware of those diagnoses before your mother
13 died?

14 A. To an extent it was always very, very unclear and felt
15 very kind of -- there was a lot of flitting between the
16 diagnoses and it also felt the diagnoses changed when
17 the doctor changed. So, yes, it didn't really feel like
18 the diagnosis was necessarily driving what was happening
19 and if the diagnosis changed, I would question it, and
20 I didn't really get a clear answer to why it changed and
21 what that would mean for kind of her treatment plan
22 going forwards, and so on, so yes.

23 Q. So following on from that point, were you provided with
24 any information as to what those diagnoses meant, coping
25 strategies on how you as a family could assist your

1 mother in dealing with those diagnoses?

2 A. Not necessarily in relation to those specific diagnoses,
3 only to look out for the warning signs and to raise
4 concerns through the care coordinator and go through
5 normal channels in that way.

6 Q. Adam, I am going to ask you some questions about your
7 mother's admission to the Linden Centre in 2015 when she
8 was admitted with symptoms of psychosis. Was that her
9 first admission to an inpatient mental health facility
10 in Essex?

11 A. It was, for a long time, yes. There was a brief
12 admission before I was born, yes, which was kind of
13 unrelated to this particular episode.

14 Q. In your commemorative and impact statement, you stated
15 that, during this admission to the Linden Centre, you
16 felt extremely frustrated by the failure of the staff to
17 listen when you tried to convey to them how independent
18 your mother had been prior to that admission?

19 A. Yes, yes.

20 Q. Is it right that that was an informal admission, ie your
21 mother wasn't sectioned under the Mental Health Act?

22 A. I believe it was an informal admission. I had to do
23 a lot of persuading of her and people around her to try
24 and get her to make the right -- kind of make the right
25 choice because she was -- I had seen her low, I had seen

1 her anxious prior to this, but I had never seen the
2 extent of the psychosis around the inanimate objects
3 talking to her, thinking that someone was going to come
4 and kill her, and so on.

5 I think in terms of not being -- it felt very much
6 she was just being housed there and not necessarily
7 being pushed to get better and while -- yes, in fact,
8 from my side, it was really hard to convey what she was
9 normally like a year, two, three years earlier, which
10 was -- she was a full-time teaching assistant, she ran
11 a family household, she had done qualifications with the
12 University of Cambridge in special educational needs,
13 she used to be very physically able and, at this point,
14 kind of wasn't and it just felt there was a lack of
15 understanding of the extent of the deterioration and
16 an acknowledgement around the -- that something had gone
17 seriously wrong and there was a need to -- there --
18 a need to get her back to how she was before. But it
19 almost felt like there was no going back and it was
20 just, "This is how she is, we will make sure she doesn't
21 do anything silly", and that's it.

22 Q. Would you like to say any more specifically about the
23 failure of staff at the Linden Centre to listen to you?

24 A. There was -- yes, there was a -- not necessarily
25 a failure to listen but a point around alternative

1 treatment options that came up at the Linden Centre and
2 it was around where she was non-compliant with her oral
3 medication, and she would either forget to take it, not
4 want to take it, feel like it wouldn't make any
5 difference, and I would really be thinking what else is
6 there to do, there must be an alternative option, and it
7 just happened to be that my wife is a medical doctor and
8 we would have conversations around what other -- if
9 there were any other options that hadn't been thought
10 of.

11 And, on that, my wife suggested that I mention
12 a depot injection to try and reduce the dependency of
13 her taking oral medication, and it felt very much as if
14 that had not been considered by the clinicians, and it
15 wasn't a matter of, no, we are not going to do that, we
16 have already talked about that and we are not doing it
17 because. It was very much -- it felt like I had
18 provided that suggestion. My wife is not a psychiatrist
19 or involved in psychiatry, and that we had put that
20 forward, it was considered and then it ended up being
21 part of the treatment plan.

22 THE CHAIR: So you are suggesting that they weren't
23 proactive --

24 A. Correct.

25 THE CHAIR: -- in exploring what treatment might be

1 available?

2 A. Correct, correct. In fact, it was always very --
3 I mean, throughout the whole period of this, her
4 illness, it was always very, very reactive and not
5 proactive, and there was a second specific example with
6 this as well around the medication, again, not having
7 its desired impact, and my wife suggested the use of ECT
8 electrotherapy and, again, I remember the meeting
9 around -- and I have got the notes kind of from Maxine
10 about questions for me to ask the clinicians, and there
11 was almost the same thing around "It's not like we have
12 considered this, and we are not doing it because", it
13 was actually they pondered on it and did it and it felt
14 very much like that was not thought of as part of
15 an alternative treatment, and that it was very much me
16 specifically as someone who is completely out of the
17 medical field, and my wife who is not related to the
18 psychiatric field of medicine, coming up with these
19 ideas and, yes, adhered to, but why should it have got
20 to that point in the first place.

21 And, again, thinking about the other families and
22 other individuals who might not have someone with
23 medical experience related to them and what the
24 possibility -- what would have happened if those
25 treatment options hadn't been considered and, again,

1 other people who might, if they had had the knowledge or
2 the -- not -- drive is the wrong word but the kind of
3 the will to challenge the professionals about whether
4 there were other alternative treatment options for their
5 families. So, yes, it was -- it felt very much like we
6 were -- the family were driving the care, not the
7 clinicians driving the care.

8 Q. Helpfully, you have covered the next topic that I wanted
9 to cover with you very comprehensively but just to
10 clarify the timeline in terms of those two suggestions
11 of treatment from you, I think you say in your statement
12 that the depot injection suggestion came from you during
13 the admission to the Linden Centre in 2015 and the ECT
14 suggestion was during the admission to the Derwent
15 Centre in 2017 --

16 A. Sure.

17 Q. -- is that right?

18 A. That sounds about right. Can I also come back on your
19 diagnosis point quickly?

20 Q. Of course.

21 A. I just thought something, just around how there was also
22 quite a lot of physical side-effects that she had later
23 down the line, probably two or three years before she
24 died, around -- and again it's in the statement --
25 around hunched back, drooped face, to the point where

1 I enquired at one point whether she had had a stroke,
2 and things like that, lost dexterity in her hands to
3 really like do her shoelaces up and basic -- she used to
4 be a competitive cyclist, as kind of a younger person,
5 cycled to and from work until she became ill, and she
6 couldn't do any form of kind of fast or physical
7 activity that required coordination.

8 And I never quite got an answer as to -- that was
9 never diagnosed and I never really got a concrete reason
10 as to why that was happening. And it was kind of just
11 left to almost be "It's just kind of one of -- your mum
12 is a complex case, it's just one of the things that's
13 going to happen with all the medication she is on", but
14 it was never really -- was it a side-effect of the
15 mental health illness, was it a side-effect of the
16 medication, was it something completely unrelated that
17 wasn't being addressed. So that was just something that
18 I wanted to bring up.

19 Q. Thank you. I am going to ask you some questions now
20 about your mother's last mental health inpatient
21 admission prior to her death. As I said, you explain in
22 your witness statement that, from 2015 onwards, you
23 recalled that she was in and out of hospital. You have
24 discussed the two admissions in 2015, 2017. You
25 confirmed to me this afternoon during a discussion that,

1 looking at the documentation that you have from the
2 inquest, you believe the last time your mother was
3 admitted prior to her death was 28 May to 15 July 2020
4 at the Derwent Centre --

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. -- pursuant to Section 3 of the Mental Health Act; is
7 that right?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. On that occasion, do you recall, were you as a family
10 consulted about the discharge decision?

11 A. So the -- that particular -- I can't recall the actual
12 finer details of that particular discharge and I think
13 it was also during Covid when it was all very kind of
14 locked down and things like that. The general -- my
15 views during the discharge process and also in any other
16 discharge meeting were very -- I don't think my views or
17 the views of my family were considered in discharge
18 meetings.

19 There was a point where at the Linden -- one of her
20 admissions in the Linden Centre, she was -- she had
21 basically over these years of engagement with the
22 services had -- she had learned who to say certain
23 things to, to avoid being sectioned or put in -- or
24 admitted to the ward and -- which is why you will see in
25 the statement that she says certain things to some

1 people and certain things to other people. So she knew
2 if she was talking to that Sanctuary manager, she was
3 going to say "No, I'm not going to kill myself", when
4 a minute before that, she is talking to a worker who she
5 knows won't necessarily have the decision-making power
6 to admit her, she would say, "I'm going to kill myself
7 in front of a train tonight". And the same with the
8 consultants. She knew exactly what to say to the
9 consultant psychiatrists to avoid either being admitted
10 in the first place, sectioned in the first place, or
11 being discharged -- about being discharged.

12 And it got to the point where, at the Linden Centre,
13 there was one particular discharge meeting where she was
14 being explicit to me, she had -- exactly what she wanted
15 to do, she wanted to throw herself in front of a train,
16 that hadn't changed, she was being really, really,
17 verbal about it, and telling the psychiatrist something
18 completely different, and I knew from previous discharge
19 meetings that they would only really just take her word
20 for, "I don't want to live any more but I am not going
21 to do anything". "Great, let's discharge her". And
22 I knew if that was going to happen it would be a real
23 significant risk.

24 So I actually -- I got to the point of asking her
25 closest friends and family, including myself, to write

1 formal letters to the psychiatrist and I brought them
2 with me to the ward, to the discharge meeting, and it
3 actually went from her being discharged to her being
4 kept admitted for another kind of two, three weeks, at
5 which point she had become, definitely not better, but
6 was in a better state and a slightly less crisis state.

7 And that, for me, kind of summarised how, without
8 that level of kind of galvanising almost a group of
9 people and having it formally written on paper how you
10 had to go that far to almost say "I am being serious
11 here, like, you need to listen because, if you don't
12 listen, something bad is going to happen", which,
13 I mean, we can talk about the actual incident itself
14 later but that's exactly what happened and why she died
15 because of a failure to listen to views of the people
16 who knew exactly what was going through her mind.

17 But yes, it was on the discharge meetings, as well,
18 in terms of what to look out for, it was very much call
19 the care coordinator, she's got Samaritans, she's got
20 Crisis, but it was the warning signs were always there.
21 That's my point, is that in either all of or almost all
22 of her discharge meetings the warning signs for me were
23 always well, well above where they should be for someone
24 who's going to be discharged into the community. So she
25 was still attending said train stations, she was still

1 talking explicitly how she wants to kill herself, and
2 actually no matter how I -- how much I raised that as
3 a concern that she would actually do something, it was
4 always deemed as too low risk to be admitted or to even
5 have the home treatment team involved.

6 Q. When you say no matter how much you raised that as
7 a concern, is that at discharge meetings specifically or
8 was that --

9 A. All the time, in any interaction. So for example with
10 that call to -- the call that I made to the care
11 coordinator around where was it in the statement --

12 Q. I think we will turn to that later.

13 A. Fine. Yes, fine.

14 Q. So we can go through.

15 Just finishing up on this line of questioning and
16 just following that through?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. When you refer to the occasion where you essentially
19 stopped the discharge for a period of two weeks, was
20 that an informal admission to the Derwent Centre in
21 2018?

22 A. That sounds about right.

23 Q. I want to briefly turn to lack of planned action and
24 then I promise we will get on --

25 A. Sure.

1 Q. -- to the call --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- and all of your key concerns as we go through. You

4 state that, following your mother's depot injection

5 appointment on 4 January 2022, the clinician emailed

6 your mother's consultant psychiatrist to ask if they

7 would consider your mother's case ahead of the planned

8 appointment on 3 February --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- but nothing was actioned and she wasn't seen ahead of

11 that scheduled appointment.

12 A. Mm-hm.

13 Q. It's paragraph 20 --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- if you would like to refer to it. Do you know what

16 side-effects are you referring to there? Where you say,

17 given the side-effects?

18 A. From what I remember, it was those physical side-effects

19 that I mentioned to do with the diagnosis. So the broad

20 picture of how she presented was, when she first started

21 becoming ill, she was still physically active but it was

22 very much kind of mania, anxiety and then kind of

23 a period of being low and then depressed, but then

24 probably, I don't know, we are talking over an

25 eight-year period, maybe three or four years before she

1 died, these physical symptoms started happening, where
2 like pretty much what I said before kind of, she
3 literally had a drooped face, mouth kind of hanging
4 open, hunched over, gained a huge amount of weight, was
5 always very, very conscious of her weight but gained
6 a huge amount of weight and loss of kind of dexterity
7 and co-ordination and that was where I've that
8 was where I said, like -- at least, at least prior to
9 these physical symptoms she was physically able.

10 She was, she was mentally ill, she was really in
11 a horrible, horrible place mentally but she could at
12 least go to the shop, take herself for a walk, do basic
13 life things, like do her shoelaces, and things like
14 that. I remember vividly having to do her -- me and her
15 partner had to do her shoes for her and he had to dress
16 her, shower her, things like that. At least prior to,
17 this she was able to physically look after herself,
18 despite being depressed.

19 Q. Have you ever been provided to date with any reason as
20 to why that wasn't actioned and she wasn't reviewed by
21 her consultant psychiatrist sooner?

22 A. No.

23 THE CHAIR: Did anybody concede that that was a side-effect
24 of the drugs?

25 A. No, no, I never got a clear response as to why that was

1 happening.

2 **THE CHAIR:** Thank you.

3 A. And also, in answer to your question around do I know if
4 anything happened, I didn't even know that this kind
5 of -- this has obviously kind of come from the records
6 and I didn't know that this request for an early meeting
7 had happened and, when I read this whole series back,
8 I was raising my own concerns and I thought my concerns
9 on their own warranted an admission, let alone when
10 I went through the inquest and all this has come out
11 from other professionals. Yes, so, no, I didn't know
12 that but it doesn't surprise me that that happened.

13 MS LEA: Just staying on the topic of medication for
14 a moment, did you have any other concerns -- you have
15 mentioned side-effects -- but did you have any other
16 concerns about your mother's medication generally?

17 A. It did just feel very kind of trial and error, around,
18 "This hasn't worked for an X period of time, let's try
19 this", "this hasn't worked, let's try this".

20 Or it would go -- I would suggest something based on
21 what my wife had said for me to ask and then that
22 happened. So it was very much kind of almost like
23 a rotation of let's try these different things.
24 Whereas, in my opinion, I feel like, again, coming back
25 to the reactive not proactive theme, I feel like there

1 could have been much simpler therapeutic and kind of
2 psychological intervention right at the very early
3 stages of when she only really presented with mania and
4 anxiety, and it was very much left to get worse, and
5 worse, and worse, and worse.

6 So, yes, I don't think -- I can't remember your
7 original question; what was the original question?

8 Q. You have answered it, thank you.

9 A. I have answered it, great.

10 Q. I asked about concerns in relation to medication
11 generally?

12 A. Yes, yes.

13 Q. So you said trial and error?

14 A. No, apart from the trial and error stuff, as in, yes,
15 I just felt like she was left to get as bad as she was,
16 that even I started to become convinced that the
17 medication on its own is just not going to shift this.

18 Q. Thank you. Turning to your concerns in relation to
19 clinicians not properly considering information that you
20 have provided and you have touched on this a little
21 already. You have referenced the call that you made to
22 your mother's care coordinator. If you would like to
23 refer to it, Adam, it is paragraph 24.

24 A. Yes, got that.

25 Q. It is 24 January 2022, whereby you clearly reported that

1 she had been sitting at train stations again and was
2 thinking if she runs and jumps that will end her life.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. You state in your statement you were not reassured,
5 despite the fact that it states clearly there that you
6 were reassured --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- and you felt extremely worried but you didn't know
9 what else you could do to make the clinicians take on
10 board how unwell your mother was?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Can you recall what the care coordinator said to try
13 and reassure you?

14 A. This was a real, real pivotal point for me, so this was
15 her -- Mum going from, "I want to kill myself in front
16 of a train, I don't want to live any more", to talking
17 about specific -- like the detail of how she was going
18 to do it and the thinking behind it.

19 So she would explicitly -- what's been written here
20 by the care coordinator is slightly wrong, in terms of
21 she was -- Mum was telling me "I have been thinking",
22 and this is kind of casual conversation, as if you were
23 talking about what you had for dinner, "I am trying to
24 work out if I run and jump or if I just jump from the
25 edge, what's going to have a higher success rate".

1 And that was the first -- that's the first time she
2 had talked to me about that level of detail and in such
3 a candid way. That obviously raised alarm bells in my
4 head and this was the day before this call, that evening
5 before this call. I went out for dinner with her and
6 she told me this and then, obviously, I have gone to
7 work the following day and I remember calling probably
8 like every minute, an hour before the offices opened, to
9 get hold of the care coordinator and got through and
10 said this and the response was that "We still deem the
11 risk to be not" -- I was basically saying she has to be
12 sectioned or she has to be admitted or there has to be
13 some kind of significant increase in intervention here,
14 and the response was there is it's not, it's not high
15 risk enough let alone for a section, let alone for
16 admission and not necessarily even home -- sorry, I'm
17 crossing over with another incident but definitely not
18 significant enough for admission or section.

19 And my question was, was around, well, what is
20 like -- what is high risk enough. If you have got
21 someone who has been saying who's been saying that --
22 who's been frequenting train stations, saying they want
23 to kill themselves in front a train, and she is
24 telling me exactly how she is going to do it and I'm
25 supposed to be one of her protective factors, what's

1 the -- what's -- I specifically asked what would be high
2 enough? And the response was: kind of attending every day
3 or multiple times a day or being on the track itself.

4 At which point, I was just blown away by that
5 response around -- that's obviously why people die in
6 these situations, because you have given it one chance
7 too many and, again, that's exactly what has actually
8 happened and yes, I just, I couldn't believe there was
9 kind of an arbitrary number on that, that, that that
10 would lead to some kind of admission or some kind of
11 section, and -- yes, go on.

12 Q. Is that what brings you to the view there in your
13 statement where you say that you just felt they didn't
14 take on board how unwell your mother was?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Because you were telling them this information and then
17 you were presented with an explanation as to how she
18 could be more unwell, for example?

19 A. Yes, yes, yes. So this -- I mean, this crosses over two
20 themes, really. It is (1) the listening, to me and
21 family members and (2) the risk assessment process.
22 That if -- and I remember I am a public sector
23 professional in a school, and very much being like,
24 "I have told you this, I am trusting you to make this
25 right decision, I completely disagree with you, I think

1 it is a section, I think it is an admission, if you are
2 saying, as the mental health professional here, that
3 that is not an admission, like, I am not happy about it,
4 but, like, you need to know I am trusting you
5 effectively with my mum's life here".

6 And that obviously, this whole process has
7 completely broken all trust with what kind of mental
8 health clinicians would say to me if this were to happen
9 again in the future.

10 Q. Were you provided with any information or guidance at
11 the end of that call as to what to do or what the next
12 steps would be; do you recall?

13 A. It was just always the same. Just kind of, "If you are
14 worried about something again, call them again, if
15 she -- if Mum has the Crisis number to call, the
16 Samaritans line to call, if she needs to", and basically
17 just to keep an eye and, again, I was just, like, well,
18 okay, fine, what if she does this again, what if she
19 does run and jump tomorrow and is successful. Like,
20 I didn't necessarily say that to them but that's what
21 was going through.

22 THE CHAIR: Sorry, can I ask a question?

23 MS LEA: Yes.

24 THE CHAIR: You spoke earlier about her ability to identify
25 who she spoke to and what she said to them; do you think

1 that played a part in their slight dismissing of you and
2 your concerns and anxieties.

3 A. 100 per cent, yes 100 per cent.

4 THE CHAIR: So they had taken everything she said at face
5 value.

6 A. Yes, correct. That is absolutely correct.

7 THE CHAIR: Thank you.

8 A. And -- but then there is also the flip-side where she is
9 clearly crying out for help because she is telling
10 certainly people exactly what she is going to do, but she's
11 not telling the people who she knows are the decision
12 makers --

13 THE CHAIR: Yes.

14 A. -- what's happening. And there was another incident
15 around -- this ended up -- started to end up, actually,
16 being almost reflected on, on me, in that she also
17 realised that by telling me the things I have told you
18 she is telling me she now knows -- she is starting to
19 put together that when she tells me certain things, she
20 is getting a knock on the door the next day or she's
21 getting phone call the next day.

22 And there was a particular incident, I can't
23 remember if I am coming on to it later or if it's -- if
24 it is an opportunity to bring this up later, but she
25 there was one particular incident where she was at

1 a train station and was going between stations, trying
2 to work out which one was the best to kind of -- to be
3 successful at ending her life and, for the first time,
4 she called my brother, who also suffers with mental
5 health concerns, and anxiety and -- anxiety and she
6 would deliberately not call him, before she knows that
7 he struggles with his own mental health and would call
8 me because she knows I can kind of handle it and manage
9 it --

10 THE CHAIR: Really?

11 A. -- and, yes, so I started also being put into that camp
12 of, "I am not going to call Adam now because I know
13 what's going to happen". And it was actually only
14 then -- I mean, that was a completely traumatic time
15 that was. That was her flitting between stations, my
16 brother being on the phone to her, she -- her not
17 telling him where she was, he could hear the train
18 announcer in the background, and that was a real kind of
19 red flag around almost like is it a goodbye phone call,
20 then him texting me, at the time, during the phone call,
21 saying you need to call the police or you need to call
22 someone because she is at a train station. I don't know
23 where she is, I am going to try and get it out of her.
24 So, yes, she was very, very selective in who she spoke
25 to and she knew what the outcome would be if that was

1 the case.

2 MS LEA: Can you recall -- obviously, that conversation

3 between her and your brother was after your telephone

4 call to the care coordinator on 24 January.

5 A. I can't.

6 Q. If you can't help us any further, that's absolutely

7 fine?

8 A. I can't remember where it stood in the chronology I can

9 probably find out.

10 Q. That's okay. Your telephone call with the care

11 coordinator on the 24 January, was that the only

12 telephone call or discussion that you had with

13 a clinician that was of that nature, where you were

14 raising concerns, or were there other calls?

15 A. No, that was the -- that was definitely the one where

16 I was most blown away. There were many -- I mean,

17 almost every call or interaction in a ward round or any,

18 any kind of meeting was me saying, "She is saying this,

19 this and this, I believe it". And it not being -- and

20 her, her views being taken for face value and not mine.

21 And, like, look, I get needing to hear the patient's

22 views and put at the centre but you also need to ground

23 it in some kind of -- some kind of sense around there is

24 a logic here to what she's doing.

25 Q. You say that, in that call, you raised your concern that

1 she should be sectioned is that something that you or
2 other family members had ever raised before or was that
3 the first time you --

4 A. Yes, again, this was part of a pattern over probably
5 three or four years of times she would attend the train
6 station frequently. Also, I know of all these times
7 that she attended the train station. I don't know about
8 all of the times, she could have attended twice as much
9 as I think, she could have been attending every other
10 day. But, whenever there was a kind of spike in
11 attendances or the level of detail in what she was
12 telling me or the frequency of which she was telling me
13 that she wants to end her life, yes, I would be
14 frequently saying -- not just to the care coordinator
15 but also to the Crisis line because there is a bit,
16 again I think we are going to come to it later, on out
17 of hours and out of hours kind of contact and again
18 I remember speaking to the Crisis line, I think it was
19 on a Saturday or a Sunday, and again saying, she is
20 saying these things she saying she wants to kill
21 herself, she's saying she want to do in front of
22 a train, and I am worried about her mental state right
23 now. But it would just be, the risk is not enough, kind
24 of call the care coordinator on Monday and go from
25 there.

1 Q. I am going to ask you some questions now in relation to
2 your mother's last appointment with an EPUT clinician
3 before she died, so the review by the consultant
4 psychiatrist on 3 February 2022. Firstly, were you in
5 attendance at that appointment?

6 A. No, I don't believe I was.

7 Q. Do you know if you were aware of it at the time?

8 A. I don't, I think I was probably aware that it happened,
9 yes. But as in no, not fine detail.

10 Q. Can you recall -- and it may be that you can't -- but
11 can you recall if you had any conversations with your
12 mother after that appointment, about how it went or what
13 was discussed?

14 A. No -- I can't recall but then I think it was a pretty --
15 from what I saw, a pretty run of the mill appointment in
16 that, sadly, all these -- I mean, like I said, when you
17 actually -- when I actually saw the wider context of
18 what's going on with other professionals' concerns it
19 was obviously an extraordinary -- that should have been
20 an extraordinary meeting but, as far as I was concerned,
21 she'd been telling me very similar things for a long
22 time. I kind of knew what the psychiatrist was going to
23 say. She went with her partner, I had -- there is only
24 kind of a certain number of times I could take off
25 work for it. But no, I wasn't -- wasn't aware --

1 All I know was, was it was again deemed low risk,
2 she was deemed low risk and I obviously completely
3 disagreed with it and, actually, the first time I really
4 read the -- those notes from that meeting where it says
5 she was low risk and that no, I can't remember what the
6 quote was that no other kind of -- no significant
7 increases required, or whatever, was when that letter
8 was on her doormat two days after she died, and I am
9 clearing out the flat, and I've opened this letter
10 and there is the quote that she is low risk.

11 Q. You helpfully -- at paragraph 39 you clearly state that
12 the record of that review doesn't mention the period of
13 crisis that your mother had been experiencing just in
14 the days prior to that consultation. We have discussed
15 those key events but, just to be absolutely clear, you
16 are talking there about the contact and call on
17 31 January, where your mother reported the plan to kill
18 herself that night, the contact with the duty worker on
19 1 February after she reported a plan maybe when she goes
20 home that day --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- and then the call on 2 February where she reported
23 low mood?

24 A. Mm-hm.

25 Q. You go on at paragraph 41 to say that you consider the

1 consultant psychiatrist failed to consider the records
2 added in those days prior to the consultation which
3 showed the sustained period of crisis and repeated
4 contact with services with direct suicidal intent with
5 a plan?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. It may seem obvious but what brings you to that
8 conclusion that the consultant failed to consider those
9 records?

10 A. I mean, this is just -- when you said about it kind of
11 appearing obvious, like this is I think what I struggle
12 with, is it was obvious and I remember at the inquest
13 that I said she was kind of having -- all of these
14 things having happened, that she was still flagging up
15 kind of green or amber on the risk scale, and, like
16 I said, it being -- it appearing to be a completely run
17 of the mill normal routine appointment and, actually,
18 you mention kind of the start of sequence of events
19 being on 31st but, even kind of on the 4th, she saw the
20 depot nurse and was suicidal, on the 24th I am making
21 the call to say she's talking about running, versus
22 running and jump. You have then have the care
23 coordinator there's been a significant deterioration in
24 physical appearance and various other things. You have
25 then got the 31st, where she is saying -- she is calling

1 111, saying, "I'm thinking of jumping in front of
2 a train", I've got here kind of four, five, six, seven,
3 eight calls to various professionals saying exactly what
4 she wants to do.

5 And, yes, that -- like, how can you not hear all of
6 those things and go this person needs significant
7 intervention immediately. And, yes, it appears that the
8 consultant didn't see that and didn't have that
9 information and neither did I, otherwise I would have --
10 otherwise I would have been pressing kind of almost far
11 more than I already was, which I already felt was far
12 too much, but it's almost sad to know that if I --
13 I already felt too involved but, if I had known about
14 these instances, I could have actually, kind of, maybe
15 had a further intervention and been really shining this
16 in his eyes going, like, "Are you seeing this? Like,
17 this is -- this needs something different".

18 Q. We will turn to the inquest in a moment but I think that
19 was a finding that came out of the inquest, wasn't it?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Likewise, you state that the consultant psychiatrist
22 failed to consider whether your mother required referral
23 to the Home First team, again, that's something that
24 came out at the inquest, isn't it?

25 A. Yes. And this just screams to me kind of complacency

1 and I want to just kind of find my notes. So there was
2 talk of referral to home treatment and then there was
3 talk -- there was a kind of -- it came across very much
4 like a corridor conversation, around the care
5 coordinator having a conversation with the consultant
6 saying "Should we, shouldn't we?" And, from memory, no
7 actual referral happening to even being rejected. So
8 it's not even like -- if the referral was made to home
9 first -- home treatment, and it was rejected, I would
10 have had problems with that. The fact that it wasn't
11 even put in in the first place is an even bigger --
12 a bigger concern and there's kind of bits that are just
13 really kind of horrible to kind of read in the notes
14 saying that kind of because she was -- I have got the
15 notes here somewhere -- that because she was known to
16 Home First -- here we go, yes, so kind of -- 33(d) on my
17 notes -- 33(d), I think, might be a paragraph out -- it
18 is an ongoing thought about killing herself in front of
19 a train, Amanda is well known, and kind of, because she
20 is well known, Home First treatment team have not
21 accepted a request to make a referral because of her
22 history.

23 So you have got all of these things and, again,
24 I come back to the question, well, what would have meant
25 a referral to Home First was appropriate. Like, if her

1 saying she wants to kill herself two nights in front of
2 a train to three or four different professionals and her
3 family, and that all being logged on a medical system
4 and Home First, which is the intermediate level of
5 intervention is not deemed serious enough, again, I keep
6 asking the question, well, what is?

7 Okay, she has been presenting like this for seven or
8 eight years, so just because that is normal that doesn't
9 mean any further invention is required and she's not
10 done it before, she's visited lots of stations, she's
11 visited stations before, she has not jumped in front of
12 a train, well, unfortunately, like, she did.

13 Q. Just sticking with that 3 February appointment, you note
14 in your witness statement at paragraph 35(a) that the
15 consultant recorded your mother described her sleep as
16 fine. But three days previously on 31 January, she
17 reported to the Crisis team that she wasn't sleeping,
18 she was getting about two to three hours --

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. -- of undisturbed sleep a night and, again, it may be
21 that you aren't able to help us, but can you help us
22 with whether she was still having problems with her
23 sleep --

24 A. Yes, it was dreadful.

25 Q. -- on 3 February?

1 A. Yes, it was dreadful. Again, these are also reports
2 from her partner, that she would be kind of pacing the
3 house at night. She kind of went from sleeping in the
4 bed, sleeping on the sofa. Yes, no, it was absolutely
5 dreadful and, again, this kind of, for me, comes back to
6 kind of the picking and choosing as to what she is kind
7 of describing and how much of a concern she wants to
8 portray herself as and, again, in that meeting as well
9 she -- I mean, I am saying she is picking and choosing.
10 There is also still big red flags in terms of her saying
11 she rates her mood as 0 out of 10 and, prior to that, it
12 was 2 out of 10, and so on.

13 And, again, you can see in that paragraph she
14 strongly denied any intention to jump in front of
15 a train. She is saying that to the consultant because
16 she knows exactly what the consultant will do if she
17 says something different. He doesn't know because he's
18 not looking at the system or the system failing
19 somewhere, he doesn't know that she has said that to
20 healthcare professionals -- multiple healthcare
21 professionals in multiple different areas.

22 Q. It is also recorded at paragraph 35(a) that the
23 consultant noted there were no major side-effects with
24 her current medication. So does that go to the point
25 that you were making earlier about the lack of clarity

1 as to whether the physical symptoms she was suffering
2 were a side-effect of medication or otherwise?

3 A. Yes, like, just some of it just doesn't make sense.
4 Like, she was hunched over, mouth open, slow moving, and
5 again I come back to kind of there being a general sense
6 of the person that's -- and this comes back to my point
7 about the Linden Centre, the person that's presenting in
8 front of the healthcare teams at that moment is like
9 that person has always been like, that's what it feels
10 like. It feels like there is a lack of understanding of
11 how much of a decline that person's experienced because
12 she did go through different consultant psychiatrists as
13 well, and I can't remember when the physical symptoms
14 started and the consultants psychiatrist changed but it
15 probably was around the same time.

16 But, yes, there is definitely -- I say it is
17 a ridiculous kind of comment to make that she didn't
18 have, kind of, side-effects or symptoms.

19 Q. Thank you. And at paragraph 37(a), you state that the
20 care plan after that meeting was that your mother would
21 be reviewed by the consultant again in four months; do
22 you know whether she was happy with that plan?

23 A. I mean she didn't want to engage with the services, so
24 she -- I mean, ultimately, she wanted to kill herself.
25 So as little involvement with the services as possible

1 was -- was preferable for her, although, like I said,
2 there were obviously these flashes of cries for help,
3 where she has called the crisis line, or she has called
4 Samaritans, or me, or someone.

5 But no, I think she was very consigned to "I am
6 either going to be like this for the rest of my life or
7 I am going to kill myself", like that that was it.

8 Q. Do you know, was she due to have contact with any other
9 clinicians in that four-month interim period, her care
10 coordinator and the --

11 A. Only --

12 Q. -- depot injections?

13 A. Yes, exactly, those routine appointments.

14 Q. Did you have a view as to the plan at that stage, can
15 you recall?

16 A. No. It just -- it was, it was just very, very, like,
17 stuck in a rut, just she doesn't seem to be getting any
18 better, no one is really understanding what I am saying
19 and the seriousness of what I am saying or seeing
20 through what she's saying. And it was just doing what
21 we can do, just me and her partner just kind of
22 keeping -- him actually watching her, kind of like
23 making sure he knows where her whereabouts are, me
24 calling, and things like that. It almost felt like we
25 just we had to do the best we could. But we can't watch

1 her all the time.

2 Q. No. Very briefly, we know that that was her last
3 consultation with an EPUT clinician and that was
4 3 February and we know that she died on 12 February.

5 Would you like to say anything about the nine-day
6 period there before she died, any contact that you had
7 with her, how she seemed?

8 A. She was just -- I think, a couple of things. She was
9 just clearly like so unwell, like, it was just plainly
10 obvious.

11 She was doing normal things, she was like -- she
12 would see -- she made a friend on the ward from
13 a previous admission, she saw that friend, and then, as
14 far as I'm concerned, she went to the station on
15 12 February, like any other time she has been to the
16 station, and this was the right -- she had that 1 per
17 cent extra motivation and effort to do it, which is my
18 problem, in that that could have happened on any of
19 these other previous occasions. It just happened to be
20 on 12 February she had that slight wave of -- or maybe
21 it was that one time where I have now been here 20 times
22 I have now got the confidence to do it.

23 But no, as far as I am concerned, it was like any
24 other normal visit to the station.

25 Q. Turning now to the inquest into your mother's death.

1 You say at paragraph 47 that that took place between 13
2 and 15 December 2023?

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. The coroner recorded a narrative conclusion that your
5 mother died by suicide, however recorded that:

6 "There were plainly interventions that could have
7 been taken and would have served to protect her from the
8 known risk of suicide and not considering those
9 contributed to her death."

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. You have set out those failed interventions very clearly
12 in your witness statement and what I would like to do is
13 just go through those with you now and see if there's
14 anything further that you would like to say in relation
15 to each of them. It may be that you are happy that we
16 have covered that area; of course that's okay.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So, firstly, and I am at paragraph 48(b), the level of
19 risk that she presented with was not sufficiently
20 appreciated and addressed, they were aware of the risk
21 that she would kill herself by jumping in front of
22 a train, plans were drawn up, there was an increase in
23 risky behaviours but that didn't lead to sufficient
24 changes in the clinical response.

25 Would you like to say anything further in respect of

1 risk assessments or failure to properly risk assess?
2 A. Yes, so I mean just -- it was a -- for me, like a lack
3 of complete information around where -- you know, where
4 this information or where this logging is coming from,
5 from other people. A failure from the consultant -- if
6 the system operates in that way, a failure of the
7 consultant to find it, rather than just kind of relying
8 on, "let's open up her record, okay, nothing immediate
9 pops up right here, I am just going to go ahead". There
10 was, in terms of risk assessment, like actual kind of
11 like risk assessment procedures, the inquest highlighted
12 that they just weren't used and I can't help but think
13 that, having some kind of systematic process of
14 assessing risk there was needed.

15 And it all sounds fine in the inquest, where they
16 are saying there is an NDT and all kind of professionals
17 around the table evaluating risk, but when you have got
18 six or seven or eight instances two weeks, three weeks
19 before she dies saying she is going to kill herself and
20 exactly how she was going to do it and -- again,
21 I vividly remember in the inquest it saying that she was
22 either still highlighted as green, I think it was green,
23 or possibly amber, ie not kind of a major concern;
24 that's a big worry.

25 And --

1 Q. Sorry, just stop you there, but just touching on
2 something that you just raised in terms of the reference
3 to the notes, what you are referring to there is the
4 coroner's finding that --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- they didn't appear chronologically for clinicians to
7 review, it was based on team.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. So because it was different teams, those notes weren't
10 necessarily appearing for the consultant --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- upfront and centre, if you like?

13 A. Yes, so the depot nurse would log a concern on her
14 system, the Sanctuary worker would log a concern on
15 their system and, yes, those they were in different,
16 they were filed away in different areas of the system
17 that the consultant couldn't clearly see.

18 There was also mention around protective factors and
19 what protective factors would stop her doing that.

20 While the protective factors that were listed were me
21 and my brother, and I explicitly asked her on numerous
22 occasions, like, to try and understand the rationale on
23 her level of seriousness, "Would the impact on me and my
24 brother stop you doing it?" Or kind of imagine -- and,
25 again, I have already mentioned my brother's struggles

1 with his own mental health, what would -- "Would the
2 impact on his mental health after you did this -- have
3 you thought about?" I wanted to actually just
4 understand if she had considered the impact and she very
5 much had considered the impact.

6 It was her -- it was -- she had such a high level
7 and drive to end her life, she was willing to put -- and
8 this is coming from -- my mum loved us very much very,
9 very, very much, she was willing to put us through that,
10 so she could end her life, like, that's how miserable
11 her life was. So when we're listed as protective
12 factors, I am just not convinced that there was enough,
13 I mean, it wasn't enough.

14 Q. Adam, just touching on the last two missed interventions
15 that the coroner set out, 48(c), no formal referral to
16 the Home Treatment team, we have touched on that
17 already; and then 48(c) also, the change from your
18 mother merely talking about, in essence, hypothetically
19 ending her life or the specifics or to doing it that
20 day --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- and not appreciating that change in risk?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Did you attend the inquest?

25 A. I did.

1 Q. Yes. Were you legally represented?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Was there a jury or was it just the coroner?

4 A. No just the coroner.

5 Q. We know that a Prevention of Future Deaths report was

6 made by the coroner, dated 19 December 2023 and you have

7 helpfully listed that in the documents that you have on

8 page 23 of your witness statement --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- is that right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. I am not going to go through the three findings in that

13 report, simply because, when we turn to your

14 recommendations, they actually follow on from --

15 A. Sure.

16 Q. -- those findings and recommendations --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- so we will deal with it all together when we come to

19 your recommendations. But, in short, they relate to the

20 fact that, as you have said, the notes don't show

21 continuously, in chronological order, the fact that risk

22 management tools weren't used and the fact that there

23 were occasions where your mother's attendances at the

24 railway station were not passed on by British Transport

25 Police to the care coordinator and treating clinicians;

1 is that right?

2 A. Yes, just to add on to that as well, there is a point
3 around -- it all looked well and good the British
4 Transport Police plan with the Trust, it is, "We have
5 got this procedure in place, we have got this system in
6 place to inform everyone". There was no factoring in of
7 it being an unmanned station, and that's something that
8 really came out of this. You see all these things, you
9 are kind of reassured, and then the things that are
10 supposed to be happening aren't happening, which are
11 people relaying to the healthcare professionals that
12 she's attending and you've actually got the point that
13 the station she's regularly going to has no staff.

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. So yes --

16 Q. Understood?

17 A. -- there is also issues there.

18 Q. Have you ever received an update from the Trust as to
19 any actions that they have taken in response to that
20 report?

21 A. I have had responses to the PFD. I can't remember
22 exactly if it said what they had done or what they will
23 do. I can't remember.

24 Q. Is that the Trust's formal response to the PFD, rather
25 than a separate --

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. -- individual response to you as a family?

3 A. Yes, formal response, yes.

4 Q. Yes.

5 Adam, I am finally going to turn to your

6 recommendations for change but I am conscious that we

7 have been going for an hour. Would you prefer to

8 continue now for another 15, 20 minutes and go through

9 those recommendations or would you like a break?

10 A. No, that's fine, we can continue.

11 Q. Go through. It's important that we make clear that,

12 obviously, these are your preliminary views, based on

13 the documentation that you do have.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You may feel that as we go through we have addressed

16 everything on these issues that you would like to and

17 that's absolutely fine but I want to provide you with

18 an opportunity to say everything that you would like to--

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. In respect of your recommendations?

21 A. Mm-hm.

22 Q. Just to assist. Please can we put up the

23 recommendations on the screen, so page 19, paragraph 51

24 of Adam's statement, please. Thank you.

25 So at paragraph 51, at the bottom of the page --

1 I am grateful, thank you -- we can see there, Adam, you
2 recommend:

3 "Clinicians [should] work with families to ensure
4 that they understand what is really going on and to take
5 concerns expressed by families seriously."

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, I know you have covered this heavily in your
8 evidence --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- but is there anything further that you would like to
11 say about how clinicians failed to listen to you or your
12 family in relation to Mandy's care and treatment?

13 A. Nothing further apart from just to really, I suppose,
14 yes, summarise that I feel that we are the people you
15 need to listen to and we will always treat -- it just
16 felt -- it felt like we had to work extremely hard, like
17 I said, like the kind of gathering, gathering of letters
18 from friends and family. It required that level of
19 documentation and effort to even start to feel listened
20 to and, yes, just really being treated as kind of
21 secondary, secondary opinions.

22 Q. Do you have any views on engagement with family in terms
23 of the risk assessment process and whether that happened
24 in Mandy's case?

25 A. I'm still not -- I mean I am really not sure what the

1 risk assessment process is. All I've got is glimpses,
2 glimpses into it from the -- from the inquest. So, yes,
3 I would -- I really think actually seeing the concrete
4 kind of what are you using to decide this level of risk
5 and then the level of -- a level of intervention is
6 needed.

7 Q. Thank you. Please can we -- ah, we have it there.
8 Paragraph 52, the next paragraph, your second
9 recommendation is to "Create a better risk assessment
10 tool", as the current risk assessments are "woefully
11 inadequate".

12 I think the first thing to raise there is that it
13 came out at the inquest, didn't it, that actually those
14 tools that were available were not used?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. Would you like to say anything further about risk
17 assessment tools that you feel should have been used or
18 resources that should have been used in Mandy's case?

19 A. I just think I'd probably just pool together what I have
20 already said. It's just the how -- how are you getting
21 all the information from various different systems? How
22 are the family's views being treated in this? What's
23 the weighting, kind of like is the family's views just
24 a side comment or is it a real central factor?

25 Like I said, the protective factors element I think

1 was, was not enough.

2 I mean, for me just as a -- whatever risk assessment
3 process has happened in this case is farcical because
4 you just can't -- you just can't, you can't read this
5 case and understand this case and then not appreciate
6 how ill she was and that some serious intervention was
7 needed and didn't happen, and the risk assessment
8 process said she was okay. Like ...

9 Q. And just to be clear, when you refer to what weighting
10 should be afforded to families' views, in your view,
11 what weighting should families' views be afforded?

12 A. I don't know. It depends, it depends how you're going
13 to measure it. But I mean, I feel like if my views were
14 taken into account we wouldn't be in this situation.

15 So I mean it needs to be, it needs to be equal if
16 not more to the -- to the clinicians. Not necessarily
17 with, obviously, management plans but in terms of
18 realising the level of risk.

19 Q. Yes. Please can we have paragraph 53 on the screen over
20 on page 20. Thank you. Your third recommendation is
21 that appropriate services should be available out of
22 hours and by that you mean qualified staff on duty who
23 can access medical history and make informed decisions
24 about how to manage crisis situations. We have touched
25 briefly on out of hours.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Is there anything further that you would like to say in
3 respect of --

4 A. Yes, there is. It was really -- like, I don't know if
5 it was coincidence or what but most, most crises
6 happened out of hours. Like I said, with the call
7 I made to the care coordinator the following day from,
8 like, when Mum's saying night before that she's going
9 to -- whether she is going to run and jump or just jump.

10 It was really -- it was draining to have to -- even
11 though, even though the Crisis person on the end of the
12 Crisis phone line has the notes there's so much more
13 context to a -- to a case than just reading, the person
14 on the other end of the phone reading through the notes
15 and I felt like I had to re-explain and re-explain and
16 re-explain eight years of history to someone on the end
17 of the phone to get them to realise again -- because all
18 they are going to say is, "The consultant opinion is
19 that she is low risk". Okay, well, then if the
20 consultant is saying she's low risk, then what this guy
21 is saying is kind of, like, fine, but we don't need to
22 act on it urgently. Speak to the care coordinator on
23 Monday. Rather than: Let's do something about this
24 now.

25 There was a particular -- a particular incident that

1 I had before this that really kind of summarised it for
2 me, which was mum went into -- she was, she was having
3 a mental health crisis and also a really severe leg
4 infection and I remember the care coordinator kind of
5 saw her, decided she needed to go to A&E for the leg and
6 said she would relay to A&E that once she had kind of
7 got the appropriate physical medication for that that
8 she would then need to be assessed by the Derwent
9 Centre, the mental health part of the hospital.

10 And the next I know she comes out of her physical,
11 her physical meeting with A&E and there's been no kind
12 of no communication to the Derwent Centre, and this is
13 after hours at this point, and she is standing in
14 a hospital gown in the carpark with me and I am like,
15 she is still in this mental health crisis. She's -- and
16 when she's -- when she can see that I am on the phone
17 to -- to I can't remember who it was, I think it was
18 Crisis or the duty worker or someone, to basically say,
19 "This message that you said was going to be passed to
20 the Derwent Centre has not come through because A&E are
21 saying they're not going to -- they don't know
22 anything", and she can see that I am doing that.

23 She is then shouting and screaming at me in the
24 carpark and running around the carpark in a hospital
25 gown. I then have to call hospital security and then it

1 ends up with me having to call the police and trying and
2 get the police to effectively section her. And this was
3 probably three hours of her running round, like, highly,
4 highly distressed.

5 THE CHAIR: What happened in the end?

6 A. The police kind of basically were around her near the
7 road, near a busy road basically effectively waiting for
8 her to calm down. She calmed down to the point she then
9 got in my car, went to her partner's, I drove her to her
10 partner's house where she was living and the following
11 day -- I think if I'm not mistaken the following day she
12 was sectioned.

13 And the care coordinator said that the police should
14 have sectioned. First of all she said, "I don't know
15 why the breakdown in communication happened in the first
16 place". Then, "The police should have sectioned her",
17 and then actually during working hours the next day she
18 was sectioned and, again, I can't remember if it was
19 a section or if it was an admission but she went to
20 hospital.

21 And it was just another incident, another time where
22 I have said, "This has to happen otherwise we are going
23 to be in real trouble." It didn't, it caused an extreme
24 amount of distress. And then it's always -- the thing
25 I recommend in the first place ends up happening anyway

1 just two or three days later and in this particular
2 case, on 12 February, they didn't quite catch up in
3 time.

4 MS LEA: Do you know -- you said she may have been sectioned
5 or she may not. Do you know if that was the 2020
6 sectioned admission, her last admission?

7 A. It was -- it was during Covid, so, yes. Highly likely,
8 yes.

9 Q. Thank you. You can see on the screen in front of you
10 there at paragraph 54 you have set out your fourth
11 recommendation. We have touched heavily on this, but
12 just for completeness it's that there needs to be
13 a change in the way patient records are kept because as
14 came out at the inquest the consultant could not see the
15 reports in chronological order made by NHS professionals
16 outside of the team without actively searching for them
17 in different areas.

18 Would you like to say anything further on that or
19 are you happy that that's been covered?

20 A. Nothing really, apart from the fact that I've said the
21 risk assessment process is clearly, clearly flawed and
22 I would just -- I would really love to think that if
23 that information had been available in chronological
24 order and easily accessible to the consultant that the
25 risk assessment process would have a different outcome

1 and then more intervention would have been put in place.

2 However, saying that, I am still sceptical as to
3 whether the appropriate level of intervention would have
4 been put in place even with that complete information.

5 Q. Finally, Adam, there at paragraph 55 your final
6 recommendation is that you are unsure if any concerns
7 raised by you via phone calls or emails were acted upon
8 or logged. So in your view there should be a more
9 formal way of raising concerns about clinical decisions
10 or lack of healthcare professional action and logging
11 the concerns to ensure they are recorded and taken
12 seriously.

13 Would you like to provide any further examples of
14 concerns that you raise that you fear were not logged?

15 A. I think it was more just there was -- I had this --
16 I mean I had concrete experience of there being real
17 problems in -- in the system and trust in the system
18 being eroded. And my job kind of means that I don't
19 often -- well, the time when I had to -- when I was --
20 when I got those letters from friends and family and so
21 on I don't always have the time to have that level of
22 engagement to really try and get my point across. And
23 sometimes it really was kind of: I am at work, she's
24 told me this thing the night before. I need to call and
25 I need to relay this to the team. I need to trust that

1 the team are going to deal with it.

2 There just -- there was a worry with the gaps that
3 I had seen across her care around if I had told this to
4 reception and reception said they are going to pass it
5 on, are they? If I told the care coordinator this, is
6 it being logged on the system? And almost in the back
7 of my head I am thinking I want, I almost -- I can
8 almost see what's going to happen, where this is going
9 to end up, she is going to die and I -- I wanted to know
10 that the concerns I had raised verbally over the phone
11 or via email were kind of being centrally kept and that
12 that information was passed to the right people and
13 acted on in the appropriate way.

14 But, yes, it felt like there was no closing of the
15 feedback loop there.

16 Q. Is it fair to say on that point as well, you raised
17 earlier an inaccuracy, for example in the 24 January
18 call, you were very clear that what you were reporting
19 was that your mother was deciding whether to run and
20 jump or just jump --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- and which would likely be more successful.

23 A. Exactly.

24 Q. And that hasn't been reflected in the notes?

25 A. Exactly. Exactly that. And on that particular call

1 like I was worried that that call wouldn't be logged at
2 all.

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. But, yes, exactly that kind of thing. Whether there is
5 kind of an online platform that patients and their
6 family can see what official kind of concerns have been
7 logged or what people have referred to, I don't know,
8 but some kind of formal way of seeing what's been
9 raised.

10 MS LEA: Thank you. Please can we take down the statement.
11 Adam, thank you so much. That concludes my questions
12 for the moment.

13 Chair, do you have any questions to conclude?

14 THE CHAIR: No, I haven't got any questions. But I would
15 like if say thank you very much indeed for your time and
16 thoughtfulness in answering these questions.

17 A. Thank you very much.

18 THE CHAIR: Thank you to your wife too for coming.

19 MS LEA: Adam we are going to take a 10-minute break to see
20 if we have any further requests. Before I do, I am
21 going to put on the screen the image of your mother
22 because, if we don't have any questions we can let you
23 go.

24 A. Sure.

25 MS LEA: Please can we put up the photograph of Mandy.

1 Thank you, please can we take the image down.

2 Chair, we will break for 10 minutes. If we don't
3 have any questions we will resume tomorrow morning at
4 10.00 am, where we will hear from three further
5 witnesses in relation to the care and treatment received
6 by their family members, those witnesses are Karon Pimm,
7 Janet Carden and Patrick Brennan.

8 THE CHAIR: So if there are no questions we will reconvene
9 at 10.00 tomorrow.

10 MS LEA: Yes, Chair. Thank you.

11 THE CHAIR: Thank you.

12 (4.31 pm)

13 (A short break)

14 (The hearing did not reconvene)

15 (4.37 pm)

16 (The Inquiry adjourned until 10.00 am,
17 on Tuesday, 8 July 2025)

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