

Monday 20 October 2025

(10.07 am)

**THE CHAIR:** Ms Troup?

**MS TROUP:** Chair, today we continue with evidence from the families of those who have died. First this morning we hear from Dawn Johnson and Craig Scott, who are going to be speaking about their mother, Iris Scott. Iris died on 1 March 2014, aged 73, and, Chair, their evidence will cover a very broad range of issues. After lunch we will hear from Robert Wade, who will speak about his son, Richard Wade, and Richard died on 21 May 2015 aged 30. That evidence will include Richard's experiences of mental ill health, his time as an in-patient at the Linden Centre in Chelmsford and his death. The evidence today, again, will inevitably touch on deeply troubling matters. People attending today or watching remotely may find some of the matters distressing, and I would like to make clear that emotional support is available from the Inquiry from those who require it. There are two support staff from Hestia, a provider of emotional support, here today and for each day of this hearing. They are wearing orange lanyards and scarves, so as to be easily spotted and there is a private room downstairs available for people to talk to Hestia staff if needed.

For those watching online, information about

1 available emotional support can be found at the Lampard  
2 Inquiry website at lampardinquiry.org.uk and under the  
3 "Support" tab, near the top right-hand corner. We want  
4 all those engaging with the Inquiry to feel safe and  
5 supported.

6 Could the witnesses be sworn, please.

7 **DAWN JOHNSON (sworn)**

8 **CRAIG SCOTT (affirmed)**

9 **Examination by MS TROUP**

10 **Q.** Dawn, if we start perhaps again with you. Could you  
11 state your full name for the record, please?

12 **A. DAWN:** Dawn Alison Johnson.

13 **Q.** Thank you. The Inquiry sent to you, some months ago  
14 a request for evidence under Rule 9 and in response you  
15 provided a witness statement. You should have a copy of  
16 that witness statement in front of you. It is 42 pages  
17 long and dated 9 June this year. If you turn, please, to  
18 page 42, it is in fact redacted, but this is the witness  
19 statement that you signed and made a statement of truth  
20 on that page, 42. Is that right?

21 **A. DAWN:** That's correct, yes.

22 **Q.** Dawn, are you happy that the contents of that witness  
23 statement are true and accurate?

24 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

25 **Q.** Craig, if I can come to you, can you state your full name

1 for the record?

2 **A. CRAIG:** Craig John Scott.

3 **Q.** Thank you. You provided a witness statement to the  
4 Inquiry dated 27 May 2025, and looking please at page 12,  
5 that is where you made a statement of truth and signed.  
6 Is that right?

7 **A. CRAIG:** Correct.

8 **Q.** And I ask you also, are you content that the contents of  
9 that statement are accurate?

10 **A. CRAIG:** I am.

11 **Q.** Thank you. You are the daughter and son of Iris Scott,  
12 who was born on 5 December 1940, and who died at the  
13 Crystal Centre on 1 March 2014, yes?

14 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

15 **Q.** At the time of her death Iris was 73.

16 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

17 **Q.** You have provided to the Inquiry in Chelmsford, in  
18 September 2024, commemorative and impact accounts about  
19 the effect of your mother's death on you both and your  
20 family, and also telling us about the life of Iris and  
21 who she was as a person. We thank you for that evidence  
22 and for your evidence today. You give evidence today  
23 side by side and, Craig, I understand from your witness  
24 statement -- your witness statement is shorter and, Dawn,  
25 you have taken us through the chronology of events that

1           we will come to. But Craig, I understand that you adopt  
2           and agree with all of the content of Dawn's witness  
3           statement, is that right?

4   **A. CRAIG:** I do.

5   **Q.** And that your witness statement essentially adds comment  
6           or impressions or recollections where you felt able to do  
7           so?

8   **A. CRAIG:** Correct.

9   **Q.** And also gives your own opinions on certain matters that  
10          we will come to?

11 **A. CRAIG:** It does.

12 **Q.** Both of your witness statements, I think, have been  
13          prepared obviously from your own recollections, but also  
14          following analysis by your legal team of medical records.

15 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

16 **Q.** I think those include both GP reports and NEPT's records.

17 **A. DAWN:** Yes, yes.

18 **Q.** We are also assisted by the fact that, Dawn, you kept  
19          contemporaneous note of events in your diary.

20 **A. DAWN:** Yes, from the December onwards I started to make  
21          notes of my own which I kept and asked my mum also to  
22          make notes daily because obviously we didn't get to speak  
23          to her all the time.

24 **Q.** That was going to be my next question. We are also  
25          assisted by notes that your mother made and that you now

1           have?

2   **A. DAWN:** Sorry.

3   **Q.** Please don't say sorry, it is very helpful. That was at  
4           your own request and that was after her admission to Ruby  
5           Ward, was it?

6   **A. DAWN:** That's correct. That was mainly after the  
7           Christmas period, but as I said, just so that if there  
8           was anything she couldn't remember, that she would write  
9           down to tell us.

10   **Q.** We will come to see, I think, why it was that you made  
11           that suggestion to her. You both told us a little about  
12           your mother when you gave your commemorative evidence.  
13           My understanding, and you must correct me if this is  
14           wrong, is that her very first episode of mental ill  
15           health came in around November 2007. And Craig, you tell  
16           us that there was a party in November 2007 for family and  
17           friends and what your first noticed was that your mother  
18           seemed very withdrawn, is that right?

19   **A. CRAIG:** That's correct, yes. We had family fireworks  
20           going, and where my mum would normally be very much the  
21           life and soul of any family gathering, my wife and she  
22           was the first to highlight to me, "Do you think your mum  
23           is okay?" No, she wasn't.

24   **Q.** What were her symptoms at that time, it was anxiety, is  
25           that right?

1   **A. CRAIG:** To be fair, we didn't really -- at that point in  
2                   time we didn't really know, something was wrong,  
3                   something was off, whether it was general ill health or  
4                   mental health, we didn't have an idea at that time, but  
5                   she definitely was not herself.

6   **Q.** I understand. By 30 November her condition had come the  
7                   point where her GP made a referral to a private  
8                   psychiatrist, I think?

9   **A. DAWN:** We decided to take mum to a private psychiatrist  
10                  at the Priory in Chelmsford because -- basically to jump  
11                  the queue and make sure that we could nip things in the  
12                  bud.

13   **Q.** Because you were so concerned about her?

14   **A. DAWN:** Yes, she was just, she deteriorated quite quickly  
15                  over those couple of weeks.

16   **Q.** I understand that by early 2008 her condition had  
17                  deteriorated further and that you made contact with the  
18                  mental health crisis team?

19   **A. DAWN:** That's correct, yes.

20   **Q.** On 3 January 2008 your mum was first seen as  
21                  an outpatient at the Linden Centre; is that right?

22   **A. DAWN:** I can't remember the date, but yes, it was into  
23                  the New Year.

24   **Q.** It is right, yes. And at that time, my understanding  
25                  from your witness statements and this is from your and

1        your legal team's analysis, down, her diagnosis at that  
2        time was given as moderate to severe agitated depression?

3    **A. DAWN:**    Yes.

4    **Q.**    Thereafter, at the end of January, your mother was  
5        discharged to the care of the community mental health  
6        team.

7    **A. DAWN:**    That's correct.

8    **Q.**    And my understanding is that across the sort of early  
9        part of 2008 and the Spring, a range of different  
10       medications were tried to deal principally with her  
11       anxiety.

12   **A. DAWN:**    That's correct.

13   **Q.**    She had home visits, I think, from a community  
14       psychiatric nurse.

15   **A. DAWN:**    Yes.

16   **Q.**    And continued to see a psychiatrist within the community  
17       mental health team during that period, is that right?

18   **A. DAWN:**    I can't remember the order that they came in.  
19       I can only remember when we had to actually call the  
20       crisis team out for an emergency psychiatrist.

21   **Q.**    Yes. By July, I understand that the records show that  
22       she was very much better.

23   **A. DAWN:**    That's correct, yes.

24   **Q.**    And Craig, the way you describe that is that you felt  
25       that by that stage you had your mum back.

1   **A. CRAIG:** Yes, to go back to when the crisis team first  
2               came out, mum was in serious distress. It was not  
3               a pleasant sight, to be fair. The psychiatrist that  
4               arrived that day just gathered up all the medication that  
5               mum had at that time, put it in a bag, took it away and  
6               prescribed this new, these new doses, this new variant of  
7               medication. Yes, just to elaborate by July mum was back  
8               and very much herself, a big change.

9   **Q.** The psychiatrist then decided she was so well by then  
10            that a plan was made to, over the next three months, to  
11            wean her off any antidepressants and I think that had  
12            happened by 1 October 2008.

13 **A. DAWN:** Yes so that she didn't become dependent on  
14            anything because she was back to her normal self.

15 **Q.** And, in fact, she was discharged then back from the  
16            Community Mental Health Team on 1 October 2008?

17 **A. DAWN:** I can't remember the date, but certainly, yes, in  
18            the autumn.

19 **Q.** In summary, as a course of treatment, what was done over  
20            that period, when you first noticed or your wife first  
21            notice those symptoms or the feeling that something was  
22            off, your mum wasn't right, to 1 October 2008 that course  
23            of treatment and intervention was successful?

24 **A. DAWN:** Very.

25 **Q.** Thereafter she was well, and I understand that in 2011



1           there was a very short period, towards the end of 2011,  
2           when your mum started to suffer again with poor sleep.

3   **A. DAWN:**    Yes.

4   **Q.**   Which had been a trigger back in 2007?

5   **A. DAWN:**    Yes.

6   **Q.**   But that her poor sleep did not, on that occasion, turn  
7           into anything else because she was prescribed, I think,  
8           diazepam and zopiclone to get her back into a regular  
9           pattern of sleep and those drugs were stopped by the end  
10          of 2011 and then she remained well.

11   **A. DAWN:**    Yes, it was just a very quick spike as such.

12   **A. CRAIG:**   Could I also add.

13   **Q.**   Please do.

14   **A. CRAIG:**   At the end of when mum was feeling well, she was  
15          clearly and very willing to articulate what caused that  
16          issue, anxiety spout, which we then were able to address  
17          and reassure her. So you know, the fact that that  
18          treatment was successful and it addressed those issues  
19          and those symptoms, it was a win-win in every case that  
20          the issues were addressed and we obviously got mum back  
21          to, well to her best.

22   **Q.**   I understand, and I think you will correct me if I am  
23          wrong, it is both of your feeling that the reason that  
24          was successful is because her presenting symptoms which  
25          were very high, unmanageable levels of anxiety, were

1 first dealt with and then you were able to begin to  
2 understand what had caused the anxiety and to address  
3 that such that she became settled and well.

4 **A. CRAIG:** That's correct, yes.

5 **Q.** If we come to early 2013, her anxiety began to return?

6 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

7 **Q.** I think you tell us there were a number of triggers for  
8 that, your brother was experiencing some personal  
9 problems, your father was unwell. She had had some  
10 dental problems that were affecting her sleep. That in  
11 itself being a trigger for the return of anxiety. And  
12 Dawn, I think you note that by 2013 you and your siblings  
13 were all busy with your lives and your own families, and  
14 your mother was the doer in the family and possibly felt  
15 some sense of loss, is that right?

16 **A. DAWN:** I think obviously it got to the stage that  
17 Craig's children, obviously my sons and my other  
18 brother's daughters, they were all old enough doing their  
19 own thing, so they didn't much -- not need, they  
20 obviously did their need their nan. But they didn't want  
21 to be there with them all the time and they were  
22 obviously off doing things by themselves. So yes, that's  
23 where mum felt the loss that she wasn't as involved as  
24 she wanted to be.

25 **A. CRAIG:** I think as parents, with all due respect to my

1       mum and dad at the time, we didn't need their help as  
2       much because the children were able to look after  
3       themselves. So we didn't need the babysitters, which is  
4       something that mum loved to do and obviously she was  
5       missing.

6       **Q.** And then the children didn't need babysitters?

7       **A. CRAIG:** No.

8       **Q.** Understood. In the spring of 2013 Iris was first seen by  
9       her GP, who I understand -- and you have set out some of  
10      the medications, Dawn, in your witness statement,  
11      prescribed really a range of different medications across  
12      the Spring and the summer.

13      **A. DAWN:** Yes. That was gleaned from obviously mum's  
14      medical report which our legal team has set out for us.

15      **Q.** Yes, I understand. By April 2013 there had been  
16      a referral to the Community Mental Health Team.

17      **A. DAWN:** Yes.

18      **Q.** And then by June I think efforts had been to adjust or  
19      reduce some of your mum's medications, but the GP noted  
20      that doing so had worsened her condition quite  
21      significantly?

22      **A. CRAIG:** Yes.

23      **Q.** If we can look, please, Dawn, at page 5 of your witness  
24      statement, I just want to ask a couple of things about  
25      the notes you have here. So we can see that what you

1        have -- what is recorded are some of the changes to your  
2        mother's medication between 26 June 2013 --

3        **A. DAWN:**    Yes.

4        **Q.**    -- and her date of admission to Ruby Ward, which was 23  
5        August 2013. But to make clear, I think you have just  
6        said it actually, but these are not complete records.  
7        This is not a cut and paste.

8        **A. DAWN:**    No. No, this is just a summary and it just  
9        really highlights how many different changes of  
10       medication that mum actually had.

11       **Q.**    Yes. And looking at that, if you could look, please, at  
12       page 6 and at one of your entries, the second entry on 24  
13       July 2013, we can see some of this. There appears to be  
14       an effort just to stabilise your mother. The wording  
15       used there is:

16                        "I have reinstituted some of the medication in  
17       a hope that it might help put her back on an even keel  
18       for the time being."

19       **A. DAWN:**    Yes.

20       **Q.**    We then also see, there are notes here about her  
21       questions about her medication, I think.

22       **A. DAWN:**    She always questioned her medication, and I think  
23       if I can go back to on that occasion where we took mum to  
24       the Priory, the psychiatrist there was very quick to say  
25       that, "You need to stay on a medication for at least six

1 weeks for it to take a hold", but also, on the flipside  
2 of that, not stay on it so long so you become dependent.  
3 I think mum was frustrated because, she wanted to be well  
4 and she was very quick to ask for medication to be  
5 changed so that she could be well.

6 **Q.** She was quite vocal about that?

7 **A. DAWN:** Yes, definitely.

8 **Q.** And I think part of your consideration is that something  
9 had worked for her in the past during the 2007/2008  
10 period, so she knew a balance could be struck and she  
11 wanted it to be achieved?

12 **A. DAWN:** Yes, that's what we asked for but that wasn't  
13 happening unfortunately.

14 **Q.** So she had no anxiety in general around taking  
15 medication, she was just pushing for the right balance to  
16 be found? I understand.

17 **A. DAWN:** Yes, because back in 2008 the medication that the  
18 crisis psychiatrist gave her actually knocked her out,  
19 which was not nice to see, for I would say probably about  
20 three days, that's right, Craig? But then it kind of  
21 reset the clock. She was just spiralling between  
22 different medications.

23 **Q.** Yes, understood. You both note that at the time, before  
24 the summer of 2013 and before Iris was admitted to Ruby  
25 Ward, the particular psychiatrist who was treating her

1 appeared to change her medication according to her  
2 request, rather than at that psychiatrist's own  
3 direction. You both tell us that your mother was a  
4 strong character and that psychiatrist appeared to be  
5 being led by your mother?

6 **A. DAWN:** He was totally led by mum and always changed the  
7 medication when she requested it.

8 **Q.** Was that something that concerned both of you at the time  
9 and that you noticed at the time?

10 **A. DAWN:** We noticed it at the time, but at that stage this  
11 was probably our first interaction on a regular basis  
12 with somebody and we just thought, we didn't query it at  
13 that stage, we thought it was the process and we thought  
14 they knew what they were doing.

15 **Q.** Yes. I think at a later stage, because that particular  
16 psychiatrist, in fact, continued his care of your mother  
17 into the early part of her admission into Ruby Ward --

18 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

19 **Q.** -- and stayed until the very end of November 2013.

20 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

21 **Q.** Dawn, I think you recall, at that later stage, so  
22 November 2013, the ward manager in discussing the fact  
23 that that psychiatrist was to be reallocated, and your  
24 mother was to have a new psychiatrist made comments to  
25 the effect of that the ward manager was glad that was

1 taking place and described that particular psychiatrist  
2 as "a bit of a ditherer"?

3 **A. DAWN:** Yes, she did, she actually said those words which  
4 at the time we both thought was quite unprofessional  
5 really to say something about a psychiatrist who was  
6 attached to her ward.

7 **Q.** Craig, we don't need to go to it, I don't think, but in  
8 your witness statement you tell us that it appeared to  
9 you, at that time, that what was happening was -- you  
10 haven't used this word, but I get the impression from  
11 your witness statement that you felt that it was  
12 haphazard and that a series of different medications was  
13 being tried just to try and find something that might  
14 work.

15 **A. CRAIG:** Yes, and it was also hinted or implied that there  
16 are many different medications we can try, it was a  
17 matter of finding the right one. It was almost an excuse  
18 for the forever changing medication.

19 **Q.** Looking at your statement, the words that you recall are  
20 that the psychiatrist said:

21 "There are lots of different drugs we can try,  
22 we will find the right ones eventually."

23 **A.** Yes, which didn't quite sit right with me, to be fair,  
24 especially obviously after having the experience we did  
25 in 2007/2008.

1   **Q.** By 30 August the decision was taken that Iris should be  
2       admitted as a voluntary patient to Ruby Ward at the  
3       Crystal Centre. Can you help us with what you can  
4       remember, and I appreciate that it was now more than 10  
5       years ago, about the basis for that decision. Why was it  
6       decided that it would be best, by then, for her to be  
7       admitted as an in-patient?

8   **A. DAWN:** To take mum out of the family situation for what  
9       they suggested was just going to be a three-week quick  
10      fix.

11   **A. CRAIG:** And also dad's health. He was struggling and dad  
12      couldn't cope and we couldn't be at their home 24/7. It  
13      wasn't a good situation, you know, dad had obviously,  
14      being a bit older than mum, was struggling and still not  
15      in the best of health. He wasn't unhealthy, but not the  
16      best of health and he was struggling to cope with mum's  
17      anxiety especially at those elevated levels.

18   **Q.** Understood. So who was it that told you that the plan at  
19      that stage was for her to be admitted for a three-week  
20      period, do you know?

21   **A. DAWN:** I believe it was the psychiatrist that mum was  
22      under for that period up until November. I think it was  
23      him that suggested that this would be the way forward.

24   **Q.** Effectively to take her out of the home situation, your  
25      father for obvious reasons was struggling to care for



1 her, stabilise her perhaps and she could go home.

2 **A. DAWN:** Yes, as a voluntary patient.

3 **Q.** As a voluntary patient. As we know that is not what  
4 occurred.

5 **A. DAWN:** No.

6 **Q.** And your mother remained on Ruby Ward until she died on 1  
7 March 2014. Before we go through, I would like to take  
8 you through what did occur on that ward between 30 August  
9 2013 and your mother's death in March 2014. I want to  
10 take you through a summary of what you consider to be the  
11 most key issues and the most grave failings, so that we  
12 see as we are going through that more detailed  
13 chronology, those listening understand what it is that we  
14 are looking at and the context of what happened here. If  
15 at any time I make an error or there is something you  
16 want to add, please say so. I think knowing that Iris  
17 was on the ward between 30 August 2013 and 1 March 2014,  
18 one of the key issues you have raised is that at no stage  
19 during that time did there appear to be a clear or  
20 settled diagnosis?

21 **A. DAWN:** No.

22 **A. CRAIG:** Correct.

23 **Q.** In fact, and we will come to see it, questions were being  
24 raised I think as late as late February 2014 as to  
25 whether or not there was any mental illness and whether

1       the matters might be related to personality issues, is  
2       how they are described, or a personality disorder.

3   **A. DAWN:**   That was probably 36 hours before mum died.

4   **Q.**   Yes, and in fact I think what you are referring to is a  
5       psychologist's report that was -- yes, 28 February is the  
6       date on the report, but I think perhaps he saw your  
7       mother on the 26th. That report concludes that there is  
8       no depression, but notes that there is an increased level  
9       of anxiety beyond what we might expect in everyday life.

10  **A. DAWN:**   That's correct.

11  **Q.**   In other words, unless you think I am summarising  
12       wrongly, a mild anxiety.

13  **A. DAWN:**   Yes.

14  **Q.**   And that report is dated the day before your mother died.  
15       There are also some very grave issues around treatment,  
16       care planning and medication. We have talked about it a  
17       little and we will come to it again. I think is this  
18       fair, both of you had the impression and remain of the  
19       impression that what staff were attempting to do was to  
20       find and treat the underlying cause for your mother's  
21       symptoms rather than dealing with the symptoms  
22       themselves?

23  **A. CRAIG:**   Yes, in one of the meetings, I'm sure when we  
24       spoke to the psychiatrist, we directly asked that  
25       question and that was the answer we got.

1   **Q.** And your feelings on that were?

2   **A. CRAIG:** Well, it seemed to be a cart before the horse  
3       scenario, especially after experiencing what we did in  
4       2007, 2008 and also a very close friend, who is part of  
5       the industry, a clinical psychologist in Australia and he  
6       happened to be over in the UK at the time and we just  
7       asked him, I just remember running that scenario past  
8       him, and he said, "That's definitely the wrong way", or  
9       in his expert opinion it would be the wrong way to treat  
10      a patient in such condition.

11   **Q.** In that he would have preferred to see the presenting  
12      symptoms, and the principal presenting symptom I think  
13      was this unmanageable anxiety, treated and dealt with and  
14      then some headway being made into what the underlying  
15      issue might be.

16   **A. CRAIG:** That's correct.

17   **Q.** But what you say over the whole of that period of her  
18      admission, is this right, is that that was the other way  
19      round?

20   **A. CRAIG:** Exactly.

21   **Q.** I don't think there was any real care plan that you felt  
22      you could follow or that she could follow?

23   **A. DAWN:** No, I think she was very frustrated by that.

24   **Q.** Yes. That frustration and that lack of structure  
25      heightened her anxiety?

1   **A.**   Definitely, I mean she was in a ward that she shouldn't  
2           have been on. It was, I think at that stage possibly  
3           above 80 per cent of the patients unfortunately had  
4           dementia, but mum, apart from her illness, was very  
5           switched on and wanted to engage. She needed to be  
6           occupied all the time and she really felt alone because  
7           she really couldn't have much conversation.

8   **Q.**   I think we will come to it but one of the senior nursing  
9           staff, in her witness statement for your mother's  
10          inquest, explained that unfortunately at that time it was  
11          the case that there were a large number of dementia  
12          patients on Ruby Ward and that was something that caused  
13          a great deal of upset to some of the ward's more  
14          functional clients, that's the way in which she has  
15          described it.

16   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes.

17   **Q.**   In particular to your mum, who was active, sociable,  
18          needed some stimulation and contact and actually ended up  
19          being very isolated.

20   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes.

21   **Q.**   You describe the ward environment, Craig, as clean but  
22          not fit for purpose otherwise.

23   **A.   CRAIG:**   Yes, I mean, it's exactly what you would expect  
24          to see on a modern day ward, but as far as fit for  
25          purpose, staffing levels weren't great. You could see

1       that there seemed to be a lot of junior staff members,  
2       very much driven from one central point, it seemed to be  
3       very matriarchal, one person in charge and everybody  
4       followed that individual's direction.

5   **Q.** Was that individual the ward manager?

6   **A.** Yes, it was.

7   **Q.** Thank you.

8   **A.** And I would suggest they stayed in line with that  
9       direction.

10   **Q.** I see.

11   **A.** But overall, no, it wasn't fit for purpose for someone of  
12       mum's situation. Playing devil's advocate, I'm not sure  
13       where else mum could have gone at that time in defence,  
14       the NHS or the Trust as a whole, but the care plan, the  
15       care was just completely inadequate at that time for a  
16       patient of that stature.

17   **Q.** Did you ask them about moving ward?

18   **A. CRAIG:** Yeah.

19   **Q.** Did you say to them that this wasn't the right place?

20   **A. CRAIG:** The only other option was to go to Topaz, which  
21       is deemed for younger patients and, although mum was a  
22       young 73 year old, very sort of dynamic and sharp, that  
23       would have been -- that was deemed inappropriate for her  
24       because of the levels of violence and that was clearly  
25       detailed to us. So that ward had a problem.

1   **Q.**   So Ruby was the least worst option?

2   **A.   CRAIG:**   Yes, it seemed to be more sedate.

3   **Q.**   I understand.   In terms of staffing arrangement, you both

4       noted very, very low levels of staff.

5   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes.

6   **A.   CRAIG:**   Yes.

7   **Q.**   A lot of bank staff.

8   **A.   DAWN:**   Correct.

9   **Q.**   And an incident you mentioned Craig is one where all

10       members of staff on the ward but one had to attend, I

11       think, the other ward which was Topaz, for an incident,

12       leaving one staff member for 15 vulnerable patients at

13       that time on Ruby Ward?

14   **A.   CRAIG:**   Yes, and there was also another instance where

15       there was one gentleman helping a patient to their room

16       and I actually said -- my words along the lines were, "I

17       bet you are doing this all the time." His direct response

18       to me was and I almost quote, "I'm a patient, mate, I

19       don't work here."   That just took my breath away a little

20       bit, stepped back and went "Oh well."   And then you look

21       around and it's an isolated ward.   A number of patients

22       sitting there at their desks or at these tables in the

23       common room, less than engaged.

24   **Q.**   Yes.   I think you both saw patients helping other

25       patients off the floor?

1   **A. CRAIG:** Yes.

2   **Q.** Or patients helping other patients to do basic things?

3   **A.** Yes.

4   **Q.** Craig, you also describe a staffing system that what you  
5       saw it was broken and that there were very, very few  
6       staff who were actually confident in their roles.

7   **A. CRAIG:** Yes, it seemed to be in the short period of the  
8       time mum was there, relatively, you know, I'm mindful and  
9       I understand that staffing levels can progress and people  
10      can get trained up, et cetera, but I'm not quite sure how  
11      you go from in one example serving a cup of coffee from  
12      behind the --

13  **A. DAWN:** Cafeteria.

14  **A. CRAIG:** Cafeteria centre which was directly on the ward,  
15      to then effectively administering medication in a  
16      relatively short period of time. I would have expected  
17      more supervisory guidance and one for one tuition. We  
18      didn't see that.

19  **Q.** Understood. Yes, it seemed to you then that fairly few  
20      members of staff were carrying out varied different roles  
21      on the ward.

22  **A. CRAIG:** I would put it slightly different, that the  
23      levels of experience to do the job appropriately was  
24      questionable.

25  **Q.** Yes. There appeared to you both, I think, to be a

1 complete lack of continuity in your mother's care and  
2 treatment, in that I think during that period she was  
3 treated by three different psychiatrists?

4 **A. DAWN:** That's correct, yes.

5 **Q.** There came a period in very late 2013, going into early  
6 January 2014 when there was no psychiatrist in charge of  
7 her care, as far as you understand it.

8 **A. DAWN:** Yes, there was a period over the Christmas, I  
9 think, the psychiatrist that had been in charge of mum  
10 just prior to that, either was on maternity leave or sick  
11 leave and so there was nobody stepping in or to take the  
12 lady's place.

13 **Q.** Yes. You had different psychiatrists forming different  
14 opinions and your overall sense, I think, was that nobody  
15 had an overview or a plan for her care and treatment?

16 **A. DAWN:** No, we would have expected, like with the handover  
17 or during that period, especially as we had flagged to  
18 them like weeks before that Christmas was mum's favourite  
19 time of the year and that whatever medication she was on,  
20 she would dip because she just wanted to be with her  
21 family.

22 **Q.** Yes, you told us in your commemorative account about the  
23 fact that Christmas was her very favourite time of the  
24 year.

25 **A. DAWN:** Yes, yes, and to leave her by herself then --



1   **Q.**   Yes.

2   **A.   DAWN:**   I mean -- but I don't know, they didn't seem to  
3       have the forethought to say, "Right, we have got to get a  
4       grip of this."   They didn't listen, basically.

5   **Q.**   Yes.   One of the things that the serious incident report  
6       noted and we will come to that a little later and I am  
7       keenly aware that you both see a great number of  
8       deficiencies in that report as a whole, but one of the  
9       things that it noted was that your mother's key worker  
10      appeared to have very little involvement in her care.

11  **A.   DAWN:**   No, not at all, I mean she just she didn't engage  
12      with us.   She didn't engage with mum.   The only time she  
13      did engage with us, which we both found strange, was  
14      after mum's significant attempt in the January and it was  
15      almost like she was trying to make up for mistakes made.

16  **Q.**   Yes, that was on 14 January.

17  **A.   DAWN:**   That's correct.

18  **Q.**   We will come to that.   In relation to that individual,  
19      the SI panel found that she had undertaken no risk  
20      assessments in relation to your mother and that there was  
21      no evidence that she had evaluated any of your mother's  
22      care plans.

23  **A.   DAWN:**   That's correct.

24  **Q.**   In terms of staff, the way in which staff conducted  
25      themselves on the ward, we have talked about that a

1        little, but it would be fair for me to say, I think, that  
2        neither of you considered that ward to be a therapeutic  
3        environment.

4        **A. CRAIG:** No.

5        **A. DAWN:** Absolutely not, no.

6        **Q.** Thank you. There was a distinct lack of warmth from  
7        staff both towards you as a family and to your mum in  
8        particular after her attempt to end her life on 14  
9        January.

10       **A. DAWN:** Correct.

11       **A. CRAIG:** Yes, I would slightly elaborate on that.

12       **Q.** Please do.

13       **A. CRAIG:** One of mum's and dad's friends, let's just say he  
14       had had a checkered past, he had spent some time in Her  
15       Majesty's Service and he actually said the staff there  
16       were more considerate and had more empathy than he  
17       witnessed on mum's ward.

18       **Q.** Yes. We are going to come to some examples of what you  
19       described not just as unkindness, but mistreatment from  
20       staff towards your mother and there was a failure on more  
21       than one occasion to notify you of the very most serious  
22       incidents.

23       **A. DAWN:** Yes, they clearly went out of their way to try to  
24       prevent us going into the ward on the January incident so  
25       that, you know, so that we wouldn't see mum's injuries.

1   **Q.**   Yes.   A lack of candour and openness.

2   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes.

3   **Q.**   And then you describe staff engagement with you as a one  
4       way street and that it only occurred if it was initiated  
5       by you.   Nobody came to you to discuss any aspect of your  
6       mother or her care and treatment, is that fair?

7   **A.   DAWN:**   No, they saw us as interfering, I think.

8   **A.   CRAIG:**   Yeah, ultimately, with mum challenging them daily  
9       and then when we arrived, us asking the questions, we  
10      were clearly the problem family.

11   **Q.**   Thank you.   And then most obviously, you raise grave  
12      concerns around safety, the most basic failures to keep  
13      your mother safe from harming herself.

14   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes.

15   **A.   CRAIG:**   Yes.

16   **Q.**   As well as some security incidents, her seeming to be  
17      allowed to leave the ward without anyone asking very many  
18      questions.   I am aware that she was a voluntary patient,  
19      but nobody taking note in particular of where she was  
20      going.

21   **A.   DAWN:**   Or how long or when she was back.

22   **A.   CRAIG:**   Even though she was a voluntary patient, there  
23      were still various restrictions and understandably rules  
24      within the ward that she had to abide by, and for them to  
25      have effectively a double locked door -- a corridor /door

1 process to get out and you needed to be tagged in and  
2 tagged out. You know, there was again, clear lack of  
3 oversight of what mum's movements were at times.

4 **Q.** Yes. Your mum also had periods of leave both with you, I  
5 think, and with her care worker.

6 **A. DAWN:** That's correct, yes.

7 **Q.** And I think there were occasions on which she tried to  
8 get out of the car when her care worker was driving.

9 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

10 **Q.** There was a day on which you called to speak to your  
11 mother and were told that she was off the ward.

12 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

13 **Q.** Following her admission on 30 August 2013, I think you  
14 know now from the records that throughout September and  
15 October she was on level 1 or general observations; is  
16 that right?

17 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

18 **A. CRAIG:** That's right.

19 **Q.** We have spoken a little about the ward environment. What  
20 you noticed, I think, immediately is that she was  
21 spending a great deal of her time alone.

22 **A. CRAIG:** Yes.

23 **Q.** There were some activities on the ward, I think, but none  
24 that were really suitable for her; is that right?

25 **A.** Yes, I mean, obviously, there was puzzles and she could

1 go to Tai Chi and things like that, but again because of  
2 the ability of the other people in the group, mum just  
3 got frustrated and that then, I think, there was an  
4 occasion where she was actually asked not to go to --  
5 well, they stopped her going, because through frustration  
6 I think she was disruptive, because she just was  
7 desperate for engagement, people to listen to her and to  
8 get some care.

9 **Q.** And to engage with her?

10 **A. DAWN:** Yes, definitely, yes. That's what they needed to  
11 do to set up the proper care plan.

12 **Q.** Yes. I think on 17 September staff noted that your  
13 mother volunteered when asked that she was isolated,  
14 there was no one for her to engage with and that she was  
15 very, very flat in mood and that was after only two weeks  
16 on the ward. Thinking about what one of the senior  
17 nurses had said at the inquest about the fact that for  
18 those clients on the ward, like your mother, who had much  
19 higher levels of functionality than some of the dementia  
20 patients, I understand that there was an incident on 23  
21 October 2013 when another patient went into your mother's  
22 room, opened his bowels on the bed and punched her; is  
23 that right?

24 **A. DAWN:** We didn't know about this until our legal team  
25 actually looked at the notes, we hadn't been informed of

1           this at all. And taking you back, Rachel, to where you  
2           mentioned about at the end of September mum felt low.

3   **Q.**   Yes.

4   **A.   DAWN:** You've got to remember mum initially went in there  
5           for a three week quick fix.

6   **Q.**   Yes, yes.

7   **A.   DAWN:** And nothing was being done, to sort of comply with  
8           that, and that she would be in and out in three weeks.  
9           Where two, three weeks in she is telling them she's low  
10          and nothing is happening.

11   **Q.**   Yes. You had seen absolutely no progress and I'm aware  
12          that you have only learnt now about the incident I have  
13          just described, but it can be very clear to us why in  
14          fact that environment might have been making that first  
15          presenting anxiety very, very much worse.

16   **A.   DAWN:** Yes.

17   **A.   CRAIG:** I think, again, just to add to the point, that we  
18          weren't informed on that point. There were other items  
19          that we weren't informed on. It just makes me wonder  
20          what else happened there that we don't know, that wasn't  
21          documented.

22   **Q.**   Yes.

23   **A.   CRAIG:** Just complete failure. And it goes back to that  
24          lack of engagement. Being willing to -- the  
25          accountability or the lack of accountability from the

1       ward side and the respect for the patient and/or the  
2       family.

3   **Q.**   Yes.   The day after that incident, in fact, Dawn, I think  
4       you had a call with your mother, you were on your way to  
5       Cornwall and she said to you on the phone that she didn't  
6       want to be alive and that she wouldn't be here when you  
7       got back from Cornwall.

8   **A.**   That's correct, yes, that was on the 24th.

9   **Q.**   So that was the day after the incident I have just  
10      described.

11  **A.**   **DAWN:** Yes.

12  **Q.**   She didn't tell you about that incident.

13  **A.**   **DAWN:** No.

14  **Q.**   Was that the first time she had mentioned something like  
15      that to you or spoken to you about wanting to end her  
16      life?

17  **A.**   **DAWN:** I'm not exactly sure on timing, I think it was  
18      just before then when I went into mum's room I noticed  
19      that the toilet seat was loose and the curtain rail and I  
20      pointed this out to staff and asked for mum to be moved  
21      rooms, which they did comply with, they moved rooms.  
22      They were very vocal about the fact that they were  
23      anti-ligature beds and the radiators were on the ceiling,  
24      but there's door handles everywhere. So they had moved  
25      her but they weren't addressing all the issues and

1 obviously then, with mum making that statement on 24  
2 October, that was in her mind from the early part of her  
3 admission.

4 **Q.** Yes. Had it been before her admission, do you know?

5 **A. DAWN:** No. Certainly didn't know, and certainly dad  
6 didn't mention anything like that to us at all.

7 **A. CRAIG:** No.

8 **Q.** We will come back to it, but you having pointed out those  
9 deficiencies, she was moved rooms and you talk about  
10 safety issues and radiators on the ceiling, but as we  
11 will see, there were fixed ligature points in the  
12 bathrooms.

13 **A.** That's correct.

14 **Q.** After your mother told you that she was feeling that low,  
15 and she was quite specific I think, on 24 October.

16 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

17 **Q.** You obviously, feeling serious alarm, contacted the ward  
18 manager.

19 **A. DAWN:** I did.

20 **Q.** I want to take you to your witness statement, please, to  
21 look at, it's page 18, Dawn, the response you got when  
22 you reported your mother's low state. So if you look at  
23 page 18 and paragraph 65.

24 **A. DAWN:** Yes, that's right, yes.

25 **Q.** Do you recall that conversation?



1   **A. DAWN:** Yes, I recall that without looking at that.

2   **Q.** I understand.

3   **A. DAWN:** She just said that I was being a paranoid daughter

4       and that nothing was going to happen on that ward and

5       that mum was just trying to raise my anxiety.

6   **Q.** Yes.

7   **A. DAWN:** And totally dismissive, didn't take anything on

8       board at all.

9   **Q.** I think she went so far as to say that if you didn't calm

10      down, you would end up on the ward as well, didn't she?

11   **A. DAWN:** That's correct, yes. Obviously, I was very

12      distressed because I'm away and --

13   **Q.** Of course. As far as you are aware, there is no record

14      of your call to the ward manager about that --

15   **A. DAWN:** No.

16   **Q.** -- at that time on that day.

17   **A. DAWN:** No.

18   **Q.** As far as you were aware, no other action was taken in

19      relation to the information.

20   **A. DAWN:** Certainly I have no knowledge of anyone speaking

21      to mum or, as you say, notes making in her records.

22   **Q.** The records show no change to the level of observations

23      after you had passed on that information, or any other

24      renewed risk assessment or action of any kind.

25   **A. DAWN:** No, no action at all.

1   **Q.** The first record that we see of your mother having  
2       expressed on the 24th a wish to die comes eleven days  
3       later, on 4 November. It's actually at the next  
4       paragraph on the page we were looking at, page 18 and  
5       paragraph 66. There's a record we see on NEPT's systems  
6       from 4 November:

7               "'... [Iris'] daughter said her mother voiced a  
8       concern that she would 'end it all' in a phone  
9       conversation - no specific plan was said'."

10   **A. DAWN:** That's correct, yes.

11   **Q.** On the same day it appears that your mother was spoken to  
12       about having told you that she was feeling low enough to  
13       want to end her life and just looking at the next  
14       paragraphs on that page --

15   **A. DAWN:** 67, yes, I am with that, yes.

16   **Q.** So 67 on page 18, what happened essentially was that your  
17       mother said, "No, I wouldn't want to distress my family,  
18       I'm not going to hurt myself."

19   **A. DAWN:** Yes, she said she wasn't brave enough to do it,  
20       yes.

21   **Q.** She said she wasn't brave enough, and as far as you are  
22       aware, that was taken at face value.

23   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

24   **Q.** Moving forward, just four days later, there's a record  
25       that shows us that on 8 November Iris herself told staff

1           that she wanted to kill herself.

2   **A. DAWN:** Yes, we weren't informed of that either.

3   **Q.** No notification to you either, Craig, about that, or to

4       your father?

5   **A. CRAIG:** Not at all.

6   **Q.** On that day the psychiatrist seems to have noted "high

7       anxiety depression".

8   **A. DAWN:** Correct.

9   **Q.** And then on the next day, which is 9 November -- no, I am

10       so sorry, 9 November is when that was discussed with her

11       on the ward round, no other action was taken although I

12       think there was that day a CPA meeting that you attended.

13       You tell us that at paragraph 69?

14   **A. DAWN:** Yes. As I say I think that perhaps we were asking

15       for a CPA meeting --

16   **Q.** I understand.

17   **A. DAWN:** -- because nothing was happening and we were just

18       trying to get some action and ...

19   **Q.** So were you told during that CPA meeting, as far as you

20       can remember, that on 8 November Iris had told staff that

21       she wanted to kill herself?

22   **A. DAWN:** No, I didn't recall that at all and until we were

23       speaking to the legal team after we were doing our

24       statement, yes.

25   **Q.** That's when you first discovered --

1   **A. DAWN:** That's when we first discovered that mum had made a  
2       couple of comments that she was low enough to think about  
3       wanting to take her life.

4   **Q.** Yes. It appears then, going through November, that a  
5       number of further changes appear to have been made to  
6       your mother's medication and that by 18 November the  
7       psychiatrist who was taking over from the one that had  
8       been described as a bit of a ditherer, that we were  
9       discussing earlier, noted that she considered that your  
10      mother's diagnosis was still unclear.

11   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

12   **Q.** So that's mid-November and so we are a number of months  
13      in to what should have been a three week quick fix, sort  
14      of respite stabilise stay.

15   **A. CRAIG:** Yes, again, you know, not meaning to be defending  
16      the Trust but mental health isn't a science. It seems  
17      that from our experience it's very subjective.

18   **Q.** Yes.

19   **A. CRAIG:** And it just seemed that this particular  
20      psychiatrist now had a completely different view as to  
21      where mum should be treated, and I think from the lack of  
22      progress that we had seen in mum under the original  
23      psychiatrist, the fact that this particular individual  
24      wanted to change it, we were thinking okay maybe he has  
25      got it wrong and she is going to get it right. For a

1 family that had not been through that process before, it  
2 was difficult to understand what was the right approach,  
3 but that underlying treatment plan just seemed to be very  
4 much the same of treating -- not treating the symptoms,  
5 and it was just following that same path.

6 **Q.** Yes. Nonetheless, as you say, the fact that there  
7 appeared to be a -- the fact that there was a new  
8 psychiatrist and a slightly different opinion, you took  
9 as a potential positive, because no progress had been  
10 being made up to that point.

11 **A. CRAIG:** We just thought it couldn't get any worse.

12 **Q.** Yes. In December, and I think this comes to us from the  
13 serious incident report, the psychiatrist noted that --  
14 it's actually at page 19, paragraph 71, Dawn -- both of  
15 you, I am so sorry, if you want to look it:

16 "... that 'while depressive illness played a  
17 part, personality issues were more important'."

18 Now that's not the first time we are going to  
19 see that kind of comment in your mum's records. Did  
20 anyone ever say anything like that to you, any staff  
21 member, did anyone say, "We think this might be  
22 personality issues rather than, or as well as, a  
23 depressive illness"?

24 **A. CRAIG:** No.

25 **A. DAWN:** No. I think in the December they talked about

1       doing a scan.

2   **Q.**   Yes.

3   **A.   DAWN:**   Because they thought that there may be some small

4       nerve damage, frontal lobe damage.   That was early in

5       December, but again, we didn't get the results of that

6       until 23 January, when we challenged in a CPA meeting.

7   **Q.**   Yes, so that's -- yes, we will come to that CPA meeting

8       which was on 23 January, but I think that's right and in

9       fact the new psychiatrist on 3 December had noted that

10      actually, in her view, your mother was not responsive to

11      medication.   It just wasn't --

12   **A.   DAWN:**   Wasn't working, no.

13   **Q.**   It wasn't working, which of course is what your mother

14      had been saying for all of those months --

15   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes.

16   **Q.**   -- repeatedly.   She felt it herself that it wasn't

17      working, she wasn't making any progress.   I understand

18      that a referral was made for a scan to begin to look at

19      the possibility of the issues you have just described on

20      the 17th -- actually on the 3rd.   It took place on 17

21      December and then you repeatedly chased for the results

22      of that scan.

23   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes.

24   **Q.**   You left messages?

25   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes, I think the psychiatrist, she was quite

1 surprised that we hadn't had the results by the time that  
2 we were challenging the staff on 23 January.

3 **Q.** Yes. Do you know what the results of that scan were?

4 **A. DAWN:** I think there was -- I can't recall exactly, but  
5 I think there was small nerve damage, maybe? But again,  
6 I would have to look at mum's notes to be 100 per cent  
7 sure on medical terminology.

8 **Q.** No major issue was flagged as a result of that scan?

9 **A. DAWN:** No, definitely not.

10 **A. CRAIG:** Nothing that would change their path --

11 **A. DAWN:** Change their path.

12 **A. CRAIG:** -- or suggest that the treatment -- treatment  
13 plan -- it would completely deviate from where they were  
14 going at that moment in time. So mum was in all sense  
15 healthy.

16 **Q.** Yes, we have referred to this a little already, but your  
17 mum remained on the ward in the lead-up to Christmas, you  
18 were see no progress and I think you took the step of  
19 trying to warn staff that she was likely to deteriorate  
20 over the Christmas period.

21 **A. DAWN:** Yes, we did warn staff.

22 **A. CRAIG:** More than once, repeatedly, because again we  
23 never felt we were being listened to especially round  
24 this time of year. We knew how mum was going to be  
25 reacting away from her family.

1   **Q.**   Yes.  I think at that time you were worried about changes  
2       to staff as well as how she was likely to react, as you  
3       say, to being away from home over that particular period.

4   **A.   CRAIG:**  Yes.

5   **Q.**   There came an incident on 19 December where, as I  
6       understand it, your mother left the ward and there was  
7       some sort of incident in the car park where -- did she  
8       run at your father's car?

9   **A.   DAWN:**  Yes.  Dad and I had gone to the hospital  
10      independently, we were in the car park, and mum had  
11      obviously been let out of the ward, as she had a coat on,  
12      but she sort of run towards, like dad's car, and she was  
13      telling him to go, go away, and she was quite vocal and  
14      she looked very agitated, but obviously they had let her  
15      out of the ward like that.

16  **Q.**   Yes.  That event, as I understand it, from both of your  
17      witness statements and from the records that you have  
18      relied on in those statements, led to a decision in the  
19      ward that your mother should be assessed under the Mental  
20      Health Act?

21  **A.   DAWN:**  That's correct, yes.

22  **Q.**   Help me to understand why that was.  Was that because she  
23      had displayed particular agitation outside of the norm,  
24      was there some danger or some new level of --

25  **A.   DAWN:**  I think because she had run out into the car park,



1 she had been let out in an agitated state and again, it  
2 was obviously because she was going to be there at  
3 Christmas, nothing was happening and this was her  
4 desperation.

5 **THE CHAIR:** Was she aggressive when she was agitated?

6 **A. DAWN:** Not aggressive, she was more vocal, she was just  
7 telling them to go. I think, I mean she was frail, you  
8 know, so she wasn't going to -- my dad was 6 foot,  
9 although he was elderly, he was 6 foot 3, she was barely  
10 5 foot, so there was nothing she could do. She was just  
11 frustrated with there being no action and unfortunately  
12 on that day it was directed towards our dad.

13 **A. CRAIG:** And I wonder whether the decision for the  
14 ward/hospital/trust to section mum at that time was more  
15 for their benefit than it was for mum's, granting them  
16 more direct control and oversight over her movements, et  
17 cetera, where as an in-patient under the --

18 **Q.** As a voluntary --

19 **A. CRAIG:** She can move relatively freely. Where,  
20 obviously, if you are sectioned, they have greater  
21 responsibility, perhaps, to your care, which they can  
22 then enforce. So I wonder whether it's more for their  
23 own controls than it was for mum's wellbeing.

24 **A. DAWN:** I also question the fact whether it was not to  
25 punish us, but again, sort of put us in our place, that

1 over that period she is going to be on section because  
2 around that time they actually restricted visits as well.

3 **Q.** So you tell me if I am misunderstanding. Do you consider  
4 that there may be an element of, not just what Craig said  
5 about having control over your mum's movements, but also  
6 in fact over yours?

7 **A. DAWN:** Their way of containing the situation.

8 **A. CRAIG:** Indirectly punishing us all.

9 **THE CHAIR:** You said earlier that they thought you as the  
10 problem family. Do you want to say a bit more about  
11 that?

12 **A. DAWN:** Well purely because --

13 **THE CHAIR:** Were there individuals or did you think all of  
14 them felt that?

15 **A. DAWN:** Every day we had an issue to raise because we  
16 wasn't getting any feedback, the staff didn't have time  
17 to talk to us. As we have mentioned before sometimes the  
18 periods we were there we would only see one permanent  
19 member of staff, the rest maybe at a desk, every time we  
20 approached that desk shoulders went down and it was,  
21 "Like, what do they want today?"

22 **A. CRAIG:** The tone was set from the top, as I implied  
23 earlier, from the people in charge to ward manager, and  
24 the people reporting in to her. She controlled that  
25 ward. I wouldn't say with a rod of iron, but you knew --

1     **THE CHAIR:**   Sorry, could you repeat that?

2     **A.   CRAIG:**   I won't say she controlled with a rod of iron,  
3                   but she was very, very clear who was in charge and how  
4                   the ward would be managed and run.  And if that person,  
5                   that individual, took a decision, everybody jumped.  I am  
6                   sure we are going to touch on a bit later, when we talk  
7                   about the first attempt, so I'll probably just leave it  
8                   there for a minute.

9     **MS TROUP:**   I think there was a stage after that where, in  
10                  particular, Dawn, you had a conversation with a staff  
11                  manager who told you that you were not complying as a  
12                  family.

13    **A.   DAWN:**   Yes.

14    **Q.**   And that you were not assisting your mother by not doing  
15                  so.

16    **A.   DAWN:**   That's correct and we were making the situation  
17                  worse and because of our presence on the ward, they had  
18                  to deal with mum in a different way.

19    **Q.**   Yes.

20    **A.   DAWN:**   I remember leaving the hospital that day, and when  
21                  I got home my husband suggested going back to speak to  
22                  the staff and try and address the situation while it was  
23                  still fresh, but we had then, by things that mum had said  
24                  and by the things that she had written down, that --  
25                  because she used to say, "You can't beat the system, you

1       don't realise what they are like when you're not here."  
2       We thought that anything we done, we were not -- we  
3       didn't ... it wasn't we thought she was in danger, but  
4       there certainly was not, we didn't feel comfortable about  
5       the situation and it was from that day that I decided  
6       that I was going to start making a personal diary of  
7       every time, a note in the diary, every time I went in  
8       there what had happened and asked mum to do the same.

9       **THE CHAIR:** And did you get the impression that they were  
10      hostile, not just to you as family, but to your mother  
11      personally?

12      **A. DAWN:** Yes.

13      **THE CHAIR:** That they didn't like her?

14      **A. DAWN:** No.

15      **A. CRAIG:** They didn't like to be challenged, and the fact  
16      that, as Dawn just implied there, if we then challenged  
17      again and again, that would -- when we left the ward that  
18      would only be taken out on mum, whether it would be  
19      leaving her on her own for long periods of time, just  
20      making her life generally more difficult. It was  
21      becoming anti-productive from our challenge to what might  
22      then, we were hoping would, where mum would benefit, in  
23      fact, it was I think the opposite effect.

24      **MS TROUP:** Yes. There came to be a stage, I think, where  
25      both recorded in your mother's diary and in what she said

1       to you, it appeared to you, I think that she was afraid.

2   **A. DAWN:** She was afraid, yes.

3   **Q.** Yes, and we will come to some of the reasons for why that

4       might have been, but she recorded in her own thoughts in

5       that diary and said to you, "They'll try to break me."

6   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

7   **Q.** And she was worried about repercussions?

8   **A. DAWN:** Yes, she always used to write notes in there, "Be

9       careful what you say to them." And that was, "Be careful

10      what you say because it comes back on me."

11   **Q.** Yes, and also things to the effect of, "You don't know

12      what it's like in here when you are not here." Craig,

13      you must help me, do I understand correctly that that is

14      something that you heard another patient saying?

15   **A. CRAIG:** Those exact words, we were sitting in the common

16      area, so the four, the family -- I'm not sure if it was

17      through another incident or we were just sitting there

18      passively talking to mum, but there was another lady

19      sitting with her family and those exact words she

20      repeated.

21   **Q.** What were the words, please?

22   **A. CRAIG:** "You don't know wait's like in here." Prior to

23      that, I have to say when mum said it, I probably didn't

24      take it as serious as I should have, or we should have,

25      not in the same context, because clearly we didn't know

1        what it was like to be in a ward like that for that  
2        period of time. But that just struck me as very ... I  
3        don't know the word, poignant.

4    **A. DAWN:**    Telling.

5    **A. CRAIG:**    Telling.

6    **A. DAWN:**    Because around that time as well there was a  
7        similar situation, where we were sitting on those tables,  
8        I'm not sure if it was the CQC that were in. There was  
9        certainly a body of people going around asking questions.

10   **Q.**    An inspection, was it a formal inspection?

11   **A. DAWN:**    Yes, a formal inspection of some sort, because mum  
12        was, I was looking to try and get someone's attention and  
13        she was agitated, "No don't rock the boat, just leave it,  
14        let it go."

15   **Q.**    She didn't want you to complain.

16   **A. DAWN:**    No.

17   **Q.**    You said a few moments ago in response to some questions  
18        from Baroness Lampard about it that you were at the desk  
19        every day, there was always something you needed to  
20        raise, but I want to just try and set that in context and  
21        you tell me if this is wrong. As I understand it, in  
22        part that is because the questions you had were never  
23        answered so they remained the next day?

24   **A. DAWN:**    Yes, and we never got to see anybody. Even if we  
25        said, "Could you ask so and so if this is, what's going

1 to happen next", we never got that response back. So we  
2 were getting perhaps as frustrated as mum and we could  
3 see mum getting worse. You know, nothing was getting  
4 better so we had to try to do something. I can't  
5 remember if it was around that time that we actually made  
6 enquiries at the Priory but it was beyond our reach.

7 **A. CRAIG:** Financially just no chance.

8 **A. DAWN:** It's not like a broken leg where six weeks or  
9 whatever it may be better. We just didn't know how long.  
10 We couldn't financially, I'm sad to say.

11 **Q.** I understand. Could I take you back please to the  
12 assessment that took place following the incident in the  
13 car park on 19 December. Did either you or your father  
14 attend that assessment?

15 **A. DAWN:** Not that I recall, no, we were just told.

16 **Q.** That it would be taking place?

17 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

18 **Q.** Or you were told that it had taken place?

19 **A. DAWN:** Probably we were told that she had been placed on  
20 section 2, yes.

21 **Q.** Now, one of -- if you want to have a look at them, the  
22 comments that are recorded by the clinicians during that  
23 assessment are on page 20 of your witness statement,  
24 Dawn, at paragraphs 79 and 80 and one of the things I  
25 wanted to ask you about, we can see here that the records

1 say, obviously both doctors agreed that your mother  
2 should be detained under section 2.

3 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

4 **Q.** That was the conclusion of the assessment, but her  
5 behaviour here is referred to as "becoming very  
6 unpredictable", and there's a note that she "constantly  
7 questions her medication". But if you look at paragraph  
8 80 the approved mental health practitioner appears to  
9 have used the word "aggressive" in relation to your  
10 mother's behaviour and all I wanted to ask is whether or  
11 not you think -- you may have answered it, but whether  
12 you think that's a fair assessment, whether you think  
13 that is right that she was actually aggressive.

14 **A. DAWN:** I don't think she was very aggressive, like I said  
15 she was very vocal, just, "No, no, no, no go way."

16 **A. CRAIG:** How do you define "aggressive"?

17 **Q.** Let me put it this way, had anyone on the ward ever told  
18 either of you that she had behaved in an aggressive  
19 manner.

20 **A. CRAIG:** The only person, sadly, that mum was aggressive  
21 to in any way, shape or form was my dad.

22 **A. DAWN:** She would give him a little nudge.

23 **A. CRAIG:** Nudge or grab his hands across the table and  
24 lurch a little bit towards him. I'm not sure if she may  
25 have kicked him under the table, not hard but enough. An



1 unnecessary act, but she certainly wasn't aggressive to  
2 anybody else, not to anybody else in her family and I  
3 would suggest that had she been aggressive to anybody  
4 else on that ward, staff/patient, they would have told  
5 us.

6 **Q.** You would have known about it?

7 **A. DAWN:** Definitely, yes.

8 **Q.** In any event, as I understand it, from certainly your  
9 notes, Dawn, in December and January your mother was  
10 spending around about 12 hours a day alone?

11 **A. DAWN:** Yes, she wasn't allowed into to her room, her room  
12 was locked, and she had a tote bag with her I suppose,  
13 and she used to sit outside by the nursing station from  
14 the moment she got up, she was probably not supervised  
15 but probably watched getting dressed. She then had to  
16 spend that time in the communal area. Obviously she then  
17 had very little stimulation. She wasn't talking to  
18 fellow patients and because of her behaviour she hadn't  
19 been welcomed at some of the activities outside of the --  
20 within the Crystal Centre, the Amethyst ward. Yes, she  
21 hadn't been invited back to perhaps the Tai Chi and  
22 things like that.

23 **Q.** And part of that was, as you described, she was finding  
24 that very frustrating.

25 **A. DAWN:** The way was she was presenting, yes.

1   **Q.** It was too easy for her, she was frustrated.

2   **A.** Yes.

3   **Q.** What I understand that you were told about the section on  
4       20 December?

5   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

6   **Q.** And you were told she was going to be sectioned for 28  
7       days as a result of that assessment and you were at the  
8       same time told, Dawn, that your visits were going to be  
9       restricted?

10   **A. DAWN:** That's correct.

11   **Q.** That was 20 December that was after you had conveyed to  
12       staff, I think both of you, that your mother was likely  
13       to deteriorate over Christmas.

14   **A. DAWN:** Yes, and I'm not sure if it was on that day. I  
15       think they said, "You've got ten minutes with your mum",  
16       and I remember saying to mum, "Right, we have got ten  
17       minutes, this is what's going to happen, this is what I  
18       want you to do." I used to take her clothes home to be  
19       washed, "Give me your clothes and now this is what I want  
20       you to do. I want you to write down ..." but she was --  
21       not out of control -- she was seriously agitated because  
22       she was now thinking, "I'm in there and not only am I not  
23       going to be out of the hospital to be with my family, my  
24       family aren't going to be able to come and see me", and  
25       she had gone from being lonely to desperate.

1 THE CHAIR: What reason was given for restricting your  
2 visits?

3 **A. DAWN:** They said that our visits raised her anxiety, but  
4 there was nothing that we could see, and I don't think  
5 there's been anything in the notes to say that that --  
6 that we raised her anxiety. Because it wasn't just Craig  
7 and I that were going in. Mum had a big circle of  
8 friends who were also visiting. So it was everybody, and  
9 my mum's sister-in-law was more like her sister really,  
10 because my mum had lost her brother at such an early age,  
11 and they had a very close bond. It wasn't just us. It  
12 was the whole family.

13 **A. CRAIG:** I think they saw it as well that we were  
14 placating to mum's condition and where they were being  
15 firmer, or wanted us to be firmer and we were being sort  
16 of more considerate to mum's needs and that was something  
17 that they pushed towards myself and, unfortunately, I  
18 adhered to their requests and I was firmer to mum. I  
19 absolutely regret that to this day.

20 **Q.** I understand. Now, that is interesting because what I  
21 recall is that on 20 December which was the date of the  
22 assessment under the Mental Health Act, your mother  
23 recorded in her own diary notes to the effect of, about  
24 the staff, "They think I'm putting it on, they think I'm  
25 putting this on to attract attention." And what you are

1 saying, I think, Craig, is possibly that you were not  
2 treating this as something your mother was putting on and  
3 therefore, possibly, disrupting what staff -- the way in  
4 which staff were approaching it, is that fair?

5 **A. CRAIG:** Yes, I guess the stance I took, although slightly  
6 firmer than perhaps Dawn and dad, I just tried to get her  
7 perhaps a bit more forcefully to engage with the  
8 programme that the ward was setting out for her rather  
9 than fighting it and I think I probably used along the  
10 lines of, "There's no point fighting it, you are not  
11 going to win. You just got to go with the flow and we  
12 are going to come out stronger and better at the end of  
13 it." And she just kept repeating, "It's not happening,  
14 not happening." That would frustrate me. I was probably  
15 less patient and that than I am today.

16 **Q.** Thank you. Dawn, I am going to take you, please to the  
17 conversation you had with a member of staff on the 22,  
18 which will just take us a few minutes and thereafter, as  
19 long as you are both content and, Chair, you are content,  
20 I propose a short break. You, in fact, were told, I  
21 think on the 20th, you did visit -- Dawn, and I am  
22 looking please at page 21, paragraph 83 of your statement  
23 if this assists. You did visit and a staff member  
24 accused you, I think possibly not you personally, your  
25 family, of interfering with your mum's progress,

1           disrupting her and she reiterated that your family as a  
2           whole was not complying and not supporting nursing staff.

3   **A. DAWN:** That's correct.

4   **Q.** She also said that your mother was not eating, drinking  
5           or sleeping. Was that true, as far as you were aware?

6   **A. DAWN:** No, that was not true. Every day I went in there  
7           I brought, she had a cake and a Bounty, she certainly ate  
8           the stuff from the canteen. She was losing weight  
9           because of her anxiety. Her metabolism was going at the  
10          speed of light, you know. That's why she was losing  
11          weight.

12   **Q.** Yes.

13   **A. CRAIG:** The same had happened in 2007, 2008, mum had lost  
14          a significant amount of weight purely because her  
15          metabolism was obviously through the sky.

16   **Q.** Because of that very significant anxiety.

17   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

18   **Q.** Understood. On the 21st you were told that the ward was  
19          closed and that you couldn't visit until the following  
20          Monday, the 21st was a Saturday.

21   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

22   **Q.** You called, I think, Dawn, then on the 22nd, which was  
23          the Sunday, and when you called in the morning, you were  
24          told that you couldn't speak to your mum because she was  
25          too agitated.

1   **A.**   DAWN:   That's correct.

2   **Q.**   And then you did manage to speak to her later that day,  
3       on the 22nd, and she told you that she was frightened.

4   **A.**   Yes, she was frightened.   She was upset, yes.

5   **Q.**   At some stage on that day and during that visit, staff  
6       informed you that you, not you personally Dawn, your  
7       family, would not be able to visit over Christmas; is  
8       that right?

9   **A.**   **DAWN:**   That's correct.

10  **Q.**   And obviously you have already made clear that was the  
11       worst possible time to be restricting contact.   What  
12       reason was given?

13  **A.**   **DAWN:**   I can't, I honestly can't remember a reason.   It  
14       was just that they had made the decision, as Craig had  
15       referred to earlier, that perhaps this was their way of  
16       dealing with us as a family, mum as a patient, but if  
17       they were going to do that, why hadn't they done that in  
18       the first couple of weeks and said, "Okay, right, your  
19       mum's here, we've got three weeks, let's go from now."  
20       We are now into month four.

21  **Q.**   Yes.   I think you have both addressed this really, you  
22       considered that it was a punishment of sorts --

23  **A.**   **DAWN:**   Definitely, yes.

24  **Q.**   -- this restricted contact and it was around that time I  
25       think that you decided to instruct an independent

1       advocate.

2   **A. DAWN:** Yes, I don't know, I remember getting a card -- I  
3       don't know if that was at the -- I don't know how that  
4       all came about because obviously myself I was agitated at  
5       that time, I was having to deal with dad who was also  
6       agitated, wasn't he, because he just wanted us all home  
7       as a family.

8   **A. CRAIG:** Just to add to the extra pressures Dawn was  
9       experiencing at the time, I was away on holiday.

10   **Q.** You were what?

11   **A. CRAIG:** I was away on holiday. I had left on the Friday,  
12       which would have been the 21st, so Dawn was managing this  
13       on her own. A lot of what happened from now from the  
14       21st until the New Year I wasn't aware of. So kindly  
15       Dawn kept this from me, so I could enjoy my holiday with  
16       the family.

17   **MS TROUP:** Thank you.

18               Chair, would you be content to take a short  
19       break there?

20   **THE CHAIR:** Ten minutes?

21   **MS TROUP:** Yes, please.

22   **(11.28 am)**

23                               **(Break)**

24   **(11.47 am)**

25   **THE CHAIR:** Ms Troup?

1   **MS TROUP:** Before the break we were talking about the fact  
2           that just before Christmas, you instructed an independent  
3           advocate. Am I right in understanding that the principal  
4           purpose of instructing the advocate at that stage was to  
5           try to get some access to see your mum over Christmas.  
6   **A. DAWN:** Correct.  
7   **Q.** I understand that that advocate went into the ward?  
8   **A. DAWN:** He did.  
9   **Q.** And spoke to staff and whatever those discussions were,  
10          on Christmas Eve you were told that there had been a  
11          U-turn and that you could visit your mum?  
12   **A. DAWN:** That's correct.  
13   **Q.** In a call on the same day, I think on the evening of 24  
14          December, Dawn, your mother again expressed to you that  
15          she did not wish to be alive.  
16   **A. DAWN:** Yes  
17   **Q.** Can you remember whether you reported that comment to  
18          staff?  
19   **A. DAWN:** I can't remember on that occasion, no. Obviously  
20          that was at same time we had just been told we could go  
21          to see her, and I knew she was anxious that I could see  
22          her the next morning, on Christmas Day.  
23   **Q.** You also tell us that you felt, you had a feeling during  
24          that call that your call was being listened to.  
25   **A. DAWN:** Yes.



1   **Q.**   Tell us about that, please?

2   **A.   DAWN:**   There was just a click on the line.   It wasn't a  
3           delay but it just ... I couldn't hear somebody was there  
4           but I was aware that with the click, that someone could  
5           possibly be there.

6   **Q.**   And you had that feeling.

7   **A.   DAWN:**   I had that feeling, yes, which I now know was  
8           being listened to.

9   **Q.**   We will come to that because there comes a point in  
10          February when in fact NEPT's records show that your  
11          mother requested to be allowed to make telephone calls to  
12          her family in private without being monitored and that  
13          that request was declined.

14   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes.

15   **Q.**   On Christmas Day, what your mum said to you was that she  
16          couldn't stand being a prisoner anymore and that she  
17          wanted to kill herself.   This is at the last two lines of  
18          paragraph 88 on page 22, if you want to follow.

19   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes I'm with you there, yes.   Again, she just was  
20          saying she felt alone and as always her medication was  
21          wrong.

22   **Q.**   Yes, and she had raised that on Christmas Eve as well, I  
23          think, hadn't she?

24   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes, yes.

25   **Q.**   That her medication was wrong?

1   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes.

2   **Q.**   I ask again, but I do bear in mind what you have  
3       described about the slight bind you were in.   Do you  
4       remember whether or not you reported that comment on  
5       Christmas Day about wanting to die?

6   **A.   DAWN:**   I can't remember 100 per cent.   I can't see a  
7       reason why I wouldn't have said but I can't truly say  
8       unless it was there in my notes to say, there was just so  
9       much going on.

10  **Q.**   Yes, I understand.   Moving forward into the New Year, you  
11       were told on 2 January that there would be another change  
12       of psychiatrist; yes?

13  **A.   DAWN:**   That's correct.

14  **Q.**   I think you were both unhappy about that -- perhaps Craig  
15       you were still away?

16  **A.   CRAIG:**   No, I had returned by that point.

17  **Q.**   You had returned.   You were both unhappy about that  
18       because we are now on to the third psychiatrist during  
19       this admission and you voiced your frustration about that  
20       to the ward manager.

21  **A.   DAWN:**   That's correct, but she still didn't -- there was  
22       a gap before, we were told that mum was going to get a  
23       psychiatrist but I don't think that happened for perhaps  
24       another week, it certainly didn't happen on the 2nd.

25  **Q.**   I think that's right because what the records show is

1           that by 7 January, the last time your mum had been seen  
2           by a psychiatrist was on 27 December?

3   **A. DAWN:** Right.

4   **Q.** So there was something of a gap. On 9 January, when you  
5           spoke to her on the phone, she was very agitated and told  
6           you, I think, that in part that was due to the change of  
7           psychiatrist.

8   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

9   **Q.** She also, Dawn, I think told you on that call that staff  
10          were trying to break her down.

11   **A.** Yes, she just said staff were lying and that she couldn't  
12          carry on and she said trying to break her down.

13   **THE CHAIR:** Did you ever have moments when you wondered  
14          whether she was delusional? In other words, did you have  
15          any reason --

16   **A. DAWN:** No --

17   **THE CHAIR:** -- to question the truth of what she was saying?

18   **A. DAWN:** Absolutely not, no. Absolutely not, no because we  
19          also had a feeling that things weren't right as well and  
20          she was never one, she didn't exaggerate things. She was  
21          just frustrated. The way she presented, obviously she  
22          was ill, but that was due to her frustration. She just  
23          wanted to be out of there. She wanted to be back doing  
24          what she used to be doing.

25   **A. CRAIG:** She certainly didn't present any other issues of

1 delusion with anything else, it was --

2 **THE CHAIR:** Truth?

3 **A. CRAIG:** No, nothing like that. She was still very much

4 the strong individual that we knew her to be but

5 obviously the topic of the conversation was always around

6 the care, lack of care, the medication. It was always

7 very focused, so to go there and have a, a pleasant

8 meeting, a sort of social meeting with mum, was nigh on

9 impossible, certainly made things hard. But, you know,

10 she was the one that was suffering more than anybody

11 else, though.

12 **THE CHAIR:** Thank you.

13 **MS TROUP:** On 12 January, I understand again, Dawn, that your

14 mum told you, not only did she tell you again that she

15 didn't want to be alive, but she disclosed to you that

16 she had tried to suffocate herself.

17 **A. DAWN:** That's correct.

18 **Q.** She had used an item that we might describe as a very

19 everyday item but that was nonetheless obviously risky.

20 **A. DAWN:** Yes, and available to her, yes.

21 **Q.** Yes. On that occasion, because of the information she

22 had given you, you did inform staff.

23 **A. DAWN:** I did.

24 **Q.** And as far as you are aware, was any action taken?

25 **A. DAWN:** I don't think any notes were made, they certainly

1        didn't speak to mum whilst I was there.

2        **Q.** There's nothing in the records that shows any change or

3        any action?

4        **A. DAWN:** No, she just remained on -- I think she was on

5        level 1 then, yes.

6        **Q.** She was. And on 13 January the records confirm that she

7        remained on level 1 observation so there had been no

8        step-up --

9        **A. DAWN:** No.

10       **Q.** -- in those observations as a result of the information

11       you had conveyed to staff.

12       **A. DAWN:** No, that's correct.

13       **Q.** The following day on 14 January her period of section had

14       come to an end and a decision was taken by clinicians not

15       to extend it. Now I think what you tell us is that you

16       do not remember having any input into that? Am I right

17       that you were simply told that had ended and it wasn't

18       going to be extended?

19       **A. DAWN:** Yes, I just think that the period was up and that

20       was it, despite having said -- you know, what mum had

21       said to me on 12 January, two days later they didn't

22       think, "We will extend it for another week."

23       **Q.** Yes. As far as you are aware, either of you, was any

24       further assessment taken place -- did any further

25       assessment take place at that stage?

1   **A. CRAIG:** Not that I'm aware.

2   **A. DAWN:** Not that I'm aware.

3   **Q.** And presumably, if you didn't have any input into the  
4       decision, or if nobody asked you about your thoughts  
5       about whether or not that period of section should be  
6       extended, you had no opportunity to discuss that with  
7       her?

8   **A. DAWN:** Correct.

9   **A. CRAIG:** Correct. I mean, other than whenever we did  
10       challenge things, we were never consulted about a  
11       decision. So it was made -- they made that decision,  
12       which was in some cases maybe fair enough, but I would  
13       certainly expect to be engaged on some of the more  
14       serious items or decisions made like sectioning and  
15       coming off of section, but we never were.

16   **Q.** As far as you are both concerned, what was the overall  
17       effect or impact of that period under section? Do you  
18       think it had made any kind of difference to any aspect of  
19       your mother's progress or her --

20   **A. DAWN:** Made it worse.

21   **A. CRAIG:** It deteriorated.

22   **A. DAWN:** Without a doubt.

23   **A. CRAIG:** Obviously those comments and records suggest  
24       exactly that from mum's feelings.

25   **Q.** Yes. And the regularity with which she was expressing to

1       you in particular, Dawn, her wish to die and that she  
2       couldn't stand to be a prisoner anymore, I think is how  
3       she put it. The 14 January when the decision was made  
4       not to extend her section was also the day on which your  
5       mother made her first attempt to ligature.

6       **A. DAWN:** Correct.

7       **Q.** And that took place in her bathroom, in the bathroom of  
8       her room on the ward.

9       **A. DAWN:** Correct.

10      **Q.** What we know now, and I am going to come back to the way  
11      in which you found out about this, but what we know now  
12      from the records is that on 14 January for certain no  
13      information about that incident was communicated to any  
14      of you.

15      **A. DAWN:** No.

16      **A. CRAIG:** No.

17      **Q.** No records from that date reflect the incident, the fact  
18      that she had attempted to ligature.

19      **A. CRAIG:** No.

20      **A. DAWN:** Nothing in her plans at all.

21      **Q.** No records from that date reflect the injuries that your  
22      mother had sustained during that incident.

23      **A. DAWN:** Correct.

24      **Q.** Those injuries, forgive me, were primarily major  
25      bruising -- major facial bruising and bruises to both

1 sides of the head and dental injuries; is that right?

2 **A. DAWN:** Correct.

3 **A. CRAIG:** Certainly injuries that wouldn't go unnoticed to

4 the naked eye.

5 **Q.** They were obvious facial injuries.

6 **A. CRAIG:** Obvious, very, very obvious.

7 **Q.** Thank you. We also know from the records that the only

8 treatment provided to your mother, having attempted to

9 ligature on 14 January, was paracetamol and to have her

10 blood pressure taken.

11 **A. DAWN:** Correct.

12 **Q.** There was no physical Examination by a doctor until two

13 days later at 7 pm pm on 16 January.

14 **A. DAWN:** I don't thin they even spoke to mum, questioned

15 her to see if her story was true, because I think at

16 first mum said that she had had a fall.

17 **Q.** Yes. You think at first she said she had had a fall?

18 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

19 **Q.** Right. I will come back to that if that is all right,

20 because the first that you knew of this incident was

21 that, is this correct, you must tell me if I have the

22 sequence of events wrong, your father called the ward on

23 15 January, so the following day, and was told that he

24 couldn't speak to your mother because she had gone for

25 treatment because she had knocked a tooth out?



1   **A. DAWN:** Yes. My dad had come to my house on that 15th and  
2       that's when he said to me, "Mum's had an accident that  
3       she's had to go to the dentist, she's knocked a tooth  
4       out."

5   **Q.** Was he told that she had had an accident by staff? Not  
6       by your mother? He didn't speak to her at that time, did  
7       he?

8   **A. DAWN:** He didn't speak to her, he was just told that he  
9       couldn't speak to mum because she had gone for treatment  
10      because she had knocked her tooth out.

11   **Q.** And then at around 4.30 pm on the same day, so 15  
12      January, you did manage to speak to your mum.

13   **A. DAWN:** Yes, I phoned her.

14   **Q.** That's not the same -- so that's later in the day and  
15      your mother was quite plain with you that she had tried  
16      to end her life; is that right?

17   **A. DAWN:** Yes, after some questioning, yes, because I was  
18      asking her about the accident because I think she said  
19      that she had slipped or something like that. And I had  
20      asked her "Where?" And she said that she had hurt her  
21      face on the wardrobe. Well there wasn't -- between her  
22      bed and the wardrobe there was no space to slip and hit  
23      your head, and I was asking if the floor was wet, just  
24      generally trying to get to bottom of why she had gone to  
25      the dentist and that's when she just said she was sorry

1           and, "I did it."

2   **Q.**   I think she then went on to give you some fairly  
3           substantial details about how she had tried to ligature.

4   **A.**   Yes.

5   **Q.**   You tell us about those, we will come back to them, at  
6           paragraph 97 on page 24?

7   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes.

8   **Q.**   And then I think, is this right, you -- was your father  
9           still with you, because you gave the phone to him and he  
10          carried on talking to your mother?

11   **A.**   Yes.

12   **Q.**   While you contacted the ward?

13   **A.**   That's correct, yes, I was trying to keep mum engaged  
14          where as I realised something was seriously wrong and  
15          hence I phoned to speak to the ward manager.

16   **Q.**   And you did that and you spoke to the ward manager whilst  
17          your dad remained on the phone with your mum and you were  
18          told that it wasn't true.

19   **A.   DAWN:**   There was nothing wrong and that my mum was just  
20          attention seeking.

21   **Q.**   The ward manager also said to you, I think, that she was  
22          simply trying to raise your anxiety as a family.

23   **A.   DAWN:**   That's correct.

24   **A.   CRAIG:**   That was a consistent line and if you remember,  
25          going back to when Dawn was travelling to Cornwall, it

1       was just a consistent line they took that, you know,  
2       mum's behaviour was just there to ... more hinder us or  
3       aggravate us to do things, rather than any real concern.

4   **Q.**   Yes. Now, your legal team have undertaken -- you recall  
5       that and you had recorded it yourself in your own notes.

6   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes

7   **Q.**   But also your legal team have undertaken this analysis of  
8       medical records and I am looking at paragraph 100 on page  
9       24, NEPT's own records confirm that the ward manager told  
10      you that it was not the case, that's at the very bottom  
11      of page 24, Dawn.

12  **A.   DAWN:**   Yes

13  **Q.**   Now I understand by that that those records are saying it  
14      was not the case that she had made an attempt to  
15      ligature.

16  **A.   DAWN:**   That's correct.

17  **Q.**   And:

18                "'... staff are aware of Iris at all times due  
19      to her fluctuating levels of anxiety'."

20                It is your belief now, or quite soon after,  
21      that a great deal of what you were being told was to try  
22      to prevent you from going to the ward?

23  **A.   DAWN:**   Yes, definitely. I said that I would come in and  
24      they said that there was no need to come in, that  
25      everything was fine and then, obviously, I was just

1           questioning what was happening, why had she gone to the  
2           dentist, we was obviously looking at something, that  
3           something had happened basically.

4   **Q.**   Yes.

5   **A.   DAWN:**   Until I went the next day I didn't realise the  
6           seriousness of what we saw and what had happened.

7   **Q.**   No, because on the 15th, of course, you had no idea of  
8           the injuries we just described.

9   **A.   DAWN:**   No, not at all.

10   **Q.**   You thought there was just a problem with a tooth.

11   **A.   DAWN:**   Just a tooth.

12   **Q.**   The records show that in fact on the 15th your mum's  
13           observation levels were raised to level 2 but you didn't  
14           know about that at the time.

15   **A.   DAWN:**   No.

16   **Q.**   You had just been told that it wasn't true and that there  
17           was nothing wrong. Then the records from the 16 January,  
18           so the following day, tell us that at the ward review it  
19           was decided that level 2 observations were to remain in  
20           place, that all risky items were to be confiscated from  
21           your mum, and that there would be some additional  
22           medication, essentially some changes to her medication;  
23           yes?

24   **A.   DAWN:**   Correct.

25   **Q.**   The extent of her injuries became clear to you

1 immediately, I think, on the afternoon of that day when  
2 you visited with your father, Dawn?

3 **A. DAWN:** That's correct.

4 **Q.** Not only could you see the injuries she had sustained to  
5 her face, I understand that during that visit your mum  
6 showed you, she walked you through what she had done on  
7 the 14th to try to ligature.

8 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

9 **Q.** And what she showed you involved a fixed ligature point  
10 in her bathroom.

11 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

12 **Q.** A chair.

13 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

14 **Q.** And a cord item or belt item.

15 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

16 **Q.** At that point, as I understand it, Dawn, you approached  
17 staff and started to talk to them about what had happened  
18 and what your mum had just shown you and that staff  
19 member insisted during that conversation that your mum  
20 had simply had a fall.

21 **A. DAWN:** Yes, it was mum's key worker.

22 **Q.** That was her key worker?

23 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

24 **Q.** There is then a slightly bizarre turn to this  
25 conversation between you and the key worker in which, as

1 I understand it, the key worker tells you that your mum  
2 couldn't possibly have ligatured because she was being  
3 observed every 20 minutes.

4 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

5 **Q.** And help me to understand this, you say looking at the  
6 middle of paragraph 103 on page 25 --

7 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

8 **Q.** -- starting about halfway down, with the sentence  
9 starting "I explained", do you see that?

10 **A. DAWN:** Yes. Because I was explaining to the key worker  
11 that they said she had a fall and I said, "Well, if she's  
12 got bruises on both sides of her head and under her eyes  
13 and everything", and the way that the item had broken,  
14 the key worker suggested that she must have cut it with  
15 some scissors. I obviously questioned that, how would my  
16 mum have some scissors or a sharp --

17 **Q.** Can I stop you for a moment? So there was a breakdown  
18 item that your mother told you she had used --

19 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

20 **Q.** -- to try to ligature, and you saw that broken cord.

21 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

22 **Q.** And you pointed out to the key worker that there was no  
23 explanation for that if what had happened was simply a  
24 fall.

25 **A. DAWN:** Correct. And she suggested about the scissors

1 and, you know, why on earth would my mother have scissors  
2 or have access to scissors on level 2 observations, let  
3 alone in a psychiatric ward, and she then suggested that  
4 mum could have damaged that cord by rubbing it on the  
5 windowsill, so where the window was open, to -- because  
6 it was frayed it hadn't just broken it had frayed broken.

7 **Q.** I see.

8 **A. DAWN:** But obviously in the ward the windows don't open  
9 very far at all, they give enough ventilation for air but  
10 for obvious reasons they don't open as an escape risk.  
11 So I don't know -- I don't know why she was going to the  
12 lengths when --

13 **Q.** Of making those suggestions?

14 **A. DAWN:** -- we had produced an item which she had clearly  
15 used and mum had gone step by step through how she had  
16 done it, it was basically covering their backs.

17 **Q.** At that point you called Craig and asked him to come  
18 immediately to the ward.

19 **A. DAWN:** Yes, definitely. Craig was at work and I would  
20 never call him at work if it wasn't, you know, something  
21 serious. I didn't even say to Craig exactly what, I just  
22 said I needed him to come as soon as possible.

23 **Q.** I understand. And, Craig, I understand from your witness  
24 statement obviously that you did go straight to the ward  
25 and that Dawn was waiting for you in reception, explained

1 to you the circumstances we have just described and that  
2 both of you were told that your mother had been sent to  
3 her room because she was very agitated.

4 **A.** That's correct, yes.

5 **Q.** You both went to her room together and on doing so, what  
6 you saw was your mum setting up the ligature in exactly  
7 the way she had described to you.

8 **A. CRAIG:** Yes.

9 **Q.** Using the same or similar items.

10 **A. DAWN:** Yes, exactly.

11 **A. CRAIG:** And bearing in mind that I was working locally at  
12 the time so it didn't take me long to get to the  
13 hospital. So from the time that Dawn had initially  
14 engaged with mum and for the time I got there wasn't long  
15 at all, so you know, there wasn't a delay where perhaps  
16 mum had a long time to think about this. She was sent to  
17 the room and she was ...

18 **Q.** She was sent to her room and straight away --

19 **A. DAWN:** By herself.

20 **Q.** -- started to make this attempt.

21 **A. CRAIG:** She was on her own, left on her own.

22 **A. DAWN:** So why was she sent to her room be herself? Why,  
23 having discussed that with the key worker and there was  
24 my father there as well, why had they not taken that  
25 opportunity to sit with her. I was literally going out



1 of the ward to meet Craig.

2 **Q.** Craig, I understand that it was you who immediately went  
3 to reception or to the desk --

4 **A. CRAIG:** Yes.

5 **Q.** -- to report there was an urgent situation.

6 **A. CRAIG:** Yes.

7 **Q.** There were no staff around that you could see.

8 **A. CRAIG:** Not initially, no. When I say "not initially",  
9 there was no one at the desk initially and then literally  
10 probably a couple of minutes later, one of the junior  
11 members of staff arrived and I said, "We have an issue,  
12 we need the ward manager, we need some senior staff." I  
13 was told, "Just give me a minute", I said, "I'm not  
14 giving you any time at all" --

15 **Q.** There are no minutes.

16 **A. CRAIG:** No. "You get the appropriate staff members and  
17 come to my mum's room immediately. We have a problem."

18 **Q.** Yes. And the person who did come was the senior member  
19 of nursing staff?

20 **A. CRAIG:** Yes, accompanied by, if I believe, one or two  
21 other members of staff.

22 **Q.** I see. And this is what we touched on earlier that you  
23 felt that that response really someone had thought  
24 actually a serious failing has occurred --

25 **A. DAWN:** That's correct.

1   **Q.**   -- and we are going to need to address this with this  
2       family.

3   **A. CRAIG:**   The course of events, from what I recollect, was  
4       when they arrived and they realised that there was a  
5       concern and there was something they needed to address we  
6       were asked, Dawn and I, to go and wait in reception.

7   **Q.**   Yes.

8   **A. CRAIG:**   So that's why I think, I'm not sure if the head  
9       of the ward was initially present at the room.

10   **Q.**   Yes.

11   **A. CRAIG:**   But whilst Dawn and I were waiting in reception  
12       that's when the head of the ward arrived and at that time  
13       Dawn and I had, we're not telepathic by any stretch but I  
14       know we both had the same thought, the only reason why  
15       she is here is that there is a problem, they have sent  
16       the big guns to come and speak to us.

17   **THE CHAIR:**   Was that the ward manager?

18   **A. CRAIG:**   I have to be careful how I define it, I'm not  
19       sure if it's the ward manager, I think we have to be  
20       careful.

21   **MS TROUP:**   Are you talking about the clinical manager?

22   **A. DAWN:**   No, we are talking about   *(redacted)* -- sorry.

23   **Q.**   It's okay, it's all right.

24   **A. DAWN:**   The key worker.

25   **A. CRAIG:**   She was in charge of the running of the ward on a

1 day-to-day basis, so you have probably got managers above  
2 who were probably technically closer to ward managers,  
3 but she was in charge of day-to-day operations managing  
4 that ward and everything around it so --

5 **Q.** You waited -- no --

6 **A. CRAIG:** As soon as she arrived, body language was  
7 completely different, it was more engaging almost  
8 warming, probably trying to calm us down not to agitate  
9 us any further than perhaps her previous demeanour might  
10 have done. A quick conversation, sort of let us settle a  
11 bit, and then we walked through and then I think, Dawn  
12 correct me if I am wrong, I'm not sure if we went  
13 straight to the room again or we went to the communal  
14 area of the ward. I can't remember.

15 **Q.** To wait, yes, I understand.

16 **A. CRAIG:** But we witnessed, in probably that period, the  
17 two other members of staff going through mum's room,  
18 removing other times of concern.

19 **Q.** Can I ask you about that please, because I just want to  
20 ensure that I am clear on this. I understand that before  
21 leaving the ward that day, one of the things that you did  
22 was impress upon staff that you must be informed of  
23 incidents like the incident that had taken place on 14  
24 January. And Dawn, can I ask you please to turn to page  
25 28 of your witness statement and to paragraph 117. This

1 is actually about a different period, but if you look at  
2 the last three lines there, I just want to ask you  
3 whether it is the case that on 16 January, which is the  
4 day we have just been talking about, is what you mean  
5 there that on that day, 16 January, before you left, you  
6 found a cord in your mother's room, or are you talking  
7 about a different day? A better way for me to put it  
8 might be before you left the ward on 16 January, did it  
9 occur that you found any cords or risky items in her  
10 room?

11 **A. DAWN:** She had shown us the cords and obviously we had  
12 shown that to the staff.

13 **Q.** And they had been removed?

14 **A. DAWN:** I thought they had been removed. It was when I  
15 went into the ward on the 20th and went to mum's  
16 wardrobe -- because as I stated before I used to do mum's  
17 washing, to get her dirty washing out and that's when we  
18 had discovered the two items that had been fixed together  
19 were still in the bottom of her wardrobe.

20 **Q.** Yes. That was on 20 January?

21 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

22 **Q.** I think it was the case that after that incident, and  
23 after you had left the ward, a decision was taken and  
24 again this is what the records tell you I'm not sure it  
25 was communicated to you, but you will tell me if I am

1 wrong that level 2 observations would remain in place,  
2 and the decision was taken that you discussed a little  
3 earlier that your mum would be placed on restrictions and  
4 the effect of that was that her bedroom door would be  
5 locked between 9 am and 10 pm every day, such that she  
6 could only access the main or communal areas of the ward.

7 **A.** That's correct.

8 **Q.** Now, given all that we have learned so far about the ward  
9 environment, and the functionality of the majority of the  
10 clients and the time that your mother was spending alone  
11 in many ways, those decisions about restricted access to  
12 any kind of private space, I think your impression is  
13 that those worsened her condition?

14 **A. DAWN:** Yes, it just escalated the whole situation because  
15 she obviously was in a very low place at that time by her  
16 actions, and also the staff weren't believing her story  
17 and I think there was a situation, I think you may come  
18 on to that.

19 **Q.** No, go ahead.

20 **A. DAWN:** There was a situation where the ward manager went  
21 into my mum's bedroom and shouted at my mum that she had  
22 overstepped the mark this time and --

23 **Q.** This is 18 January, I think, this conversation?

24 **A. DAWN:** This was after, obviously, we had raised the  
25 issue. They had then made notes and examined mum two

1        days after anything had happened.

2    **Q.** But on the 18th, as I understand it, when you visited

3        your mum, what she told you about the conversation she

4        had had with the ward manager --

5    **A. DAWN:** Yes.

6    **Q.** -- who was, according to your mum, overtly angry with

7        her.

8    **A. DAWN:** Yes.

9    **Q.** Said that she had overstepped the mark.

10   **A.** Her boundaries.

11   **Q.** She had gone too far this time.

12   **A. DAWN:** And not to ask about medication or anything.

13   **Q.** Not to present any kind of challenge.

14   **A.** Yes, slammed the door and walked out.

15   **Q.** Slammed the door, but I think what your mum told you was

16        -- she didn't necessarily name the ward manager, but that

17        staff had tried to get her to change her account about

18        what had happened on the 14th.

19   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

20   **Q.** So that first attempt.

21   **A. DAWN:** Yes, and I think that's why, as well, mum was so

22        desperate, determined to show Craig and I what she had

23        done because she wanted someone to believe her.

24   **A. CRAIG:** She wanted to be heard. She wasn't being heard

25        in there and, you know, I guess she also had concerns

1       that perhaps we were siding, although we were obviously  
2       engaging with mum, maybe in her mind we were siding with  
3       the ward, or could side with the ward's narrative about  
4       around what had happened. But clearly evidencing to us  
5       the process she had gone, she had attempted, that was her  
6       way of communicating to us her real intent.

7   **Q.** She was desperate for help?

8   **A. CRAIG:** Yes.

9   **Q.** On the same day, 18 January, I think again at your  
10       request the independent advocate also visited the ward,  
11       and he was told that she had had an accident by banging  
12       her head on the wall?

13   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

14   **Q.** Which is slightly different again, isn't it?

15   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

16   **Q.** The purpose I think of having the independent advocate  
17       intervene at that time is because you were so concerned  
18       that nobody was investigating what had actually occurred  
19       on the 14th?

20   **A. DAWN:** Yes, that's right.

21   **Q.** And I think is this right, a major part of the issue was  
22       what your mum had raised about some pressure being put on  
23       her to change her account about what had happened?

24   **A. DAWN:** That's correct, that was on the 18th as well.

25       It's difficult to phrase this but --

1   **Q.** You phrase it as you want to.

2   **A. DAWN:** They actually said to her that if she didn't  
3       change her story, they were --

4   **Q.** They were going to reveal something about her.

5   **A.** -- reveal something that didn't need to be revealed and  
6       it was blackmail, basically.

7   **Q.** So that threat was made.

8   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

9   **Q.** And your mum told you about that on 18 January.

10  **A. DAWN:** Yes.

11  **Q.** She also, I think, said that she felt a huge change in  
12       the way that staff were treating her. It hadn't been  
13       optimal previously.

14  **A. DAWN:** All right all the smiles had stopped and there was  
15       shunning, I suppose, really, is probably ...

16  **Q.** You felt very strongly, I think, that she was frightened?

17  **A. DAWN:** Yes, definitely, of course she was frightened.  
18       Obviously she was worried about the whole situation that  
19       they had made these threats to reveal something about her  
20       and also, I mean, that's no way to treat her after  
21       something like that has happened to tell her that she has  
22       overstepped the boundaries and don't ask for anything.  
23       They should have been going totally the opposite way and  
24       spending all the time with her and doing their best to  
25       make -- how could they make good, they can't --



1   **Q.**   Provide therapeutic care.

2   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes that's right, doing their job.

3   **A.   CRAIG:**   Why put additional pressure on someone in a very  
4           fragile situation like that, it just doesn't make sense  
5           unless you've got your own agenda, which probably they  
6           did and maybe they have.

7   **Q.**   Tell me this was the point I think at which you  
8           considered putting cameras into her room?

9   **A.   CRAIG:**   Yes, we were clearly, by this stage, at a loss  
10          and very, very uncomfortable with the situation or the  
11          environment that mum was in at the time.   From the  
12          engagement, or lack of, with the nursing staff and the  
13          only engagement we did have with them was difficult at  
14          best, so to try and understand what mum was going  
15          through, you know, if you remember back to the quotes of,  
16          "You don't know what it's like in here."

17   **Q.**   Yes.

18   **A.   CRAIG:**   We thought, well, perhaps we need to know what  
19          it's like in here and so the only way to evidence that  
20          was, you know, perhaps we could put some cameras in her  
21          room, inadvertently, secretly.

22   **Q.**   You decided against?

23   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes, probably the worst decision we made.

24   **A.   CRAIG:**   I mean, probably the worst, but how things ended  
25          up, maybe the best, in some respect.   But that would have

1       been difficult viewing of course, but maybe we would at  
2       least have the truth that we don't have today.

3   **Q.** I understand. After that incident, I understand that  
4       throughout January and February, in summary, risky  
5       behaviours escalated.

6   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

7   **Q.** And it became very clear that your mother was desperately  
8       crying out for help.

9   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

10   **Q.** She was seen accessing another patient's belongings and  
11       asking another patient for a belt or cord of some kind.

12   **A. DAWN:** Correct because we had taken everything away by  
13       that time, anything that was in her wardrobe.

14   **Q.** You found, as you described to your horror, items that  
15       could be plainly used to ligature in her wardrobe when it  
16       was unlocked at your request?

17   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

18   **Q.** You discovered she had somehow tried to use a staff  
19       access card to access her room.

20   **A. DAWN:** Yes, for some unknown reason even though the door  
21       to mum's room was locked, obviously the staff had a PAC  
22       tag to access those rooms. Sometimes if mum asked they  
23       would give her the PAC tag to go into the room by  
24       herself. What's the point then of locking outside of her  
25       room and keeping an eye on her and then on the other hand

1       saying, "There you go, Iris, off you go."

2   **Q.** And allowing her to access her room with their card.

3   **A. DAWN:** Without any supervision.

4   **Q.** We learn from the serious incident report that in January

5       staff observed your mum placing an item of clothing that

6       could plainly be used to ligature with inside her pillow

7       case?

8   **A.** That's correct, yes.

9   **Q.** And those behaviours continued to escalate. I want the

10       take you, please, before we move on to what eventually

11       happened to the CPA meeting on 23 January that you both

12       attended?

13   **A. CRAIG:** Yes.

14   **Q.** That meeting was attended by both of you, your mum's

15       psychiatrist, care co-ordinator, the nurse in charge on

16       the ward and a senior manager.

17   **A. CRAIG:** Yes, I think it was Glynn --

18   **A. DAWN:** I think our brother was there as well.

19   **A. CRAIG:** And I'm not sure if dad was there as well.

20   **A. DAWN:** I think he was.

21   **A. CRAIG:** I think he was.

22   **Q.** The major concerns you were raising was the fact that

23       when you called the ward on the 15th to find out what had

24       happened on the 14th, you were told that your mother was

25       attention seeking.

1   **A.   DAWN:**   Yes.

2   **Q.**   The fact that there appeared to have been no proper  
3       investigation of that incident and the fact that your mum  
4       had told you that staff were trying to get her to change  
5       her story or she would be in trouble?

6   **A.   DAWN:**   Correct.

7   **Q.**   You also raised issues around her care and treatment at  
8       that meeting, but focusing on those major concerns about  
9       what had happened on the 14th, as I understand it, there  
10      were some sort of conflicting -- it was a conflicting  
11      meeting in that one member of staff accepted that that  
12      had been a ligature attempt and apologised and said that  
13      efforts would be made that it wouldn't occur again.

14  **A.   DAWN:**   Yes.

15  **Q.**   But your mum's psychiatrist said that he wasn't 100 per  
16      cent sure that it was an attempt to end her life and that  
17      there wasn't clear evidence either way.

18  **A.   CRAIG:**   I don't remember that part, if I'm honest, but I  
19      do remember the ward management accepting and admitting  
20      that they now could see that it was an attempt.

21  **Q.**   They now did?

22  **A.   CRAIG:**   They now did concede that it was an attempt.

23  **A.   DAWN:**   And they kind of set up at that point and said  
24      from there on they intimated they were going to make  
25      things better but it was too late.   My mum was too low,

1           it was too late.

2   **A. CRAIG:** And I'm not sure Rachel, if you are going to  
3           touch on this but at that point, that meeting then,  
4           following on from our suspicions and our concerns  
5           thinking about having a camera in the room, I decided to,  
6           or we agreed to record that meeting surreptitiously.

7   **Q.** So you have that recording of the meeting?

8   **A. CRAIG:** That's why I particularly remember the staff  
9           agreeing that there was an issue and conceding to that  
10          effect, and I remember Dawn, just to touch on that point,  
11          I remember the point she felt like we had gone too far.  
12          There was no turning back now. Mum's condition had  
13          deteriorated, that far, there was no turning back.

14   **Q.** I see. That was on 23 January and the very next day,  
15          Dawn, as you were handed an envelope containing your  
16          mother's belts, bearing in mind that she had been on  
17          restricted access to her room since 15 or 16 January.

18   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

19   **Q.** She also in early February told you a little about the  
20          way in which she was being treated, and I think there was  
21          a particular incident where a staff member threatened --  
22          bearing in mind her history of poor sleep and anxiety  
23          around that, a staff member she had asked to turn the  
24          lights off at night had threatened to leave them on all  
25          night if she kept complaining about it?

1   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

2   **A. CRAIG:** There was another incident as well, apologies if  
3       you are going to get to it, but there was a male member  
4       of staff, quite a big gentleman.

5   **Q.** Yes.

6   **A. CRAIG:** I think there were suggestions of bullying by  
7       him, where he would instead of making way in a corridor  
8       to let mum pass he would block her path. I'm not sure  
9       how forcefully he did that, but those were the sort of  
10      things that mum suggested he had done.

11   **Q.** She suggested that to you, she told you about that?

12   **A. CRAIG:** Yeah.

13   **Q.** She told you about that?

14   **A. CRAIG:** Yes.

15   **Q.** Thank you. I think also you have told us that you took  
16      your mum's washing home?

17   **A. DAWN:** Yes, that's correct.

18   **Q.** On 3 February you found a pill, some sort of medication  
19      in the pocket of her jeans.

20   **A. DAWN:** I did, yes.

21   **Q.** And called the ward, spoke to the ward manager who said,  
22      "Oh well".

23   **A. DAWN:** I essentially showed them. They came back and  
24      said, "That's not one of your mum's tablets, that's not  
25      medication she's on." I said, "You are missing the

1 point, how has my mum got anybody's tablets, how has she  
2 got this medication?" And it was just dismissed, it was  
3 almost, "Why are you raising this point, we don't see it  
4 as an issue".

5 **A. CRAIG:** If you remember from the earlier matter, almost  
6 first this morning, I said about staff having adequate  
7 training and the controls and oversight of staff as they  
8 progress up that, those qualification periods, so they  
9 can clearly be responsible for people in that position, I  
10 would suggest that's probably one of the reasons why that  
11 happened. You had a junior member of staff not  
12 adequately qualified, not adequately supervised when  
13 distributing medication to a wide number of patients at  
14 one time. Because they would regularly leave the station  
15 to go and administer.

16 **Q.** To go and do that?

17 **A. CRAIG:** Yes.

18 **Q.** I understand. Can I take you please to 11 February and,  
19 in particular if we can look together please at page 32  
20 of your witness statement, Dawn, and paragraph 139. Now,  
21 we recall that you told us that on Christmas Eve you had  
22 had a feeling that your call with your mum was being  
23 listened to.

24 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

25 **Q.** Here we see, and this is 11 February, that the records

1           show -- are those, we think those are NEPT records, are  
2           they?

3   **A. DAWN:** Yes I believe so yes.

4   **Q.** That your mum had approached staff and asked to be  
5           allowed to have private telephone calls with her family,  
6           and you say there in response:

7                        "It was explained to her by staff that  
8           following her behaviour during her husband and daughter's  
9           visit the previous day, it was felt necessary to monitor  
10          conversations with her family."

11                       Now, you had no discussion with anyone about  
12          that at the time --

13   **A. DAWN:** No, absolutely not.

14   **Q.** -- because you didn't know?

15   **A. DAWN:** And as I say the feeling I had, it was just purely  
16          a feeling, I didn't know back at Christmas time that my  
17          call was being listened to. It was just a feeling I had  
18          from the click on the phone. Obviously they were  
19          listening to far more than we knew they were.

20   **A. CRAIG:** Or we had given them permission to.

21   **Q.** I am sorry say that again?

22   **A. CRAIG:** Or we had given them permission to. Maybe they  
23          don't need permission but I would expect them to have  
24          given us --

25   **A. DAWN:** I don't know why they were listening.



1   **A. CRAIG:** At least inform us that that was the case, but I  
2       guess that's consistent with their lack of engagement and  
3       information that didn't flow to us during the course of  
4       mum's treatment.

5   **Q.** I understand. I would like to take you on, please, to  
6       the circumstances leading up to your mother's death. We  
7       know that between 11 February and the 28th there had been  
8       a number of further medication changes.

9   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

10   **Q.** We see a note in the records where the psychiatrist is  
11       questioning whether there is a genuine mental illness or  
12       again we see this phrase around personality problems.

13   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

14   **Q.** Again, presumably nobody discussed that with you.

15   **A. DAWN:** No.

16   **A. CRAIG:** No.

17   **Q.** Because you didn't know that those were their  
18       considerations at the time. What we know is that the  
19       records on 27 February show that it was decided that  
20       there would be a review of the restrictions your mum had  
21       been placed under --

22   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

23   **Q.** -- in terms of her access to her own room, and so on, and  
24       that her psychiatrist decided that those would be lifted  
25       after the ward round if there were no other concerns?

1   **A. DAWN:** Yes, but I think on -- I think it was on the 27th  
2           when mum was having the meeting, it was by a doctor that  
3           didn't know mum.

4   **Q.** I see.

5   **A. DAWN:** I think the psychiatrist was busy on something  
6           else and that that doctor had questioned mum about her  
7           feelings. She had said that she wouldn't do anything to  
8           hurt her family and that even if she could have access to  
9           risky items, she wouldn't know what to do with them.  
10          Well this was clearly untrue because she had shown for  
11          the previous three months that any time that she could  
12          get her hands on an every day item that could be deemed  
13          risky, she certainly did know how to use it. He took  
14          mum's word as that was it, she wasn't going to do  
15          anything and she was lifted from level 2 restrictions.

16   **Q.** Yes, and she was allowed access to her own bedroom again.

17   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

18   **Q.** That decision was taken or I think or the restrictions  
19          were lifted fairly late on the 27th, you came to learn of  
20          this the next day, the 28th?

21   **A. DAWN:** Yes, I was told in a phone call in the morning and  
22          I immediately asked for CPA meeting because I couldn't  
23          believe with what had happened over the last few weeks,  
24          that they was actually lifting those restrictions without  
25          consulting us, and as I said before, with a doctor who

1        didn't know mum. She clearly stated -- she clearly had  
2        the intention and knew what to do with risky items.  
3        Unfortunately that meeting was arranged for a few weeks'  
4        time, so our brother, who was living over in Germany,  
5        could fly over and come. As we know, 24 hours later she  
6        wasn't with us.

7        **Q.** Yes. What your mother said to that doctor on 27 February  
8        was, as you say, taken at face value and that was despite  
9        the fact, I think, that there were some conflicting  
10       accounts. So we can see from the records, for example,  
11       that on 13 February your mum is recorded as having said  
12       to staff that actually the family was not a protective  
13       factor and that she wouldn't miss her grandchildren, she  
14       didn't have feelings for the family. I don't suggest  
15       that that communicates anything other than utter  
16       desperation but the record was there --

17       **A. DAWN:** Yes.

18       **Q.** -- to be noticed.

19       **A. CRAIG:** Yes.

20       **Q.** We also know now, moving into the evening and night of 28  
21       February -- I am sorry, 28 February that there was some  
22       sort of incident, meaning that staff had left the ward  
23       and the ward environment was in flux or slightly chaotic  
24       at the time; yes?

25       **A. DAWN:** Yes.

1   **Q.** The ward records, or NEPT records, tell us that a staff  
2       member found your mother hanging in her bathroom at  
3       quarter past midnight on 1 March 2014.

4   **A. DAWN:** Correct.

5   **Q.** What he describes having found, if can I put it in this  
6       way, is an exact mirror of the items and system your  
7       mother had described to you from 14 January and that you  
8       yourselves had seen on 16 January. Is that a fair  
9       description?

10   **A. CRAIG:** Correct.

11   **A. DAWN:** It is a fair description and it was exactly 24  
12       hours after being taken off of observation for the  
13       significant attempt on 14 January, and this was less than  
14       24 hours after being taken off of observations.

15   **Q.** Yes. The nurse who is said to have found your mum also  
16       says in his statement to the Inquest or his in his  
17       account, that when he had come on to shift at 8.30 pm, he  
18       had been informed that your mum had been offered some  
19       sedative medication because she reported feeling very  
20       anxious. You considered that that ought perhaps to have  
21       triggered some sort of alarm bells, given that  
22       restrictions had just been lifted.

23   **A. DAWN:** And she also said to the person, "There's no need  
24       for you watch me tonight."

25   **Q.** Where do you know that from, Dawn, do you know? I can

1       see it in your statement?

2   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

3   **Q.** Paragraph 152. It doesn't matter very much but I just  
4       wonder --

5   **A. DAWN:** I must have been told, it must have been in one of  
6       the statements, for me to know that because obviously I  
7       was not there. I left the ward probably about half five,  
8       whatever dinner time was, it was around dinner time, when  
9       I left the ward and mum had had her hair done that day.  
10      She was in a sober, somber mood. She was quite within  
11      herself, but I left the ward about half five or six  
12      o'clock that day. So it must have been in one of the  
13      statements for me to know that --

14   **Q.** I understand. Please don't worry, I understand.

15   **A. DAWN:** Because obviously I was not there and I wasn't  
16      able to speak to her.

17   **Q.** Please don't worry, I understand. But in your mind, in  
18      any event, an in-patient in these circumstances telling  
19      staff that they don't need to be checked on is an obvious  
20      trigger for concern?

21   **A. DAWN:** Yes, correct.

22   **Q.** I understand, and you must tell me if I have any of this  
23      wrong, but both of you have very grave concerns about the  
24      sequence of events on that evening as presented by ward  
25      staff, and in part that is because although the staff

1 member I have just referred to reports finding your mum  
2 at about quarter past midnight, in fact, we know from  
3 ambulance service records that the first call to  
4 ambulance services was made at 36 minutes or 35  
5 minutes -- no 32 minutes past midnight, I am so sorry.

6 **A. DAWN:** That's correct but my mum's door was not accessed  
7 before 25 minutes past 12. In fact, the senior nurse had  
8 gone sick that evening, there were bank staff in.  
9 Basically they were short staffed that night. They only  
10 had one card between the three people that were on duty  
11 to access rooms and one of the -- the person that had the  
12 card was in a different part of the Crystal Centre, so he  
13 was actually out of Topaz and Ruby Ward. He was still  
14 within the Amethyst Centre, but he was photocopying at  
15 the front.

16 **Q.** I understand.

17 **A. DAWN:** So he was nowhere near that area and there was a  
18 gentleman that was on level 2 that should have been being  
19 watched every 20 minutes in the bedroom opposite mum's,  
20 but that card did not access the room until after he said  
21 that he saw mum.

22 **Q.** And you know that having sought to obtain the records of  
23 the access card from the Trust?

24 **A. DAWN:** We asked for the PAC tag report for that night so  
25 we could determine where the people were on the ward.

1   **A. CRAIG:** And it goes to the consistency that from previous  
2       attempts and how the Trust, the board, had tried to, in  
3       our view, cover up certain, especially the first attempt,  
4       again tried to get mum to change her mind and dismiss it,  
5       et cetera, and the inconsistency of the events on the  
6       night, naturally we can only -- we speculate, we just  
7       can't get comfortable with what is being presented to us  
8       by the board, or by the Trust, on the events of that  
9       night. It's very difficult to accept. Too many  
10      inconsistencies.

11   **Q.** I understand, and in terms of the cover-up that you have  
12      referred to from earlier in January, I think your  
13      feeling, both of you, is that had you not been there on  
14      the 16th, and witnessed your mum doing what she did, that  
15      event of 14 January might actually have forever been  
16      dismissed as a fall. It might not have been accepted  
17      that that was a ligature attempt; is that fair?

18   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

19   **A. CRAIG:** Yes, I would agree. What didn't help the ward  
20      and the Trust was the significant injuries that mum  
21      sustained. There's no way they could cover that up and  
22      yet mum's, her local key worker --

23   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

24   **A. CRAIG:** Bearing in mind she was supposed to be dealing  
25      with mum on a regular basis, at the coroner's inquest

1       actually denied ever seeing mum in that condition.

2   **Q.**   So that key worker denied having seen the injuries after

3       14 January?

4   **A.   CRAIG:**   Correct.   And, you know, these weren't slight

5       superficial injuries that would go --

6   **Q.**   Unnoticed.

7   **A.   CRAIG:**   You could see them from a good distance away.

8   **A.   DAWN:**   It was the community care worker, wasn't it?   And

9       she had actually taken mum to the dentist and she accused

10      mum of continually prodding her face to make them worse.

11      Mum was prodding her face because she could obviously see

12      where it was so swollen, she could see, you know, and she

13      could feel.

14   **Q.**   And feel presumably, of course.   I understand that the

15      serious incident report that was later published, and I

16      will ask you a few things about that, was really, for

17      both of you, notable in what it missed rather than what

18      it did contain, because what we know, having now talked

19      through the events of 14 January and 16 January, and

20      knowing that the events in the early hours of 1 March

21      2014 mirrored both of those events, is that somehow,

22      despite all that had occurred, your mum remained in

23      possession of an item that was obviously risky, a fixed

24      ligature point remained in place and nothing had been

25      actioned or changed about those matters.



1   **A. CRAIG:** Not only the items that mum used, that she had,  
2           if you like, for her personal items. You touched on the  
3           point and it's the chair, the chair that mum used in the  
4           initial attempt and then ultimately, I hate to say it,  
5           successful attempt, was a very heavy chair. I used to  
6           have to move it. So if I went to visit mum and she was  
7           sort of sitting or laying on the bed I would move that  
8           chair. Now I don't consider myself -- I'm not the  
9           strongest person in the world but I am by no means the  
10          weakest and it took reasonable effort to move that chair.  
11          It wasn't the standard chair that we are all sitting on  
12          today. For someone in mum's condition, frail, that would  
13          have taken significant effort on both occasion to move  
14          that chair, to drag it across the floor, it must have  
15          made a noise.

16   **Q.** Dragging across the floor?

17   **A. CRAIG:** Dragging -- admittedly, she is not moving it ten  
18          yards, she is probably dragging it three to four yards to  
19          the area needed but it would have taken significant  
20          effort. Had the ward on both days been suitably staffed,  
21          it couldn't have -- you would have definitely heard it.

22   **Q.** Yes.

23   **A. CRAIG:** So it's just, you know, but you go back to the  
24          first attempt, why wasn't that identified and that item  
25          removed? Again another failing.

1   **Q.** Yes. You also, I think, questioned the item that your  
2       mum used on 1 March 2014 was a scarf and it was found to  
3       be her own and she must have brought it from home, and  
4       you questioned why she was allowed to have that in her  
5       room given all that has taken place by then.

6   **A. DAWN:** Definitely.

7   **A. CRAIG:** Well there was a significant search -- as I  
8       touched on earlier, we witnessed them going through the  
9       wardrobe on the, was it the 15th or 16th, cleaning out --  
10      I'm sure there was a hair dryer, belt, everything. So  
11      why wasn't it identified then? There were other  
12      occasions as well, so there is no excuse for that time to  
13      be there, it's not like mum had had a home visit or we  
14      had brought it in. Clearly, we would never do such a  
15      thing. So there was just no excuse for having an item,  
16      an everyday item like that in her room.

17   **Q.** Yes. I understand that you have learned -- it had always  
18      been your impression that your mum had died before 2 am.

19   **A. DAWN:** Yes.

20   **Q.** Because that's what you were told, and in fact ambulance  
21      service records show that when they attended your mum was  
22      in what they call "workable arrest", and ambulance  
23      service records tell you that she was recorded as  
24      deceased at 2.17 in the morning. You have questions, I  
25      think, that have never been answered around training for

1 the resuscitation and the use of the defibrillator and  
2 what happened in those minutes when ...

3 **A. DAWN:** Well, as we said before, mum's room wasn't entered  
4 until 25 minutes past. It should have been obvious this  
5 was an emergency. However, an ambulance was not called  
6 for ten minutes.

7 **Q.** Yes.

8 **A. DAWN:** We are at a hospital. There's an ambulance  
9 station right outside the hospital gates. Also they  
10 contacted the doctor on call at the Linden Centre who  
11 didn't turn up until same time later because he said he  
12 didn't realise it was an emergency.

13 **Q.** Presumably only because someone had not communicated to  
14 him that it was an emergency?

15 **A. DAWN:** Well, obviously, yes, I think the issue was also  
16 that they didn't have a mobile phone. There was only one  
17 phone which was at the nurse's station so they were  
18 having to relay. I appreciate it was probably quite a  
19 distressing time in the ward but they had to go back to  
20 the nursing station. But one of -- the nurse, female  
21 nurse that was on duty said that my mum had a faint  
22 pulse. We were told it was a workable arrest.

23 **Q.** Yes.

24 **A. DAWN:** The nurse that found mum said that she was  
25 standing facing the door. (...Redacted...)

1                   *As I described before, mum was five foot tall*  
2                   *so that scarf would have had to have been very long*  
3                   *(...redacted...)*

4                   *[Gist: The witness questioned whether the*  
5                   *described circumstances of their mother's death were*  
6                   *physically possible, noting that aspects of the account*  
7                   *did not appear consistent with her mother's height, the*  
8                   *objects said to be involved, or the layout of the room.*  
9                   *They expressed doubt about how the situation could have*  
10                  *occurred as described].*

11                  Combined with the pulse, a workable arrest and  
12                  nothing was called. What happened in those ten minutes  
13                  when something could have been being done and wasn't?  
14                  Basically she should still be here.

15       **Q.** Thank you. Craig is there anything that you want to add  
16                  there before I move on?

17       **A. CRAIG:** It's just, I don't understand how there can be so  
18                  many inconsistencies on an event with a relatively small  
19                  timeframe.

20       **Q.** Yes.

21       **A. CRAIG:** People have different recollections of different  
22                  events, I understand that, especially in high stress  
23                  environments. But there's, what I would call unrefuted  
24                  evidence of times when doors are opened, closed, calls  
25                  are made, et cetera. Why wasn't that relayed to us at

1           the time? We are finding out a lot of things ten years  
2           later.

3   **Q.**   Yes.

4   **A. CRAIG:** I just find that unacceptable and it just makes  
5           me wonder what -- why? Again, that's just, that's the  
6           big question.

7   **Q.**   Thank you. One of the things you note, Craig, about the  
8           serious incident report is that once you had read it, you  
9           didn't consider it really worthy of further scrutiny.

10   **A. CRAIG:** It wasn't fit for purpose.

11   **Q.**   It doesn't mention --

12   **A. CRAIG:** For me it was a copy and paste from some other, I  
13           don't think mum's name was even mentioned correctly. It  
14           was a --

15   **Q.**   I think you received a copy of it that named her as  
16           Mrs Smith, did you not?

17   **A. CRAIG:** Yes. I mean, how can someone not proofread that  
18           before you put it in front of two grieving relatives?  
19           And have that respect and care and attention to detail --  
20           I say attention to detail, I mean that's the basic to at  
21           least have the name of the deceased presented correctly.  
22           Let alone the overall content of that document. It just  
23           wasn't fit for purpose, it was a waste of time.

24   **Q.**   It didn't, in fact, address in sufficient detail in your  
25           view, any of the matters we have just discussed how that

1 item came to be in your mum's possession. The fact of  
2 the ligature point that was used, a fixed ligature point  
3 in a bathroom, how staff dealt with those minutes that  
4 you have just described or the inconsistencies between  
5 ward staff timings and ambulance staff timings. None of  
6 that was addressed.

7 **A. CRAIG:** I would say that report was more there to protect  
8 the ward and the Trust than it was to address the issues  
9 that happened on that evening and leading up to it. It  
10 wasn't a serious report to say where the accountability  
11 is and where we can make improvements. It was how can we  
12 protect what we have and make best of a bad situation?  
13 That's putting it politely.

14 **A. DAWN:** I think one of the statements from the female  
15 nurse that was on duty that evening, her statement wasn't  
16 taken till 25 May, a significant time after the event,  
17 for something that, as the report suggests, is a serious  
18 incident and they are investigating their own.

19 **Q.** Yes. For that reason I think, you tell us in your  
20 witness statement, that actually you felt fairly  
21 dismissive of the process from the start. They are  
22 marking their own homework.

23 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

24 **Q.** In terms of the inquest, I know that that took place in  
25 June 2015. There had been a delay because there was a

1 delay in disclosure on the part of the Trust as I  
2 understand it, it had been due to take place in March  
3 2015, finally took place in June 2015.

4 **A. CRAIG:** Some of that was at our request.

5 **Q.** I see. Thank you.

6 **A. CRAIG:** Because March, we didn't want March, it was so  
7 close to the anniversary. We had dad's birthday in early  
8 April. So the delay didn't help but again it goes back  
9 to their initial suggestion of March 2015, almost a year  
10 to the day after the event, you know, what was their  
11 thinking?

12 **Q.** Their thinking. I think both of you say in slightly  
13 different ways in your witness statements, but you must  
14 tell me, that you felt -- I know that Dawn you did, you  
15 found INQUEST, the charity, and then found some legal  
16 representation, but your overall impression was that the  
17 process leant towards the Trust. Help me with what you  
18 mean by that?

19 **A. DAWN:** They seemed to be more obstructive, and I remember  
20 with the Coroner, when I was trying to especially talk  
21 about the attempt and mum's final act.

22 **Q.** Yes.

23 **A. DAWN:** They just kept saying this is not an  
24 investigation. This is an inquest. We just wanted to  
25 get our story across. Again, I can't understand when you

1       have so many deaths in one particular area, which are all  
2       going through one Coroner's office, how this was missed  
3       for such a long time.

4   **Q.** Thank you. There was no prevention of future deaths  
5       report, was there?

6   **A. DAWN:** No.

7   **A. CRAIG:** It felt like to me and I would only describe it  
8       as institutional bias. In that, our initial barrister  
9       and the Coroner clashed, so much so that we had to --  
10      well, he removed himself from the process, which  
11      massively hindered the process for us. So we had to get  
12      someone else in, get them up to speed with what's gone  
13      on, and then go again. It just every challenge was  
14      always -- every challenge that we put forward was  
15      rejected and it seemed that everything that the Trust put  
16      forward was accepted. That was my first experience of  
17      ever being in a situation, in a courtroom, an environment  
18      such --

19   **Q.** Proceedings.

20   **A. CRAIG:** In proceedings such as that. I couldn't believe,  
21      although I was very much immersed with it, I couldn't  
22      believe what I was witnessing or being part of. I  
23      expected mostly the Coroner to be leaning on our side,  
24      rather than the Trust's, just from a humane point of  
25      view.



1   **Q.** A human point of view, yes.

2   **A. CRAIG:** A human perspective but it most definitely  
3       wasn't. As I say, I can only describe it as  
4       institutional bias. That's what it felt like.

5   **A. DAWN:** And they were very much against us obviously using  
6       the tape that we had mentioned.

7   **Q.** Of the CPA meeting?

8   **A. DAWN:** Of the CPA meeting, however they failed to mention  
9       that they had been listening to our phone calls. So it  
10      was very much don't do what we do, do as we say.

11  **A. CRAIG:** And obviously that was a factual piece of  
12      recording, you know, you can't dispute that. Yet there  
13      was other piece of blackmail -- or the other issue that  
14      the Coroner allowed to be presented during the trial, the  
15      sensitive information that I'm not sure if I can say it  
16      or whether I can't.

17  **Q.** We don't need to.

18  **A. CRAIG:** So that was just unnecessary. We informed the  
19      Coroner and the legal teams that this would have a  
20      massive impact on my dad's health, my dad's health going  
21      forward was completely dismissed. This was a relevant  
22      piece of information but she was not allowing it to be  
23      framed in a different way. It was coming out as brutal  
24      as it could be.

25  **Q.** Yes.

1   **A. CRAIG:** And I just, again, it just seemed to me that very  
2           much erring on the side of the Trust's case, rather than,  
3           I shouldn't put it as a case because it wasn't a trial,  
4           but the Trust's position.

5   **Q.** I understand. The other thing that happened and then I  
6           would very much like if I can to move to talk with you  
7           both about the recommendations you would like to see  
8           made, or the comments you have made on there, is that  
9           talking as you have just done, Craig, about the thinking  
10          and the compassion behind actions taken following the  
11          death of a loved one, I understand that on 21 July of  
12          2014, your father received at home a letter to your  
13          mother inviting her to join the board of governors.

14   **A. DAWN:** Indeed.

15   **Q.** Or some position of that sort; is that right?

16   **A. CRAIG:** Correct.

17   **Q.** That obviously would have been fantastically distressing  
18          to him. Did he receive an apology or did you?

19   **A. DAWN:** I think he did.

20   **A. CRAIG:** I can't remember.

21   **A. DAWN:** I think he did, yes, but I mean how can that  
22          happen?

23   **A. CRAIG:** Even at the time initially after mum's death, we  
24          went to the ward to collect her things and the staff,  
25          there was, there's no sympathy/empathy. They just kept

1       referring to mum as "the body". And I have to say I had  
2       to walk out because I was about to lose my temper. That,  
3       24 hours earlier she was under their care, or meant to be  
4       under their care.

5   **Q.** Yes. That injury recollection also of that day that  
6       staff, on 1 March that when you went to the ward, staff  
7       referred to your mum as "the body"?

8   **A. DAWN:** Indeed, and they didn't really know the process,  
9       did not appear to know the process and what we should do  
10      next. I think we might have been given a leaflet, I'm  
11      not sure.

12   **Q.** I think you told us that it appeared to be nobody knew  
13      the process --

14   **A. DAWN:** No.

15   **Q.** -- everything was chaotic and they didn't even have a  
16      telephone number for the mortuary.

17   **A. DAWN:** That's correct. And around that time, as well, we  
18      had asked, my husband had been in contact with the  
19      Coroner's officer to see if we could have a full  
20      toxicology report at the post mortem.

21   **Q.** Yes.

22   **A. DAWN:** This was because in my mum's personal diaries she  
23      had put that she had kept asking for PRN and for blood  
24      tests because she was describing herself, not that she  
25      knew what it would feel like but she said, "If I knew

1       better it would feel like cold turkey, it was almost like  
2       I was coming off of the medication."

3       **Q.** Withdrawal.

4       **A.** At that time she had been, her dosage of Risperidone had  
5       been increased, despite the fact that she had some like  
6       blurred vision and things like that, which is something  
7       that Risperidone causes and she should have been taken  
8       off of it or reduced immediately. But when the police  
9       officer went to the nurse's station to get my mum's notes  
10      for the post mortem, they were given the wrong notes, so  
11      the toxicology report was inconsistent because it wasn't  
12      the right patient's notes.

13     **Q.** Yes. When you were asked, Dawn, in the Inquiry's Rule 9  
14      request, a question along the lines of what do you think  
15      should have been done differently for your mum and your  
16      answer, I think --

17     **A. DAWN:** Just everything.

18     **Q.** Everything, yes.

19     **A. DAWN:** Everything. We should have never been at that  
20      stage because she was a voluntary patient. When you  
21      think how stretched the Mental Health Care is and the  
22      fact that mum should have been in there for just three  
23      weeks, a quick fix, and had they listened to us or looked  
24      back at 2008, that's all that needed to be done. All she  
25      needed to be given was the PRN that she was given on that

1 occasion, I'm not saying it would have worked exactly the  
2 same way but they didn't even try it. She was supposed  
3 to be there for a three week quick fix. She could have  
4 had that, she could have been like in a deep sleep for  
5 three days as she was before, and perhaps --

6 **Q.** Come through it.

7 **A. DAWN:** Come through it. But that wasn't even tried, and  
8 I think, Craig, there was an occasion where mum was  
9 agitated, I don't remember when it was.

10 **A. CRAIG:** Yes, I think Dawn was away and I had come to  
11 visit mum one weekend, Saturday afternoon, and she was  
12 agitated and there was a temporary bank staff -- no, she  
13 was sitting in from the other ward so she had come over.  
14 I can't remember even how I started the conversation with  
15 her and asked her regarding this particular medication,  
16 and she listened to me and she prescribed it. Now, that  
17 just -- obviously I was pleased at the time, I thought,  
18 "Great, this is a way forward." Ultimately, that was  
19 removed, but again, when you think about that process,  
20 that is it right that a temporary member of staff who  
21 doesn't know mum's case is able to change her medication  
22 at will?

23 **Q.** And at your request.

24 **A. CRAIG:** And at our request, without going through a  
25 governance process. I find that, in retrospect when you

1 think about different things, difficult to accept. At  
2 the time I was pleased, I thought mum's getting what she  
3 had before and we may get on the right road again.

4 **Q.** I understand.

5 **A. CRAIG:** But not ideal.

6 **A. DAWN:** On that note as well, in respect of a temporary  
7 nurse coming in, bank staff or whatever, they were  
8 changing the computer systems at that particular time and  
9 some were trained on, I can't remember, I think one was  
10 called Remedy.

11 **Q.** Remedy.

12 **A.** And one was called Care something, but they didn't know  
13 how to transfer the details or -- because some people  
14 didn't have access to the up to date records, so ...

15 **Q.** Yes. That was one of the findings of the SI report, that  
16 those problems and poor recordkeeping impacted or may  
17 have had an impact on your mother's care and treatment  
18 because some of it simply wasn't available, for example,  
19 some of the notes or records on one or other of those  
20 systems wasn't available to bank staff, for example.

21 **A. DAWN:** Yes.

22 **A. CRAIG:** I think there was also, correct me if I am wrong,  
23 example where the records weren't dated correctly, I  
24 think there was an entry after mum's death.

25 **Q.** I see.

1   **A. CRAIG:** Or something like that, I am pretty sure the  
2           consistency or the accuracy of mum's record definitely  
3           had a lot to be desired.

4   **Q.** Dawn, moving please, if I can, to the matters you have  
5           listed at page 42 of your witness statement, that you  
6           would ask the Inquiry to consider as recommendations for  
7           change. We have covered, I think, these; staffing and  
8           training, the suitability of wards, the interaction with  
9           and between staff and psychiatrists, care plans and  
10          treatment and compliance with regulation or regulatory  
11          bodies. Before I move to Craig to look at his views and  
12          recommendations, is there anything, us having gone  
13          through all that we have gone through this morning, that  
14          you would want to add at this stage to that list?

15   **A. DAWN:** Only if these recommendations are made that it's  
16          actually checked that these recommendations are complied  
17          with because, from my understanding, the CQC inspected  
18          the wards on numerous occasions and I think, I can't even  
19          count on two hands how many times said did about ligature  
20          points and these were never removed. Had they been  
21          removed, or after mum's death, then perhaps people that  
22          died the following year would still be here. But it  
23          wasn't complied with. I don't know if this is finances,  
24          incompetence or they just brushed it under the mat  
25          because nobody was checking whether these things were

1 going to be done.

2 **Q.** They weren't.

3 **A. DAWN:** They weren't.

4 **Q.** I understand, thank you. Craig, you have recorded in two  
5 paragraphs in your witness statement on page 12 your  
6 views and recommendations and some thoughts that you have  
7 and you note the other deaths in Essex that this Inquiry  
8 is examining and tell us that you think all the obvious  
9 recommendations will already have been made.

10 **A. CRAIG:** Yes. To me, this is just, as it says there,  
11 there's just zero accountability. I am mindful that a  
12 lot of this comes down to budget. It's -- mental health  
13 has become more in focus since mum's death, thankfully,  
14 but is there a real desire to take these recommendations  
15 and others more seriously? That's what I question.

16 There's a small note in this and it may be  
17 harsh, but I'm a bit of a cynic at heart, so apologies.  
18 But sometimes I just wonder, it's a bit like battlefield  
19 casualties, and this is why how I view some of perhaps  
20 the Trust or the Government. On the battlefield,  
21 especially in recent engagements that most forces,  
22 British forces, have been involved with, the enemy are  
23 not trying to kill our combatants, they're trying to maim  
24 and injure because the impact, both for the cost of and  
25 mentally for the relatives and the Government, especially



1 the cost, is significantly greater than repatriating one  
2 of our forces personnel. I sometimes think it's easier  
3 (this is me), it's easier for the trusts and the  
4 Government to let these incidents happen because they  
5 can't adequately finance the treatment, so it's an easy  
6 way out.

7 That's incredibly harsh and maybe a completely  
8 off-centre way of thinking of it, but I can't see why  
9 simple instructions, guidance, whatever you want to call  
10 them, removing ligatures, cannot be addressed. That is  
11 not a significant cost to any entity at all. I can only  
12 assume, then, they are quite happy to go through this  
13 process of, or allowing people to go through this  
14 process.

15 To Dawn's point, at the Coroner's inquest,  
16 where we have had significant numbers of people attending  
17 those inquests for exactly the same reasons that we have  
18 had to go through and they continue to go through, what  
19 other conclusion can you draw? It's just lack of desire,  
20 lack of willingness and it's just easy to keep going with  
21 the status quo and that's unacceptable.

22 **MS TROUP:** Thank you. Chair, I have come to the end of my  
23 questions for Dawn and Craig and unless you have any  
24 others we can break.

25 **THE CHAIR:** I have got none. Can I thank you both very much



1   **A.** Robert Ian Wade.

2   **Q.** And you are here to give evidence about your son, Richard  
3       Wade; is that correct?

4   **A.** That is correct.

5   **Q.** And today you will be giving evidence to this Inquiry  
6       about when Richard first experienced mental ill health in  
7       2007, the mental ill health he went on to experience in  
8       2015, culminating in his admission in the Linden Centre  
9       in Chelmsford on Finchingfield ward. Tragically also his  
10      death shortly afterwards and matters surrounding all of  
11      this, together with the recommendations you suggest the  
12      Inquiry should consider making, is that correct?

13  **A.** Yes.

14  **Q.** Was Richard under the care of North Essex Partnership  
15      University NHS Foundation Trust or NEPT whilst a patient  
16      at the Linden Centre?

17  **A.** He was.

18  **Q.** Have you provided the Inquiry with a main witness  
19      statement?

20  **A.** I have.

21  **Q.** Do you have that in front of you?

22  **A.** I do.

23  **Q.** Is it 50 pages long?

24  **A.** It is.

25  **Q.** And if we look at pages 46 and 47, can we see that there

1 is a statement of truth and that you have signed the  
2 statement?

3 **A.** It is and I have.

4 **Q.** And is that statement dated 4 June of this year?

5 **A.** It is.

6 **Q.** You explain, this is paragraph 2, in that statement that  
7 it is based on your memory of events and from your  
8 understanding of Richard's records and other disclosure  
9 and the evidence placed before his inquest; is that  
10 correct?

11 **A.** That's correct.

12 **Q.** Have you had an opportunity to read through that  
13 statement recently?

14 **A.** I have.

15 **Q.** I think there are a couple of minor corrections to be  
16 made. Can we deal with those first, please?

17 **A.** Yes.

18 **Q.** First dealing with paragraph 32(iv) on page 9, should the  
19 reference in that paragraph be to 12 am rather than  
20 12 pm?

21 **A.** It should.

22 **Q.** And should the reference in paragraph 52(i) on page 13 be  
23 to 17 May rather than 17 March?

24 **A.** It should.

25 **Q.** And the reference in paragraph 148 of the statement, we

1 can see there reference to the word "abdominal", should  
2 that in fact say "abnormal"?

3 **A.** It should.

4 **Q.** Are there any other corrections that you would like to  
5 notify just at the moment?

6 **A.** There is one other, the year is stated at 2015, it was  
7 actually 2016 and hopefully we will pick that up as we  
8 pass through.

9 **Q.** Was it the other way around, 2015 should have been 2016.

10 **A.** That's correct.

11 **Q.** We will find that and we can notify people if we don't  
12 pick it up during this evidence. Subject to all of that,  
13 is this statement true and accurate to the best of your  
14 knowledge and belief?

15 **A.** It is.

16 **Q.** Thank you. I am going to call that your main statement  
17 or just your statement, but in fact you have separately  
18 provided something that's entitled an addendum statement.

19 **A.** Mm hmm.

20 **Q.** Does that contain your suggested recommendations?

21 **A.** Yes, it does.

22 **Q.** And that refers to a document that's entitled:

23 "A proposal for a National Health Service  
24 mental health patient safety doctrine", which you have  
25 also provided to us.

1     **A.** I have, yes.

2     **Q.** I will refer to that as "the doctrine". Please feel free  
3       to refer to any of those documents as is helpful to you.  
4       Your main statement, your recommendations, the doctrine  
5       all form part of the body evidence of this Inquiry. I  
6       won't be asking you about every aspect of them, so please  
7       rest assured that the Inquiry will take considerable care  
8       to scrutinise everything you have said.

9                 Robert, did you provide a commemorative account  
10       in relation to Richard at our hearing in September last  
11       year?

12    **A.** I did.

13    **Q.** In fact, it was the last day, I think, on 24 September.

14    **A.** It was, yes.

15    **Q.** And I think you were accompanied then by your wife,  
16       Linda, yes? And I think Linda is here today,  
17       accompanying you today as well; is that correct?

18    **A.** She is.

19    **Q.** I would like to start your evidence by talking about  
20       Richard. Was he born on 13 April 1985?

21    **A.** He was.

22    **Q.** Your commemorative evidence in September included that he  
23       grew up healthy and strong with a sharp and agile mind.

24    **A.** He did.

25    **Q.** He loved sport, particularly cricket.

1   **A.**   Very much.

2   **Q.**   You made a reference to rugby as well but cricket was his  
3       main game.

4   **A.**   It was.

5   **Q.**   And he enjoyed academic success.

6   **A.**   He did.

7   **Q.**   We will talk a little bit more about that and his time at  
8       Essex University in a moment.

9   **A.**   Okay.

10  **Q.**   Before we move on, is there anything else you would like  
11       to say now about Richard. We heard with interest what  
12       you said in September, and as I said, we will touch on  
13       his time at Essex at just after that. Is there anything  
14       else that you would like to tell us about him before we  
15       move on?

16  **A.**   I think I said what needed to be said about him in  
17       September, and today I would like to focus on doing this  
18       and doing this alone, but rest assured he is very much in  
19       my mind, as you can imagine.

20  **Q.**   Let's move to 2007, please. Would Richard have been 21  
21       or 22 years old, around that age at this time?

22  **A.**   2007, I think he was 21.

23  **Q.**   I want to look at something, to address with you  
24       something that you say in your statement about this  
25       period.

1   **A.**   Okay.

2   **Q.**   I am going to be looking from paragraph 3 of your main  
3           statement.

4   **A.**   Okay.

5   **Q.**   This is what you say there:

6                       "Richard's mental health problems first arose  
7           in 2007 as an irrational fear of motor neurone disease or  
8           MND. Despite regular visits to GPs and A&E departments,  
9           each giving the same reassurance, he could not free  
10          himself from those fears. The only treatments he  
11          received were antidepressants. He was deeply anxious,  
12          causing him to be restless, pace and lose sleep."

13                      You say at paragraph:

14                      "A mental health home visit team did assess  
15          Richard in 2007. They asked few questions and left after  
16          suggesting he consult a neurologist. This being contrary  
17          to the GP's assessment of his condition being of  
18          depressive origins, was not followed. The GP did refer  
19          Richard to the same community mental health clinic that  
20          made the home visit but Richard declined the appointment.  
21          At a later point that year, and if an attempt to break  
22          Richard's depressive cycle, we privately consulted a  
23          specialist MND neurologist."

24                      So was a private appointment made for Richard  
25          to see a leading MND specialist?



1   **A.**   It was, yes.

2   **Q.**   What was the specialist's diagnosis?

3   **A.**   The diagnosis really boiled down to the specialist saying  
4       to Richard that, "I am going to tell you that you don't  
5       have motor neuron disease, but you are not going to believe  
6       me, are you?" To which Richard said, "No", his fear was  
7       deep rooted. I think behind that the neurologist made  
8       the obvious diagnosis that it was, in fact, depression  
9       that he had and this was an expression of that depression  
10      as motor neuron disease.

11  **Q.**   Thank you. You describe in your statement how following  
12      that visit there was a gradual deterioration in Richard's  
13      condition.

14  **A.**   Yes.

15  **Q.**   That he was too ill to work and that he was kept at home  
16      in the company of a relative or friend.

17  **A.**   Yes.

18  **Q.**   And, in fact, is it a feature of the times that Richard  
19      had mental ill health that there was close support for  
20      him from his family and friends?

21  **A.**   Yes. We have got excellent family relations. My sister  
22      lives a few miles away, so we were able to draw on  
23      uncles, aunts and nephews who were more than willing to  
24      sit there, they shared all their Christmases, they shared  
25      their birthdays and many other things together. So that

1        was there. He had an excellent circle of friends, they  
2        were willing to support as well and of course his  
3        brother, my wife and I would take as much of the burden  
4        as we could.

5    **Q.** You mentioned his brother, that is his younger brother?

6    **A.** That's his younger brother, yes.

7    **Q.** Can I just check that everyone can hear the evidence  
8        clearly? Thank you. Did the deterioration reach a  
9        crisis point in around midsummer of 2007?

10   **A.** Mm hmm, yes. The conditions were getting worse and  
11       worse, we had done the rounds of the doctors, we had done  
12       the rounds of the hospital. Along the way it became  
13       obvious he was becoming depressive, but they seemed to  
14       have no way of getting out of the cycle. Whatever  
15       resources they had, they were an antidepressant drug or a  
16       visit by a home support team or something of that nature.  
17       There seemed to be no way from our conversations with  
18       them to escalate it to anything meaningful within mental  
19       health. So as we really had been round that cycle many,  
20       many times and Richard's anxious state was growing and  
21       growing, that reached a crisis point one afternoon, which  
22       I think is where you are going to go next with the home  
23       visit by a GP or you will do in your time.

24   **Q.** Absolutely. Let's move to that now.

25   **A.** Okay.

1   **Q.** Is it right that the GP prescribed a strong sedative?

2   **A.** It is.

3   **Q.** For Richard, and what effect did that have?

4   **A.** One of the problems Richard had all the way through was  
5       that he couldn't sleep. Richard was a very light sleeper  
6       and only slept little. He liked working and sleep was  
7       something he did, but it was always light. Even by  
8       Richard's standards, the sleep had become far too short  
9       to sustain him, which of course accelerated the problems  
10      that he experienced. On the day that the doctor got  
11      there he was pacing, talking, he was most uncomfortable.  
12      The doctor gave him a strong sedative and he fell asleep  
13      and he slept a long time after that one. That seemed to  
14      break the cycle and in doing that, he then slept longer  
15      and longer, sometimes hours and hours at a time during  
16      the day as well as at night and it was the catching up  
17      with the sleep that was really the path to recovery.  
18      That's what he needed. That is what he had lost and that  
19      is what he got back.

20   **Q.** Having had the advantage of the sedative and being able  
21      to sleep, was there also a course of private counseling?

22   **A.** Yes. After that, my wife contacted -- researched and  
23      contacted a local counsellor and that counsellor worked  
24      with Richard over a period of time. I can't remember the  
25      exact amount of time now, but I don't think that's

1           important. She worked with him as long as necessary.

2           And he came out of that in a much better condition than  
3           he went into the final crisis point.

4   **Q.** And, in fact, the way you put it in your statement is  
5           that he could pick up the threads of his life.

6   **A.** Yes, indeed.

7   **Q.** I want to come on now to a comment you have made in your  
8           statement about this period. Could you put up, please,  
9           the main statement at page 2. That's HJA007877 and  
10          expand paragraph 7. I think you have touched on this  
11          already, but can we just look at this. It is on the  
12          screen in front of you as well:

13                        "Each of the medical professionals with whom  
14          Richard consulted at this time gave him appropriate  
15          treatment and care within their compass."

16   **A.** Mm hmm.

17   **Q.** "What seemed to be missing was any route to specialist  
18          resources to hasten Richard's recovery."

19                        Now you spoke to a route about breaking out of  
20          the cycle. Is that the comment here or is this pointing  
21          to something else?

22   **A.** No, that one is alluding to it if you like. What that is  
23          really saying is that each of the doctors we saw were  
24          thoroughly professional, they were absolutely correct in  
25          what they did, they were correct in their diagnosis, but

1       when they come to the point of doing something about  
2       mental illness they had nothing in their toolkit. If it  
3       were a physical problem they would have antibiotics, they  
4       would have some other drugs, they would have a route of  
5       referral to a consultant, but that seemed to be  
6       completely absent on the mental health side. That didn't  
7       seem to come about. And so everything they did was  
8       within their compass, in other words they did what they  
9       could and they had no more, but what was missing, and as  
10      I allude to there, is the specialist resources to assist  
11      to Richard's recovery. Now, those special resources in  
12      this case turned out to be an injection in the arm to put  
13      him to sleep to get him back into sleep patterns, such  
14      that he could make his own recovery with his family and  
15      his friends around him, supporting him through all of  
16      that period and then at the end of it taking a course of  
17      counseling therapy that moved him then towards the  
18      brightest period of his life and I expect we will come to  
19      that later again.

20   **Q.** I think this is something of a theme that we might pick  
21       up on later on, people working within their own  
22       compasses, as you said it --

23   **A.** Yes.

24   **Q.** -- and not having access to the specialist tools that  
25       perhaps would have assisted at an earlier stage?

1   **A.** Yes, and from memory I listed them on the second occasion  
2       so there is more detail.

3   **Q.** We will come on to that again. Could you take that down,  
4       please. I am just picking up on an aspect of that, this  
5       is from paragraph 15 of your statement that the  
6       antidepressants prescribed to Richard addressed the  
7       chronic aspect of his condition.

8   **A.** Yes.

9   **Q.** But it was the sedative he was given during the GP home  
10      visit that addressed the acute side and opened the way  
11      for a more rapid recovery. That is point you have just  
12      been making?

13   **A.** It is, although the antidepressants may have worked in  
14      the long-term he really needed to get through a short-term  
15      crisis and the exit route for that crisis was the  
16      injection and the sedative that put him to sleep.

17   **Q.** You say later in your statement that the use of sedatives  
18      allowing him to sleep was the only effective intervention  
19      in his suffering. Is that throughout the whole of this  
20      period, both 2007 and 2015?

21   **A.** Yes. No, that's the only one that had a marked change.  
22      He did on occasion later on try sleeping tablets, but his  
23      depression was so far advanced that talking to a friend  
24      who is a doctor, he lightheartedly mentioned that he  
25      would have needed horse tablets to have had an effect on

1 him. They simply weren't strong enough to have the  
2 effect that was desired. They may have been at the  
3 limits of what can be prescribed safely, but they weren't  
4 adequate for what he needed.

5 **Q.** Thank you. Let's deal with the time between 2007 and  
6 2015. You cover this at paragraph 16 of your statement.

7 **A.** Yes.

8 **Q.** You say that the period between the two bouts of mental  
9 ill health, as you put it, were the most productive of  
10 his life.

11 **A.** Indeed.

12 **Q.** You explain that he returned to academia, he studied an  
13 MA in history and a Ph.D. in political science at Essex  
14 University?

15 **A.** Yes, he did.

16 **Q.** And then at paragraph 17 you set out some further things  
17 that he was -- actually paragraph 11, this is page 2, you  
18 set out what he was able to accomplish. Would you just  
19 take us through that. This is the bottom of page 2 and  
20 the top of page 3?

21 **A.** Yes. While he was at Essex University and having  
22 completed his masters, he got involved -- I will take  
23 them in sequence, it is easier to follow. Across the  
24 whole of that period so these aren't in particular order,  
25 he founded and helped found the academic student journal

1       that they started publishing again. He has a paper which  
2       is the first paper in the first edition, so Richard being  
3       Richard, he had put himself to the forefront there. That  
4       was published and we are privileged to have a copy of  
5       that on our shelf at home. He founded, recruited,  
6       trained and lead the debating society and team. Essex  
7       University at that point didn't have a debating society.  
8       Richard was interested in politics, and so he thought,  
9       "How can I rope as many people as possible in helping me  
10      go the direction I want to go whilst doing them a favour  
11      in return?" So he started a debating society that he  
12      then recruited, trained and took to competitions. So  
13      that he had debating competitions. We had the wonderful  
14      privilege of meeting some of that team at his funeral and  
15      one young gentleman there, a young Asian gentleman we  
16      were talking to, said that he was by nature extremely  
17      shy, but having met Richard and been strong armed into  
18      the debating team, he ended up after university, not  
19      necessarily following his degree, but he became a radio  
20      presenter with him own program on an Asian channel in the  
21      Birmingham area.

22   **Q.** I think you may have told us about that in September  
23       actually.

24   **A.** It was a wonderful story with that one there. He played  
25       for the university rugby club, which give me lots of taxi



1 duty all round because Richard did not drive, did not  
2 want to drive and probably never would drive. That is  
3 probably a good thing for all of us. He did many things  
4 well but driving was not one of them. He became a  
5 lecture in American politics, he has always been  
6 fascinated by America and its politics, particularly the  
7 lead-up into and out of the 1960s period so he used to  
8 lecture on that. That would supplement his income and  
9 that was while he was doing a Ph.D.

10 **Q.** And, in fact, I remember in September you brought a copy  
11 of his book along?

12 **A.** Yes.

13 **Q.** And you refer to that in paragraph 14. Just tell us  
14 briefly about that?

15 **A.** Yes, Richard's fascination in politics was not only the  
16 Ph.D. but he took that further. He wrote a book called:

17 "Conservative Economic Policy from Heath in  
18 Opposition to Cameron in Coalition."

19 Which he interviewed many people, Norman  
20 Tebbitt and a list of illustrious people that sort of  
21 standard are on there. I still have the recordings of  
22 those interviews. I can't bring myself to listen to  
23 them, but I think there will at some point be an  
24 appropriate academic library where they should sit.

25 **Q.** You say elsewhere that Richard enjoyed good physical

1 health?

2 **A.** Yes he did, he was as strong as an ox.

3 **Q.** It sounds from your evidence as if in this period from

4 2007 to 2015 he was thriving for much of that time?

5 **A.** Sorry he was?

6 **Q.** Thriving?

7 **A.** Yes, he was.

8 **Q.** I am afraid that does now bring to us 2015 and the

9 reappearance of the symptoms.

10 **A.** Okay.

11 **Q.** Did his fear of MND first reappear in early May 2015?

12 **A.** Yes, round about that time.

13 **Q.** You cover this in paragraph 17, in fact you give it a

14 date, 4 May.

15 **A.** His depression has started to become evident before that

16 in very small parts, but again it accelerated away. So

17 finding the date of the transition is very difficult to

18 pin on that one.

19 **Q.** But from around early May?

20 **A.** Yes, that would be reasonable.

21 **Q.** You then describe in your statement the period between 4

22 and 12 May.

23 **A.** Yes.

24 **Q.** When Richard saw the GP on various occasions and attended

25 Broomfield Hospital A&E, and during this period was he

1       prescribed diazepam, sleeping tablets, antidepressants?

2   **A.** Yes, but different things with different doctors. In the

3       round, yes.

4   **Q.** Did he in fact see GPs from two different surgeries, his

5       own GP in Essex and your local GP in Suffolk?

6   **A.** Yes.

7   **Q.** That may become relevant a little bit later on.

8   **A.** Okay.

9   **Q.** Let's just be clear, at this time in 2015, was Richard

10       living in Essex and your family home, where you were, was

11       in Suffolk, correct?

12   **A.** Yes. Richard lived in Chelmsford and he commuted in to

13       London on a daily basis, and then he would come and visit

14       us as often as he reasonably could in Sudbury in Suffolk.

15   **Q.** Thank you very much. Now, the medication that he was

16       prescribed at this stage, did that make any difference to

17       his condition?

18   **A.** None at all.

19   **Q.** As far as you could see during this period, was there any

20       thought given to a longer term care plan?

21   **A.** No.

22   **Q.** During this time did any doctor consider or discuss with

23       you or Richard, as far as you're aware, the question of a

24       possible admission?

25   **A.** No.

1   **Q.** So this is what you say in your statement at paragraph  
2       245:

3                   "Identifying the sequence of the phases of  
4       Richard's deterioration in both episodes" -- so that's  
5       2007 and 2015 -- "of his illness, it appears that the  
6       second phase, or pre-crisis, was the point at which  
7       decisive intervention would have been most beneficial."

8   **A.** Yes.

9   **Q.** "And yet in the decisions and prescriptions of both GPs  
10       and A&E (they) were ineffective in preventing the crisis  
11       phase that followed."

12                   You add in a paragraph afterwards, 247, that:

13                   "... in the case of Richard, the routes for  
14       prompt escalation either did not exist or were not used.  
15       His progression into crisis was inevitable."

16                   You say in the next paragraph:

17                   "Having considered Richard's decline into  
18       mental health crisis on two occasions, and repeated  
19       failure to act effectively during his pre-crisis period,  
20       it is clear that Richard did not receive adequate  
21       treatment."

22                   So I would like to just take stock and make  
23       sure I understand the importance of what you have said  
24       there, please. Are you saying that a key issue in  
25       Richard's case was a failure to act at an early stage

1 pre-crisis, and in doing so to avert the development of  
2 the actual crisis itself?

3 **A.** Absolutely.

4 **Q.** Are you saying that the mechanisms were not in place at  
5 this time for this to happen?

6 **A.** They were either not in place or they were not used. I  
7 do not know which.

8 **Q.** In fact, is this one of the areas of the doctrine that  
9 you have put forward seeks to cover, and we will come on  
10 to that?

11 **A.** Yes.

12 **THE CHAIR:** Can I just ask, you pointed us in the direction  
13 of the sedatives that were given to him in the earlier  
14 phase. Do you believe that that is one of the things  
15 that would have helped at this stage? Or do you not have  
16 a view about what that earlier intervention would have  
17 looked like?

18 **A.** I have given some thought to that point. I don't think  
19 it is important what the treatment is specifically. What  
20 is important is that the meaningful intervention comes  
21 before the transition from the first phase of the mental  
22 illness taking route, before it then accelerates away and  
23 that goes into the crisis that follows. It is the  
24 aversion of that second part. In Richard's case it was  
25 indeed the sedative. Now there is an aversion to giving

1        sedatives outside and I remember in the news many years  
2        ago there were cases of sedatives being used just as  
3        liquid cosh to put patients out so that they wouldn't be  
4        a trouble during the day and the night, and quite a  
5        campaign led on that and the consequence of that was that  
6        the idea of using sedatives on patients was frowned upon.  
7        But it was right in so far as those for whom it was not  
8        necessary but it seems that it was no longer available  
9        for those that it was necessary for. From that part  
10       there it means that for those for whom that type of  
11       treatment is appropriate, if it is not available they  
12       will inevitably make the transition from the non-crisis  
13       phase to the crisis phase and there is nothing to stop  
14       them because the illness has taken over.

15    **MR GRIFFIN:** I would like to move now to 16 May. This is the  
16       assessment. Was that a Saturday?

17    **A.** Yes, it was.

18    **Q.** You describe in your statement that Richard's next  
19       contact with medical professionals was the Suffolk Mental  
20       Health Crisis Team at your home on that evening, Saturday  
21       16 November.

22    **A.** That's correct, yes.

23    **Q.** Now did they work as part of the Norfolk and Suffolk NHS  
24       Foundation Trust, as far as you are aware?

25    **A.** They did.

1   **Q.** And did an assessment take place, in circumstances we  
2       will come on to in a moment, by an emergency mental  
3       health assessor?

4   **A.** Yes, it did.

5   **Q.** And let's, if we need to, let's refer to her as the  
6       mental health assessor.

7   **A.** Okay.

8   **Q.** Did she attend with two police officers?

9   **A.** She did.

10   **Q.** This is from paragraph 17 of your statement and 22. Now  
11       was this the only time that Richard had an assessment of  
12       this type?

13   **A.** Yes, it was. He had seen the mental health team visit in  
14       the previous one but he didn't have a full assessment on  
15       that.

16   **Q.** Now from paragraph 22 in your statement you describe what  
17       happened at this stage. In essence, was it this? Was  
18       Richard pacing outside the family home and did he refuse  
19       to reenter, for example, for dinner?

20   **A.** That's right.

21   **Q.** Was the assessment therefore carried out in the street  
22       outside your home?

23   **A.** Yes, it was.

24   **Q.** What was the temperature like at this time, do you  
25       remember?

1   **A.** It was a May day, so at that particular point in the day  
2       it wasn't too uncomfortable. That, I think, we will come  
3       to shortly.

4   **Q.** Was he in fact outside for several hours?

5   **A.** He was, yes.

6   **Q.** And did the temperature drop during that time?

7   **A.** Yes, it did.

8   **Q.** And did you have to take action, for example, sending out  
9       warm food and clothing?

10  **A.** Yes.

11  **Q.** What involvement did you and your family have in this  
12       assessment that was taking place outside of the house?

13  **A.** None whatsoever.

14  **Q.** Were you, however, able to give the mental health  
15       assessor background information about Richard's illness?

16  **A.** We were, yes.

17  **Q.** A decision was made to take him to a mental health  
18       facility. Were you involved in that decision at all?

19  **A.** Yes, we were. It was clear that he needed to go to a  
20       mental health facility and the obvious one for the mental  
21       health nurse, the assessing nurse at our house, was to  
22       use the Trust for which she worked which was Norfolk and  
23       Suffolk, but they wouldn't take him. They thought that  
24       he should go to Essex. He should go to Essex because  
25       although he was in Suffolk visiting us, his GP was in



1       Essex and so they should take him. That formed the basis  
2       of a long delay through that evening before he finally  
3       got an admission.

4   **Q.** So you say you were outside or he was outside for hours.  
5       Was much of that time actually taken up in working out  
6       where he should go?

7   **A.** There was two big chunks, one of them was giving the  
8       nurse the information that she needed to support the  
9       decision that she pretty much had already come to. A  
10      very small part was then deciding what type of admission  
11      it should be, perhaps we will leave that.

12   **Q.** Well, in fact, ultimately was the decision that it should  
13      be a voluntary admission?

14   **A.** It was and we had a strong influence on that on the  
15      guidance from the nurse, which I think was the correct  
16      decision in itself.

17   **Q.** Before we move on to Richard being taken to the Linden  
18      Centre, I just want to ask you about the kind of  
19      information you were able to give to the mental health  
20      assessor because this may become relevant.

21   **A.** Okay.

22   **Q.** You explain in your statement that you gave all the  
23      relevant information that you could and you say this,  
24      this is paragraph 22, "Nothing was left out."

25   **A.** Everything she asked, everything that we could think of,

1           we told her.

2   **Q.** And you had, and this is at 22 (xi) on page 6, "We  
3 covered the issue of suicide." Now do you recall, and I  
4 am sorry to ask you this, but do you recall what you  
5 informed the mental health assessor of in terms of  
6 suicide?

7   **A.** We told her that he had discussed taking his own life  
8 with his aunt, my sister, and that he wanted her to take  
9 him to the (redacted) bridge so that he could jump off at  
10 the centre mark of it. My wife is Welsh and I am  
11 English, and in Richard's mind the way he thought it  
12 would be so that we could not determine which country he  
13 had taken his life in. So he wanted to go to the  
14 (redacted) bridge. He also had very good family links  
15 into Wales, as strong as those in England just more  
16 remote, and he would have been -- it would have been a  
17 very jumbled mind making not the best of decisions but  
18 something that seemed sensible to his troubled mind at  
19 that time.

20   **Q.** But this is obviously something he had thought about and  
21 articulated quite clearly.

22   **A.** He had thought about, articulated, he had by this stage  
23 probably researched something about on the internet and  
24 we are certain that at a later point that he had.

25   **Q.** And was that information that you passed on to the mental

1 health assessor?

2 **A.** Yes.

3 **Q.** You say this at paragraph 85 of your statement as well,  
4 page 19. You say:

5 "On 16 May" -- so during this session as I  
6 understand it -- "I gave the MHA a warning that if  
7 Richard became overwhelmed by his suicidal ideations and  
8 there was a flaw in the safety policies and procedures in  
9 a ward, he would quickly identify it."

10 Now is that correct? Was that also information  
11 that you provided to the mental health assessor whilst  
12 Richard was outside the house?

13 **A.** I did, yes.

14 **Q.** Thank you. Did you become aware that a bed had been  
15 secured in a mental health ward ultimately and that  
16 Richard would be admitted?

17 **A.** Yes. I would like to explain a little around that  
18 selection process.

19 **Q.** Yes.

20 **A.** The selection process wasn't the trust's -- there were  
21 now two trusts negotiating over Richard, North Essex and  
22 Norfolk and Suffolk, but they weren't negotiating to have  
23 him, they were negotiating for the other one to have him.  
24 They didn't want him. The saddening part of that is, in  
25 truth, both had beds available. Neither wanted to fill

1       it. So the nurse, who I have great sympathy for, was  
2       just left to hang out to dry in our house while they  
3       fought out what they wanted to do.

4   **Q.** You say in your statement, this is paragraph 31:

5                "Why was Richard not simply taken to the  
6       nearest available and most appropriate facility?"

7                And is that the strong feeling you have now?

8   **A.** It is very much. I think I go on to say that if they  
9       needed to transfer him subsequent to that, they could  
10      make any financial arrangements between themselves and it  
11      would surprise me if they haven't got such a facility.  
12      What I couldn't understand is if neither of them wanted  
13      to and all of those counties are in East Anglia, at what  
14      point is that a National Health Service? Well, it  
15      wasn't, they were independent health services each  
16      protecting their own interest at that time.

17   **Q.** Thank you. And I think the situation outside the house  
18      was made even worse by a troubling allegation that  
19      Richard made against you.

20   **A.** Correct.

21   **Q.** Did he accuse you of trying to kill him and did it  
22      quickly become apparent that there was nothing to answer  
23      for, but at least did it demonstrate the state of mind  
24      that he was in at the time?

25   **A.** Yes, this is more that -- I think it was I wanted to kill

1 him, but I don't think it makes that much difference to  
2 the type of accusation made. That accusation was made  
3 and the police officer that it was made to -- I knew  
4 nothing about this and I was walking around trying to  
5 arrange things and trying to help the nurse get the  
6 arrangements correct for getting Richard into appropriate  
7 care and as I walked through the hall, the policeman  
8 suddenly and very forcefully said, "Your son says you  
9 want to kill him." I must be honest that took me aback.  
10 That was an utterly shocking and awful thing to hear. I  
11 think with a little bit of reading the room and a touch  
12 of sensitivity, as much as he was compelled to deal with  
13 the issues, I don't think it would be difficult to come  
14 up with a thousand and one better ways than that.

15 **Q.** So more compassionate approach, or more understanding  
16 approach, would have been in order.

17 **A.** I think if he is an experienced police officer, and he  
18 was, he would have read the situation outside and  
19 Richard's condition, he would have had a good idea of  
20 what type of family it was he was dealing with, the  
21 people that were there and if it was at all credible, and  
22 balanced his approach on those factors. I don't think  
23 for a minute he shouldn't have challenged me in some way  
24 because that's a serious thing for someone to say and if  
25 he doesn't follow up on it and it leads to a consequence

1 later that has its own problems. So yes, by all means  
2 follow it up but think, be considerate, be compassionate  
3 and be thoughtful to circumstance, context and all that  
4 you see around you, because that, after all, is what they  
5 should be trained for.

6 **Q.** Thank you. And in fact was there another repercussion of  
7 the allegation that Richard had made, was that in fact,  
8 as you say in your statement, that it made it next to  
9 impossible for you fully to participate in identifying  
10 the best course of action for Richard?

11 **A.** Well, it would and it did. The accusation having been  
12 made, the nurse has to take that into consideration in  
13 putting in her thoughts, and what she advises a degree of  
14 protection for Richard such that if it turns out to be  
15 true, that can be thought of and considered. So yes, it  
16 somewhat cramped my style.

17 **Q.** We are going to move off from this time in a moment.  
18 Before we do, I would like to look at an aspect of your  
19 statement, please. Could you put up page 6 of the  
20 statement. This is HJA007877 and expand (xii) and (xiv)  
21 at the bottom of the page. In fact, can we see at the  
22 bottom "Our one concern"? So this is at this stage  
23 whilst this assessment is taking place outside your  
24 house:

25 "Our one concern was his safety, and my wife

1           asked the MHA: 'will he be safe?' (and) her reply:  
2           'Yes'."

3                       Did you hear that as well?

4   **A.**   Yes, I was standing there.

5   **Q.**   Do you recall how you and Linda felt on hearing that?

6   **A.**   I think relief is the main thing. We knew that he was in  
7           a desperate situation. The behaviour that he was  
8           exhibiting was completely alien to his normal nature in  
9           every way. We were deeply concerned for his safety and  
10          what might happen to him and when we heard that and  
11          knowing that he would be going to a specialist hospital  
12          that should be able to recognise and treat his condition  
13          and know that he will be safe and, therefore, able to  
14          recover and maybe this time the, sequence of events of  
15          the motor neuron disease having happened twice, we would  
16          have to put a longer term programme in place for and with  
17          Richard. But that was a relief in itself.

18   **Q.**   Can you take that down, please. We are going to move on  
19          now, Robert, to Richard's admission at the Linden Centre.  
20          Before we do, is there anything further you would like to  
21          raise about the time Richard was assessed outside the  
22          house and what happened at that stage?

23   **A.**   I think we have covered all the key issues that go with  
24          that one. Sorry, may I just say one thing? The nurse at  
25          that point did come up for a lot of pressure later on in

1 other investigations and the Inquiry and the questioning  
2 of me when I talked to the Trust, which I think all of it  
3 was wholly misplaced, and I think she managed a difficult  
4 situation to the best that her experience and ability  
5 allowed her.

6 **Q.** In fact, we are going to come on in a moment to another  
7 difficult situation involving her, aren't we?

8 **A.** Okay.

9 **Q.** Just coming on then to Richard's admission at the Linden  
10 centre in Chelmsford, was he admitted to Finchingfield  
11 Ward?

12 **A.** Yes, he was.

13 **Q.** Now that, we understand, is an acute adult in-patient  
14 ward?

15 **A.** Yes.

16 **Q.** Was this Richard's first ever admission to a mental  
17 health ward.

18 **A.** It was.

19 **Q.** And as we have established this was an informal  
20 admission?

21 **A.** Indeed.

22 **Q.** Did he arrive for admission procedure at about 12 am and  
23 did he enter the ward at about 1 am on Sunday 17 May as  
24 far as you are aware?

25 **A.** I think those times are about right from the documents I



1 have.

2 **Q.** Did you and Linda also make your way to the Linden Centre  
3 but a little later on as we will hear?

4 **A.** Sorry, I couldn't quite hear that.

5 **Q.** Did you -- so Richard has gone and been admitted in the  
6 very early hours of Sunday 17 May 2015?

7 **A.** Yes.

8 **Q.** Is it right that you and Linda also went to the Linden  
9 Centre but that was a little bit later on?

10 **A.** That's correct, yes.

11 **Q.** If at any stage I say something that you can't hear,  
12 please make sure to stop me as you just did, thank you.  
13 Now what I want to come on to first of all is what you  
14 describe in your statement, it is an issue between the  
15 mental health assessor and the receiving staff nurse on  
16 the ward. Have you learnt that this issue occurred at  
17 the time of his admission to the Linden Centre? So the  
18 mental health assessor from the Norfolk Suffolk Trust, as  
19 you have described, and the admitting nurse at the Linden  
20 Centre from NEPT, let's refer to the admitting nurse as  
21 the staff nurse. Was the issue, as you understand it,  
22 that the staff nurse refused to accept the mental health  
23 assessor's oral statement and can you just explain a  
24 little bit more of your understanding of what the issue  
25 was at this stage.

1   **A.**   Okay.   While at our house the mental health nurse took  
2           copious notes.   So our expectation is that those notes  
3           would have gone down and that would be part of the  
4           handover procedure.

5   **Q.**   Were they handwritten notes?

6   **A.**   They were handwritten notes, yes.

7   **Q.**   Thank you.

8   **A.**   Now, upon the admission, she tried to, as I understand  
9           it, and this is from two sources, one is the documents  
10          that I have seen and the other one is from comments  
11          from -- I will just see how you refer to the DI.

12   **Q.**   So the detective inspector, we will hear that there were  
13          two criminal investigations and this is the detective  
14          inspector of the first --

15   **A.**   Yes, it is the first of the two on this one.   The DI not  
16          the DCI in this case.   When we spoke to him they were  
17          doing the first of the corporate manslaughter inquiries  
18          into Richard's death.   He intimated to us that it was  
19          clear that the handover process had been fractious and  
20          uncomfortable in what happened.   So the nurse taking  
21          Richard down wanted to do an oral handover, as you have  
22          said.   That was not acceptable to the staff nurse as the  
23          admitting professional.   There was back and forth, it  
24          seems, about who should then enter it into their system  
25          and it ended up with the assessing nurse from Suffolk

1       having to try and enter the data into Essex's system,  
2       even though the admitting nurse was there. So at this  
3       point the information is supposedly going in, but what is  
4       unusual is if you read the statements that I have managed  
5       to acquire that were taken as the interview statements  
6       that led up to the serious incident report, of the staff  
7       nurse that was the admitting nurse, she then claims in  
8       her statements that during the early hours of the morning  
9       she entered all the data herself. So it's very difficult  
10      to work out who did what and when. But there was a  
11      disagreement, I don't know at what level and I don't know  
12      where blame, if any, would lie because I was not there  
13      and that is not in any of the records, but certainly the  
14      DI felt uncomfortable with the way that that was done.

15   **Q.** And would this be another example of a mismatch  
16      potentially between two different NHS areas,  
17      Norfolk/Suffolk on the one hand and Essex on the other,  
18      or do you think this was more of a personal thing?

19   **A.** Like another piece of evidence we will come to I think  
20      it's possibly and maybe probably both.

21   **Q.** Thanks you. From what you have learnt subsequently, do  
22      you believe that the information that you gave to the  
23      mental health assessor about Richard's suicidal ideations  
24      was passed on to the staff at the Linden Centre?

25   **A.** I think the straightforward answer to that is no, not all

1 of it was handed over, but what was handed over, one must  
2 then ask the question was that sufficient? I suspect you  
3 will come on to that a little bit later as well, or I can  
4 expand on that now if you wish?

5 **Q.** Well, why don't you expand on it briefly now and if we  
6 need to go further we can.

7 **A.** Right. The question is one, to my mind, not of what  
8 information were they given but did they adequate  
9 information to manage Richard's condition safely? Now my  
10 opinion on that is yes, not just because I'm Richard's  
11 father but because if you look at the requirements in the  
12 Trust documentation and you map what they actually said  
13 they had to those requirements, it was more than met.  
14 But that's not just my opinion. There was another  
15 doctor, yes, and his name is on here as the consultant  
16 psychologist, wrote a report on behalf of Essex police as  
17 an independent report, and when he wrote his report,  
18 there is a copy there somewhere, that he made it  
19 absolutely clear that they had obtained all of the  
20 information that they required to manage Richard's  
21 condition properly.

22 **Q.** We are going to track that through, for example, with the  
23 question of the level of observations that was set. So  
24 that will illuminate that in a moment. One of the  
25 things, just going back to the time when the mental

1 health assessor was presenting her handwritten notes and  
2 whatever happened at that stage, I just want to refer to  
3 what you say in your statement. This is paragraph 38.  
4 You expressed your, "huge concern that their professional  
5 focus was not on prioritising", Richard's needs. And you  
6 raised the question of a friction in the acceptance and  
7 admissions process and whether that led to poor judgment.  
8 So that's paragraph 38 and also paragraph 241. I just  
9 wanted to ensure that we have on the record those  
10 concerns that you have raised in relation to that stage  
11 of the admission.

12 **A.** Friction normally between people frequently leads to  
13 competition and competition means somebody has to win,  
14 but the person that lost was Richard.

15 **Q.** Thank you. Now you describe next that after he was  
16 admitted, Richard was assessed by a locum doctor. Can we  
17 refer to him as the locum doctor?

18 **A.** Yes.

19 **Q.** You raise concern in your statement that he was only a  
20 locum doctor. This is paragraph 240. Could you just  
21 explain a little bit more what the nature of your concern  
22 was, 240, it's page 44.

23 **A.** Okay, on the very first raised question I raised there:

24 "Was the locum doctor who assessed Richard  
25 sufficiently experienced in mental health practice?"

1                   I do have an answer for that one and the answer  
2           is in my opinion, no. The locum doctor, I did look it  
3           into his background a little bit, had been trained in St  
4           Petersburg in Russia. He was not a full member of the  
5           Institute of Psychologists, he was an associate, and yet  
6           as a locum doctor turning up to make a full assessment on  
7           what type of treatment was necessary, he was effectively  
8           wielding the power of a consultant since there was no one  
9           senior there to challenge him. I can't understand why  
10          you would take a locum doctor, who isn't fully  
11          experienced in the craft that he wishes to perform, and  
12          make better and stronger decisions. In fairness to the  
13          doctor and in line with the report by the chartered  
14          psychiatrist, he did indeed elicit the necessary  
15          information from Richard to make a good decision. It is  
16          what he did with the decision where things went wrong,  
17          and that was on the level of the observations that  
18          Richard was placed on.

19   **Q.** We will come on to that in just one moment.

20   **A.** May I make a further point? That as a locum he would not  
21          have known precisely what all of the practices and how  
22          they were performed inside that hospital, so how could he  
23          have given good guidance of what level of observation to  
24          give, if he wasn't experienced as a full psychiatrist, as  
25          a member of the appropriate institute or familiar with

1 the hospital.

2 **Q.** So a key question in your mind is was the staff  
3 sufficiently senior and experienced to be conducting this  
4 assessment at this stage?

5 **A.** In the case of the doctor, yes.

6 **Q.** We will come on to the level of observations that were  
7 set in just a moment. But what I want to deal with now  
8 is the nature of the search that was conducted of  
9 Richard, and we know that there is an issue about a  
10 failure to remove dangerous items.

11 **A.** Mm hmm.

12 **Q.** I want to ask you about the items that Richard was left  
13 with after his admission to Finchingfield ward. I am  
14 going to ask that a part of your statement is put on the  
15 screen to address this. Could you please put up page 10  
16 of the statement, HJA007877 and expand paragraphs 36 to  
17 37. This what you say here:

18 "The search of Richard's possessions was  
19 cursory at best; leaving Richard, known to have suicidal  
20 ideation, with shoe laces, electric cords, razors,  
21 scissors and his dressing gown cord (with which he took  
22 his life)."

23 **A.** That's correct.

24 **Q.** You add this:

25 "This search was found to be inadequate at

1 Richard's inquest, forming the basis for a prevention of  
2 future deaths instruction to the Trust by the Coroner."

3 **A.** Yes.

4 **Q.** To be clear Richard was allowed to retain a dressing gown  
5 with a cord on admission to the ward?

6 **A.** Those items were still in his bag when that bag was  
7 returned to us after his death.

8 **Q.** In fact, you say later in your statement that only one  
9 thing was confiscated from him which was some deodorant  
10 spray.

11 **A.** That's right.

12 **Q.** That was even though some of these items were also  
13 considered to be what they term contraband, the razors  
14 and the scissors, that it made clear that the list of  
15 contraband is not exhaustive, and it is also made clear  
16 that anything that a person possesses that they intend to  
17 harm themselves or others should be removed.

18 **A.** That's correct. If I could just expand on that a little.  
19 There is a meaningful and profound difference between the  
20 spray and the other items. If you read the documents,  
21 the spray comes under the classification of those items  
22 that can be used to harm staff. So they removed that  
23 from him. What they didn't remove were the things with  
24 which he could harm himself. The list that you referred  
25 to which is the advisory one, also hangs in the area that



1 the searches are taken. That list, there is a list of  
2 examples that clearly states they are there as examples,  
3 that are taken pretty much as *the* policy, and it is even  
4 written as if that is the policy in the serious incident  
5 report. And so the serious incident report was written  
6 by a very senior member of the nursing team, and that  
7 person is presenting it as if it is policy when either he  
8 knows it isn't, or he knows it is and he is saying it  
9 anyway, and I don't think either of those two positions  
10 are good in my mind.

11 **Q.** In fact you just referred, we know that there was the  
12 inquest, obviously. We will come on to the  
13 investigations.

14 **A.** Of course.

15 **Q.** There was also something, an investigation that led to  
16 something called a 72-hour report; is that correct?

17 **A.** Yes, that is right.

18 **Q.** That is dated 14 September 2015, according your  
19 statement. Was one of the two recommendations it made  
20 that staff receive refresher training on security checks  
21 and patient belongings? This is paragraph 123 --

22 **A.** I am just getting the record report now, so I can check.

23 **Q.** If you look at your statement, it's page 25 and paragraph  
24 123. Do you see that, at (i) there is the reference to  
25 the 72-hour report.

1   **A.**   Page 25.

2   **Q.**   At paragraph 123, two investigations the 72-hour report,  
3       can you see the second of the two recommendations --

4   **A.**   That's the one where there is the mistake I couldn't  
5       remember.   The date we received the report was on 14  
6       September 2016, not 2015.

7   **Q.**   Thank you very much.

8   **A.**   That was caused by an e-mail that I received from the  
9       Trust, where this dates the report as -- the first time  
10      of the appearance of the report in this train of e-mails  
11      is on 20 May 2015, which would indeed put it in the  
12      72-hour framework.   It seems that it was first given to  
13      the gentleman that led the interface with us as a family  
14      in 2016 and he then passed it on to us.   I have several  
15      problems with that, in that we had a meeting with the  
16      Trust on 5 August 2015 and at that time we were not told  
17      this report existed.

18   **Q.**   So it is right there's an issue either with the timing,  
19      the date of the report or with failure to disclose it in  
20      a timely manner to you?

21   **A.**   One or other and again both are possible.

22   **Q.**   Thank you.   As you subsequently learnt, can we see what  
23      one of the two recommendations actually related to.   So  
24      if you look at 123, do you see (b) there, that staff  
25      receive refresher training on security checks and patient

1 belongings. I just want to trace this through, and you  
2 have also made reference to a serious investigation  
3 report. We will touch on this later, but it is probably  
4 right to know, right from the beginning, that you take  
5 issue with various aspects of this report?

6 **A.** Yes.

7 **Q.** This is from December 2015 as I understand it from your  
8 statement. That includes, and this is paragraph 164 of  
9 your statement at page 26, that includes that there  
10 appeared to be a lack of robustness in the searching.  
11 164?

12 **A.** Correct, yes.

13 **Q.** So both of the investigations conducted, immediately  
14 after the death, also reached conclusions of concern in  
15 relation to the failure to take dangerous items from  
16 Richard?

17 **A.** Yes.

18 **Q.** In fact, in your statement you described the failure in  
19 relation to the search as best described as a failure in  
20 policy.

21 **A.** Mm hmm.

22 **Q.** Can you explain what you meant by that?

23 **A.** Can you refer me to the paragraph, please, just to pick  
24 up the context?

25 **Q.** Yes, it is paragraph 174 at page 33, just at the bottom

1 of the page.

2 **THE CHAIR:** Did you say 173?

3 **MR GRIFFIN:** 174 right at bottom.

4 **A.** There was a lack of robustness, but there were several  
5 things. The policy itself outlines clearly what should  
6 and shouldn't be done. What is absolutely clear is that  
7 the policies aren't followed and neither are the policies  
8 understood by the staff. That's not just true of this  
9 policy, it seems to be true of every policy that I have  
10 come across. Each and every one has been misapplied in  
11 some way or other. Sorry I am just trying to gather my  
12 thoughts here and get this part right. The people doing  
13 the search go by the convenient list that's placed just  
14 in front of them. They do not seem to have an  
15 understanding of what the policy is. Now, supposedly  
16 they are trained on it, clearly they are not. Now, if  
17 you look at all their policies, their policies are thick,  
18 complex and whatever you are doing, you have to know  
19 where that is in the policy to go there and go and get  
20 the advice that you are seeking. But then you don't know  
21 it's there because you haven't read the policy or been  
22 trained properly. So it is a policy failure in that the  
23 policies are monolithic documents that I would suspect  
24 for the people doing those particular jobs and the  
25 pressures that they have in doing their jobs, they are

1        never going to get the time to read them and fully  
2        understand them. It is that second part. So their  
3        policies fail.

4    **Q.** Can I just make sure I have understood what you are  
5        saying.

6    **A.** Yes.

7    **Q.** So this is an issue of policy and what you are referring  
8        to here is trust policy?

9    **A.** Yes.

10   **Q.** It is an issue of policy here specifically in relation to  
11       search procedures, but you say in fact it looks as if it  
12       is a wider problem as well, beyond just this policy?

13   **A.** Yes, I would say it's an entire practice of the trust.  
14       Maybe I will expand on that a bit later.

15   **Q.** It is an issue in relation to staff adherence to policy.

16   **A.** Yes.

17   **Q.** To the clarity or brevity of that policy?

18   **A.** Yes.

19   **Q.** And to training or lack of it in relation to the policy?

20   **A.** Yes.

21   **Q.** Does that cover all of those points?

22   **A.** If I were doing that job, if I were expected to read  
23       those policies, go on the ward and do them, I wouldn't  
24       know how to do it.

25   **Q.** I am about to leave this topic of the search Robert.

1 Before I do, is there anything else you would like to say  
2 or raise about that aspect of Richard's experience?

3 **A.** There is another aspect on one of the statements in the  
4 three-day report, but I think that would probably come up  
5 in another section. If not, I will raise it at the end.

6 **Q.** Okay that's fine. What I want to do now, please, is come  
7 on to the question of observations and risk assessment.  
8 You have already adverted to this previously. You  
9 explain in your statement that following the Examination  
10 by the locum doctor a meeting was held to determine,  
11 amongst other things, the level of observations that was  
12 to be applied to Richard. Have I understood that  
13 correctly?

14 **A.** Sorry, once more?

15 **Q.** I am going to say that again. If there is an ongoing  
16 issue, we may see if we can put up the volume of the  
17 microphone. You explain that following the Examination  
18 by the locum doctor, a meeting was held to determine,  
19 amongst other things, the level of observations that was  
20 to be applied to Richard. Have I understood that  
21 correctly?

22 **A.** Yes, you have.

23 **Q.** What kind of meeting do you understand this to have been  
24 and for what purpose other than specifically to fix an  
25 observation level?

1   **A.** Right. The meeting, as I understand it, and what the  
2 documents suggests go on is not much more than people sit  
3 in a room and they talk about what they are going to do.  
4 I am not aware of there being a structured methodology to  
5 that meeting in terms of a flowchart or anything of that  
6 that was used because there was nothing like that in the  
7 records that I have been given or I have seen.

8   **Q.** Is this what is sometimes referred to as a  
9 multidisciplinary team meeting or do you not know?

10   **A.** I don't know about multidisciplinary team meetings. If  
11 is such an official sounding meeting, it was an  
12 unofficial and ad hoc version of it.

13   **Q.** Thank you. You explain, this is from paragraph 134 of  
14 your statement, you explain that the decision reached at  
15 this meeting was for level 2 observation -- we will come  
16 on to that in a moment.

17   **A.** Yes.

18   **Q.** And you explain this means four observations an hour.  
19 And you separately explain in your statement that staff  
20 have explained in various interviews that level 2  
21 observations were the standard for new admissions?

22   **A.** They have, but I disagree with that from their policy  
23 documents.

24   **Q.** The Inquiry has received evidence from EPUT, so the  
25 successor trust, concerning the different levels of

1 observations at that trust.

2 **A.** Okay.

3 **Q.** They start at level 1, which is general observations,  
4 which involves knowing the patient's location but without  
5 the need to keep them in sight. They then include  
6 enhanced levels from 2 to 4. The minimum of the enhanced  
7 levels, as we have been told, is level 2 or intermittent  
8 observations, where it is necessary to check a patient a  
9 minimum of four times an hour. It sounds as if that is  
10 the level that you are talking about here, that was  
11 applied to Richard, is that --

12 **A.** The level 2 was applied, that's correct.

13 **Q.** Then there is the level 3, which is sometimes referred as  
14 continuous within eyesight. So this is a more enhanced  
15 level, where staff are allocated to each patient and the  
16 patient must be kept in continuous eyesight. Then there  
17 is an even more enhanced level at 4, which is continuous  
18 within arm's length where staff are allocated to observe  
19 a patient in close proximity.

20 **A.** Yes.

21 **Q.** I think we are at least concerned with levels 2 and 3.  
22 Is that right?

23 **A.** I think those are the appropriate two for this, yes.

24 **Q.** We will come on to this in a moment, but I have just  
25 described level 3 at EPUT. Does that actually equate to



1 level 3?

2 **A.** Yes, it does.

3 **Q.** Given what was known about Richard, what is your view  
4 about observations being set at level 2, so a minimum of  
5 four times an hour?

6 **A.** If I go back to the point of the settings of the levels,  
7 that is the policy documents do not say that the standard  
8 observation level is level 2. It is not in their  
9 documents. What the documents for their policies  
10 actually say is that the appropriate level should be  
11 applied on the information that is known. In a separate  
12 document it says that if the patient -- that the big  
13 warning flag, if you like, is suicide and it was clearly  
14 stated and it was on all the documentation of the Trust  
15 that Richard was suicidal. The Trust and even what I  
16 classify as the better nurses within it, in the  
17 communications that I've had, misunderstand that policy.  
18 They seem to have very fixed, this-is-what-we-do  
19 attitudes, and are incapable of changing from it. I will  
20 give you an example of that, one particular staff nurse,  
21 and it is on the list but I won't refer to it at the  
22 moment, came in in the morning and said she was shocked  
23 that Richard was on level 2. But the Trust is so  
24 inflexible, that even though their policies state that  
25 she has the authority to increase the level of

1 observation, though not decrease them, which seems  
2 sensible, she didn't do so. But she had the authority to  
3 do so. That is another point that is taken up by the  
4 consultant psychiatrist with the police, that they are  
5 inflexible in the application of their policies. So they  
6 are right at convincing themselves that level 2 was the  
7 one they always did. They did not go to level 3 although  
8 they had the power to do so. I think that in going to  
9 level 2, with Richard known to be suicidal and letting  
10 him have a shower is a critical part of how he took his  
11 life.

12 **THE CHAIR:** Can I just ask why do you say they were right or  
13 in their own minds they were right to put him in level 2?

14 **A.** Because they have absolutely convinced themselves their  
15 standard practices, the things they do day-to-day, are in  
16 fact what the policies are. Whereas the policies don't  
17 say what they think they do. They do not seem to be  
18 aware of their own policies.

19 **THE CHAIR:** So you say it is a matter of habit that they put  
20 people on level 2?

21 **A.** I think that would be a reasonable way to express it,  
22 yes.

23 **MR GRIFFIN:** You say elsewhere in your statement that in your  
24 view Richard was at immediate risk, and you explain that  
25 NEPT should have taken a more proactive approach to his

1           care?

2   **A.**   Hmm mmm.

3   **Q.**   Having regard to his suicidal ideation and as directed by  
4           its own policies?

5   **A.**   Yes.

6   **Q.**   And they should have immediately placed him under  
7           one-to-one observations?

8   **A.**   Yes.   If I may point out a flaw in their thinking on  
9           level 2 observations.   It is the observations are four  
10          times an hour, which leads everyone to go that would be  
11          every 15 minutes.   No, they should be done randomly and  
12          the Trust is right in that they do do them randomly, but  
13          the idea of doing them randomly is that the patient never  
14          knows when they are going to be observed.   In other  
15          words, they don't know when they are not being observed,  
16          they can't be certain of it.   But since they had given  
17          Richard unfettered and unsupervised access to the  
18          bathroom, Richard would have known at that point that no  
19          one was going to disturb him, which completely nullifies  
20          their thinking in using random observations because they  
21          have cancelled out the randomness by putting a safe  
22          period into it.

23   **Q.**   What do you think would be different in if Richard had  
24          been on a more enhanced level of observations on  
25          Finchingfield Ward?

1   **A.** All the information that follows would not be taking  
2       place, none of it. Would Richard still be alive today?  
3       I would hope so. Richard was ill on two occasions with  
4       exactly the same thing. So that's the start of a trend.  
5       So it is feasible that he may have had to manage that for  
6       the rest of his life and we have discussed that as a  
7       possibility between us. But we never got to that point.  
8       They didn't put him on level 3, they put him on level 2  
9       and as I warned the nurse the night before, if there is a  
10      flaw in your processes, he will see it, and he did.

11   **Q.** You say at paragraph 90 of your statement that Richard  
12      would be helped through his crisis and survived.

13   **A.** Yes.

14   **Q.** And with proper care and guidance, have found a way to  
15      live a fruitful life.

16   **A.** Indeed.

17   **Q.** Does that accurately summarise the significance, in your  
18      eyes, of setting the wrong observation level?

19   **A.** Correct.

20   **Q.** Robert, I am going to move on to a new topic in a moment.  
21      Before I do, is there anything else that you would like  
22      to raise on the issue of risk assessment and observation  
23      levels?

24   **A.** No, not at the moment.

25   **MR GRIFFIN:** Chair, it is quarter past three. We've been

1       going for an hour and a quarter. I wonder if now might  
2       be a convenient moment for a ten minute break. That will  
3       take us to twenty-five past three.

4 (3.15 pm)

5 (Break)

6 (3.28 pm)

7       **MR GRIFFIN:** I would like to move on to ask you about the  
8       extent to which staff involved Richard in his own care at  
9       the Linden Centre, even for the short time he was there,  
10      and also the extent to which the family was involved. I  
11      would like first to see what you said about Richard's  
12      care management and plans and I am going the turn to  
13      paragraph 70 of your statement. What you say there is  
14      that:

15                    "An undated and unsigned care plan was shown to  
16                    us, but as far as we are aware, Richard was not involved  
17                    in its creation, the Trust claiming that he was too  
18                    compliant."

19                   What did you understand by that term, "too  
20       compliant"?

21     **A.**   Okay.  The care plan that we were shown was to the first  
22           two of three pages.  The original one did not have a  
23           third page, so we did not have a signature and date or an  
24           identity.  A third page did turn up some weeks later,  
25           which surprised me because I don't see how the document

1       could be separated, but it did turn up some time later  
2       when we kept pressing for it. When you read the care  
3       plan, it's just completely generic in its terms and if it  
4       was trying to do anything for an individual, it just  
5       didn't do it, and besides, if you spoke to Richard, you  
6       would remember it. He had the knack of being in your  
7       mind and remembering him. In what they wrote there was  
8       none of his voice, and his voice would have been there  
9       had he spoken, had he had the chance to speak in fact.  
10      So we challenged that in that there was nothing in his  
11      voice, and it was clear that they hadn't seen Richard  
12      when they developed this care plan, which they accepted  
13      on the basis that he was too compliant. The idea being  
14      that because he was so ill and because he would just do  
15      everything he was told, whatever he said would therefore  
16      be meaningless and of no value to the care plan. So I  
17      asked the obvious question, and that is how non-compliant  
18      must you be before you get a care plan? And I have never  
19      received an answer to that obvious question.

20   **Q.** To what extent was the family involved in decisions  
21       relating to Richard's care, again for the short time he  
22       was on the ward?

23   **A.** Not at all. We did try to contact the Trust in the  
24       morning, my wife called them, I think about 7.30. I  
25       think the times are in here somewhere, called early, and

1       they promised to call back. They didn't call back so she  
2       made another call. We had no chance to make any input at  
3       all on the care plan. We couldn't even find out how he  
4       was.

5     **Q.** Do you think in total, you say somewhere in your  
6       statement, that he was actually on Finchingfield Ward for  
7       no more than 12 hours in total?

8     **A.** That's right.

9     **Q.** Is it right that when you phoned the Linden Centre on the  
10      morning of 17 May, you were told that Richard's phone  
11      battery was drained, that he had asked for a charger, but  
12      that none was available?

13    **A.** Yes.

14    **Q.** So were you able to talk at any stage by phone with him  
15      whilst he was at the Linden Centre?

16    **A.** No.

17    **Q.** In fact, was the last time that any of you spoke to him  
18      during the time outside your house on Saturday the 16th?

19    **A.** Yes. Well that would be true for me because I went out  
20      with him, but withdrew when it was clear that it wasn't  
21      going in a good direction. That's when I left him with a  
22      neighbour, a really sensible man, he just managed it  
23      beautifully till the police got there. My wife only saw  
24      him in the house before he thought of going outside and  
25      my second son would only have seen him before he left to

1 go back to his room.

2 **Q.** Thank you very much. Can I now ask you about a plan to  
3 move Richard out of the Linden Centre, and I would like  
4 to look at the part of your statement where you address  
5 this. Could you put up please page 20 of the statement  
6 that's HAJ007887 and paragraph 94. You say this:

7 "We had no immediate concerns on the evening of  
8 16 May beyond what one would expect for a son and  
9 brother; we were too exhausted and needed sleep for the  
10 coming day. It was due to lack of information from and  
11 response to my wife's call to the Linden Centre that we  
12 started to have doubts about the Linden Centre."

13 That's the call you just referred to?

14 **A.** Mm hmm.

15 **Q.** "An internet search on the morning of 17 May revealed  
16 many poor reports and serious concerns regarding safety  
17 and treatment, and so we formulated a plan to move  
18 Richard to a safer location."

19 So your concerns were raised, both by your own  
20 experience with the Linden Centre, and what you had been  
21 able to access online; is that right?

22 **A.** That's correct.

23 **Q.** Could you go over the page please and expand the next two  
24 paragraphs?

25 **THE CHAIR:** Can I just ask one thing?



1     **MR GRIFFIN:**   Yes, of course.

2     **THE CHAIR:**   At what time did your wife phone the Linden  
3                   Centre?

4     **A.**   The first one was about 7.30, the second one was about 9,  
5                   9.30 something like that, so a while later.

6     **THE CHAIR:**   And you have criticised, or suggested, that you  
7                   were not engaged in any way in the care plan that night  
8                   before.  Had you been, what would you have said?  What  
9                   would you have asked them to do?

10    **A.**   Well, I think the first thing that would come out, given  
11                   that their observation levels were inappropriate for  
12                   someone with suicidal ideation.  For example, on the  
13                   admission policy, when they are going in and in the  
14                   suicide policies, that the danger points should be  
15                   recognised as those when someone first enters, and if  
16                   they are unknown to the Trust, both of which were true of  
17                   Richard at that time, as well as all of the other  
18                   suicidal ideations that sit on top of it.  So those two  
19                   factors were in breach of their own policy as well.  So I  
20                   think the key thing that I would have been looking for  
21                   was that they were close to him, knew what his behaviours  
22                   were and got to understand the troubles that he had,  
23                   particularly in terms of motor neuron disease, because  
24                   apart from mentioning it in one or two documents, nothing  
25                   was done around that at all and no record of any way of

1       trying to calm him down about it. Now the reason on the  
2       previous example that you showed as to why we were so  
3       exhausted by the time Richard left, was for the two weeks  
4       as the motor neuron disease got the better of the  
5       depression, it became the prominent concern on his mind.  
6       We spent massive amounts of time trying to talk him down  
7       and calm him around that motor neuron disease. The  
8       concept and the idea that he could have got in a police  
9       car, be taken to another location, walk in and be utterly  
10      calm about something that had denied him sleep for weeks  
11      or months to the point of crisis all the way through, and  
12      you just lie down and have a goodnight's sleep is a  
13      patent nonsense. So that's where I would really be  
14      starting from. They had completely the wrong end of the  
15      stick and in many ways I believe by convenience and  
16      choice.

17   **THE CHAIR:** Thank you. Sorry.

18   **MR GRIFFIN:** Not at all. Can we just continue what we were  
19      looking at the top two paragraphs:

20                "The plan was that my wife and I would drive to  
21      the Linden Centre and re-establish communications with  
22      Richard, and given the events of the previous evening,  
23      possibly with me waiting in my car. Our son would drive  
24      to Richard's flat to retrieve details of his private  
25      health insurance and then meet up with us and Richard.

1                   Once Richard had agreed a way forward, and a  
2           new hospital found, he would have been moved to that  
3           location" -- and then you say this -- "Fate intervened  
4           and we were to be too late by minutes."

5   **A.**   Yes.

6   **Q.**   And we will move on to see what you mean by that in just  
7           a moment.   Could you take that down, please.   Did you and  
8           your wife Linda go to the Linden Centre at just before  
9           noon on Sunday 17 May?

10 **A.**   Yes.

11 **Q.**   When you arrived, were you met by a healthcare assistant  
12          at the entrance of the Linden Centre?

13 **A.**   Yes, but if I could lead you towards that.

14 **Q.**   Of course.

15 **A.**   We arrived at the Linden Centre, we turned up and you  
16          enter a sort of vestibule type area and there is a  
17          controlled door inside that and you can see into an  
18          office over to your left.   There's an open area behind  
19          glass panelling and walling and you can see the patients,  
20          you can see what's going on and there's a restaurant over  
21          to your right-hand side, a cafeteria area.   There was no  
22          one in that area at that time.

23 **Q.**   So you say in your statement:

24                   "Personal ID was not requested", and you  
25           weren't asked to sign a visitor's register.

1   **A.** No, what happened was we were stood at the entrance  
2       trying to gain access and someone walked over, opened the  
3       door and that's the healthcare assistant that you  
4       mention, and he said to us you must be Mr and Mrs Wade.  
5       We hadn't introduced ourselves. We never said yes and we  
6       never said no. He simply took it that we were. When I  
7       wondered how he had managed to recognise us, he told us  
8       it's because we look like Richard. I think if you look  
9       at the photograph, he looks no more like us than any  
10      other human being would.

11   **Q.** We will come on to the photo at the end.

12   **A.** Okay, so having done that part there and spoken to him,  
13      he admitted us, he did not ask us to put anything into a  
14      signing in book, and already I am beginning to think that  
15      if these people know that Richard thinks that I wanted to  
16      kill him, why on earth are they letting me in through the  
17      door and not challenging me on identity or location? So  
18      I'm already becoming very suspicious of what's going on  
19      because that is the first point of contact and that  
20      establishes control for the patient. It wasn't taken.

21   **Q.** You say that you were invited on to Finchingfield Ward,  
22      that would be you and Linda?

23   **A.** That's correct.

24   **Q.** You were left there unattended while he went to look for  
25      Richard.

1   **A.** Yes, we entered the ward, he invited us down to the ward,  
2       at this point I am becoming seriously concerned because  
3       he was marching us down to meet Richard close to his  
4       room. Which means that if Richard was in his room, the  
5       first sight he will see of me is standing outside in the  
6       corridor, bearing in mind that he still thinks that I  
7       want to kill him. So that made no sense whatsoever. But  
8       it was also some of the things he started to say as we  
9       were walking down. He said, for example, that Richard  
10      had had a goodnight's sleep. Well, that's patent  
11      nonsense. Richard hadn't slept for weeks and unless they  
12      gave something pretty robust he wouldn't have done  
13      either. So that I didn't believe. He told me that the  
14      doctor was going to come in and that they would be  
15      looking to give, to release Richard, which also seemed  
16      ridiculous, bearing in mind it was only 12 hours before  
17      he had been admitted for suicide. So the things he was  
18      saying just did not match the situation and seemed wholly  
19      inappropriate for the conversation that you should be  
20      having with the parents on first meeting, irrespective of  
21      whether the patient thinks that one of those parents  
22      wants to kill him.

23   **Q.** Another point you raise in your statement, over and above  
24       what you have just told us, is that you were left at  
25       liberty to walk off and enter other patients' rooms for

1 example.

2 **A.** We could have done anything we wanted to.

3 **Q.** And that your second son was able to enter a little later

4 on, again without challenge.

5 **A.** Okay, yes. If I can fill some of the time in between

6 those things, but stop me if that's something you want to

7 ask.

8 **Q.** We may come on to it. If we don't I will pause and you

9 can fill in then, if that's okay?

10 **A.** Okay, fine.

11 **Q.** Did your experiences of visitor security at the Linden

12 Centre and Finchingfield Ward inform wider concerns over

13 patient safety and, for example, the risk that patients

14 might be able to leave the ward?

15 **A.** Yes. We entered without giving identification. After

16 the events of Richard being found, which I think --

17 **Q.** We will come to that.

18 **A.** Okay, fine. Then when he was found we moved back to a

19 family room in the reception area.

20 **Q.** We will come back to that.

21 **A.** In that family room there's big glass panels all the way

22 round so that you can see out and it doesn't feel such an

23 enclosed space, well, fine. But it meant that we could

24 look across and we could see the door opposite.

25 **Q.** Can we come on to this because I want to take this in

1 stages to ensure that we capture everything.

2 **A.** No, we were left unsupervised for long periods of time on  
3 two wards, the one on which Richard was and on the  
4 entrance to another ward.

5 **Q.** Let's trace exactly where you and Linda were at different  
6 times. The first thing I want to ask is this, though;  
7 when you arrived on Finchingfield Ward, did staff know  
8 where Richard was?

9 **A.** No.

10 **Q.** I am now going to move on to the troubling evidence about  
11 what happened to Richard, so I just want to prepare you  
12 for that.

13 **A.** Okay.

14 **Q.** I want to ask you about what happened next by reference  
15 to what you said in your statement. You cover this from  
16 paragraph 56. After you arrived on the ward, where were  
17 you and Linda placed?

18 **A.** We were placed on the corridor in the Finchingfield Ward  
19 looking down towards Richard's bedroom with a clear sight  
20 of the bathroom at the far end.

21 **Q.** Can I ask you this because we've been hearing some  
22 evidence last week about in-patient rooms that have en  
23 suite bathrooms.

24 **A.** Yes.

25 **Q.** If I have understand correctly, is this actually a

1 bathroom that is separate from the bedroom?

2 **A.** Yes, it is. As we looked down the corridor there were  
3 rooms down either side, I think Richard was the second  
4 from the end, on the right-hand side as we look, and the  
5 bathroom was dead ahead.

6 **Q.** So you had a good line of sight both of the entrance of  
7 his room and in fact of the bathroom.

8 **A.** Perfect line of sight.

9 **Q.** Thank you. You describe how the healthcare assistant who  
10 had greeted you and Linda went to Richard's room on the  
11 right-hand side as you have described.

12 **A.** Yes.

13 **Q.** Learnt that Richard wasn't there, said he would look in  
14 the garden and you describe how he was also asking other  
15 members of staff if they had seen where Richard was; is  
16 that correct?

17 **A.** Yes. Having walked down on the corridor and left us in  
18 the corridor looking down, he walked down to Richard's  
19 room, come out, came back to us and said that he's not in  
20 his room he might be in the garden, but then again he  
21 might be anywhere else, how would he know he's in the  
22 garden as opposed to any other location was the oddity in  
23 my mind. He went out disappeared round the garden, came  
24 back sometime later, wasn't there, then walked up and  
25 down the corridor asking people if they had seen Richard.



1 I believe another member of staff got involved but it's  
2 very difficult to tell because the staff didn't wear any  
3 form of uniform or identification. So during the whole  
4 of that afternoon, or the hour -- it seemed like a long  
5 time -- but for the whole of the roughly the hour and a  
6 bit that we were there, it was impossible to tell who  
7 were patients and who were staff.

8 **Q.** But did there come a time when you heard a shout?

9 **A.** Yes.

10 **Q.** You heard someone speak.

11 **A.** We did, yes. That was after the healthcare assistant had  
12 come back and it seemed that two healthcare assistants,  
13 again, it's difficult to tell, were coming back asking  
14 "Have you seen Richard?", "Is he there?" It was a  
15 bizarre show. It didn't look real, it looked staged, it  
16 looked wrong. And as they are coming up the corridor  
17 there was a shout from somewhere else and I can't tell  
18 where, that came from elsewhere, and it said, "He's in  
19 the bathroom."

20 **Q.** In fact, in your statement you say, "He's in the shower",  
21 do you actually recall which it was?

22 **A.** I think it would be the shower. Because he would have  
23 asked for a shower, he very rarely bathed, he showered  
24 frequently.

25 **Q.** What could you yourself see at this time?

1   **A.** At this time we are starting to see people move around.  
2       Immediately after that the alarm klaxon went off. People  
3       are now running in all directions so we are half  
4       following some of what's going on, trying to work out  
5       what's happening. At the start of the process the door  
6       down the bottom was locked or at least it was shut and no  
7       one was in. When we looked back down, a little later on,  
8       the door was open and we could see -- we saw the door was  
9       open and we could see Richard's legs poking across the  
10      room.

11   **Q.** And could you tell was he lying on the floor, as far as  
12      you could see from his legs, or was it not possible to  
13      say?

14   **A.** What we could see was the bottom end of his legs if he  
15      was suspended, as we believe he was, it is feasible that  
16      he could still have been upright at that time but we  
17      could not tell.

18   **Q.** I understand, so what you could see was the bottom end of  
19      his legs?

20   **A.** Indeed.

21   **Q.** Were you and Linda then taken to the family room that you  
22      just started to describe?

23   **A.** We then went to the family room after that.

24   **Q.** Was that pretty quickly, I think you say in your  
25      statement within 30 seconds you were sent back to the

1 family room near reception?

2 **A.** Yes, could I just add something before that as I think it  
3 is material to the finding.

4 **Q.** Please do.

5 **A.** And that is that while we were there we saw two staff  
6 nurses, one male, one female running down and I am not  
7 sure if they ran down before the door was opened or not,  
8 it's a very difficult time to remember. But they were  
9 running down and I know because we saw them afterwards  
10 and recognised them as they were the two that opened the  
11 door on the second of the two groups, and we will come on  
12 to that part a bit later.

13 **Q.** Yes, definitely. So you are back in the family room.  
14 Was it at this time that your second son joined you?

15 **A.** It was. He turned up at the door and he couldn't get in  
16 because there was no one manning the door.

17 **Q.** Now if I have understood the geography correctly, when  
18 you are in the family room you can't see Richard's room  
19 or the bathroom or anything?

20 **A.** No, you are round the corner by that time and there's a  
21 sort of a little chicane in the corridor that would have  
22 blocked that.

23 **Q.** But you do describe at paragraph 60 what you could see  
24 from the family room. You describe a squabble between  
25 staff and visitors.

1   **A.**   Yes.

2   **Q.**   Now was that squabble anything to do, as far as you are  
3       aware, with Richard, or was it something completely --

4   **A.**   CRAIG nothing, nothing to do with Richard.

5   **Q.**   And you also describe a paramedic with an oxygen bottle  
6       unable to re-enter the ward because no staff were able to  
7       open the door.

8   **A.**   Yes, one of the things that really surprised me is that  
9       -- from my time in the navy, we practised emergency  
10      situations again and again and again and at any time of  
11      day someone knew that they had to man a particular  
12      location and do a particular set of tasks in relation to  
13      that emergency and it started with for exercise, for  
14      exercise, for exercise and it happened every single day.  
15      What I couldn't understand is, bearing in mind that they  
16      are almost certainly going to get an emergency, and in an  
17      emergency situation they are going to have to control the  
18      door, why no one was posted on it. In fact, I can't find  
19      any record anywhere of anyone saying what their specific  
20      job was in any form of emergency.

21   **Q.**   So this issue about inadequate -- let me just make sure I  
22      understand. One of the issues that arises is of an  
23      inadequate emergency response; is that correct?

24   **A.**   I think it's closer to absent.

25   **Q.**   Absent emergency response, thank you.

1   **A.**   Yes.

2   **Q.**   Now during the time that this is all happening, to what  
3       extent are you and Linda and your second son being kept  
4       informed.

5   **A.**   All right.  Completing the part of (redacted) getting in,  
6       he only managed to get in when he got, when I approached  
7       a -- no that was another point.  He only managed to get  
8       in when someone else wanted to leave, that person left  
9       and (redacted) just walked in beside them and the member  
10      of staff didn't challenge him at all.  He didn't present  
11      identification and he didn't sign any book.

12  **THE CHAIR:**  Classic tailgating.

13  **A.**   Pardon?

14  **THE CHAIR:**  Classic tailgating.

15  **A.**   Yes, just walked through and that was it.

16  **MR GRIFFIN:**  Were you and Linda and your second son then  
17      moved to some seats in a corridor?

18  **A.**   We were but there are some important issues that happened  
19      between those two points in time.

20  **Q.**   Of course.

21  **A.**   Shall I cover them now?

22  **Q.**   Yes please.

23  **A.**   Okay, we were in the family room and we were given a cup  
24      of tea, it seems reasonable, and an apple.  The apple  
25      seems rather odd, but bearing in mind the shock we had

1        had, we ate the apple for the sugar to try and keep  
2        ourselves going. And if they had done with foresight,  
3        then well done for the person that did that. We sat  
4        there, we asked for some sort of help, we were given no  
5        information, we were told at one point that they had  
6        caught Richard in time. What we didn't understand in  
7        that, and I don't think the person understood when they  
8        said it, was they caught him in time, he had had a heart  
9        attack so his heart had stopped, they had got his heart  
10       going. What they didn't tell us what that it was so long  
11       later that the delay had destroyed his brain but I think  
12       we will cover, we will come on to that in your question.  
13       So we are now wondering what will happen, so we are  
14       pressing for a senior nurse to come and visit us.  
15       Finally, a nurse turned up, the gentleman sat down and he  
16       put his hand over the front of his face in *this* fashion.  
17       And having put it over his face he proceeded to mumble  
18       and he mumbled and used words in a bizarre Eastern  
19       European Italian accent. I couldn't understand a word he  
20       said. He wouldn't repeat anything that he said but the  
21       only two words we understood were "choke" and "cord", and  
22       that's all we understood and that is the extent of the  
23       information that we were given on Finchingfield Ward. We  
24       were then moved --  
25       **Q.** To the corridor.

1   **A.** Sorry to complete your question now, I didn't want that  
2       part missed out, we were then moved from the family room  
3       around the corner on the basis that they were clearing  
4       the area so that they could move Richard out. What they  
5       didn't tell us was the condition Richard was in. Nothing  
6       prepared us for that.

7   **Q.** But did you learn that he had been taken to A&E?

8   **A.** Yes, we did.

9   **Q.** Okay, we are going to come on to A&E but before we do, I  
10       would like to look at part of your statement, please.  
11       Could you put up the statement at page 12. This is  
12       HJA007877 at page 12 and expand (iii) at the bottom.  
13       Thank you. Now you have touched on this already but I  
14       think it is helpful to look at this slightly more  
15       detailed version of what you say in your statement:

16                "Throughout the time that we occupied the  
17       family room, and during emergency conditions, the main  
18       entrance was not manned."

19                And as we have heard:

20                "At one point a paramedic with an oxygen  
21       cylinder was unable to enter until I demanded a member of  
22       staff that the paramedic be admitted. Throughout the  
23       emergency there was an air of     panic" --

24   **A.** Yes.

25   **Q.** - "and this is reflected in the SIIR. It gave the

1 appearance of the unpreparedness that comes from the lack  
2 of exercises and drills necessary to an effective  
3 emergency response."

4 Now is that what you were referring to earlier  
5 on?

6 **A.** It is. That's what I led into there. This led to the  
7 point where at one stage one of the emergency team that  
8 had been called in ambulances had been let out, taken,  
9 gone and got an oxygen bottle and was standing with the  
10 oxygen bottle outside the door trying to get in and the  
11 only way that that person got in was because I walked  
12 across to the dining room where there was a member of  
13 staff, at least I hope it was, there was a member of  
14 staff standing there and I made it plain to them that  
15 they need to go over to the door and let the person in  
16 because my son is in serious condition down the corridor.  
17 That's the only way that that even happened.

18 **Q.** Can we read the next paragraph, 51. You say:

19 "The witness statement of the on-call  
20 Dr/paramedic states that the paddles of the defibrillator  
21 were on the wrong way, meaning that the initial attempts  
22 to restart Richard's heart " -- and you mentioned this he  
23 was in cardiac arrest -- "served no purpose and some of  
24 the most valuable recovery time lost."

25 **A.** Yes.



1   **Q.** Could you take that down, please. But is this, again,  
2       all part of the nature of the emergency response in  
3       relation to Richard?

4   **A.** Well, yes. If you are using a piece of equipment and you  
5       are doing it in a relaxed manner and you can just pick it  
6       up and you put it together and you take your time. It's  
7       ease to do. You can follow the instructions, it's not  
8       difficult. But if you then put that same person under  
9       severe pressure, whether it's a real situation or not, so  
10      you bring in some form of simulated stress, that person  
11      won't be able to do it that easily. But you will only do  
12      that when you have built up the muscle memory of having  
13      done it repeatedly time and time again and under as close  
14      conditions as you can to the stressful ones you find when  
15      you have a patient in cardiac arrest before you.

16   **Q.** So this comes back to the point about training and/or  
17      drilling to make sure that come an emergency you are  
18      ready and able to deal with any eventuality.

19   **A.** Indeed, whatever training they did, if it was on their  
20      policies or whatever, was of no value in a situation like  
21      this, and I think I have alluded on a previous answer  
22      that the training had no benefit then either.

23   **Q.** I am going to just ask -- I am going to read from  
24      paragraph 227 of your statement because that's also  
25      relevant here, you say:

1                    "After Richard was found we witnessed one  
2           member of staff, and one member of staff only who, seemed  
3           to know what they were doing."

4                    Was that a ward manager?

5       **A.**   I think that would be the role that that person had at  
6           the time.

7       **Q.**   You say:

8                    "The remainder of what we saw ranged from poor  
9           to appalling."

10      **A.**   Yes.

11      **Q.**   "The documentation available to us provides us with no  
12           comfort, as it displays no warmth towards Richard at his  
13           time of need."

14                    And you say this at paragraph 228:

15                    The disparities in professionalism, competence  
16           and compassion between Finchingfield Ward in the Linden  
17           Centre and A&E and ICU in Broomfield Hospital, where  
18           Richard was nursed until his death, could not have been  
19           more stark."

20                    That was your experience?

21      **A.**   Yes.   If I could just add to that, if I pick up on the  
22           question that you asked me previously, Chair, about what  
23           would I have done, I would have liked to have seen the  
24           quality and the professionalism of the ICU staff, in the  
25           Linden Centre.   If they could match one tenth of what

1           those people had my son would still be with us today.

2   **Q.** You explain in your main statement that Richard was found  
3       unconscious with a ligature around his neck in the  
4       bathroom on Finchingfield ward?

5   **A.** Yes.

6   **Q.** Did you subsequently learn that he must have ligatured  
7       using pipe work in the bathroom in what you regard as a  
8       foreseeably dangerous location?

9   **A.** Yes, we did. We were not told that he had ligatured  
10      himself completely. All we heard was "cord" and "choke".  
11      That's all we knew when we left the Linden Centre itself.  
12      So we picked this up in police investigations and other  
13      investigations as it goes along. Now, the ligature  
14      itself, the first time we were told it was a ligature was  
15      in the A&E department over in the hospital, and do you  
16      want me to go there?

17   **Q.** We will come on to that in a moment.

18   **A.** Yes, but it was a ligature that we were subsequently  
19      told.

20   **Q.** Do you make this point at paragraph 198 of your statement  
21      that Richard did hang himself and that that conclusion is  
22      important, let's just remember this is mid-May 2015, and  
23      that conclusion is important because in February 2015,  
24      just three months before Richard, another gentleman took  
25      his own life by hanging in the very same room as Richard?

1   **A.**   Correct.   In February of that year a gentleman hanged  
2       himself on a separate ligature point in the bathroom.  
3       When Richard used it, you have mentioned the pipework, so  
4       I will use that term, and it's absolutely obvious that  
5       the pipework, you cannot miss it.   A few things suggest  
6       that Richard hanged himself and didn't just  
7       self-ligature.   The first of them is that the autopsy  
8       report, the pathologist on three separate occasions  
9       mentions that the wounds and the marks and lesions on  
10      Richard and the type of death and the damage done to him  
11      was caused more than likely -- sorry he used the term  
12      consistent with hanging rather than self-ligature.   He  
13      points out that self-ligature is extremely difficult  
14      anyway.   The next part of the evidence is that on the  
15      pipework itself the damage that was done would have been  
16      consistent with Richard hanging himself and consistent  
17      with nothing else, in the way that it is broken.   The  
18      point that finally convinced me on this was when I did  
19      something the police, and the Trust never did, and that's  
20      elicit from an eyewitness that Richard was in fact  
21      connected to the pipe, and I know who undid the knot and  
22      I know how the pipework had become broken.

23   **Q.**   So two points.   One is that the evidence when you put it  
24      altogether indicates that he hanged himself?

25   **A.**   Yes.

1   **Q.** And the other thing is that this was coming not long  
2       after another gentleman, as you put it, had also hanged  
3       himself in the same bathroom?

4   **A.** Well, yes, and after that the CQC which I guess which  
5       will also cover --

6   **Q.** We will touch on that briefly.

7   **A.** Did an investigation. That would have triggered and we  
8       had the discussion with the Trust on 5 August that there  
9       should have been some repairs made. The pipework itself  
10      was still there when we returned to meet with the Trust  
11      on 5 August. We were taken down to the room.

12  **Q.** We will come on to that in a moment as well.

13  **A.** Okay.

14  **Q.** I am going to move on now, Robert, to the A&E and the  
15      ICU. Before I do, is there anything else you would like  
16      to raise before this very difficult piece of evidence?

17  **A.** I think you have pulled on the leash on several  
18      occasions. We will cover those when we get there.

19  **Q.** So A&E at Broomfield Hospital?

20  **A.** Yes.

21  **Q.** You describe in your main statement from paragraph 64,  
22      arriving at A&E and going to the family room there.

23  **A.** Mmm hmm.

24  **Q.** What happened whilst you were in the family room?

25  **A.** Okay, the three of us left the Linden Centre in two cars.

1 We drove over to the car park, pulled over into the  
2 hospital, up to the desk to find out what was going on.  
3 They knew that Richard was there. We gave reasonable  
4 identification, and they directed us towards the family  
5 room, so that we could wait there whilst we were waiting  
6 for some news of Richard. In there, there were already  
7 two people. There were two ladies, one sat in the corner  
8 wearing black and another one sat here, I believe it was  
9 a blue dress that she was wearing.

10 **Q.** You said a blue dress?

11 **A.** I believe it was blue, and she was sat with her hands on  
12 her thighs, like someone waiting for an interview, which  
13 struck me as an odd way to sit in A&E if you are waiting  
14 to find out the condition of a loved one. But that  
15 didn't do much. We started talking, and we were really  
16 trying to struggle to understand what had happened to  
17 Richard, we had been given so little. Clearly, the lady  
18 in the corner, dressed in black, clearly recognised that  
19 our circumstance was somewhat uncomfortable or we had  
20 made her feel uncomfortable, I don't know which it is,  
21 but she had the common sense and the politeness to leave  
22 the room to us, so that we could deal with the troubles  
23 that we had. But the other lady stayed and she didn't  
24 say or do anything. She just sat there and we talked and  
25 we tried to rationalise what was going on. Then it

1        dawned on me that she still hasn't moved, she was like a  
2        statue, sitting with her hands on her hips. At this  
3        point she said that she was from the Linden Centre. If  
4        she is from the Linden Centre and she has come over about  
5        Richard, we are going to want to know what happened, so  
6        we started pressurising her with questions. In that at  
7        one point we told her we didn't know how he died. So she  
8        demonstrated how she had been told, because we found out  
9        that she hadn't been in on the morning. She only turned  
10       up in the afternoon after Richard had hanged himself.

11    **Q.** Did she inform you that Richard had choked himself using  
12       a cord?

13    **A.** Yes.

14    **Q.** But did she also demonstrate it and did she demonstrate  
15       it in significant and graphic detail?

16    **A.** Together with facial expressions, yes.

17    **Q.** Thank you. What was your reaction to what she said and  
18       to the demonstration that she gave?

19    **A.** Utter horror.

20    **Q.** Did you also speak with an A&E doctor?

21    **A.** Yes, we did.

22    **Q.** Did he inform you of the seriousness of Richard's  
23       condition?

24    **A.** Yes, he did. He told us that Richard had severe brain  
25       damage and it was most unlikely that there was any chance

1 of a recovery.

2 **Q.** Was Richard transferred to the intensive care unit?

3 **A.** He was.

4 **Q.** You explain in your main statement and you say this at  
5 paragraph 69:

6 "At ICU the full extent of Richard's injuries  
7 were revealed to us. The extent of those injuries were  
8 such that they provoked a senior ICU charge nurse to  
9 issue a safeguarding report for the first time in his  
10 career."

11 Correct?

12 **A.** Correct, yes. He was so upset by what he saw. The --  
13 there was one point I would like to make about the A&E  
14 waiting room, but I think we will deal with this and then  
15 go back.

16 **Q.** Yes.

17 **A.** Richard had hanged himself and the ligature had  
18 completely closed off the blood to his brain.

19 **Q.** May I just say this, Robert. There will be a variety of  
20 people watching and listening to this evidence, so whilst  
21 it is very important you are able to give a true account,  
22 could I ask you to do so with some care just with an  
23 awareness of people who may be listening.

24 **A.** Of course. Let me express it this way, then. I am a  
25 fairly robust person, but when I walked in to see Richard



1 I couldn't last more than a matter of seconds before I  
2 had to walk out.

3 **Q.** I am so sorry.

4 **A.** That was true of everyone that came, we warned them of  
5 the condition that he was in. The state that he was in  
6 was nothing representative of the person that went into  
7 care the day before, and it was that state that provoked  
8 the charge nurse to write the document. His work  
9 colleagues who turned up, and we advised them of  
10 Richard's condition and they were running out crying at  
11 what they saw. It was truly a horrible thing to happen  
12 to him.

13 **Q.** I am very sorry the hear that. Robert, you said there  
14 was another matter that you wanted to refer to while you  
15 were in the family room?

16 **A.** Yes, there was. Bits of this may come up elsewhere, but  
17 this is a link I think that is important and it sets the  
18 scene of maybe the mindset of the Trust that day. The  
19 healthcare assistant wrote three statements.

20 **Q.** Is this the healthcare assistant from the Linden Centre?

21 **A.** In the A&E.

22 **Q.** In the A&E, thank you.

23 **A.** She wrote three statements. The first of which was in  
24 May, so this is dated on the day of he incident itself  
25 and her going on to the A&E. Now, she came over to the

1       A&E and the Trust supposedly sent her over for our care.  
2       Now, I challenged the Trust on this, and after  
3       challenging many times and discounting their arguments  
4       all the way through, if she was sent over to care for us,  
5       I would have thought she would announce herself to us,  
6       but this is from the associate director of quality, it's  
7       on the list over there, and that particular person  
8       accepted, "I know the member of staff didn't identify who  
9       she was and this again is something that we'd have  
10      expected to occur." From that they wouldn't meet with us  
11      or allow us to meet her or get anything else from her.  
12      On her three statements that supposedly she is there for.  
13      The first statement, all about us for the most part, runs  
14      on to three pages. If you look at the evidence of what's  
15      written down of what Richard said in the hospital, it  
16      amounts a two half lines. Now, in mental health it would  
17      seem to me that the only thing that you've got, you  
18      haven't got stethoscopes, you haven't got blood pressure  
19      metres, none of these apart from their physical health  
20      are relevant necessarily to their mental health. The  
21      main way you can see what happens to the patients is,  
22      one, by how they act and, two, by what they say. Those  
23      records are absolutely critical to developing the picture  
24      of the patient. In twelve hours two and a half lines.  
25      In a matter of minutes three pages.

1   **Q.** You think their focus was not in the right area?

2   **A.** I will say exactly where their focus was and, if I may, I  
3       just need to get the right person on here. There is when  
4       the lady was returned back over to the Linden Centre,  
5       this information was fed back to the team including the  
6       operations director. What difference to Richard's health  
7       did knowing about us make to the Linden Centre? He was  
8       already beyond help and destined to die just four days  
9       later, so why start finding out about us for someone who  
10      was supposedly there for our care and didn't even tell  
11      us?

12   **Q.** Thank you. I want to look at a brief chronology, please,  
13      to take stock.

14   **A.** Okay.

15   **Q.** The Suffolk Mental Health Crises Team attended outside  
16      your home on the evening of Saturday 16 May 2015.

17   **A.** Yes.

18   **Q.** Richard was admitted to Finchingfield Ward at the Linden  
19      Centre in the very early hours of Sunday 17th May?

20   **A.** Yes.

21   **Q.** He was taken to A&E, was that later on the Sunday?

22   **A.** That was about somewhere coming up to 1 o'clock, I think  
23      he moved over to the A&E, so it was twelve hours to the  
24      point of the incident and then we left at just round  
25      about the 1 o'clock time, and he had already gone by that

1           time, just before. So the whole of all of these  
2           incidents had taken place in a compressed period of time,  
3           yes.

4   **Q.** He was transferred to ICU?

5   **A.** Yes, he was.

6   **Q.** And tragically Richard died on 21 May. Which was a  
7           Thursday I believe.

8   **A.** Yes, he did.

9   **Q.** So this is all happening within a condensed period of  
10          time in terms of his time on the ward, but also just over  
11          a matter of a few days?

12   **A.** Yes.

13   **Q.** I am going to move on now, Richard, to the meeting of 5  
14          August. Before I do is there anything you would like to  
15          raise at this time?

16   **A.** No, I think the points have come out on that part there.

17   **Q.** So moving now to 5 August 2015, you attended a meeting  
18          with NEPT; is that correct?

19   **A.** That's correct.

20   **Q.** You refer to this meeting in your statement from  
21          paragraph 113. What was the purpose of the meeting from  
22          your perspective?

23   **A.** We had a whole bunch of questions that were unanswered,  
24          very much the area that the Inquiry is around at the  
25          moment.

1   **Q.** Who attended from the family?

2   **A.** I beg your pardon?

3   **Q.** Who attended from the family?

4   **A.** My wife and I.

5   **Q.** You describe at paragraph 116 that the following attended

6       from the Trust: "The deputy director of nursing" --

7   **A.** Yes.

8   **Q.** -- "the operation director at the Linden Centre, and the

9       charge nurse who had also been present on 17 May."

10   **A.** Yes.

11   **Q.** Where did this meeting take place?

12   **A.** In the Linden Centre.

13   **Q.** Can I ask you a question about that. Were you surprised

14       about the location for the meeting, namely the place

15       where Richard had been able to ligature, or did that seem

16       appropriate to you?

17   **A.** I would say by this stage I was beyond surprise. I don't

18       think there was -- I reached a point in dealing with the

19       Trust where worrying about things, such as tact, really

20       didn't matter any more and I was more concerned with fact

21       than place.

22   **Q.** During that meeting, were you escorted to the bathroom

23       where Richard had ligatured?

24   **A.** We were.

25   **Q.** You say this at paragraph 117:

1                    "When the charge nurse escorted us to the  
2           bathroom we passed through a locked door" --

3    **A.**    Yes.

4    **Q.**    -- "On the other side of the door a patient was sat on  
5           the floor" --

6    **A.**    Yes.

7    **Q.**    -- "To our amazement the charge nurse stepped over her  
8           and then when we entered the bathroom we were shocked to  
9           see the pipework repaired but not enclosed."

10                    And I think you touched on that earlier?

11    **A.**    Yes.

12    **Q.**    What did you think, putting the charge nurse stepping  
13           over a patient to one side, what did you think about the  
14           fact that the pipework had been repaired but remained  
15           unenclosed?

16    **A.**    Madness, I cannot think why you would want to do that.  
17           Following the death in February, they changed the  
18           ligature point then, but on this occasion there's a  
19           ligature point and you look at it you can't miss it.  
20           It's there. It's one of the first things you see when  
21           you open the door and it was there and it was repaired.

22    **Q.**    And this is in the context, as you tell us, of a  
23           gentleman who had in February died in the same bathroom?

24    **A.**    In the, by the same method, yes.

25    **Q.**    You say in your statement, this is paragraph 115, that

1       during the meeting with the Trust, you found out that the  
2       Trust did not have a separate ligature policy.

3     **A.** No.

4     **Q.** That patients were left with belts and cords, i.e..  
5       ligatures, for their dignity.

6     **A.** Yes.

7     **Q.** Despite this being contrary to their search policy.

8     **A.** Yes, that policy struck me particularly. The argument  
9       was that one of the important things for patients was  
10      their dignity. I asked the question, to which again I  
11      didn't get an answer, and that is what is the dignity of  
12      dying on a toilet floor? So I think that just puts in  
13      stark contrast. But on that point of ligatures, while I  
14      was talking to the deputy director of nursing there, she  
15      was wholly obsessed with the concept of ligature points,  
16      which seems bizarre bearing in mind they repaired one,  
17      but she was wholly concerned with those. If the ligature  
18      points were so it wouldn't happen, despite the fact that  
19      the Trust is trying to make the case that my son  
20      self-ligated and didn't use a ligature point. She  
21      looked absolutely bamboozled, when I pointed out that the  
22      only common thing in a strangulation, be it a hanging or  
23      self-ligature, is the ligature, not the ligature point.  
24      It was like no one had ever explained that to her before,  
25      her mind was so linear in her thinking. I don't think

1 she was an uncaring woman and I don't think she was  
2 unintelligent. In fact, I think she was very bright and  
3 I thought she spoke with sincerity when she tried to  
4 comfort us and I don't think otherwise, but like the rest  
5 of the Trust, this linearity of thinking, it's a laser  
6 beam straight ahead, nothing to the periphery.

7 **Q.** You add amongst the things that you learned during this  
8 meeting was that the Trust representatives did not know  
9 if by policy the bathroom door, behind which Richard  
10 happened himself, was supposed to be kept locked or left  
11 open.

12 **A.** No, they didn't know. Can I just go back a bit, the lady  
13 behind the door, and the door is important, because that  
14 door was locked the day we went there on 5 August. But  
15 on 17 May the door was open because we never went through  
16 a locked door on that occasion. The poor lady on the  
17 other side, she was in a terrible mess, the poor lady, it  
18 really was sad to see. She was trying to roll a  
19 cigarette with her hands. She was having difficulty  
20 doing it, to get the bits together to have a smoke. It  
21 was just sad to see. It shouldn't happen. There should  
22 be more dignity for people?

23 **Q.** The 72-hour report addresses bathroom doors and you say  
24 this in your statement, paragraph 123, that one of the  
25 two recommendations was that in-patient bathroom doors be



1           kept locked until required for use?

2   **A.** Mm hmm. Yes, if there's reasonable separation between  
3       toilets and bathrooms and the toilets are properly  
4       constructed such that they are safe, or everyone the  
5       novel idea of someone on level 2, if they have got  
6       suicide in their record, have someone with them whilst  
7       they are separated out. But no, it's, they are managing  
8       it all wrong there.

9   **Q.** You have touched on this, about the bathroom door being  
10       open twice during the incident?

11   **A.** Yes.

12   **Q.** Can I come to that now please?

13   **A.** Yes.

14   **Q.** You have concluded that staff opened the bathroom door on  
15       Finchingfield Ward twice on 17 May.

16   **A.** Yes.

17   **Q.** This is paragraph 175 of your statement onwards, you  
18       refer to two different scenarios, each with two members  
19       of staff arriving to find the bathroom door locked. One  
20       member of each group unlocks the door, the door is opened  
21       and Richard is found on the floor. And you note that:

22                   "The SIIR could not answer the question of  
23       which of the two groups of staff opened the door and that  
24       the possibility that the door was in fact opened twice  
25       was expressly raised and acknowledged at Richard's

1       inquest."

2   **A.**   Yes.

3   **Q.**   And your own conclusion, as I have just mentioned, is  
4       that the door was opened twice, once by each group of  
5       staff.

6   **A.**   Yes.

7   **Q.**   This is what you say at paragraph 186.  If true, this  
8       means that Richard was found, then left alone with a  
9       ligature round his neck and the door locked on him.  Now,  
10      have I correctly summarised that particular point?

11  **A.**   Yes, you have.  When we were met going into the hospital,  
12      I told you that the behaviour of the person was bizarre,  
13      he was saying things that you wouldn't say in that  
14      circumstance.  So for some reason he was off a normal  
15      script.  It didn't make sense why at the time, but he was  
16      not speaking as someone should speak to you.  Then, when  
17      we went over to the hospital at a later point and  
18      everything had gone through, my son and I talked that  
19      through and the only thing that seemed to make any sense,  
20      of all the scenarios that could be, was that he must have  
21      known Richard's condition to have behaved in such a  
22      bizarre manner and said such odd things that patently  
23      weren't true.  So we put it as a strong possibility that  
24      the door was opened twice.  Now, I can't imagine in any  
25      way, shape or form that you could confuse yourself

1       whether you unlock and open a door and find someone  
2       hanging themselves on the other side of there. I don't  
3       know how you can make that mistake. My personal  
4       experience of life is of all of the things I have been  
5       involved in that really impress on your mind, I can see  
6       them quite clearly and I could call some of them up now  
7       as I speak. They are there, they don't go away. Yet  
8       somehow this completely false memory of opening the door  
9       and finding someone hanging behind it, has arisen in  
10      their head. But then you would have to do it to one or  
11      other of the groups. What about if neither of them have  
12      got that wrong. What if they both have that right? They  
13      did open the door? If you look at the evidence and the  
14      descriptions that they give, when I finally got hold of  
15      the statements and I was able to examine them, it only  
16      reconfirmed that for me. Early in the process we got  
17      involved with, I think it's Channel 5 News, but we got  
18      involved with a news company as we tried to get some  
19      traction to having our story listened to and heard. Two  
20      young ladies turned up and the two of them were as sharp  
21      as razors, they really were as bright as buttons. I gave  
22      them the evidence, stepped back and left them to have a  
23      read. After a relatively short period of time, in  
24      relation to the evidence they needed to read, they had a  
25      short conversation, one looked at me and said, "You do

1 realise the door was opened twice", without me telling  
2 them. The answer is I believe -- there's even a YouTube  
3 video of that still on the internet.

4 Then at the inquest, as the evidence was being  
5 given, one of the members of the jury, most likely the  
6 Chairman speaking on behalf of the others, asked a  
7 question, "Does that mean that the door was opened  
8 twice?" And the coroner said, "That's where the evidence  
9 seems to point." That seemed to be sufficient and the  
10 whole thing just cruised on past. Now, if it was opened  
11 twice, that means that Richard was found hanging and not  
12 only found hanging, but left hanging because I know the  
13 second group were the ones that undid the ligature and  
14 removed it from the ligature point.

15 **Q.** Thank you. I am going to move on to a new area, Robert.  
16 Before I do is there anything else you would like to say  
17 about what we have covered so far?

18 **A.** There are a couple of points I think I would like to  
19 raise. That is the Trust, everything was delayed in  
20 terms of the generation of the reports and when they were  
21 written. The report, the 72-hour report should have been  
22 written in 72 hours. We have already covered on that.  
23 The report itself comes up, and it seems to suggest that  
24 it was written within the 72 hours but then never made  
25 any distribution. What I cannot understand is this.

1       That if they had written the report in May, by the 20th,  
2       as it is written here, why, when we met in August did the  
3       gentleman sat to my left, who was the operations manager,  
4       not mention it? I would have thought he would have done  
5       because one of the people that was signatory to it, as I  
6       understand it, worked in that department so he would have  
7       known about this report.

8       **Q.** And you have explained already that the first you heard  
9       of the 72-hour report was some significant time later?

10      **A.** It was, it came much, much later, but the gentleman I was  
11      speaking to, who was the assistant quality director, I  
12      think I used the term earlier, I can't understand why he  
13      hadn't seen it until the September. So all of that I  
14      find very troubling around the report itself.

15                       There was one other point I wanted to make.

16      **Q.** We may pick it up because we are gong to move now to  
17      address investigations and, as I have said, at the end I  
18      will pause just to let you regroup.

19      **A.** Sorry, I do have the point if I may. If you read the  
20      report, it's very scant. If you read the instructions on  
21      the back page, they are quite specific. Nothing was done  
22      according to the requirement. That was the point I  
23      wanted to make.

24      **Q.** You describe in your statement the long road to this  
25      Inquiry, basically.

1     **A.**   Yes.

2     **Q.**   And the various investigations that have taken place  
3           along the way.  We have just discussed the investigation  
4           that led to the 72 hour report and matters surrounding  
5           that.  There was also, as we have heard, a serious  
6           investigation report.  You have fundamental concerns  
7           about the SIIR, which you detail in your statement and  
8           you say this, this is paragraph 126:

9                         "I have profound concerns regarding almost all  
10           of the contents of the Trust's SIIR of December 2015 as  
11           demonstrated in my response in January 2016."

12                        And you, amongst the concerns that you raise in  
13           your statement are that its independence was compromised  
14           by the fact that it was conducted by a nurse at the same  
15           Trust.

16    **A.**   Indeed.  On that one, the report itself was written by --  
17           I will try and get the right name for you here, sorry the  
18           right title.

19    **Q.**   We can refer to this person as the author of the SIIR.

20    **A.**   Okay, the author of the SIIR was -- in a conversation  
21           that we first had with the Trust or had been involved in  
22           it, was presented to us, and without saying as much, very  
23           much that he is independent of the Linden Centre, well he  
24           was independent of the Linden Centre in so far as he  
25           worked in the western area of the Trust.  Now, given his

1        job title, it's most likely that he either reported  
2        directly to the director of nursing who sat on the board  
3        or through no more than one other to have a title such as  
4        his. But what really troubles me about that is not just  
5        that he did it, but it was in contravention, as I would  
6        understand it, to the Serious Incident Framework  
7        published by NHS England which controlled those matters  
8        at the time. In that framework, sorry, in that  
9        framework, towards the back here it clearly states:

10                "An independent investigation should be  
11        considered for the following circumstances that is  
12        independent wholly of the Trust: A serious incident  
13        where the organisation is unable to conduct an effective,  
14        objective, timely and proportionate investigation. This  
15        is particularly relevant incidents where the obligation  
16        of the authorities to account for the treatment of the  
17        individual is particularly stringent, including" --

18                Well, I think we come nicely under that:

19                -- "Deaths (and near deaths resulting in severe  
20        harm)" --

21                So we have qualified for that one:

22                -- "of those detained under the Mental Health  
23        Act ... and, in certain circumstances, the deaths of  
24        informal psychiatric in-patients."

25                So these are the conditions that now cover the

1 admission basis of Richard:

2 "The cause of death is unknown" --

3 Well, it was known; it just wasn't correctly  
4 communicated:

5 "Where there is reason to believe the death may  
6 have been avoidable" --

7 Well, we do know it is avoidable because in the  
8 very first letter we see from the CEO of the Trust he  
9 stated that he was saddened because Richard's death was  
10 avoidable, so we clearly qualify for that:

11 "Or unexpected, i.e. not caused by the natural  
12 cause of the patient's illness and underlying medical  
13 conditions when this is managed in line with best  
14 practice."

15 **Q.** So is the short point that the policy is clear that the  
16 conducting of an SIIR by someone from the same trust is  
17 clearly in breach of it?

18 **A.** Yes.

19 **Q.** You go on, and we will look at this later, but you go on  
20 to make a recommendation specifically addressing this  
21 point, don't you?

22 **A.** Yes, I do, but no trust should ever be allowed to do an  
23 investigation of this nature into itself. They are  
24 marking their own homework and we all know where that  
25 leads in the end.



1     **THE CHAIR:** Just to be absolutely clear because I know that  
2           on occasions organisations will do one themselves, in  
3           order to get it done quickly, and will then employ  
4           somebody independent to do an investigation, and so far  
5           as you are aware, no independent investigation was  
6           undertaken?

7     **A.** It was presented to us as if there was some sort of  
8           separate independent investigation, in that someone would  
9           then be looking through all of the documents to go  
10          through it, but that turned out to be an editing service,  
11          as I understand it.

12    **THE CHAIR:** Okay. Thank you.

13    **MR GRIFFIN:** Moving on, you refer in your main statement to  
14          two CQC investigations; one that had been launched in  
15          February 2015 into the death that we have already  
16          discussed, and another into Richard's death. And you  
17          have raised concerns that the CQC into Richard's death --  
18          concerning that, was it that one of the investigations  
19          was quite focused on the death and was it in Richard's  
20          case it was a much wider investigation; was that one of  
21          the concerns?

22    **A.** Yes, I would express it slightly differently, if I may.  
23          The CQC doesn't do investigations into deaths, that's the  
24          responsibility of other bodies, but what they can do is  
25          look into whatever detail they like in the way that a

1 particular hospital or trust is managed. Now on the  
2 first of the investigations, that's the one that followed  
3 from the death in February, they did a relatively  
4 detailed look into the Trust and into the area where the  
5 gentleman died, and having done that that they came up  
6 with a report with some fairly strong recommendations.  
7 In Richard's case, bearing in mind that we are now back  
8 in the same room, with the same cause of death, with a  
9 ligature point that should have been repaired at the time  
10 of the other one, and when I asked for a list of the  
11 repairs that should have been done I was told that the  
12 list had been lost, like many other documents. In that  
13 situation, what the CQC did was they looked broadly  
14 across the Trust when they had a clear problem right  
15 under their nose, and that I don't understand.

16 **Q.** There was another element in that communications between  
17 the CQC team and yourself were poor, as you describe it,  
18 that led to a complaint and in summary, Robert, whilst  
19 you were unhappy with the CQC investigation, you were  
20 more happy with the way your complaint was addressed; is  
21 that correct?

22 **A.** Yes, I was, if I could just pad that out?

23 **Q.** If you could do it briefly because we have got a little  
24 more ground that we need to cover, so please do but.

25 **A.** Okay, I will put this one very briefly. The report that

1 the CQC came up with was a very powerful document and it  
2 is the only document that I've seen so far where a public  
3 institution has had the courage to be honest about its  
4 own failings and how it is going to deal with them. In  
5 that sense, I think it is a very good report. What they  
6 have written doesn't make good reading but for my story  
7 of how I got here, it was a seminal part in gaining  
8 access and ending up here today. So it had a benefit.

9 **Q.** Can we be clear that the report that you are talking  
10 about, this is the report following your complaint.

11 **A.** Yes.

12 **Q.** It's not a report addressing matters of the Trust. This  
13 is addressing failures in relation to the way the CQC  
14 have conducted the investigation.

15 **A.** Yes, that's correct.

16 **Q.** Thank you very much. And as you say, the honest approach  
17 in that report was of significance to you.

18 **A.** Yes, to put it really simply and that is, if I had had  
19 the same degree of honesty and integrity in the other  
20 reports that had been written before that, from my point  
21 of view much of this wouldn't have happened this way, it  
22 would have taken a very different course.

23 **Q.** You tell us also about Richard's inquest which took place  
24 after some delay. Did you privately fund a barrister for  
25 the inquest?

1   **A.**   Yes, I did.

2   **Q.**   You make two observations about the inquest process, I  
3       want to make sure I have understood them. This is  
4       paragraph 214. In essence were you concerned that there  
5       was a large bundle of documents put together for the  
6       inquest, but insufficient time allocated actually to deal  
7       with all of them?

8   **A.**   Yes. If you take a full ring binder they fill four of  
9       them. Reading that amount of documentation and  
10      understanding it is impossible. The barrister, we  
11      employed two barristers, one in sequence and I will be  
12      blunt about what the first one did. She waited until it  
13      was almost too late and then she gazumped us by putting  
14      the prices up at the very last moment. We employed  
15      another barrister and I will take my hat off to the  
16      gentleman. He got full control of the facts of the  
17      matter in the limited time that he had but he didn't  
18      manage to get to the point of the linkages between them.  
19      He didn't have sufficient time for that, so he and I had  
20      to work at that during the inquest itself.

21   **Q.**   You had previously, I think, maybe in September, you  
22      explained the toll that this long path to this Inquiry  
23      has taken on you. Is this an aspect of that, having to  
24      brief a barrister very much at the last minute in  
25      relation to matters that must have been of great concern

1 and worry?

2 **A.** Mm hmm.

3 **Q.** Thank you. Do you also note in your statement that there  
4 are many deaths in the scope of this Inquiry that will  
5 have passed the desk of the Essex Coroner, and do you say  
6 in your statement it's difficult to understand how this  
7 pattern was not noticed and if noticed, not acted upon?

8 **A.** Well, yes, there's one central Coroner's Office in Essex  
9 and it's in Chelmsford. This Inquiry started out with  
10 the Chair mentioning the 2,000 deaths that formed the  
11 basis of the start of the investigation that's here.  
12 Many of those deaths must have passed across because they  
13 weren't natural deaths, so they must have passed across  
14 the desk of the Coroner. That's their job to monitor  
15 those. If that happened over 20 years at 2,000 deaths,  
16 that's 2 deaths a per week, I don't know how you can't  
17 notice a pattern. They have then issued on many of  
18 those, preventions of future deaths that have done  
19 absolutely nothing to change anything and yet the process  
20 carries on and I don't understand why.

21 **Q.** Thank you. We have touched on one of two police  
22 investigations, can we just deal with those briefly.  
23 First of all, there was a corporate manslaughter  
24 investigation conducted in 2015 by Essex Police. Is it  
25 right that you enjoyed a good relationship with the

1 detective inspector who is running that investigation?

2 **A.** Excellent relationship. He was a very slow methodical  
3 man, worked his way through the facts. What I did notice  
4 was that as his investigation went on and started to get  
5 closer to the truth, then he seemed to have fewer and  
6 fewer resources at his disposal, and towards the end it  
7 seemed to be a side project that he was doing. He  
8 managed to get to the point to pass charging advice to  
9 the CQC, which I thought was a sterling effort and we  
10 were able to debate points quite strongly and see where  
11 the merit of the arguments were and those I won went into  
12 the evidence and those that I lost didn't, and I think  
13 that's good and I think that's how it should be.

14 **Q.** Am I right in thinking that this investigation didn't  
15 lead to any criminal charges or proceedings?

16 **A.** No, it didn't. What happened there was the CQC didn't  
17 approve the charges. On the first one, if I remember  
18 correctly, it was on the basis that they believed that  
19 the seminal part of the evidence for them was that the  
20 search wasn't done, I think they called it  
21 professionally, was done properly, which seemed strange  
22 given that the Trust had settled out of court on that  
23 very same point. So I couldn't understand. So I  
24 complained and I wrote an analysis of where I thought  
25 their faults were. They didn't send me the analysis,

1       their response to that until just before Richard's  
2       inquest, and then after the inquest the police announced  
3       that they were going to do a second manslaughter but on a  
4       much broader basis than the one they had done before.

5     **Q.** So this is 2017 by Kent and Essex Police?

6     **A.** That's right.

7     **Q.** I think you mentioned earlier that it was a detective  
8       chief inspector who was leading on that.

9     **A.** That's right, yes.

10    **Q.** Were the crimes to be addressed corporate manslaughter,  
11       gross negligence manslaughter and all other incidental  
12       crimes as you describe them?

13    **A.** That's what he said to us at a meeting at the, I think it  
14       was the sports club or some sort of a club area at the  
15       central Essex Police Station.

16    **Q.** Were families told that the investigation would leave no  
17       stone unturned?

18    **A.** Yes, it was.

19    **Q.** What was the working relationship like with the family  
20       during the second investigation?

21    **A.** There was wasn't on of any meaning.

22    **Q.** You describe it in your second statement as there being  
23       no meaningful communication.

24    **A.** That's correct. The only communication that we had was  
25       that we had one interview of about an hour, but that

1       wasn't into corporate manslaughter, that was into any  
2       other criminal charges that we thought might be relevant.  
3       We gave the police documentation to support those other  
4       charges. Early in the following year my wife received an  
5       e-mail just saying that they were no longer going to  
6       pursue any other charges. At no point was I ever  
7       interviewed about or gave them evidence of corporate  
8       manslaughter.

9       **Q.** Thank you. You have already mentioned that you brought a  
10      civil action against NEPT which was settled.

11     **A.** Yes.

12     **Q.** You also refer in your main statement to working with  
13      your local MP, James Cartlidge, at the time.

14     **A.** That is correct.

15     **Q.** You say that his support has been, as you say,  
16      "invaluable".

17     **A.** Correct.

18     **Q.** Did he secure a debate in the House of Commons about  
19      Richard's case?

20     **A.** Yes, he did.

21     **Q.** Did that in turn secure an independent Inquiry into  
22      Richard's death?

23     **A.** It did.

24     **Q.** Does that bring us then to the Essex Mental Health  
25      Independent Inquiry?



1   **A.** One more step.

2   **Q.** Yes, tell me.

3   **A.** And that is having had the independent Inquiry offered --

4       sorry, offered to us, it was then broadened out to other

5       people. The families had to choose their route from

6       there. My view at that point was, given all of the

7       impediments that the state, for want of a broader term,

8       had put in front of us, that if we didn't co-operate with

9       that then what we would end up is continually being told,

10      "But you were offered." But having decided not to go

11      down that route I pressurised the minister, or spoke to

12      the minister more accurately, and received from her a

13      statement that effectively said that the reasons why

14      there couldn't be a public inquiry into Richard's death

15      was because one, public inquiries are normally about

16      groups, that's not totally true they can be done on

17      individuals, and secondly, there was no evidence of

18      systemic failure.

19   **Q.** What was the name of the minister, do you recall?

20   **A.** Sorry?

21   **Q.** What was the name of the minister?

22   **A.** That was Nadine Dorries.

23   **Q.** Nadine Dorries, thank you. That does bring us a grouping

24       of different cases to be considered by the Essex Mental

25       Health.

1   **A.** And it was the failure of the Essex Mental Health on  
2       those two grounds that left the minister nowhere else to  
3       go but to capitulate to all of the other pressures that  
4       had been placed upon him.

5   **Q.** And that led us to here and to today and you sitting  
6       giving evidence to the Chair?

7   **A.** Yes.

8   **Q.** Robert, I am going to move on to cover your  
9       recommendations next. Before I do is there anything  
10      further you would like to say about the route to your  
11      evidence today and to the Lampard Inquiry?

12  **A.** No, I think I have recalled back all of the things I  
13      wanted to raise on the way through, thank you.

14  **Q.** Could you put up please the recommendations, please,  
15      HJA009990. I think we have covered the first one but may  
16      I read it out anyway:

17                   "The Trust must never again manage a serious  
18      incident investigation into either a death or near miss  
19      occurring within itself; instead being managed by a  
20      different trust with independent legal oversight  
21      nominated by, and reporting to, the victim's next of  
22      kin."

23                   Now I think we have covered that but is there  
24      anything else you would like to say about that now?

25  **A.** Yes, I think it is a matter of not allowing that to grow

1 too far and therefore swamping the system. I think we  
2 got very close to this on a point, on a question you  
3 asked me earlier, Chair. That is that this needs stick  
4 at the very top of the triangle because as you come away  
5 from the top of the serious incidents, a number of lesser  
6 incidents will grow massively on the way down. The idea  
7 is not to clog the system up but to remove the ability of  
8 a trust to write an SIIR that then forms, as it has done,  
9 T the centre piece of what happened at the Inquiry --  
10 sorry, at the inquest, what happened at the first police  
11 and the second police investigation and forms part of  
12 what the CQC would look at. So they should not be  
13 managing that document. And then to make sure that it's  
14 managed, the oversight that's given to the whole thing  
15 should be a route back to the family so that they can  
16 press the alarm bell and when things are going off and  
17 intercept things that are being done that are incorrect.

18 Q. Thank you, that is very clear. Can we see two further  
19 recommendations:

20 "The Trust redesign its entire care delivery  
21 service by using safety cases within a patient safety  
22 doctrine (as outlined in the attached proposal) and the  
23 CQC and Coroner develop mechanisms to track and report a  
24 range of performance data relating to the patient safety  
25 doctrine for mental health care."

1                   Now I think both of those take us to the  
2           doctrine, and unless there is anything you would like to  
3           say at this stage, what I propose to do is now to move on  
4           to discuss your doctrine.

5   **A.**   Okay.

6   **Q.**   Could you take that down, please.   Could you put up the  
7           doctrine, this is HJA010168, and could you expand up to  
8           and including the first paragraph of the introduction.  
9           Thank you very much.   Do we see here the title, "Proposal  
10          for a National Health Service (Mental Health) Patient  
11          Safety Doctrine." Now this proposal was written by you  
12          with the assistance of ChatGPT?

13   **A.**   Yes.

14   **Q.**   Does it say this that it aims to provoke:

15                   "A structured discussion on the formulation,  
16          validation and rollout of a patient safety doctrine for  
17          mental health patients in the United Kingdom.   The  
18          Lampard Inquiry is considering a significant number of  
19          deaths over an extended time period.   This proposal  
20          hypothesises that the relevant mental health model care  
21          has systemically failed and is incapable of self  
22          correction and should be replaced by rapid evolution into  
23          a radical solution."

24                   Just to make sure I have understood, please, is  
25          the starting point of your doctrine, therefore, that the

1 current approach is not working and cannot be made to  
2 work?

3 **A.** Yes. If I may expand on that?

4 **Q.** Please do.

5 **A.** I have already covered the number of deaths and I have  
6 already covered the fact that they passed through the  
7 Coroner and they have led to a whole number of prevention  
8 of future deaths, none of which has changed anything.

9 At the beginning of our investigations into all  
10 of the things that have happened the senior medical  
11 doctor within the Trust stated, and I think it was in one  
12 of the minutes of the Trust board itself, that he could  
13 find no pattern within the deaths that happened. My  
14 second son said, "That's because there is no pattern,  
15 it's random." What they are managing is so thin that  
16 deaths could take place anywhere and you can't see them.  
17 But I believe it is possible to see and why these things  
18 happen. I have missed out some of the things, it would  
19 have gone a little bit too far on detail, but i will  
20 cover them now and how I arrived at going into this. If  
21 you look -- my wife loves a good murder mystery, and in a  
22 good murder mystery it always boils down to the clever  
23 interpretation of means, motive and opportunity. Let's  
24 have a look at those three in the case of Richard. In  
25 the case of Richard, the motive was suicidal ideation.

1       The means was the dressing gown cord that he used, that  
2       he was left with. And the opportunity was being left in  
3       the bathroom which broke the protection of the level 2  
4       rounds. If you want to stop anyone taking their own  
5       life, then you have to remove, and make sure those, a  
6       combination of those or certainly two of them never  
7       happen. You don't let them go together. And what can  
8       you use to prevent them coming together? Well you need  
9       some form of safety process that goes round it. The  
10      National Rifle Association has one -- this is other stuff  
11      I have been reading in the background to this -- has one  
12      that is their safety practice, and it's safe people,  
13      using safe equipment with safe processes in safe places.  
14      I can't think of anything that doesn't fit better here  
15      than patients, or people which are the patients and the  
16      caring staff, the property, which is what the patients  
17      have, in this case the ligatures, the scissors and all  
18      the other items and then what the staff have that you  
19      need to deny them access to. A complete rethink on the  
20      policies and the way that you can read them and  
21      understand them, and the places that they're in being  
22      made as safe as possible, safe as possible or if there  
23      are things you can't do you manage these other factors,  
24      such that those three items; the means, motive and  
25      opportunity never come together. So this is by no means

1       meant to be a full and complete document. It is just  
2       that it is a way to start the discussion, to come up with  
3       a better way of doing things, because if you map out the  
4       2,000 deaths in any space, you will always find that it's  
5       lights coming on in two or three locations of how people  
6       died, never one, and that's why that chief doctor  
7       couldn't find any pattern within them.

8       **MR GRIFFIN:** Can we just look at the rest of the introduction  
9       there because that picks up on what you have said a  
10      little bit, and provides a little bit more information  
11      about the background to this document:

12                 "This proposal adapts the structured processes  
13      of military doctrine development into the area of  
14      National Mental Health Policy."

15                 Now, you mentioned earlier in your evidence  
16      that you were in the Navy; is that right?

17      **A.** That's correct.

18      **Q.** Are you therefore drawing in part on your own experience,  
19      past experience, in the military?

20      **A.** In part on that, in part from management positions I have  
21      held and the rest of my life and the things I read, yes.

22      **Q.** And in fact, elsewhere in this document you, I refer to  
23      other areas you have drawn, for example, the nuclear  
24      industry and the aviation industry.

25      **A.** Yes.

1   **Q.** So industries or areas that have to do with high risk  
2       situations?

3   **A.** Hm mmm.

4   **Q.** "While the military doctrine often incorporates  
5       obfuscation and deception at strategic operational and  
6       tactical level, this report deliberately excludes such  
7       elements, instead it emphasises transparency, ethics,  
8       trust and evidence based practice as their guiding  
9       principles. A structured methodology that includes clear  
10      and well-established principles, testing with validation,  
11      dissemination of information and is accepting of  
12      controlled revision at all levels is employed to provide  
13      a rigorous framework for mental health system reform."

14                Thank you, could you take that down, please.  
15      Now, the doctrine covers various further points. You  
16      referred before to the safety case, using safety cases,  
17      and in fact does the report address in further details  
18      the safety case approach and does it give a couple of  
19      worked examples of how it might work --

20   **A.** Yes.

21   **Q.** -- including, if I have picked up on this rightly, do you  
22       draw on Richard's experience? For example, one of the  
23       safety cases relates to ward observation.

24   **A.** Yes.

25   **Q.** Thank you.



1   **A.** I try to stick as closely to what I had a reasonable and  
2       valid opinion on as I could.

3   **Q.** Thank you. And you come on, you provide the conclusion,  
4       you provide two annexes, including a generic safety case  
5       structure. Robert, I can assure you that the Chair and  
6       the Inquiry will be considering that in some detail and  
7       with great care. Is there anything else at this stage  
8       that you would like to draw our attention to arising from  
9       the doctrine?

10   **A.** Yes, so I think it's linked end to end and I will start  
11       at the patient end of it with the safety cases. The  
12       safety cases are developing process and procedure that is  
13       deeply embedded into many high risk industries including  
14       the National Health, where, since our second son first  
15       introduced that as part of an afternoon with the Essex  
16       Mental Health Inquiry and hopefully that material was  
17       available to you, because he is far more of an expert on  
18       that than I am.

19   **Q.** Yes.

20   **A.** Now if you look at the idea that happens there is you  
21       never take, instead of having a thick monumental document  
22       over here that you can't find what you want, as you come  
23       to do a particular piece of work on a ward, on a mental  
24       health ward, so you effectively have a job card if you  
25       like. On that it tells you the aim of what you have got

1 to do. The objectives you are going to do and how you  
2 are going to prove that you have made it safe for the  
3 patient.

4 **Q.** So this is a practical approach.

5 **A.** This is the practical approach. Now, by doing it that  
6 way you can put on to those elements of work all of the  
7 things across all of those different documents in one  
8 place relevant at one time. They can now have their mind  
9 clear on what they are trying to achieve. When you have  
10 achieved that you can now link all of those safety cases  
11 to make up a whole overall procedure of care for a  
12 particular patient. You can also manage your staff more  
13 effectively because within them you can state who is  
14 qualified to do it, what level of qualification they need  
15 and you can map that to the individuals of whom you have  
16 proved can actually do those safety cases and do they  
17 need supervision, oversight or can they do it on their  
18 own?

19 So you can build training programmes, have  
20 staff come in, they can used to using the safety cases  
21 and the nurses now know that someone that they haven't  
22 met before has actually been approved to do a whole  
23 series of work, and the nurses, instead of worrying about  
24 every singling detail, can use their professional skills  
25 to put all of that work together into a comprehensive

1 pattern of care for the patients themselves.

2 **Q.** If I have understood correctly the purpose of this  
3 document is effectively to start a discussion?

4 **A.** Yes.

5 **Q.** The starting point being that there needs to be  
6 fundamental change?

7 **A.** The word "proposal" at the beginning gets your attention.  
8 The fact I used the word "hypothesis" below it, probably  
9 is a bit more honest.

10 **MR GRIFFIN:** Thank you. I am going to move on now. We have  
11 come to the end of the questions I have for you. The  
12 situation is this, Robert. In a moment we will put up a  
13 photo of Richard and your family. Before I do that, I  
14 want to make sure that we have covered all of the key  
15 points that you feel should be covered in your evidence  
16 today.

17 **A.** I think so. It is difficult to think of anything else.

18 **MR GRIFFIN:** This is the process, we will put up the  
19 photograph, I have seen it, it is a lovely photograph of  
20 the family. That may well be the end of your evidence,  
21 but we will just break to check whether there are further  
22 questions that need to be asked. If there are no  
23 questions then you don't need to come back.

24 **A.** I was informed of one question.

25 **Q.** We have covered that. Could we then put up the

1 photograph, please, Amanda.

2 This was clearly at one of his graduations.

3 **A.** That was his Ph.D.

4 **MR GRIFFIN:** And that looks like a very happy occasion.

5 **A.** It was, it was a lovely day.

6 **MR GRIFFIN:** Thank you very much. Chair, do you have any  
7 questions?

8 **THE CHAIR:** I have no questions. I just want to thank you  
9 very much indeed. We have worked you very hard, this  
10 afternoon, but I am very grateful for it, thank you, and  
11 to your wife too.

12 **(Break)**

13 **HEARING MANAGER:** There are no further questions for the  
14 witness, so that brings us to the end of today's  
15 proceedings. We will reconvene tomorrow morning at 10  
16 am.

17 **(5.03 pm)**

18 **(Adjourned until 10 o'clock on 21 October)**

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

**I N D E X**

DAWN JOHNSON (sworn)	2
CRAIG SCOTT (affirmed)	2
Examination by MS TROUP	2
ROBERT WADE (sworn)	114
Examination by MR GRIFFIN	114