

Monday, 8th December 2025

Opening statement by MR GRIFFIN

MR GRIFFIN: The Inquiry's holding a virtual hearing to hear from its Core Participants on procedural matters, including the Inquiry's draft Statement of Approach on investigating illustrative cases of those who have died.

The Inquiry is in listening mode and will consider with care the submissions being made. The background to the hearing is this: on 3rd October this year, the Recognised Legal Representatives acting on behalf of the bereaved and lived experience Core Participants provided a written submission asking for permission to address you at the outset of the evidential hearings, which were to start on 13th October.

The submission referred to concerns arising from a lack of an Inquiry roadmap to a final report; a lack of clarity about the Inquiry's investigative plan or strategy; the absence of information about the Inquiry's plans to identify samples of cases or illustrative case examples; limited disclosure and the Inquiry's approach to Rule 10 questions.

It was not possible to hear those submissions at the start of the October hearing. Chair, you were concerned about the disruption that hearing submissions on the first day of the October hearing would have on the

1 Inquiry's hearing timetable and the consequent impact of
2 that disruption on the bereaved family witnesses who had
3 been asked to attend to give their evidence over the
4 following days. Further, the Inquiry was intending to
5 share with Core Participants its investigative strategy
6 in November.

7 Consequently, and given the focus of the issues the
8 Core Participants wished to address you on, you
9 determined that holding a hearing after that strategy
10 had been shared would enable a more effective hearing to
11 take place.

12 At the start of the October hearing I provided
13 an opening statement that referred to the Inquiry's
14 approach to its illustrative cases and its investigative
15 strategy and I spoke of other work undertaken by the
16 Inquiry in parallel with this.

17 Following the October hearing, on 13th November, the
18 Inquiry circulated to Core Participants its draft
19 Statement of Approach on investigating illustrative
20 cases of those who have died.

21 It set out the factors the Inquiry intends to
22 consider in order to select cases for investigation: how
23 we will identify and explore the issues and themes
24 raised by those cases in accordance with its Terms of
25 Reference; how the Inquiry proposes to approach the

1 gathering and testing of factual evidence and how
2 families, providers and other agencies may engage with
3 the Inquiry's investigations.

4 The document concludes by saying that the Inquiry is
5 aware of the importance and urgency of its task. This
6 draft Statement of Approach therefore sets out a process
7 that, whilst being appropriately thorough, allows for
8 its Terms of Reference to be met and for recommendations
9 to be made for lasting change with all due expedition.

10 Core Participants have been invited to make
11 submissions on the draft document at this procedural
12 hearing, with skeleton arguments to be provided in
13 advance.

14 Other procedural matters can be raised at this
15 hearing without the need for written submissions in
16 advance. We have in fact received some further written
17 submissions on behalf of the clients at Hodge Jones and
18 Allen addressing a matter of law.

19 As I have mentioned, the hearing is being held
20 virtually. It is being live-streamed and can also be
21 viewed on the Inquiry's YouTube channel. In the usual
22 way, a transcript and video of today's proceedings will
23 go onto the Inquiry's website.

24 Chair, with that, may I introduce the legal
25 representatives who will be addressing you today. We

1 will hear first from Maya Sikand KC on behalf of the
2 client Deighton Pierce Glynn. We will also hear from
3 Eleena Misra KC on behalf of the client Hodge Jones and
4 Allen, then Fiona Murphy KC on behalf of the clients of
5 Bhatt Murphy, Brenda Campbell KC on behalf of the
6 clients of Bindmans, Sophie Lucas on behalf of the Bates
7 Wells clients and Anna Morris KC on behalf of the
8 organisation INQUEST.

9 Chair, EPUT (Essex Partnership University NHS
10 Foundation Trust) and NELFT (Northeast London NHS
11 Foundation Trust), NHS England and Melanie Leahy have
12 provided written submissions but will not be addressing
13 you today.

14 Most speakers have been allocated a maximum of 45
15 minutes to address you with no further time being
16 allowed beyond this for any speaker, and less where they
17 have indicated they require less time. For those who
18 are about to speak, may I ask that you follow this
19 approach:

20 Please keep your cameras and microphones off unless
21 you are addressing the Chair in your allocated slot, and
22 the starting time provided for each speaker are
23 indicative only, we will move from one speaker to the next
24 as soon as the previous speaker is finished, subject to
25 taking breaks. I will introduce each speaker.

1 Chair, we can now move on to the submissions
2 themselves. I therefore call on Ms Sikand KC to address
3 you.

4 THE CHAIR: Thank you.

5 Submissions by MS SIKAND

6 MS SIKAND: Good morning, Chair. I appear today alongside
7 Laura Profumo on behalf, in fact not just DPG, but three
8 RLRs -- Leigh Day, Irwin Mitchell and DPG -- who
9 represent between them the interests of six Core
10 Participants, comprising five bereaved families and one
11 former patient.

12 With apologies for not indicating this earlier,
13 Chair, you may be pleased to hear that I will not need
14 the full 45 minutes allocated, a generous time slot for
15 which we thank you, but given our many written
16 submissions, including the ones on the draft
17 investigative strategy, I intend to take probably only
18 half of that time.

19 I won't be addressing you, Chair, on Oxevision as
20 others with directly affected clients will do so.

21 Chair, as it happens, today is the last day of
22 National Grief Awareness Week 2025, which makes this
23 opportunity to address you directly more poignant. We
24 have wanted to address you directly on the key
25 procedural concerns which our clients hold in respect of

1 the management of this Inquiry for some time. It is not
2 lost on those who represent that this is the first
3 opportunity we have been given to orally and publicly
4 address you on such matters since the opening of the
5 statutory phase of this Inquiry in September 2024.

6 It is also not lost on them that this hearing has
7 only come about further to a joint written application
8 just before the beginning of the October hearings, as
9 Mr Griffin has just set out in detail.

10 Chair, we don't say this out of blunt criticism or
11 for point-scoring, but rather to emphasise that this
12 hearing, which falls now just beyond the halfway mark of
13 the Inquiry's current timetable, marks a critical
14 juncture at which to pause and reflect on its direction
15 and the steps that we consider are now urgently needed
16 in order to ensure the Inquiry is capable of meeting its
17 statutory objectives.

18 Chair, like me, you will have read the skeleton
19 submissions of all the CPs and you will have noticed
20 that in several fundamental respects we speak with one
21 voice, bereaved families, former patients and corporate
22 CPs alike. Independently we all ask you for the same
23 thing -- transparency, openness and clarity -- and
24 a time-limited and achievable roadmap to fact-finding
25 and recommendations.

1 Chair, unfortunately the only clarity we have as
2 I address you today is that the draft investigative
3 strategy raises more questions than it answers, not just
4 about that particular strategy, but everything else the
5 Inquiry has yet to achieve, but needs to if it is to be
6 true to its terms of reference and its list of issues.

7 Whilst Mr Griffin indicated in his October hearings
8 that the Inquiry was leaving no stone unturned in its
9 investigative efforts, it included seeking extensive
10 evidence from providers and third party agencies as well
11 as rigorously exploring and obtaining data on core
12 issues and research materials. We have yet to receive
13 any indication as to the remit or outcome of those
14 inquiries.

15 The Rule 9 requests and the long list of materials
16 that Mr Griffin indicated the Inquiry has made --
17 evidential requests in respect of obtained data in
18 relation to -- remain unpublished and undisclosed to us,
19 with no timetable for disclosure.

20 Chair, how do we advise our concerned clients as to
21 what this material is, when we are getting it, where it
22 fits in and what role our clients will play in
23 responding to it? Who are these key individuals
24 referred to as authors and historians? Chair, these
25 should not be secrets.

1 I'm deeply conscious of the fact that today's
2 hearing will come across as a giant moan, Chair, and it
3 will be difficult to hear criticism as opposed to an
4 appreciation of what the Inquiry has done to date. We
5 absolutely recognise that we wish to put the experiences
6 of the bereaved first; that they, having relived their
7 deeply traumatic experiences in the public domain, want
8 to know exactly what is next and how the Inquiry is
9 going to examine not just the detail of their own cases,
10 but also how it is going to determine any failures in
11 governance, both at a micro and macro level.

12 The Inquiry's desire to hear bereaved voices as
13 quickly as possible meant that the Inquiry opened
14 without any modular structure, quite unlike any of the
15 other 2005 Act inquiries that our legal team and other
16 teams have experience of. A glance at the Inquiry's
17 website will tell you almost nothing. In February we
18 are told we will hear important further evidence from
19 bereaved families with "further focus on selected themes
20 relevant to EPUT investigations".

21 On one part of the website, April and July hearings
22 will apparently include considerations of "selected
23 themes relevant to Inquiry investigations"; "wider
24 themes and the national picture", and "corporate
25 evidence and responsibility".

1 In another part of the website, April and July
2 remain marked as "TBC". Even the wording that there is
3 is, with respect, Chair, unhelpfully vague, especially
4 given the late stage of this Inquiry. What are the
5 selected themes? Why aren't they published? How can
6 they remain unpublished when time is so short?

7 There are something like 36 sitting days of evidence
8 left on the current timetable. Chair, it is obvious to
9 every CP that, without a robust and urgent roadmap to
10 direct the Inquiry's progression from the current
11 hearings to its conclusion, there is a real risk that
12 this Inquiry will not be able to fulfil its statutory
13 objectives within the allotted time and that, in its
14 expeditious attempts to do so, the voices of bereaved
15 and lived experienced CPs may be displaced from the
16 centre of this Inquiry.

17 Having made those general observations, Chair,
18 I turn to some detail. You have our written submissions
19 which address primarily in accordance with ILT's request
20 the draft Statement of Approach, which I will refer to
21 as the draft SOA. I do not seek to repeat all the
22 matters covered in those submissions, Chair, but only to
23 underline certain key areas which bear on our clients'
24 wider concerns over the investigative direction of this
25 Inquiry and their engagement in its important work.

1 First, a primary concern for our CPs and which we
2 note runs through nearly all other RLR's written
3 submissions, is the lack of clarity as to how this draft
4 SOA fits in with the various other work streams that the
5 Inquiry is, or will be, undertaking. We recognise that
6 this draft strategy will assist in fulfilling some of
7 the terms of reference. We do not, however, understand
8 this (audio breaks) amounts to the totality of the
9 investigative work the Inquiry is proposing to undertake
10 and CTI has made that clear.

11 Despite its limitations, the draft SOA is of course
12 welcome, but it provides us with no insight whatsoever
13 into what other areas the Inquiry will be examining and
14 in what detail. For example, whilst the Inquiry will be
15 required to interrogate under its tools the relevant
16 Trust's culture, management and governance structures at
17 the time, and we hope that also includes the extent to
18 which any such failures contributed to preventable
19 deaths, we have yet no indication on how it proposes to
20 achieve this.

21 We are likewise still in the dark as to the final
22 proposed areas on which expert evidence will be sought,
23 far less so which experts will be instructed. These and
24 all other strands of the Inquiry's investigations
25 outside of the draft SOA remain elusive, Chair, as

1 I said at the beginning.

2 We have yet to hear any substantive evidence from
3 the providers, clinicians or CPs with lived experience
4 on the key issues within scope, let alone the experts.
5 That is the case now over a year into this public
6 inquiry and with not much time left to run. That is
7 a matter of significant disquiet for our CPs.

8 We ask that this state of affairs is rectified as
9 a matter of urgency and that the Inquiry legal team
10 provides a clear plan or roadmap as to its proposed
11 investigative approach for the remainder of this Inquiry
12 within achievable timelines. This must set out all
13 other proposed work streams, including the scope and
14 timescale of the Inquiry's evidence gathering processes,
15 including obtaining and providing expert evidence, the
16 proposed systemic issues such work will address and how
17 these areas will interact with and inform the clustered
18 thematic issues proposed by the draft SOA.

19 This roadmap we say, Chair, must include the
20 disclosure plan which CTI spoke of at the opening of the
21 July 2025 hearings and has yet to materialise. It is
22 vital this plan is provided as soon as possible in order
23 to afford a meaningful pre-publication window of
24 consultation with CPs.

25 Chair, we fully appreciate that ILT have been

1 working hard behind the scenes to progress the
2 investigative course of this Inquiry. However, in the
3 context of a public inquiry where there is a presumption
4 of openness, it is not enough simply to tell CPs that
5 the work is underway and to limit their public
6 involvement to the provision of evidence alone. CPs
7 must be apprised of the key investigative work the
8 Inquiry has already undertaken and what remains to be
9 done, even if it has not been conducted within the four
10 walls of the hearing room, to enable us to effectively
11 engage with, understand and assist this Inquiry.

12 Without this understanding of the wider investigative
13 picture, Chair, you will appreciate that our comments on
14 the draft SOA are necessarily siloed at this stage.

15 We note that in the October opening, Mr Griffin said
16 that a clear investigative strategy was finalised and
17 due for publication in November. It cannot be right
18 that this strategy was finalised in October, given the draft
19 we have been provided with.

20 A key concern we have highlighted in our written
21 submissions, echoed by others, is the lack of clarity as
22 to the evidence base for the figure of 140 deaths, which
23 is referred to at paragraph 11, which ILT proposes will
24 form the illustrative case sample.

25 Whilst we understand that this number comprises all

1 bereaved families in this Inquiry under category 9A, in
2 addition to the additional categories of cases
3 identified at 9b to f, this has yet to be formally
4 confirmed by ILT to all CPs. Whilst we welcome the
5 inferred indication that all bereaved CPs' cases will
6 fall within the illustrative cases, the Inquiry's
7 methodology for case selection remains opaque, in
8 particular how the categories of cases identified at
9 paragraph 9 are said to apply and discharge the criteria
10 at paragraph 8.

11 For example, it is not clear to us what, if any,
12 expert or statistical analysis has been sought in order
13 to ensure that the cases within these categories
14 comprise overall a proportionate cross-section of the
15 issues identified at paragraph 8 accounting for
16 appropriate weighting between different patient cohort and
17 trust sizes. Nor is it clear how and on what bases the
18 selected categories beyond those of bereaved CPs have
19 been identified. For instance, and this is supporting
20 the observations made by INQUEST, why only cases
21 concerning inquests with neglect findings are included at
22 paragraph 9B, as opposed to those where critical
23 causative findings have been made.

24 Chair, we direct you to our written submissions for
25 further observations on this particular issue.

1 Put plainly, without clarification from ILT on the
2 methodology behind its case selection, our CPs cannot be
3 assured that these categories are sufficiently and
4 fairly representative of the key issues which underpin
5 the Terms of Reference.

6 The draft SOA is also inexcusably silent on the
7 timeline for completion of the various investigative
8 stages outlined. Not even a preliminary indication of
9 any such timeline has been provided, which is
10 particularly concerning given the few sitting days left.

11 A clear and realistic timeline must be disclosed to
12 us now for the provision of all draft 140 case summaries
13 and the disclosure of the thematic clusters grouping
14 these cases, building in sufficient time for CPs to feed
15 into and comment on each stage.

16 ILT must also indicate what stage of the proposed
17 investigative work has so far been reached, given the
18 seemingly ambitious remit of this strategy and the
19 various other work streams which must run in parallel.

20 For our clients to understand and accept this draft
21 SOA as both sensible and necessary, they need to believe
22 it is achievable, Chair. Our CPs also have significant
23 reservations over the asymmetrical approach to
24 disclosure and evidential input that the draft SOA
25 appears to envisage. The strategy seems to indicate, as

1 per paragraph 51(c), that only CPs within the same
2 cluster will have sight of the case summaries within its
3 grouping, in addition to those with direct equity in
4 that case summary.

5 This approach is not rationalised, nor can it be
6 acceptable for CPs to be in different states of
7 knowledge, depending on their thematic grouping. The
8 current proposed approach would risk a dangerously
9 unbalanced process whereby only the Trust providers
10 would have sight of all relevant case summaries, despite
11 these forming the basis for the thematic clusters and in
12 turn key findings and conclusions which you, Chair, will
13 draw from these. Additionally, the draft SOA appears to
14 restrict consultation on the development of the thematic
15 clusters only to those CPs within the identified
16 cluster.

17 It is imperative that all CPs are offered
18 a meaningful opportunity to engage and feed into the
19 formulation of these case clusters, even if not within
20 that particular cluster. Without such collective
21 engagement, CPs can have no confidence that the
22 appropriate systemic issues will have been identified
23 and sufficiently interrogated. This is particularly
24 important given the strategy's indication at
25 paragraph 54. That is that all clusters will be

1 (inaudible) evidence.

2 Chair, the exclusion of patients with lived
3 experience from this draft strategy is also a matter of
4 significant concern to our clients, in particular X1,
5 a former patient under the care of NEPT. The failure to
6 include those with lived experience within the draft SOA
7 is indicative, we submit, of the Inquiry's general
8 approach to this cohort to date, having failed to engage
9 with and assure the CPs as to their fundamental role
10 within this Inquiry. The fact the Inquiry still has not
11 provided any indication in its timetable as to when it
12 intends to hear evidence from those with lived
13 experience, despite being pressed repeatedly, including
14 in our phase 1 closing submissions, is unacceptable,
15 Chair. In his October opening, Mr Griffin said:

16 "Furthermore, the Inquiry is making considerable
17 progress towards obtaining evidence from those who have
18 lived experience of mental health services provided by
19 Trusts in Essex."

20 I'm afraid we have not seen any evidence of that.

21 Rule 9s are said to be coming for those who have
22 filled in the form, but again there is no clear
23 timetable for this. Certainly X1 filled in that form
24 a long time ago and has had no Rule 9 request. Chair,
25 so concerned has she been that, as you know, she wrote

1 to you directly. Those like her with lived experience
2 will provide valuable, first-hand evidence on the key
3 systemic issues which underpin this Inquiry, ward safety
4 in particular, be it sexual safety, or general safety,
5 ligature points, use of restraint, overuse of medication
6 and many other aspects on which bereaved families are
7 not, understandably, in a position to assist.

8 We believe that they are a relatively small cohort.
9 Their evidence should not be siloed or treated as
10 a bolt-on consideration by this Inquiry. It must be
11 heard rooted in its appropriate context alongside the
12 evidence from providers, bereaved families and external
13 agencies contemporaneous to the issues raised.

14 The suggestion raised by the ILT team correspondence
15 that the Inquiry cannot accommodate lived experience CPs
16 within the draft SOA due to the fact that their evidence
17 has yet been obtained is no excuse. This is especially
18 so in circumstances where the delay in obtaining lived
19 experience CPs' evidence is down to the Inquiry's own
20 dilatory approach to publishing its lived experience
21 framework, which was not finalised until July 2025.

22 The absence of written statements from family CPs
23 does not, it rightly appears, exclude them from being
24 an illustrative case. The same approach must apply to
25 lived experience CPs. Their evidence, Chair, is no less

1 valuable to this investigative process and must be
2 anchored at its very centre.

3 We ask that the Inquiry communicates now, as
4 a matter of utmost priority, when it intends to hear
5 from lived experience CPs, such as X1. This is an issue
6 which must also be reflected clearly and given
7 precedence within the Inquiry's awaited roadmap.

8 It is hoped, Chair, that moving forward the work
9 between ILT and CPs on these pressing issues can be
10 genuinely collaborative and two way. We and many other
11 CPs have raised our concerns repeatedly as to the ways
12 in which we continue to find our CPs' ability to
13 effectively engage in this Inquiry constrained. To
14 date, we have provided the following written submissions
15 to the ILT in order to assist:

16 1. Closing submissions at the end of phase 1 on
17 behalf of Leigh Day, dated 30th May 2025, raising numerous
18 procedural issues, including the Rule 10 process,
19 disclosure, the lack of engagement of lived experience
20 CPs, timetables for evidential hearings and the absence
21 of any judicial procedure for applications to be heard.

22 2. Closing submissions on behalf of Irwin Mitchell,
23 dated 29th May 2025, addressing disclosure and
24 evidential hearing phases timetables.

25 3. Draft undertakings, written submissions on

1 behalf of all of our CPs, dated 27th August 2025.

2 Instruction of neurodiversity expert, written
3 submissions on behalf of all of our CPs, dated
4 24th September 2025.

5 Contrary to the approach taken in various other
6 public inquiries that we have been collectively involved
7 in, the Inquiry has not formally responded to any of
8 these submissions or simply told us where they are at,
9 nor have they published them. We work hard on each of
10 these pieces of work, Chair, asking our clients to turn
11 their minds to each of these issues before submitting
12 them onwards to you, Chair, only to be faced with a wall
13 of silence.

14 For example, did you agree with our observations on
15 the scope of instruction of neurodiversity experts?
16 What about the crucial issue of undertakings? Has that
17 been resolved? If not, what is the current position?
18 And what are the delays, if any? Are you likely to make
19 a ruling on this issue? If so, when will we hear,
20 Chair?

21 Additionally, the Rule 10 process remains unaltered
22 and unworkable. Re-examination of our own witnesses
23 should be a given, but yet we don't have mics. The
24 process for replying to questions directly remains
25 unclear and in any event pointless without our own mics.

1 Again, we do not know your view, Chair.

2 We hope this hearing will mark a welcome shift in
3 the relationship between the ILT and CPs and that the
4 urgent concerns we now raise are not simply received
5 into the ether along the lines of our previous
6 submissions. We urge a renewed focus, Chair, on the
7 principles of transparency, openness and effective
8 participation that should underpin any public inquiry.

9 As the first statutory inquiry into mental health
10 provision, to our CPs this feels like
11 a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to embed desperately
12 needed change. Our CPs want you to be able to make far
13 reaching recommendations, but those recommendations will
14 only be meaningful and respected if the springboard is
15 a public evidence base with clear findings of fact.

16 We will do our best to respond to the RIF
17 suggestions as directed by 12th September, Chair, but
18 until we understand the fundamental structure of the
19 remaining work, focusing on the RIF feels like we are
20 being asked to put the cart before the horse.

21 Chair, those are our submissions and we hope that
22 they are of some assistance.

23 THE CHAIR: Thank you, Ms Sikand. Thank you very much.

24 MR GRIFFIN: Thank you. Chair, we now hear from Ms Misra KC
25 on behalf of Hodge Jones and Allen.

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Submissions by MS MISRA

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MS MISRA: Good morning, Chair. You will have received two

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sets of submissions on behalf of the clients represented

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by Hodge Jones and Allen, all of whom I represent,

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together with my learned junior, Dr Burin, Ms Moradi and

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Ms Henshaw-Keene who are with me today. Mr Loomes, who

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is also a member of our counsel team, is attending

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an important client event in Chelmsford with the rest of

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our legal team which unfortunately clashed with today.

11

With your permission, Chair, and having obtained

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your permission to put in submissions on Article 2,

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I will address you on the Article 2 submissions with

14

a focus on what we say that means in practice, and my

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learned junior, Dr Achas Burin, will, again with your

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permission, address you on the submissions on the draft

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investigative strategy flowing on from those.

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You may know, Chair, that I joined as a leading

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counsel in only July of this year, whereas my juniors

20

have been involved from the outset with

21

Mr Steven Snowden KC. We will of course remain within

22

our allocated time.

23

Before I move on to those matters, Chair, having

24

heard the submissions of learned leading counsel

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Ms Sikand KC, I would of course endorse the themes that

1 she raised when she said what her clients are looking
2 for is transparency, openness and clarity. I am sure
3 that is an aim shared by all of the Core Participants
4 from whom you will hear today and also a bit of a theme
5 of wanting to co-operate, wanting to participate in
6 a meaningful way, but finding it very difficult to do so
7 particularly when information is provided in a silo in
8 many instances. But as I say, the focus of my
9 submissions to you, Chair, this morning will be to deal
10 with two things in particular.

11 First of all, we respect that this is your Inquiry
12 and it is one in which independent decisions will be
13 taken. So the plea for greater participation from us
14 and across all of the submissions that you will have
15 received is not a plea to cross that line, but simply
16 a plea to place the Core Participants at the heart of
17 the process.

18 Secondly, we say that what we describe in our
19 submissions as a necessary pause and reset is necessary
20 to ensure that the investigative strategy, and indeed
21 the other strands of the work of the Inquiry, whatever
22 and wherever they may be and when they take place, take
23 full account of Convention rights now and not later, so
24 that the Inquiry respects those rights and embeds them
25 in the strategy to be adopted. So that pause and reset

1 will, we say, save problems further down the line and
2 improve the output of the Inquiry overall.

3 So, in that regard, Chair, we seek a ruling from you
4 in relation to the applicability and the way in which
5 the Convention rights will, if they are found to be
6 applicable, be embedded in all of the strategies of this
7 Inquiry going forward. Now we say is that time before
8 that draft investigative strategy is set in stone.

9 I turn now to the submissions on Article 2, and
10 Chair, you will know that in those submissions I refer
11 to there being other Convention rights which are very
12 likely at play as well, but in the time that I have, and
13 because it is important to focus on the points that we
14 say are very important at this stage, I will necessarily
15 focus on Article 2. That is not to say that we abandon
16 the position that other rights may be at play and indeed
17 you may have seen that I said that Article 8 may be
18 an important factor in relation to redaction and
19 disclosure strategies.

20 So in relation to Article 2, we understand that
21 stepping back from the Terms of Reference to which,
22 Chair, you have rightly anchored the work of this
23 Inquiry, the Inquiry is focusing on systemic issues by
24 investigating inpatient deaths and near misses and it is
25 doing that to a sufficient degree to be able to

1 appreciate what the systemic issues are and what they
2 continue to be in some cases, and crucially, Chair, to
3 use that information to inform the recommendations that
4 this Inquiry seeks to make.

5 Chair, I will say nothing about the recommendations
6 and implementation forum because that is not the purpose
7 of today's hearing other than it is (audio breaks) very,
8 very welcome development so far as the Core Participants
9 I represent are concerned and so we are very concerned
10 to make sure that those recommendations are made in the
11 best possible way.

12 What is it that every single person that we
13 represent, what is it they want? They want to be heard.
14 They want their evidence to be considered to make for
15 meaningful change. It is the change that is at the
16 heart of everything they are driving for. So, Chair,
17 I invite you to take everything that I and my learned
18 junior say today in that spirit. We want to make sure
19 that we work with you so that when those recommendations
20 are made, those being your recommendations, they are the
21 most well-informed recommendations that they can be and
22 they are in a state that they can be implemented in
23 a timely and meaningful way.

24 Of course it is trite to say that the Inquiry is
25 a public authority within the meaning of the Human

1 Rights Act 1998 and therefore it is for the Inquiry
2 itself to fulfil its own duty to consider its
3 obligations under the Convention. And so I can only
4 apologise if that is legal advice which has already been
5 obtained or given behind the scenes, and indeed if there
6 is already a view that has been formed as to whether any
7 of the rights should form part of the work of this
8 Inquiry. Because I do not know, as I say, I can only
9 apologise, but I will, at this point in time, focus my
10 submissions on Article 2 on the basis that that has not
11 been a decided point.

12 Now, the nature of the article duties was very
13 comprehensively decided in a case called R (Morahan) v West
14 London Assistant Coroner judicial review which I have
15 already cited extensively in the submissions together
16 with my juniors, and that judgment was upheld by the
17 Court of Appeal.

18 You will have seen from my submissions that the
19 point that we seek to make is that really this focuses
20 in on the positive duty to protect life which itself
21 subdivides into the framework duty and operational duty
22 and, critically, we say, at this juncture in time, given
23 the draft investigative strategy, an investigative duty
24 to inquire into and explain the circumstances of
25 a death.

1 So looking at the positive duty, that also breaks
2 down, as I say, into two subheadings, if I can put it
3 that way: the positive operational duty and a framework
4 duty. In relation to the positive operational duty,
5 Lord Justice Popplewell very helpfully explains
6 that to us in the Morahan case by saying:

7 "The positive operational duty arises where the
8 state agency knows or ought reasonably to know of a real
9 and immediate risk to an individual's life and requires
10 it to take such measures as could reasonably be expected
11 of it to avoid such risk ..." Eventuating effectively.

12 So in that context, just to break that down, risk
13 means a significant or substantial risk. So that's
14 something more than remote or fanciful.

15 I make these points not because as I say in my
16 submissions that arid submissions on law would help us,
17 because I'm going to tie this into why I say, given the
18 evidence that you have received to date, Chair, we are
19 in that territory.

20 "An immediate risk to life means one that is present
21 and continuing. The relevant risk has to be to life
22 rather than of harm or even of serious harm and the
23 meaning of 'real' in this context focuses on what was
24 known or ought to have been known at the time."

25 Just pausing there, it is clear that in many regards

1 this is going to be what the Inquiry is looking at in
2 any event in order to focus on the Terms of Reference as
3 currently drafted, which is, as I say, rightly the
4 anchor for you, Chair, but looking at the systemic
5 issues. We are concerned not to upend the strategy that
6 has been drafted to date, but to make sure that it is
7 effectively cognisant of Convention rights and it is
8 strengthened to make sure that if, Chair, you were to
9 determine at some point in 2026 -- because it may be
10 that your view is that at this point in time you cannot
11 be sure, you cannot take a firm view -- but it may be
12 when you have received further evidence, when you have
13 seen the output from the legal team working for you
14 collating different strands of evidence, you may pause
15 next year and say: in fact, I think that Article 2 is
16 arguably engaged here.

17 The difficulty that we face is that if we do not
18 make these submissions to you now, firstly, we would
19 rightly be criticised for leaving them until next year,
20 but secondly, I appreciate we have made those
21 submissions in opening submissions, but it is incumbent
22 on us to reinforce them because the simple point is
23 this. If in your role as Chair next year, having taken
24 your own advice that the answer is that in fact
25 Article 2 arguably applies, it may be too late to pivot

1 the strategy to make sure that it is fit for purpose in
2 that regard.

3 For those who have access to our submissions, I'm at
4 paragraph 13, just to give it that reference point. But
5 you will see, Chair, that we refer to the case of
6 Rabone, which is a very important case, concerning in
7 that case the self-inflicted death of a voluntary
8 psychiatric patient during a home visit, so different
9 facts to those that you have heard in many instances.
10 But it is an important case which sets down key factors
11 which provide, whilst not necessarily providing a sure
12 guide, as Lord Justice Popplewell says in Morahan, does
13 provide some very important indications of the factors
14 to look out for.

15 The four factors are:

16 (1) The existence of a real and immediate risk to
17 life as a necessary but not sufficient condition of the
18 existence of a duty.

19 (2) And, Chair, I say this is important in the
20 context of what you have heard so far, an assumption of
21 responsibility by the state for the individual's welfare
22 and safety including by the exercise of control.

23 (3) The especial vulnerability of the individual.

24 (4) The nature of the risk being an exceptional
25 risk beyond an ordinary risk of the kind that

1 individuals in the relevant category should reasonably
2 be expected to take.

3 Indeed, it was in the Rabone case that the
4 Court of Appeal found that the risk of suicide in that
5 case had been real rather than remote or fanciful where
6 there had been a five per cent risk of suicide at the
7 point that the deceased was allowed to leave the
8 hospital.

9 So I hope, Chair, that that gives some helpful steer
10 as to the kind of trigger points we are looking at in
11 relation to Article 2. I won't, Chair, but I will be
12 very happy to answer any questions arising, go into the
13 authorities in too much more detail. You have my
14 learned junior's skeleton argument in this regard.

15 But why do we say this matters? Because these are
16 pointless submissions unless, we say, they should change
17 the way the Inquiry is doing things.

18 First of all, we say that the factual matrices that
19 have already emerged from the evidence that has been
20 heard to date, putting to one side whether that evidence
21 can be categorised as flushing out concerns and issues
22 of the Core Participants or something else.

23 Chair, you have heard first-hand evidence which
24 certainly in our submission shows that there is, at the
25 very least, a strongly arguable case that the Inquiry

1 will find that the Essex NHS Trusts were under
2 a positive operational duty in some cases and that this
3 was breached in circumstances of real and immediate risk
4 to life, assumption of responsibility for welfare and
5 safety, including exercise of control, vulnerability and
6 exceptional risk.

7 We say the Inquiry must take steps now to ascertain
8 whether the positive operational duty has or has
9 arguably been breached by the state while it is
10 finalising its plans to investigate illustrative cases
11 and to create a final roadmap to the end of the Inquiry
12 and not later when it might be, and probably will be,
13 too late to pivot to meet the task at hand.

14 So, I move on now, just keeping an eye on time, from
15 the operational duty to the framework duty.

16 The other aspect of the positive duty is also well
17 dealt with in the Morahan case which we have cited from
18 quite extensively in the submissions. But, Chair, what
19 I ask you to take particular regard to is paragraph 19
20 of the submissions where we say this. Citing the case
21 in question, R (L(A Patient)) v Secretary of State for
22 Justice, per Lord Walker:

23 "There is often no clear dividing line between the
24 positive operational duty and the systems duty below the
25 national level."

1 We are of course concerned in this Inquiry with
2 cases that do fall below the national level, regional
3 cases in Essex and we say that is a particularly apt
4 point to bear in mind in this particular stage.

5 We also, Chair, ask you to pay particular regard to
6 the case of Savage. That was a case concerning
7 a self-inflicted death by someone who was mentally
8 unwell and as we have flagged in our submission very
9 pertinently, a death that was in fact within the scope
10 of this Inquiry.

11 We say that in the Savage case, Lord Roger observed
12 that:

13 "The systems duty meant that the hospital had, for
14 example, to employ competent staff, take steps to see
15 that they were properly trained to high professional
16 standards and that their systems of work, plant and
17 equipment had to take account of the risk that detained
18 patients might try to commit suicide."

19 Of course, Chair, you know very well that many of
20 the patients we have considered through the prism of the
21 evidence to date were indeed detained patients, though
22 not all of them.

23 So at paragraph 21 we say that the facts of Savage
24 actually have a very strong resonance with the evidence
25 that this Inquiry has heard to date and that you, Chair,

1 will be aware of factors such as the Oxevision evidence
2 which was heard so recently, the use of the equipment
3 and the systems for monitoring patients.

4 There are also very clear common themes that have
5 been emerging in relation to staff training, competence,
6 and resuscitation for example and addressing physical
7 health concerns in elderly patient. Those are just
8 a few of many examples.

9 Chair, you will also be well aware of the change in
10 the risk assessment model which happened in April 2025
11 this year. So that assessment model is to be used by
12 the NHS from April onwards, but that of course poses the
13 question why did this need to be changed? It does
14 indicate a systemic issue before. Although I make no
15 submission at this stage as to whether it has been
16 effective in changing for the good, if I can put it that
17 way, it is another flag that needs to be considered at
18 this stage.

19 Finally, Chair, I am certain you will be well aware
20 of the Mental Health Bill and the serious impetus for
21 legislative change which is ongoing and indeed we expect
22 an Act very shortly.

23 All of this goes to my point on behalf of our
24 clients, which is we fully understand the Inquiry
25 doesn't want to lose the wood for the trees in this

1 Inquiry, but its focus, its correct focus in many
2 instances on the systemic issues, is precisely what
3 engages Article 2. So what we are asking is for the
4 pause and reset to take that into account.

5 I will now touch upon the investigative duty.
6 Chair, if it assists I'm at paragraph 23, page 7 of our
7 submissions on this point. Here, the investigative duty
8 again splits down into the substantive duty to
9 investigate every death as an aspect of the framework
10 duty and the procedural obligation that arises in some
11 cases where there is a possibility and it is important
12 to note it doesn't have to be a conclusive finding of
13 breach, but possibility of a breach by an agent of the
14 state of one of the substantive operational or systems
15 duties.

16 So because I have just made the submission to you on
17 behalf of our team that we say that we are clearly at
18 the threshold point of finding that possibility of
19 a breach of this substantive operational systems duty,
20 it now tips us into this obligation in relation to the
21 investigative duty.

22 What we say here, the procedural implications of
23 that is that we say that the enhanced investigative duty
24 is very likely engaged. I won't repeat, Chair, but if
25 it is helpful, at paragraph 29 we set out that

1 investigative duty at its core, and we say that there is
2 a requirement -- there should be a real evidential basis
3 which makes the suggestion of a breach of a substantive
4 obligation by the state a credible one.

5 I simply say this. Anyone who has followed this
6 Inquiry to date, anyone who has been watching this
7 online, attending the hearings, participating, they
8 cannot fail but to have come to the conclusion, and
9 it is only this, a conclusion that there is a real
10 evidential basis that there has been a breach of a
11 substantive obligation by the state at regional level in
12 Essex.

13 Now I come on to what are the procedural
14 implications, Chair, if you are with us, that this at
15 least deserves a pause and reset to make further enquiry
16 as to whether this Inquiry will centre Article 2 in what
17 it is doing.

18 We say that having taken such advice as you consider
19 appropriate, Chair, in your independent role, and of
20 course taking into account such of our submissions as we
21 have made as you consider helpful at this stage, the
22 Inquiry must embed into its strategies a process that
23 is suitable for, first of all, giving meaningful
24 consideration as to whether there has been an arguable
25 breach of a positive duty, either by way of the

1 operational duty or the systems or framework duty. And
2 what is the most effective way of doing that we say is
3 that there should be a baseline for findings in respect
4 of each of the deaths which form illustrative cases,
5 with clear conclusions as to whether there have been
6 arguable state breaches in respect of those cases and in
7 those circumstances to hold the investigation, however
8 that is to be done, in a way that is sufficient to
9 examine the circumstances of the death and to hold those
10 involved, whether because they contributed to the death
11 or whether because they were involved in the
12 circumstances leading to it, to account. Of course
13 accountability is such an important strand of what it is
14 that everyone involved in this Inquiry as a Core
15 Participant seeks.

16 The difficulty we find is that at the moment, as
17 currently envisaged in the draft investigation strategy,
18 this illustrative Statement of Approach, there is very
19 little time for the Core Participants to comment on case
20 summaries and this is a vital juncture at which their
21 input is needed and it is I say a critical point at
22 which the Inquiry should give active consideration to
23 Convention rights and in particular Article 2.

24 I want to make one thing very clear. We understand
25 that at the moment the Inquiry doesn't have a full set

1 of data that would allow the Inquiry to understand
2 exactly how many people did die in the relevant
3 timeframe. We know there are pieces of data that are
4 missing in that regard.

5 We are not asking, I should be very clear about
6 this, for there to be Article 2 compliant investigations
7 into every death that took place in Essex in the index
8 period. What we are asking for is for an Article 2
9 compliant investigation in relation to all of our
10 clients, and indeed anyone who falls within the scope,
11 as it were. We don't make our submissions selfishly, if
12 I can put it that way. Of course we represent the
13 largest cohort of bereaved families in this Inquiry.

14 This also has an important impact on disclosure.
15 I want to flag up, Chair, that some of the questioning
16 that has already been undertaken by your team of Counsel
17 to the Inquiry has been Article 2 compliant. It has
18 asked all the right questions. It has gone into the
19 detail and depth that would be required. So we don't
20 wish to criticise some frankly excellent examples of
21 questioning that we have heard to date, but we don't see
22 consistency in the approach taken to different Core
23 Participants giving evidence and perhaps crucially and
24 most disappointingly of all, and here we say is another
25 ask of ours, all questioning has been conducted without

1 exhibits and without proper disclosure we say in this
2 case.

3 I won't stray into that area too much because my
4 learned senior junior will address you on that. But
5 what we say is that, if I can just go now to
6 paragraph 38, if I may, of our submissions, Chair. What
7 are we asking you to do as well as make a formal ruling
8 on the engagement of Article 2 and any other Convention
9 rights you consider are or are potentially engaged?

10 First of all, we ask this Inquiry to make Rule 9
11 requests of the NHS Trusts in each illustrative case
12 where a Core Participant has outstanding questions that
13 they want answers to, to forward those answers to the
14 Core Participants and to then determine whether oral
15 evidence is required in consultation with Core
16 Participants.

17 We say this, there may be some instances where
18 having received those answers, those Core Participants
19 don't want to give oral evidence. They don't want to
20 participate further beyond being kept up to date. That
21 may in fact reduce the scope in some instances of the
22 oral evidence which could have been anticipated.

23 We also ask for there to be full and timely
24 disclosure to further the duty of candour and this goes
25 to the point that it will not be sufficient for those

1 who are tasked with at least partly behind the scenes
2 investigation to look at the medical records without
3 disclosing them because, as is picked up in our other
4 set of submissions about the strategy, in order to
5 triangulate evidence and to get the best evidence you
6 can, Chair, to inform the recommendations that you may
7 wish to make, you would want there to be an opportunity,
8 we would submit, for Core Participants to see the
9 medical records, to say, for example, actually I know
10 that's what the records say, but that's not what
11 happened and actually I can show you some evidence that
12 that meeting never happened, or that was not the
13 treatment that my loved one was receiving, that's
14 a complete mistake or error. To then add that to their
15 lived experience of what happened to their loved ones,
16 these are the people they are talking about, the people
17 they hold so dear to them to this day and to give you
18 the ability to carry out, as I say, that vital
19 triangulation with your team.

20 We also ask that those who experienced less than
21 full Article 2 inquests, either because there was no
22 inquest or because there was no Article 2 inquest, get
23 a fuller examination into their loved one's treatment
24 and decision-making.

25 We have provided to you, Chair, to try to be

1 helpful, a list of our clients and to try and pull
2 together those who have had inquests, those who have had
3 Article 2 inquests and those who have had no inquest.
4 You will also have heard evidence and received
5 documentation as to where things have, to put it very
6 bluntly, gone wrong in the inquest process as well,
7 particularly because some of the prior investigation
8 that informed the inquest, for example investigations
9 carried out by the NHS Trust, were themselves flawed.

10 I do understand and recognise that, quite rightly,
11 in the illustrative investigation strategy the Statement
12 of Approach envisages that there will be a caveat so
13 that there will be some cases where there needs to be
14 a certain going behind findings of inquests or of civil
15 proceedings. I don't focus so much on the civil
16 proceedings.

17 But with the inquests what we ask, Chair, is that we
18 get to grips with this issue now to make sure that that
19 part of the process can be finessed and tightened up.
20 And we offer our co-operation, we offer our help to the
21 extent we can be helpful, as I say, without wishing to
22 cross that line and trespassing into the fact that this
23 is your Inquiry, Chair.

24 Finally, we do ask that the experts are instructed
25 in good time on the full range of issues and that we

1 have enough time to be able to contribute what we hope
2 would be useful observations and information, not simply
3 following the clustering process as it is currently
4 envisaged.

5 I do not, in the time I have, as I say, wish to
6 address you, Chair, on the other Convention rights that
7 may be at play. I can only apologise to the extent that
8 you have received advice in the background about these
9 Convention rights. As I say, we are not cited on that
10 but I will now, with your permission, if I may, hand
11 over to Dr Achas Burin, my learned junior, who has been
12 involved in the Inquiry to date and she will deal with
13 our submissions on the strategy.

14 And I just want to check that I have your permission
15 in that regard, Chair, consistent with the Lady Chief
16 Justice's approach to bringing juniors in. Thank you.

17 THE CHAIR: Of course.

18 Submissions by DR BURIN

19 DR BURIN: Thank you, Chair. I will address you on the
20 nitty-gritty of the investigative strategy, but my
21 points have a wider resonance as well in terms of the
22 other work streams for this Inquiry.

23 I will also attempt to address some of the written
24 submissions that have been very helpfully disclosed on
25 Relativity to us in the short time that we have been

1 able to review those, and in my submission, there are
2 two key themes emerging from all the written submissions
3 before you.

4 The first is some submissions concentrating on what
5 is missing from the draft strategy, whilst others
6 concentrate on what is said in the draft strategy, but
7 they make alternative proposals, and these submissions
8 do a little bit of both.

9 In outline, what is missing from the draft, we say,
10 is that there are aspects where the draft seems vague,
11 incomplete or badly needs supplementing by a clear
12 understanding of other work streams and indeed the
13 timelines for doing all of that and our clients endorse all
14 the requests for clarity that have been put forward by
15 all the parties before you today.

16 In short, Chair, you will see from our written
17 submissions that our clients' perspective is that this
18 strategy by itself is too little too late and our lay
19 client, Melanie Leahy, has felt so strongly about this
20 that she has put in her own independent set of written
21 submissions to you.

22 In terms of what we say can be improved about the
23 draft strategy, our overall submission in this regard is
24 for the Inquiry to please continue to engage Core
25 Participants throughout in just the way that we are

1 doing today and we appreciate that, as a result of
2 today, you have received a range of views. However, we
3 observe that there is a lot of common ground between
4 everyone here and that undoubtedly the Inquiry will
5 function better as a result of taking these views into
6 consideration even if the draft strategy itself takes
7 a little longer to finalise as a result of any pause or
8 re-set. We note that the strategy states that it will
9 in any event be kept under review and we ask to be
10 involved in that process throughout.

11 So I will speak in general terms about the way in
12 which our clients wish to participate in the Inquiry
13 generally of course focusing on the shape of the draft
14 strategy, but there is also a separate question about
15 how individual Core Participants can input into their
16 own investigation in their case together with those who
17 advise them. So I will turn to that second and conclude
18 with some brief observations on points of detail.

19 So, Chair, to begin, as Maya Sikand KC has stressed,
20 our clients are encouraged by this hearing listed as it
21 was on the application of the family Core Participants
22 jointly, as indeed Mr Griffin KC has outlined. As you
23 have said, (audio breaks) is at the heart of this
24 Inquiry and for families to be at the heart of the
25 Inquiry means, amongst other things, they have a say in

1 how the Inquiry conducts its proceedings.

2 There are at least four ways to date reflected in
3 this Inquiry to varying extents that Core Participants
4 can and have inputted into the Inquiry's processes
5 directly themselves or indirectly through their RLRs.
6 So as today, we can have the ability to directly address
7 you, the decision-maker, in a traditional tribunal
8 setting, in public and indeed with the involvement of
9 all the others present here today.

10 Chair, I commend to you the expertise ranged before
11 you. You not only have the lived experience of those
12 who instruct us, so our lay clients, but you also have
13 the legal experience of many of the other Recognised
14 Legal Representatives including ourselves, and in your
15 opening statements in the past you have emphasised the
16 experience of your legal team, rightly so. But in
17 hearing from all of us, may I suggest that you benefit
18 from an even broader base of expertise than simply that
19 of your own legal team.

20 The subject matter of this Inquiry is complicated,
21 both legally and factually. Nobody would deny that.
22 The coverage of medical issues and issues about how the
23 state should relate to citizens are broad and
24 complicated, but there is strength in numbers, as my
25 learned leader has said, and hearing submissions can

1 only strengthen your investigation.

2 And we say authentically that everyone here stands
3 ready to help. An Inquiry is not an adversarial process
4 so you can take this offer of help at face value and
5 I will be telling you some ways in which, specifically
6 in relation to the draft strategy, our legal team can
7 help you. As my learned leader said, what our clients
8 seek from you therefore is opportunities for meaningful
9 input.

10 Of course, as I have alluded to, you will receive
11 a range of views and you may have to decide between them
12 if they are incompatible. If it would further assist
13 you, Chair, again we are happy to set out in writing
14 specific points of agreement or disagreement between our
15 clients and the skeleton arguments of others. We can
16 also help you with future scoping exercises as to the
17 conduct of the Inquiry by telling you what we anticipate
18 to be in each of our clients' cases the most contentious
19 issues or perhaps the witnesses that may further need
20 calling, documents that they haven't received and those
21 kinds of detail. That is why we set out in the appendix
22 to our skeleton argument information about inquests into
23 the deaths of our clients' loved ones.

24 That we hope assists you and indeed everyone here in
25 understanding the impact of Article 2 on the

1 investigative strategy. You will see that some cases
2 have had Article 2 compliant investigations already, but
3 that is not the case for all.

4 So given that Recognised Legal Representatives have
5 the most in-depth knowledge as to each of their clients,
6 can I suggest to you that the individual Core
7 Participants' representative should be the Inquiry's
8 first port of call when determining next investigative
9 steps in their case.

10 As my learned leader has said, after all this we
11 hope to receive a ruling from you and our clients have
12 repeatedly asked for more communication from the
13 Inquiry. They have asked for regular updates from the
14 Inquiry relating to its work behind the scenes.

15 We are grateful for CTI's openings and hearings but
16 for our clients this may be too infrequent and too
17 formal. Informal updates via the website would be
18 extremely welcome and the more open and forthcoming the
19 Inquiry is, the more our clients' confidence in the
20 Inquiry can grow. As I am sure you are aware, Chair, if
21 this Inquiry carries out its work behind closed doors,
22 it will lose the trust of those we represent.

23 It bears repeating that justice in order to be just
24 must not only be done, but must be seen to be done, and
25 we say that there are ancillary benefits to public

1 proceedings such as the (audio breaks) one because if
2 there is to be sustained political will to implement
3 recommendations, there needs to be press and media
4 attention. For press and media attention there need to
5 be public hearings.

6 Further, Chair, an investigative phase that takes
7 place largely on paper is too reminiscent for our
8 clients of the internal investigations that the NHS
9 Trusts carried out for themselves which families often
10 found did not foreground their views.

11 Chair, while I don't for a moment suggest that this
12 Inquiry does not intend to foreground our clients'
13 views, there is an element to which a trauma informed
14 approach requires taking their prior experience and low
15 levels of trust into account.

16 I turn therefore to other ways that our clients can
17 be more involved in this Inquiry in addition to
18 procedural hearings like this one.

19 A second way that Core Participants can be involved
20 is to make suggestions through less formal channels.
21 For example, Chair, we welcome the engagement that RLRs
22 have with your Inquiry team in ongoing meetings. We do
23 say though that meetings cannot take the place of formal
24 liaison in the form of correspondence, rulings and
25 hearings and this is simply because members of the

1 Inquiry team do not have the power to determine all
2 matters aired in those meetings and so the discussions
3 themselves do not bind you and we cannot report on the
4 outcomes of those meetings to our clients because
5 nothing can be promised. So they are helpful for day to
6 day issues, but they cannot be the main forum for our
7 clients' participation in the Inquiry.

8 A third way, therefore, that Core Participants can
9 input into the Inquiry is by attending meetings
10 themselves and in that regard Core Participants
11 appreciated the surgery that took place in person in
12 Chelmsford, but again those kind of forums require
13 delicate coordination and organisation at the outset in
14 order to be effective.

15 In our closing submissions, following the hearing in
16 May this year, we asked for a consultative panel of Core
17 Participants to be established, similar to that that was
18 commended to Government from the Independent Inquiry
19 into Child Sexual Abuse, and indeed the consultant
20 psychologist to your Inquiry was instrumental in the
21 setting up of that consultative panel.

22 To date, Chair, we have had no response to that.
23 Indeed, we have never had any response to any written
24 submission that we have made since May 2025, whether by
25 way of correspondence or a ruling, and that includes, as

1 Maya Sikand KC has set out, submission solicited by the
2 Inquiry itself on matters such as undertakings and
3 instruction of experts.

4 In November, Chair, we made further submissions to
5 try to narrow the issues of this hearing today but have
6 had no response to date.

7 In the submissions on behalf of Deighton Pierce
8 Glynn and Leigh Day, the question of the number of 140
9 deaths was raised and that is at paragraph 11 of the
10 draft strategy. Although we know that that is expressed
11 to be a round figure, we, the legal team on behalf of
12 HJA, do not know at present whether those deaths
13 comprise non-Core Participant witnesses. So as you
14 know, Chair, we represent clients who are not Core
15 Participants and, for example, whose loved ones died in
16 2024, which is outside the relevant period in terms of
17 the Terms of Reference.

18 Even though these cases fall outside the relevant
19 period, they are extremely salient to the making of
20 recommendations. Indeed, in the submissions made on
21 behalf of EPUT, it is recognised that recent deaths are
22 salient to (audio breaks) recommendations. In our
23 submission, these non-Core Participant deaths ought to
24 be included within the investigative phase and yet we do
25 not know if they are.

1 Likewise, Chair, you have previously said that the
2 evidence of those who are not Core Participants is
3 equally valuable to you as compared with those who are
4 Core Participants, but to date those who are not Core
5 Participants have never been given an opportunity to
6 provide evidence. So we ask for clarity on that. How
7 will evidence from non-Core Participants be heard?

8 I will move on, Chair, to discuss more specific
9 matters about the investigative strategy, but just to
10 summarise these requests, we ask that going forward into
11 the investigative phase this Inquiry behave more like
12 the tribunal that it is. We ask that it conducts its
13 proceedings in public, in Rule 10 questions and
14 put them to witnesses and that it hears submissions at
15 critical stages. It goes without saying that such
16 hearings or submissions should be followed by rulings or
17 definitive outcomes communicated by correspondence.

18 Outside of hearings, we ask that the informal
19 liaison meetings be supplemented by correspondence and
20 monthly written updates about the progress of the
21 Inquiry that can be shared with our clients.

22 A fourth way, aside from hearings, meetings and
23 forums, that Core Participants can contribute to the
24 Inquiry is by filling out a form, which is what is
25 proposed at paragraph 51(a) of the draft strategy.

1 Chair, I am sure you will understand the reasons why
2 Core Participants are wary about responding to their
3 investigations by filling out a form. Many have had
4 very poor experience of communicating with the Trusts
5 about their concerns when their loved one's treatment
6 was ongoing. And to them, therefore, there seems to be
7 an inferior method of engagement in a crucial part of
8 the process. Indeed, as outlined myself, Core
9 Participants have not had a good experience of written
10 engagement with the Inquiry either, for example the lack
11 of response to submissions and to written Rule 10
12 questions submitted by the Inquiry pro forma.

13 Chair, I turn to the purpose of the investigations
14 to be carried out. A number of the submissions before
15 you have raised the question about what the purpose may
16 be and I can distil from my own reading of this
17 strategy several possible purposes, all of which may be
18 concurrent.

19 First of all, we suggest that there may be
20 an administrative function to these case summaries. For
21 example, the draft strategy says at paragraph 26 that
22 the written case summary will summarise the family's
23 witness statement. I offered my assistance and that of
24 our team to you, Chair, because it may not be obvious to
25 others that we, the legal team, have already provided

1 summaries of our clients' evidence insofar as those who
2 have given oral evidence to date.

3 That work was done by sending summarises of our
4 clients' main concerns to the CTI in question who
5 conducted the oral evidence. So that information should
6 already be available to the Inquiry and if the purpose
7 of these investigations is a crib sheet for the
8 Inquiry's experts, can I suggest to you, Chair, that
9 those existing summaries are an excellent starting point
10 because they have already been summarised with the
11 assistance of Core Participants and we suggest that this
12 is a good place for the investigative unit to start.

13 If instead the case summary is a scoping exercise to
14 see what further witnesses need to be called or if
15 disclosure exists and what more is needed, again we can
16 help with that. We say that in almost every case there
17 is some disputed fact, but we anticipate that in only
18 a few cases are there major disputes.

19 What would be unacceptable to our clients would be
20 if a paper exercise was the primary basis for making
21 findings of fact. I do not suggest for a moment, Chair,
22 that that is what the draft strategy intended to convey,
23 but it gave rise to a rational fear that this might be
24 the case.

25 Quite clearly, determinations of fact can only be

1 made by you and they cannot be done by paralegals,
2 medical assessors, RLRs, CTI experts or anyone else.
3 Findings of fact should be on the basis of evidence that
4 has been thoroughly and rigorously tested, not merely
5 summarised from documents on paper.

6 Chair, I want to emphasise that not all the findings
7 of fact that we will ask you to make relate simply to
8 cause of death. Cause of death may well have been
9 satisfactorily determined in an Article 2 compliant
10 process or perhaps it may not have been. But there are
11 very relevant findings of fact that do not relate merely
12 to cause of death.

13 Chair, if new disclosure emerges during the
14 investigative phase, we need to see that disclosure. It
15 is not sufficient to see a summary of it. That would be
16 plainly unfair, bearing in mind section 17 of the
17 Inquiries Act 2005, but not only that, Chair, on a human
18 level we have examples of Core Participants finding out
19 incredibly sensitive and meaningful information for the
20 first time from disclosure, for example, such that a
21 post mortem took place that they were previously unaware
22 of. There is a family that found out that a loved one
23 had suffered childhood abuse from their medical records
24 for the first time.

25 Chair, it is not appropriate for the Inquiry to have

1 to make these kinds of determinations on an individual
2 document-by-document or case-by-case basis about what
3 disclosure a family should see in circumstances like
4 that. Yet paragraph 51(a) of the strategy --

5 MR GRIFFIN: Sorry to interrupt, just to say you have one
6 minute left.

7 DR BURIN: Thank you.

8 Chair, you have our written submissions on
9 disclosure, so I won't stress that further.

10 I could address you on common themes and clusters.
11 What we will say is we don't think the clusters approach
12 is necessarily workable, but that in terms of common
13 themes we wish to propose some for the Inquiry and we
14 don't suggest that experts should be instructed only
15 after clusters have been established.

16 I will leave others to address that in further
17 detail and as I have said to you, Chair, we can provide
18 written submissions to you on the skeleton arguments of
19 others where that would be helpful.

20 Finally, Chair, I wish to address you briefly on
21 a point about interim recommendations. You will have
22 received submissions both from ourselves and from those
23 who are represented by Bindmans on interim
24 recommendations including a recommendation on Oxevision.

25 May I clarify that insofar as we have both made

1 submissions on Oxevision, we will support the
2 recommendation suggested by Bindmans and we suggest that
3 it is for your consideration ahead of our own because it
4 is more wide-ranging.

5 Chair, I will wrap up simply by saying this. Whilst
6 Article 2 provides the onus on public inquiries to
7 initiate investigations, you know very well that our
8 families had to fight for this Inquiry, and when they
9 did so, they had a vision of an inquiry that was
10 independent, impartial, thorough and forceful and,
11 Chair, they place that faith in you still to carry out
12 the inquiry that they envisaged.

13 THE CHAIR: Thank you.

14 MR GRIFFIN: Chair, had I known that Ms Burin would be
15 talking, I would also have introduced her.

16 That takes us to our first break. I suggest that we
17 reconvene at 11.40 am, in 15 minutes. Thank you very
18 much.

19 (11.26 am)

20 (A short break)

21 (11.40 am)

22 MR GRIFFIN: We will now hear from Ms Murphy KC.

23 Submissions by MS MURPHY

24 MS MURPHY: Good morning, Chair. I appear with Sophy Miles,
25 instructed by Jane Ryan and (inaudible) Bhatt Murphy

1 Solicitors.

2 You will recall the impactful evidence of our
3 client, Ben Jackson, at the beginning of July concerning
4 the death of his 18-year-old brother, Ed Jackson on New
5 Year's Eve in 2007 on Maple Ward, and the evidence given
6 together by Alexander and Paul Guille at the beginning
7 of October in relation to their sister, Bethany Lilley,
8 who died on 16th January 2019 on Thorpe Ward.

9 We will also make submissions this morning on behalf
10 of X4, who seeks to contribute to your Inquiry from his
11 lived experience of mental health services in Essex.

12 You have our written submissions addressing your
13 counsel's draft Statement of Approach to the
14 illustrative cases of those who have died, including our
15 proposals as to how that strand of the Inquiry's work
16 might be optimised and integrated with the other strands
17 of the investigative strategy.

18 We do not intend to repeat those observations orally
19 but to highlight our key points and offer some broader
20 observations. We anticipate that we will be less than
21 30 minutes.

22 Our clients wish to acknowledge their positive
23 experiences of the Inquiry to date and to acknowledge
24 the very real challenges faced by you and by your team.
25 They welcome this opportunity to address you in public

1 regarding the Inquiry's approach. Our clients greatly
2 value your determination to place the bereaved at the
3 heart of this process, to listen and to be informed by
4 their experience.

5 We will address the contribution of those with lived
6 experience separately.

7 The counsel-to-counsel meetings have also been
8 greatly appreciated but we do highlight the point we
9 make in our written submissions that the value of those
10 meetings may well be enhanced if they were to result in
11 routine circulation of decisions made on the matters
12 discussed and action points.

13 As my learned friends, Ms Sikand KC, Ms Misra KC and
14 Dr Burin have emphasised, the effectiveness of your
15 Inquiry will be enhanced by openness and transparency in
16 all aspects of its work.

17 We acknowledge that your Inquiry faces significant
18 challenges. You have already heard significant and
19 shocking evidence regarding failures in the delivery of
20 patient care resulting in tragic and avoidable deaths
21 and you will continue to hear further evidence next
22 year.

23 It is of course important that you fully understand
24 each of those individual tragedies and the horrific
25 suffering of the bereaved families. But, in addition,

1 the evidence to date establishes, if there had ever been
2 any doubt, that there was a catastrophic breakdown in
3 the provision of inpatient mental health services in
4 Essex over the relevant period. A wholesale failure to
5 deliver a safe service.

6 Leadership, governance and oversight have come
7 clearly into focus as an essential area to be the
8 subject of forensic examination by your Inquiry. This
9 creates priorities to identify what went wrong in the
10 system overall, what steps were taken to remedy those
11 deficiencies in light of internal and external challenge
12 and why such remedial action as was taken was so utterly
13 ineffective.

14 This Inquiry must, in a phrase of your counsel
15 Mr Griffin KC, be from "ward to board". We do not
16 suggest that this is in any way straightforward. It is
17 essential that this work is undertaken in a manner that
18 is true to the foundational principles you have
19 established. The work must be open and transparent. It
20 must consult and engage the bereaved and lived
21 experience Core Participants. It must be predictable.
22 All Core Participants are keen to see the Inquiry
23 planned out carefully with appropriate timelines and
24 timetabling published well in advance.

25 Before turning to our first topic, which is

1 disclosure, our clients also wish to acknowledge your
2 responsibility under the Inquiries Act 2005,
3 section 17(3) to "avoid any unnecessary cost".

4 I wish to make plain that their concern is to offer
5 their fullest possible assistance to you in this as in
6 every other respect.

7 Our first topic, disclosure. As has been emphasised
8 and indeed acknowledged by your team, timely and
9 sufficient access to documents is essential to retain
10 the trust and confidence of the bereaved and those with
11 lived experience.

12 Given the particular characteristics and needs of
13 the traumatised bereaved families and patients who
14 participate in this Inquiry, it is vital that disclosure
15 is provided in timely and predictable ways. Their needs
16 include being able to rely upon their legal teams to
17 marshal relevant information for them and to structure
18 their engagement with it, to minimise the emotional and
19 practical impact upon them.

20 This is essential also in the interests of openness
21 and transparency and to ensure their effective
22 engagement. It will not be lost on you, Chair, that
23 these are families who were shut out from the care of
24 their loved ones and patients who were shut out from
25 their own care, the families' experiences of their

1 inquests where they have been treated unfairly,
2 especially in relation to the provider's control of
3 documents and information. This Inquiry will not repeat
4 those shortcomings.

5 We address the practicalities under two headings:

6 First, documents bearing on leadership, governance
7 and oversight, including the overall management of the
8 service at a macro level, and secondly, documents
9 relevant to individual illustrative cases and
10 importantly their context.

11 So, first, in relation to the macro level,
12 a significant body of absolutely central documentation
13 was clearly collated for the April hearings but has not
14 yet been disclosed. Obvious examples include the
15 exhibits to Paul Scott's and Ann Sheridan's witness
16 statements. It is simply not understood at this stage
17 why that material has not been provided.

18 To illustrate (audio breaks). There are also
19 materials marshalled and generated by the prosecutions
20 and by the independent investigation that preceded this
21 Inquiry. None of those documents in those categories
22 have been disclosed to date.

23 To illustrate the importance of those categories of
24 documents being disclosed before the Inquiry embarks on
25 the illustrative case studies work, we highlight the

1 circumstances relevant to the death of Ed Jackson.

2 You heard from Ed's brother, Ben Jackson, on
3 27th May. Ed's was the third of the 11 deaths addressed
4 in the 2011 prosecution. We know that Maple ward, where
5 Ed was an inpatient, was closed down in August 2013, and
6 Ben spoke poignantly about his complicated feelings in
7 relation to the information emerging of ongoing safety
8 issues at Edward House at The Linden Centre.

9 The facility was named in his brother's honour,
10 a facility that ought to have operated to exemplary
11 standards of care and safety, a facility that ought to
12 have reflected that lessons had been learned from the
13 failures in Ed's care.

14 Self-evidently to contribute to Ed's illustrative
15 casework, Ben will need full disclosure of the
16 prosecution materials, of the Trust's internal response
17 to Ed's death, including the shutting down of Maple
18 ward, the strategy that was put in place for Edward
19 House and documentation concerning the Trust's response
20 to issues emerging at Edward House. In short, Ben must
21 be in a position to place his brother's death in the
22 context of previous and subsequent deaths and near
23 misses raising similar issues. As matters stand, it is
24 unclear whether it is intended that this should be
25 achieved.

1 Staying with macro level disclosure, you will recall
2 that when we addressed you in April we emphasised the
3 importance of scrutinising the provider's evidence to
4 coroner in relation to the operation of the systems to
5 ensure patient safety and their responses to PFD reports
6 and records of inquest. This body of material will be
7 highly probative of the system issues and it is a matter
8 of regret that this too has not been disclosed as yet.

9 This ongoing situation places our clients at
10 a position of inequality in relation to the providers
11 and their legal teams. At paragraph 7 of our written
12 submissions, we address specifically the evidence of
13 Ms Sheridan in the form of a witness statement dated
14 21st March 2025, which addresses adverse findings,
15 including PFD reports and records of inquest. A number
16 of her exhibits have not yet been disclosed.

17 Bereaved families ought not to be expected to engage
18 with work in relation to their loved one's case, blind
19 sighted in relation to relevant documents held by EPUT
20 and/or your Inquiry.

21 Finally on this aspect, we highlight that there has
22 not been any disclosure of the providers and oversight
23 bodies' records save in relation to the Oxevision issue.
24 This is a topic that has been discussed in some detail
25 and apparently highly constructively in

1 counsel-to-counsel discussions. The categories include
2 minutes, papers presented at board and committee level,
3 emails, safety instructions and so on. But there has
4 not yet been clarity as to the categories of documents
5 that have been requested. Our clients' understandable
6 concern is that these important categories of documents
7 will come too late for them to engage meaningfully with
8 them.

9 Secondly, we address you on the topic of disclosure
10 in the context of individual illustrative cases. Timely
11 disclosure here is also of vital importance and it
12 cannot be confined to the particular families whose
13 loved one's cases have been clustered together. That is
14 an approach that will inevitably result in families not
15 being able to place their loved one's experience in the
16 context of the causative system failures and it would
17 exclude lived experience Core Participants entirely. It
18 would deprive your Inquiry of their assistance. The
19 process must be capable of identifying disputes of fact
20 based upon scrutiny of the relevant documents in context
21 and, where necessary, your adjudication upon disputed
22 facts.

23 This cannot be, to use Ms Misra KC's phrase, a paper
24 exercise. And disclosure must not be asymmetrical. It
25 would be invidious to afford the health care providers

1 an understanding of the full context in which
2 a particular death occurred but to deprive the bereaved
3 from that same understanding.

4 Our next topic concerns lived experience Core
5 Participants. This category of Core Participants
6 appears to be few in number and they are, as you have
7 acknowledged, a precious resource.

8 The request not to take instructions from our client
9 X4 was communicated on October 2024 and remained until
10 the framework was circulated in July 2025. X4
11 experienced this as disempowering, exclusionary and it
12 hampered his involvement with the Inquiry. And it had
13 practical consequences during the April hearings, as his
14 solicitors were not in a position to advise him as to
15 the aspects of the evidence that were relevant to his
16 experience because his full instructions had not been
17 obtained at that stage.

18 The result was that X4 watched all of the evidence
19 and he found that traumatising and it placed
20 an emotional and practical burden on him. Regrettably,
21 X4's experience has been one of feeling excluded from the
22 Inquiry to date. We know this can and will be remedied.

23 Decisions made that concern him without consultation
24 carry the very real risk of echoing X4's traumatic
25 experience as a patient. X4's experience and that of

1 the other patients ought now to be brought into focus as
2 a priority. It is of course vital that this important
3 cohort are treated with demonstrable respect and not
4 treated differently by reason of their status as
5 patients, and our proposals are the following:

6 First, that a draft investigative strategy for those
7 who offer evidence from their lived experience should be
8 provided as soon as practicable.

9 Secondly, timetabling in relation to Rule 9 requests
10 to this group and their evidential hearings.

11 Thirdly, a specific question and answer session
12 should be convened for specifically those with lived
13 experience.

14 And finally we invite you, Chair, to meet with this
15 group.

16 Our next topic is the illustrative case studies
17 Statement of Approach. May we emphasise that our
18 observations are intended to be constructive. As your
19 counsel has acknowledged, these must be rigorous
20 investigations, they must be capable of resolving
21 factual disputes and critically, in our submission,
22 capable of resulting in evidence that will assist other
23 strands of the Inquiry's investigative strategy.

24 It is for this reason that those we represent do not
25 agree with EPUT's submission that this strand of the

1 Inquiry's work should be led by your assessors.

2 This is intended to be a forensic investigation, not
3 a clinical review. It is clearly a project, as your
4 counsel has acknowledged, that will benefit from expert
5 clinical input in relevant disciplines, but it ought not
6 to be led by it.

7 We invite the Inquiry to take a robust view in
8 relation to expert evidence that has already been
9 obtained and I'm referring here to paragraph 20 of
10 EPUT's written submissions.

11 Where a civil claim has been resolved or liability
12 admitted, there can be no good reason for the expert
13 evidence that has been commissioned being kept from your
14 Inquiry. This category of evidence in particular has
15 the capability to save significant costs.

16 We have proposed chronological consideration of the
17 illustrative case studies essentially because it will
18 enable the Inquiry to place patterns in service delivery
19 alongside the governance and oversight patterns and to
20 thereby identify and consider the overall system
21 failings and the providers' resistance to change.

22 Further, a chronological approach will minimise
23 the risk of key illustrative facts being overlooked or
24 the cumulative impact of multiple failings of the
25 service delivery being missed, for example, in relation

1 to Bethany Lilley. You will recall the evidence of her
2 brothers, Alexander and Paul Guille identifying the
3 cumulative impact of the very many contributions to her
4 tragic and avoidable death.

5 The placing of her illustrative case alongside other
6 cases considering the approach to for example risk
7 identification and management might appear sensible, but
8 the risk is that other issues, for example in relation
9 to poor use of the Mental Health Act sectioning, or
10 dysfunction within the staffing teams, might not show up
11 or show up adequately.

12 We agree with the submission of Mr Beer KC, on
13 behalf of NHS England, that the purposes of this strand
14 of the Inquiry's work should be identified. However, in
15 our view, this strand will serve a number of purposes
16 by:

17 First, identifying the extent to which care
18 provision met or did not meet contemporary standards.

19 Secondly, by identifying causative contributions and
20 achieving accountability.

21 Thirdly, by identifying the extent to which
22 recommendations from previous investigations and reviews
23 were taken into account and acted upon.

24 And fourthly, in the formulation of recommendations.

25 These are complementary purposes and the fruits of

1 this strand ought to assist with each of them. We have
2 set out our proposals for systematic reporting from each
3 case study to inform the work of the Inquiry's experts,
4 the governance and data strands and scrutiny of the
5 external oversight body. Relying on Ms Sikand's and
6 Mr Beer's submissions that there ought to be greater
7 clarity as to how the Inquiry will rely upon analytical
8 methodology expertise.

9 As to case selection, we broadly support the
10 approach proposed with the additional observations that:
11 first, coronial views should be sought as to cases that
12 are considered especially illustrative, given different
13 coronial approaches to the relevant test for neglect,
14 an observation also made by Ms Sikand and Ms Morris KC.

15 Secondly, the expertise of INQUEST ought to be
16 relied upon in identifying illustrative cases from their
17 caseload and our clients strongly support INQUEST being
18 cited on documents.

19 Finally, particular care should be taken to identify
20 illustrative cases of those whose death did not occur
21 directly within an inpatient setting, given the broad
22 definition of "inpatient death" that you rely upon.

23 As to the investigative strategy generally, you have
24 our written submission, supported by a range of Core
25 Participants that the Inquiry's various work strands, by

1 which we intend to include illustrative cases, the
2 evidence of those with lived experience, benchmarking,
3 governance, external oversight, data, the RIF process
4 and so on, ought to be integrated with the illustrative
5 cases and information provided as soon as practicable as
6 to how each strand will be timetabled and brought
7 together.

8 Our final topic is Oxevision. We are grateful to
9 the Core Participants instructing Bindmans and
10 Ms Campbell KC and Mr Stoate. Our clients entirely
11 support their request for an urgent recommendation that
12 EPUT safely halt the use of Oxevision in the
13 circumstances they identify for the reasons they
14 provide.

15 Unless, Chair, there is any other aspect of today's
16 discussion that we can assist with, those are our
17 submissions.

18 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much indeed for those
19 submissions. Thank you.

20 MR GRIFFIN: Chair, we now hear from Ms Campbell KC.

21 Submissions by MS CAMPBELL

22 MS CAMPBELL: Chair, good afternoon. Together with
23 Tom Stoate, and instructed by Rachel Harger and her
24 experienced team at Bindmans Solicitors, we represent,
25 as you know, the families of Christopher Nota, of Sophie

1 Alderman and Edwige Nsilu.

2 Chair, it was in November 2024 when I last addressed
3 you on behalf of the families that we represent. In
4 those opening submissions, we stressed to you that it
5 was with a considerable degree of trepidation that
6 families who had been so badly failed by EPUT look to
7 your Inquiry to break the cycle of failures.

8 We pointed to enduring failures in diagnosis, in
9 treatment, in overmedication, in the use of Oxevision in
10 their loved ones' care, all of which contributed to
11 their preventable death, and we stressed in particular
12 the harmful impact of cultural defensiveness, of
13 resistance to public scrutiny, reminding you then of the
14 compounding trauma that comes from failing to treat Core
15 Participant families with respect in responding
16 transparently and effectively to post-death
17 investigations with the deceased and their loved ones at
18 the heart of the process.

19 It is a remarkable and perhaps unique feature of
20 this Inquiry, as indeed Ms Sikand has already pointed
21 out, that it is over one year on that I now have this
22 next opportunity to address you directly in a public
23 hearing on their behalf. Chair, we observe that that
24 has not been for the want of trying.

25 In the year that has passed, Core Participants have

1 repeatedly sought opportunities to raise and seek
2 solutions to ongoing procedural concerns.

3 A November 2024 proposal from INQUEST for a joint
4 meeting between the Inquiry and Core Participant legal
5 representatives to address procedural concerns and seek
6 clarity was refused by letter of 4 December 2024.

7 And since then, Chair, independently, and jointly
8 with other legal representatives, Bindmans have raised
9 concerns about lack of communication, about an absence
10 of updates from the Inquiry, about lack of transparency
11 in this very public inquiry's work, about disclosure,
12 Rule 10 processes, the absence of an investigation plan
13 or roadmap for the completion of the Inquiry, all of
14 which contribute to real difficulties on the part of the
15 bereaved in planning their lives, in preparing for
16 evidential phases and for their legal teams in planning
17 and allocating their resources.

18 Chair, we have sought opportunities to address you
19 before, during and after evidential hearings, but the
20 message has repeatedly been that we might bide our time
21 or have a discussion between counsel, or put it in
22 a letter, or await a promised update or plan that does
23 not arrive, and so grateful though we are for this
24 opportunity, it is perhaps no surprise that the message
25 today on behalf of the families who we represent is

1 that, far from assuaging their concerns and earning
2 their confidence, our families' trepidation and anxiety
3 about the future of this Inquiry is unfortunately
4 increasing.

5 And worse still, the Inquiry is at risk of repeating
6 the trauma which our families have endured in the past
7 by being party to troubled investigative processes.

8 Chair, those are, I know, strong words and
9 I recognise their strength. But they are representative
10 of the strength of feeling that our families wish to
11 convey today, not knowing when or if they will have the
12 formal opportunity to do so again.

13 And Chair, in November 2024, I reminded you that the
14 families we represent are motivated not only by justice
15 and accountability for the death of their own children,
16 but to prevent other children and young people from
17 other families being failed in the same way.

18 They know only too well that there are many
19 individuals and families across Essex who currently feel
20 powerless. Those caring for children and young people
21 with SEND or neurodivergent conditions continue, Chair,
22 to experience daily struggles against a system that is
23 still failing to safeguard children and their futures,
24 battling to ensure not just access to basic systems of
25 support, diagnosis and treatment to protect them as

1 children, but to ensure that they are in future able to
2 lead full and content adult lives, unburdened by
3 failures to treat or diagnose neurodivergent conditions
4 or mental health needs.

5 That, Chair, is what motivates Julia Hopper on
6 behalf of not only her son Christopher, but for all
7 children and young people whose struggles continue to
8 reflect Christopher's experience. In Julia's words,
9 Chair, she said "I can't get Chris back, he was so
10 precious and it's so hard to relive what happened to him
11 via this Inquiry. The only point of doing so is so that
12 it might stop happening. This Inquiry was such
13 an important opportunity representing the hope that
14 maybe we could get through to someone, to the
15 Government, but I feel the carpet being pulled away and
16 my heart is breaking".

17 Families like Julia's are still at the epicentre of
18 this crisis day after day. They continue to support
19 parents and families who turn to them desperately
20 seeking access to services that should protect, support
21 and enable their children to live, grow and flourish.

22 So, Julia's involvement and other families'
23 involvement in this Inquiry is not only to right
24 historic wrongs, it is personal, painful and rooted in
25 unimaginable loss, but it is also their current

1 day-to-day lived experience.

2 So their participation comes at profound emotional
3 cost and they want to know that the Inquiry truly
4 understands why they are here. Because they know that
5 these deaths were not inevitable. They know the same
6 failures recur over decades. They know the urgency for
7 robust and meaningful change is not abstract. It is
8 a matter of every day life and death.

9 The internal resources of people like Julia and
10 others who have battled for their own children are not
11 limitless. They can do, Chair, without another
12 battleground. Yet over the course of the last year
13 their pain and distress is increasing as their fear
14 mounts that this Inquiry is not going to deliver what it
15 promises. Again Julia's words:

16 "It's heart breaking. I feel it every time I hear
17 another story where a doctor won't treat a child or
18 a parent or family is demonised for fighting for basic
19 rights and support. This Inquiry is our last hope. It
20 is like watching the Titanic go down."

21 Again, Chair, strong words.

22 But I stress, as I did a year ago, and undoubtedly
23 I will in the future, that our families' Core
24 Participant status in your Inquiry is borne out of a
25 desire to make it work, with the success of this Inquiry

1 measured in both the process and the result.

2 They are not here as a kite mark of legitimacy.
3 They are here because they are experts by experience,
4 a phrase you have heard repeatedly. They can make
5 a meaningful contribution. Given a chance not only to
6 give evidence, but to properly consider and interrogate
7 the evidence that you receive, they can help your
8 Inquiry identify key failings and make impactful
9 recommendations for change.

10 Yet for over a year, and with less than a year to
11 go, there is a marked absence of proper processes,
12 procedures, frameworks that are essential for an Inquiry
13 of this magnitude to enable effective participation by
14 its Core Participants.

15 Without clear procedures for disclosure, evidence
16 handling, without two-way communication, in the absence
17 of the opportunities to make submissions, whether at
18 preliminary hearings or during evidence sessions,
19 families cannot sufficiently contribute their expertise
20 on these urgent matters of life and death.

21 Chair, when Mr Griffin KC referred, as he did in
22 opening this morning, to concerns raised in writing
23 before the October hearings and requests made to address
24 you with that point, he reminded you that we were asked
25 to wait, and we were with the promise of the publication

1 of the Inquiry's investigative strategy for the
2 remainder of the Inquiry coming before any preliminary
3 hearing.

4 That strategy, we were told, would set out not only
5 how illustrative cases were to be addressed, but would
6 address wider investigative issues. It would tell us
7 about how the Inquiry would receive evidence from
8 providers and enforcement agencies, regulators and other
9 stakeholders. It would tell us of the Inquiry's
10 approach to physical and sexual safety on wards, about
11 how the Inquiry will address candour and accountability,
12 about governance structures, ward to board evidence,
13 expert evidence including neurodivergence, autism, ADHD
14 and more.

15 Chair, in refusing on your behalf the opportunity
16 for oral submissions back in October, we were told that
17 the Chair had determined that holding a hearing after
18 that investigative strategy has been shared with you
19 would enable a more effective hearing to take place.

20 Reliant on that determination of yours, and the
21 promise of a more effective hearing in December, our
22 clients paused efforts to be heard sooner regarding
23 their urgent concerns. And yet, Chair, November has
24 come and gone, and the opportunity for a more effective
25 hearing on the Inquiry's investigative strategy has

1 dissipated and we are, Chair, I'm afraid, none the
2 wiser. Instead, we have received a single strand
3 statement of a proposed approach to illustrative cases
4 served on us as though passing it off as what we were
5 promised.

6 Chair, it is not. And our clients, I'm afraid, have
7 long had enough of promises of full disclosure and
8 transparency only to receive something falling very far
9 short. Chair, they ask: What is the plan? Where is the
10 plan? And if there is no plan, why not?

11 It is important that I emphasise and I acknowledge,
12 Chair, that you and your team are undoubtedly working
13 around the clock and that the Terms of Reference of your
14 Inquiry present unique challenges spanning, as they do,
15 two decades, multiple providers, thousands of deaths and
16 very sensitive personal records.

17 In part, it has been that very complexity of local
18 arrangements with systemic failings leading to deaths
19 obscured by differences of geographical location, time,
20 age, diagnosis and ward that has meant the failings
21 within EPUT prevailed for so long.

22 But what is already apparent from the evidence your
23 Inquiry has heard from the bereaved is that, given the
24 opportunity, they can help you draw together those
25 systemic failings.

1 The evidence that you have heard from bereaved
2 families has already drawn into sharp focus the
3 consequences of untreated or undiagnosed conditions,
4 often those which should have been identified in
5 childhood or adolescent years. There is already
6 an emerging pattern of substance misuse and undiagnosed
7 or unmet needs due to failures in early intervention.
8 The evidence has exposed that existing safeguarding
9 pathways are wholly inadequate and urgent alternatives
10 are required. Bereaved families concerns are met with
11 defensiveness, dismissiveness, enforced isolation and
12 sometimes even aggression.

13 The bereaved, Chair, know the systems, the
14 institution, the cast of characters, they have navigated
15 the smoke and mirrors and as such they are an enormous
16 (audio breaks) and to date a wholly underused resource.
17 We observe, Chair, that not only did the promised
18 investigative strategy not come in November, the promise
19 of rolling disclosure made back in July has also not
20 materialised.

21 In Counsel to the Inquiry's opening back on
22 7th July, we were told that at the same time as
23 Relativity becomes available for Core Participants, the
24 Inquiry will provide its disclosure plan. This plan, we
25 were told, would set out the Inquiry's proposal for the

1 disclosure of evidence for its hearings, along with
2 proposals for disclosure of material not connected to
3 those hearings.

4 The plan will be provided with a timetable as to
5 when disclosure of witness statements and other
6 materials relevant to the terms of reference is likely
7 to take place. This, we were assured, will allow Core
8 Participants to plan their work and resources in
9 advance.

10 Chair, access to Relativity came in mid-August but
11 no disclosure plan has ever been provided.

12 Chair, having acknowledged the inherent challenge
13 within the Terms of Reference for your Inquiry, there
14 are nonetheless practical procedural solutions that, if
15 immediately actioned, would make an immediate and
16 positive impact.

17 Our proposals have been echoed in some of the
18 submissions you have already heard today, which is
19 unsurprising given that they emerge from the basic
20 tenets of good inquiry practice across a range of public
21 inquiries, so they are neither new, nor do we submit are
22 they a lot to ask.

23 I make them across ten points.

24 Firstly, a prompt, clear and achievable disclosure
25 plan with timeframes and information about what is being

1 disclosed. Such a plan would include rolling disclosure
2 so that lawyers can address their resources, consider
3 and advise upon the material received enabling bereaved
4 families to meaningfully consider the disclosure and
5 engage within a reasonable time to do so. Such a plan
6 would also ensure clarity and transparency on what
7 avenues of disclosure is being sought, with updates on
8 organisations and specific witnesses being sent Rule 9
9 requests allowing for an opportunity to make submissions
10 in relation to the same.

11 We note, Chair, with concern, the submissions
12 received for today's hearing from NELFT, asking the
13 Inquiry for help in understanding what is expected of it
14 and within what timeframe.

15 Those are basic and not unreasonable requests but,
16 again, we wonder why they are necessary at this stage,
17 and we observe that it would be wholly counterproductive
18 for the Inquiry to find itself in a position where it is
19 re-issuing or re-making Rule 9 requests because
20 sufficient evidence wasn't sought in the first place,
21 another reason we contend for prompt and full liaison
22 with the Core Participants in relation to disclosure.

23 Secondly, Chair, we ask for monthly progress
24 updates, having been repeatedly told that the Inquiry
25 acknowledge the need for regular updates and are

1 committed to providing them. Such regular updates have
2 not materialised, leaving Core Participants and the
3 public without any proper insight into what the Inquiry
4 has been doing or what progress is being made month by
5 month.

6 We join with others in requesting a clear and
7 comprehensive proposal for expert evidence. It is of
8 particular concern that the Inquiry has not by this
9 stage formally identified all the areas in which it
10 intends to obtain expert evidence, let alone which
11 experts it intends to instruct or within what scope,
12 notwithstanding Core Participants' submissions.

13 Those we represent expect to fully participate in
14 this process which is so important to assisting the
15 Inquiry in reaching conclusions and making meaningful
16 impactful recommendations.

17 Fourthly, Chair, we ask for two-way communication,
18 in particular acknowledgement and response to written
19 communications. All too often, including in the
20 aftermath of the October hearings, detailed response on
21 matters of real substance from legal representatives
22 appears to have landed into a vacuum, apparently not
23 meriting an acknowledgement, much less a substantive
24 response.

25 Chair, we ask for preliminary hearings between

1 evidence phases at which we can address you on the
2 issues that are of paramount concern to the bereaved.

3 We join also with others in asking for rulings where
4 necessary, setting out, Chair, your written reasoned
5 basis for the decision and generating confidence that
6 the Inquiry is accountable for its decision-making and
7 that decisions are part of a wider investigative
8 strategy or plan.

9 Chair, we ask for modular evidence hearings with
10 a clear focus on strategy, enabling the Core
11 Participants and the public to know how the future
12 hearings fit within the Inquiry's wider investigative
13 strategy.

14 And we ask, Chair, for opening and closing
15 submissions from Core Participants, enabling Core
16 Participants to direct your attention to issues of
17 particular consideration or concern in that phase of
18 evidence and to draw together aspects of the evidence
19 heard in conclusion.

20 That opportunity, Chair, would influence, or at
21 least have the opportunity to influence, not just the
22 Inquiry's interpretation and approach to the evidence,
23 but also to impact public conversation and discourse.
24 You know there is an ongoing public conversation about
25 mental health treatment and care, but denying the

1 microphone to bereaved Core Participants or their
2 representatives reduces their opportunity to be heard
3 not only in Arundel House but also in the halls of
4 Westminster.

5 We observe additionally that the Inquiry has
6 proposed a recommendation and implementations forum to
7 address both final and interim recommendations. How, we
8 ask, are we to meaningfully and publicly identify
9 an evidence-based need for interim recommendations if we
10 are not to address you publicly and orally on the
11 evidence in support of them?

12 Penultimately, Chair, we ask for a Rule 10 process
13 that permits Core Participants to ask and follow up
14 their own questions, not only enhancing the effective
15 participation of bereaved Core Participants, but
16 bringing to the Inquiry the collective wisdom of the
17 bereaved, and indeed their legal teams, who have between
18 them years of experience representing bereaved families
19 in these inquests, including, specifically, Essex mental
20 health cases.

21 Finally, Chair, we ask for what was promised in
22 October: the publication of the Inquiry's investigative
23 strategy, including a timetable for progress to allay
24 Core Participants deep concerns about how much remains
25 to be achieved in such a short time.

1 Chair, I turn now to the approach to illustrative
2 cases and you have heard much on that today, and I won't
3 repeat it in detail, but we observe that it really was
4 into something of a void that your Statement of Approach
5 to illustrative cases was received.

6 It was disseminated no doubt in an attempt to
7 assuage mounting concerns, but you will understand from
8 what you have read and what you have heard today that it
9 has instead raised more questions than it answers. We
10 echo what you have already read and heard on behalf of
11 other bereaved Core Participants in their written and
12 oral submissions.

13 We raise questions as to timing. Firstly, why only
14 now is this work to commence? Surely this is a
15 Statement of Approach that could properly have been
16 determined a year ago and before many of the bereaved
17 commenced giving their evidence.

18 We recall that in a disclosure update provided on
19 26th June 2025, CTI said that they had developed
20 an investigation strategy for individual and
21 illustrative cases and promised to share it shortly. Is
22 this it, we ask?

23 And if it was developed in June, why are we
24 receiving it in November?

25 We ask about the timeframe for this statement of

1 approach and how is it achievable within the lifespan of
2 the Inquiry?

3 We ask, as others have, about how these 140 cases
4 are to be or have been identified? What is the
5 criteria, and therefore what consequences are there on
6 the Inquiry's ability to properly cluster and ultimately
7 draw meaningful conclusions?

8 We ask about disclosure, what documents will be
9 considered, how will they be collated and analysed?
10 What real opportunities exist for the bereaved to
11 participate in that process?

12 And, relatedly, at what stage and in what
13 circumstances will there be cross-disclosure among the
14 Core Participants as surely there must be of the
15 analysis of all of these 140 cases?

16 We ask about participation, how much of this process
17 is to take place behind closed doors, away from scrutiny
18 by the Core Participants or indeed the public, and how
19 much will be revisited in any public forum or hearing?

20 And we ask what is the role of lived experience
21 witnesses, whose experiences will be invaluable and yet
22 who have no clear role in this or any other aspect of
23 your Inquiry?

24 Chair, I want to turn before finishing firstly to
25 recognise the impact of the evidence that you have

1 already heard from bereaved Core Participants and then
2 to touch on the Oxevision evidence and the interim
3 recommendation that it is we seek.

4 It is apparent that not only is the very existence
5 of this Inquiry directly attributable to the
6 determination of the bereaved and those with lived
7 experience, but the progress that this Inquiry has been
8 able to make to date has been also directly attributable
9 to their courage and the clarity of their evidence. The
10 evidence that the bereaved have provided the Inquiry has
11 given it a very firm foundation for what your
12 investigative strategy must include.

13 We have identified some of them at paragraph 9 of
14 our written submissions, but for today's purposes they
15 include the care and treatment of autistic people in the
16 mental health system, including a rigorous examination
17 of the interplay between mental ill-health and autism,
18 how this should be managed and how patients should be
19 safeguarded.

20 The evidence that you have heard addresses racism in
21 mental health care, including a proper examination of
22 its causes, its disproportionate outcomes and what needs
23 to be done to address it.

24 Sexual safety and gender-based discrimination in
25 mental healthcare.

1 It identifies concerns around the use and overuse of
2 medication. It identifies concerns about the uncertain
3 role of private medical health care providers, the role
4 of regulatory bodies and the fundamental need for
5 meaningful oversight. It identifies failures in
6 co-operation between local government, local authorities
7 and mental health care providers, including in
8 particular in respect of ongoing safety concerns raised
9 about the care of vulnerable individuals in Essex. It
10 identifies trends of substance misuse and failures in
11 diagnosis and of course it raises concerning evidence
12 about surveillance and observation of patients on mental
13 health wards.

14 This Inquiry, we submit, should harness both the
15 experience and the courage of the bereaved and the lived
16 experience witnesses in interrogating each of these
17 things and more.

18 You will recall, Chair, in particular, that it was
19 through the powerful evidence of Tammy Smith, the mother
20 of Sophie Alderman, and of Hat Porter of Stop Oxevision
21 that the Inquiry was in a position to understand and to
22 challenge the weak and unsubstantiated evidence of any
23 clinical basis for the use of surveillance technology
24 and get an understanding of the extensive and ongoing
25 harms to patients arising from placing surveillance

1 devices in their bedrooms. It was assisted by Stop
2 Oxevision that concerns of privacy, consent and misuse
3 of the system were exposed, as well as a deterioration
4 in therapeutic engagement, alarm fatigue and overall
5 reliance on alerts.

6 As a result, it was clear, we contend, that the cost
7 and contractual commitments between EPUT and LIO or
8 Oxehealth, which had rested primarily on the remote
9 monitoring functionality of Oxevision and staff
10 replacement cannot continue to be justified.

11 You will appreciate that the evidence given by both
12 Tammy and Hat came at enormous personal cost, motivated
13 by their deeply held, evidence-based concerns about the
14 use and expansion of this invasive and harmful
15 technology.

16 But in the absence of an opportunity to make oral
17 closing submissions, it was on the basis of their
18 evidence and the evidence received from EPUT and LIO
19 that we wrote to the Inquiry contending that an interim
20 recommendation should be issued requiring EPUT to take
21 immediate steps to safely halt the use of Oxevision in
22 inpatient bedrooms in all adult, older adult and
23 children and young people wards within three months
24 pending the final report and recommendation of this
25 Inquiry.

1 Chair, we note that the proposed interim
2 recommendation now finds considerable force in public
3 statements by some Trusts, other than EPUT, that they
4 have paused or will uninstall the use of Oxevision in
5 their wards, concerned about a lack of evidence of its
6 effectiveness or clinical justification, or because the
7 use of Oxevision in private spaces such as bedrooms
8 raises, which of course it does, significant human
9 rights concerns, or because of profound concerns about
10 data storage and retention.

11 What is clear as a result, Chair, is that in
12 proposing this interim recommendation, we are not
13 inviting this Inquiry to enter uncharted territory, but
14 to join others in leading the move away from the blanket
15 use of this intrusive technology with its unproven
16 clinical justification.

17 As with other issues, Chair, we still await the
18 Inquiry's response to our proposal, but we note that
19 meanwhile, and quite remarkably, LIO have sought to
20 publish on their website and social media the Lampard
21 Inquiry evidence as promotional marketing material.

22 In a recent LinkedIn post, they write:

23 "In a newly published study, spanning six NHS mental
24 health providers, a clear pattern emerged. Across
25 different facilities, service types and outcomes" and

1 I stress "contactless monitoring was consistently linked
2 to safer care, with fewer incidents of self-harm, falls
3 and assaults, and reduced use of physical restraint
4 (audio breaks) rapid tranquilisation."

5 That picture, they say on LinkedIn, is echoed in the
6 evidence recently presented to the Lampard Inquiry:

7 "Over a 26-month period, one NHS Trust reported more
8 than 1,700 incidents in which contactless monitoring
9 enabled staff to identify risk earlier and step in
10 before serious harm occurred."

11 "This impact", they say, "can be life changing".

12 It is, Chair, a staggering spin on the evidence that
13 you heard. Not only using material from this Inquiry,
14 but using it in such a way as to promote the use of
15 a system, and in doing so ignoring the concerns raised
16 in the Inquiry's evidence about how the system may
17 exacerbate symptoms, particularly those experiencing
18 paranoia, about a consequence of the use of Oxevision
19 being measured in the reduction and removal of important
20 one-to-one therapeutic contact, about the significant
21 and ongoing concerns about patient consent and the
22 suggestion that contactless monitoring was consistently
23 linked with safer care, blatantly ignores Tammy Smith's
24 evidence that the Oxevision alarm sounded as Sophie died
25 but no one heard or responded.

1 The evidence that you heard, Chair, led CTI to
2 observe in closing that it remains unclear from the
3 evidence the extent to which Trusts, including EPUT,
4 have considered how this relatively new technology
5 should be applied in the provision of mental health care
6 and the extent to which they have considered its
7 benefits to patients.

8 It is plain, Chair, particularly in light of the way
9 your evidence is being portrayed on social media, that
10 a robust response from this Inquiry is called for, one
11 element of which must be, we contend, the interim
12 recommendation that we have identified.

13 There is no time for drift. Whilst more evidence
14 may be forthcoming in relation to the use of this
15 system, that which you have heard already is sufficient,
16 and for all the reasons set out in our detailed
17 correspondence, we invite you to act, because the
18 consequences of failing to act are simply too grave.

19 Chair, it is plain from all you have heard that
20 there is much to do and there is of course diminishing
21 time to do it. I reiterate, as I have already, that our
22 clients are participants in your Inquiry borne out of
23 a desire to make it work because they need this Inquiry
24 to succeed and it is in this spirit that these
25 submissions are advanced. Thank you.

1 THE CHAIR: Thank you.

2 MR GRIFFIN: Chair, we now break for lunch and come back

3 please at 1.45 pm. Thank you very much.

4 (12.45 pm)

5 (The short adjournment)

6 (1.45 pm)

7 MR GRIFFIN: Ms Lucas.

8 Submissions by MS LUCAS

9 MS LUCAS: I'm afraid it says "unable to start the video".

10 It is disabled by the host. Thank you.

11 I am instructed by Bates Wells, representing Lydia

12 Fraser-Ward. Lydia's sister, Pippa Whiteward,

13 tragically died by suicide on 29th October 2016 after

14 suffering from postpartum psychosis.

15 Chair, you heard from Lydia in July of this year.

16 She said of her sister:

17 "I don't know what more Pippa could have done to ask

18 for help. She is not a number. She is not a statistic.

19 She was a person that people loved."

20 Lydia expressed her hope that this Inquiry will

21 bring about lasting change. "If anything comes out of

22 this," she said, "I ask for a more person-centric

23 approach to care. You have to keep learning so that

24 this all hasn't been in vain."

25 Lydia has repeatedly sought clarity from this

1 Inquiry about how it intends to give crucial issues such
2 as perinatal care and the inappropriate use of
3 out-of-area placements the attention and scrutiny they
4 deserve.

5 Chair, we echo the concerns of the other bereaved
6 families that, over a year into its work, fundamental
7 questions about how this Inquiry intends to fulfil its
8 Terms of Reference remain unanswered.

9 It is our view that the Inquiry is now at a critical
10 juncture. If things continue to proceed as they have
11 been, there is a very real risk that issues of profound
12 importance to bereaved families will slip through the
13 gaps. The opportunity for rigorous interrogation, as
14 Lydia put it to keep learning, will be lost.

15 It is not too late for this Inquiry to deliver on
16 its commitments. But the task ahead is ambitious. It
17 requires a realistic cohesive and transparent plan for
18 the next ten months.

19 To that end, Chair, Lydia wishes me to bring to your
20 attention two issues arising from her sister's care
21 which she hopes will serve as a call to action. I will
22 then briefly address the Statement of Approach and
23 procedural issues which have already been addressed in
24 some detail on which I will seek to avoid repetition.

25 All I will go on to say is framed by Lydia's wish

1 for me to express at the very outset her appreciation to
2 you and the Inquiry team for the work you have done so
3 far. The enormity of the task embarked upon by this
4 Inquiry reflects the scale of its potential to improve
5 mental health care across the country. We hope to use
6 this as an opportunity to help chart a course for this
7 Inquiry to deliver meaningful and lasting change.

8 Turning first, then, to two illustrative issues
9 arising in Pippa's case. We recognise that these
10 represent a fraction of the issues, not only in Pippa's
11 case, but amongst the bereaved family cohort as a whole.
12 However, these two illustrative issues bring three
13 points into sharp focus:

14 First, the gaps in the information provided to date
15 about the substance of the Inquiry's investigative work.

16 Second, the reality that the Inquiry's core strands,
17 its illustrative cases, data analysis, expert
18 instructions and recommendations forum cannot be siloed.
19 They must function as part of an integrated and cohesive
20 investigation.

21 And, third, the sheer scale of the investigative
22 work that is still required.

23 The first issue is perinatal care and risk
24 assessments. Perinatal and mental illnesses have some
25 distinctive features. They arise in a known high-risk

1 window. They can, with effective risk management,
2 enable clinicians to predict vulnerability and offer
3 preventative support. Care is also delivered through
4 different treatment pathways involving maternity
5 services and symptoms of course emerge at a time of
6 unique change where a mother's health is inextricably
7 tied to the welfare of her new baby.

8 The Inquiry must think critically about how it
9 approaches evidence and makes recommendations in this
10 context.

11 Perinatal care cuts across many of the issues this
12 Inquiry will investigate and Lydia is anxious that the
13 opportunities for learning raised by historic
14 shortcomings in perinatal care are not treated as
15 an afterthought in this Inquiry's work.

16 Chair, as you have heard, despite Pippa having
17 previously suffered from postpartum depression, the
18 opportunity for preventative intervention during her
19 second pregnancy was missed. Despite signs of severe
20 sleep deprivation, which is a well documented trigger of
21 postpartum psychosis, no risk assessment was conducted
22 and no consideration was given to the potential harm of
23 separating Pippa from her newborn baby. During these
24 delicate early months, Pippa became stuck in a cycle of
25 discharge from and readmission to inpatient care, which

1 culminated in her being allowed on temporary home leave,
2 despite numerous attempts at self-harm and suicide in
3 the days prior. This occurred apparently without
4 referral to community support services.

5 It is in this context that Lydia now wants to know
6 how the Inquiry will investigate the joint working
7 between mental health and maternity services.

8 Has the Inquiry received evidence from EPUT's
9 perinatal mental health service and Mother and Baby
10 Unit, for example, or from other Trusts nationally?

11 Does it intend to instruct an expert in perinatal
12 care?

13 How will the Inquiry investigate staff training to
14 recognise and act upon early signs of perinatal mental
15 ill-health?

16 And how will it ensure that its recommendations are
17 specifically implementable within the maternal care
18 setting?

19 The Inquiry is yet to provide an indication, even in
20 broad terms, as to how it intends to approach the issue
21 of risk assessments across a wide range of clinical
22 contexts.

23 Lydia wants to know when the Inquiry will share its
24 proposal for expert evidence on this topic. Will this
25 encompass so-called positive risk-taking in specific

1 context of new mothers?

2 How will the Inquiry examine the relationship
3 between the timing of hospital discharge or leave
4 following a self-harm or suicide attempt and
5 a subsequent occurrence of suicide in the community?

6 Does the Inquiry intend to analyse readmission
7 statistics, both before and after the introduction of
8 the four-week discharge target?

9 The second issue is out-of-area placements. This
10 Inquiry has committed to investigating the practical
11 workings and reasons behind out-of-area placements.

12 When Pippa needed urgent support, she was informed
13 that there was only one bed in the Mother and Baby Unit
14 available in the entire country and it rejected her
15 admission without explanation.

16 This is not an isolated issue. It is a national
17 crisis. There are 19 Mother and Baby Units in England,
18 many of which have fewer than ten beds. Some parts of
19 the country have no Mother and Baby Units at all,
20 meaning new mothers are disproportionately sent far away
21 from their families and loved ones to receive the care
22 they need.

23 This Inquiry is uniquely positioned to scrutinise
24 this issue, but it must be done with the rigour and
25 diligence that an issue of this importance requires. It

1 is only through piecing together evidence from EPUT to
2 this Inquiry that Lydia has learned of the horrifying
3 reality that, while in crisis, Pippa was likely taken
4 from Essex to Nottingham where she was declined on
5 arrival before being transferred to Staffordshire, and
6 later Winchester.

7 As she said in her July evidence, if there are
8 really so few beds in this country that mothers with
9 young babies who are having a mental health crisis are
10 being ferried around in ambulances hundreds of miles
11 away, just to give them a bed, we are in dire
12 circumstances. That is why Lydia wants and deserves to
13 know how the Inquiry will assess the effect of
14 out-of-area placements on patient recovery and which
15 experts it will instruct on this issue.

16 What evidence will be obtained on out-of-area
17 placement decisions, including admission criteria and
18 timelines for placement and repatriation, and how will
19 this evidence be tested and placed within a national
20 context?

21 How will the Inquiry analyse Mother and Baby Unit
22 bed availability across the relevant period.

23 How will the Inquiry assess the effectiveness of
24 measures taken to reduce inappropriate out-of-area
25 placements.

1 And how will the Inquiry interrogate the
2 relationship between home Trusts and out-of-area Trusts,
3 including oversight mechanisms, risk-sharing agreements,
4 and home community teams, where patients are sent back
5 into the community following an out-of-area placement.

6 Chair, this Inquiry has promised to leave no stone
7 unturned. I have focused on just two issues but they
8 serve to highlight that to make good that promise, the
9 Inquiry must now engage carefully with Lydia's questions
10 and provide clear, comprehensive answers.

11 Turning now to the Statement of Approach and
12 procedural issues, we share the position of the other
13 bereaved families that greater transparency is required
14 for Core Participants to effectively participate with
15 the Inquiry's work.

16 Through meetings with the Inquiry team, written
17 correspondence and now the Statement of Approach, we
18 have caught glimpses of the Inquiry's inner workings
19 which we have tried to piece together to decipher
20 an overarching strategy, but now is the time for
21 clarity.

22 Lydia endorses the submissions you have heard
23 already today that a roadmap is now essential. It must
24 encompass all of the Inquiry's strands of work, explain
25 how they integrate with one another and set out clear

1 timelines for each phrase.

2 I now intend to briefly touch upon some of these
3 work streams.

4 First, the Inquiry's proposed cluster approach, as
5 you have already heard, requires fuller explanation.
6 Crucially, we do not know how the Inquiry intends to
7 define its overarching themes or how Core Participants
8 will be allocated to clusters.

9 It is essential that bereaved families are properly
10 consulted on both the proposed themes and their
11 allocation within them. Without this, there is a risk
12 that issues such as perinatal care and out-of-area
13 placements may fall through the gaps, where they cut
14 across themes or cannot be neatly categorised.

15 Second, evidence-gathering. When Lydia gave
16 evidence to this Inquiry in July, she did so without the
17 benefit of evidence central to Pippa's care, including
18 most of her medical records. She explained:

19 "It's very sad that I'm in a situation where I don't
20 really know exactly what happened to her and I'm having
21 to do detective work to try and work it out."

22 To this day, Lydia has only snapshots of Pippa's
23 care. It is a source of considerable distress to Lydia
24 that basic gaps in Pippa's care, such as how many
25 hospitals her sister was passed between, are no closer

1 to being addressed. It is not lost on Lydia that just
2 as being transferred miles away from home left Pippa
3 effectively deserted by EPUT, there is a risk that her
4 experience may now be overlooked in this Inquiry because
5 so much of it took place outside Essex.

6 Lydia is determined that Essex Trusts do not shirk
7 their responsibility for out-of-area patients and urges
8 this Inquiry to be mindful of this in its pursuit of
9 evidence, including from out-of-area Trusts.

10 The Statement of Approach confirms only that the
11 Inquiry will consider whether further evidence is
12 required. Chair, we ask you not to underestimate the
13 weight of this uncertainty. Lydia looks forward to
14 receiving clear answers about what evidence this Inquiry
15 has already obtained and intends to obtain in relation
16 to Pippa's care and the broader issues it represents.

17 Third, we wish to reinforce the importance of the
18 early involvement of experts who can input not just as
19 part of the case summaries, but across all the Inquiry's
20 strands of work as outlined in our written submissions.
21 Lydia is keen that the Inquiry benefit from expertise
22 across a range of clinical contexts, from Trusts across
23 the country and outside the NHS.

24 Fourth, disclosure. We ask that the Inquiry does
25 not lose sight of the substantial time and emotional

1 energy required of bereaved families to participate in
2 this Inquiry and the demands of their own lives
3 alongside this.

4 In the absence of any clear roadmap, months of limbo
5 have taken their toll and risk alienating Core
6 Participants from the work they so keenly want to
7 participate in.

8 Lydia very much looks forward to receiving
9 a disclosure plan which will afford her adequate time to
10 properly digest and engage with material.

11 And finally, Chair, we are acutely aware of the
12 limited hearing time this Inquiry has scheduled for
13 2026. We echo the concerns that the illustrative
14 casework must not become a replacement for the public
15 ventilation and for rigorous scrutiny of witness
16 evidence.

17 Lydia looks forward to receiving confirmation of
18 provider witnesses well in advance of the 2026 hearings.

19 The Statement of Approach envisages further oral
20 hearings for some illustrative cases and we look forward
21 to receiving clarity on the selection criteria and how
22 this dovetails with the existing hearing timetable.

23 Chair, this Inquiry has promised to leave no stone
24 unturned from ward to board. Time is now of the essence
25 to deliver on that promise. Lydia knows that there are

1 questions about Pippa's care to which she may never
2 receive answers. But this Inquiry can offer Lydia some
3 measure of comfort by ensuring that the past suffering
4 of her sister drives meaningful lasting change for the
5 future.

6 Chair, we urge you to be fearless in your
7 investigation of these issues and to provide bereaved
8 family members, including Lydia, with the clarity they
9 need to meaningfully contribute to its work.

10 Thank you.

11 THE CHAIR: Thank you.

12 MR GRIFFIN: Chair, we now hear from Ms Morris KC.

13 Submissions by MS MORRIS

14 MS MORRIS: Chair, good afternoon. I appear alongside
15 Lily Lewis instructed by Bhatt Murphy Solicitors and
16 make these submissions on behalf of the charity INQUEST.

17 As the Inquiry has recognised, INQUEST provides
18 advice and expertise to bereaved people in relation to
19 state-related deaths. INQUEST has considerable
20 experience of the deaths of those detained under the
21 Mental Health Act in psychiatric settings and has worked
22 on a large number of cases involving deaths in mental
23 health settings in Essex.

24 INQUEST recognises that without the family's
25 courage, persistence and determination, this Inquiry

1 would not have come into existence.

2 As Ms Campbell KC set out in her written submissions
3 to the Inquiry in November of this year, in fighting for
4 justice families repeatedly demonstrate courage over
5 fear. Through its case work and campaigning, INQUEST
6 bears witness to the significant personal cost to those
7 families of exposing failure and pushing for future
8 change.

9 Tragically the families are experts by experience of
10 what happened to their loved ones, but it should not
11 fall to bereaved families to hold state bodies or even
12 public inquiries to account. They are not responsible
13 for the deaths of their loved ones. They are not
14 responsible for the investigations into their deaths,
15 yet these families, through eloquent counsel who
16 represent them today, have expressed in the clearest
17 terms that they currently need reassurance that this
18 Inquiry is able to lift that burden and to undertake the
19 full and transparent investigation that is required and
20 that they deserve.

21 Deborah Coles, the executive director of INQUEST,
22 has given powerful evidence to this Inquiry in May and
23 we have now provided three witness statements by
24 Ms Coles on behalf of INQUEST. But beyond that, INQUEST
25 continue to actively support the families involved in

1 this Inquiry and their legal team are actively engaged
2 with both the Inquiry legal team and the legal teams
3 representing the bereaved families and those with lived
4 experience of inpatient treatment.

5 Sadly, INQUEST are experts as to how investigations
6 and legal processes over the last 25 years can
7 traumatise and impact on bereaved families. INQUEST has
8 supported families during public inquiries since 2003,
9 including the inquiry into the death of Rocky Bennett, a
10 young black Caribbean inpatient who died after ward
11 staff used excessive physical restraint against him.

12 INQUEST has also supported families bereaved by the
13 1989 Hillsborough disaster, the Grenfell Tower fire and
14 the ongoing Sheku Bayoh Inquiry in Scotland.

15 We of course welcome the Inquiry seeking reviews of
16 INQUEST on such core matters as procedural issues, the
17 draft investigative strategy and the recommendation and
18 implementation forum. But having walked alongside
19 bereaved families and survivors for decades, INQUEST
20 must now issue words of warning to this Inquiry at this
21 critical juncture of its work:

22 Do not follow the tragic pattern that so many
23 investigations have followed and failed to deliver on
24 well-intentioned promises, failed to scratch the surface
25 and failed to make robust and ambitious recommendations

1 for meaningful change.

2 We are concerned that the Inquiry is replicating the
3 experiences that bereaved families have already had with
4 previous investigations and Trust processes. INQUEST
5 hears the families through the submissions made on their
6 behalf today that they feel siloed, uncertain and are
7 unsighted on core documents and are losing confidence in
8 the Inquiry.

9 These are undoubtedly not words used lightly in the
10 context of a public inquiry that they have fought so
11 long and hard for, but without a radical change in the
12 levels of transparency and engagement for bereaved
13 families and other Core Participants, including INQUEST,
14 this Inquiry does now run the risk of causing
15 unnecessary suffering and risks not being able to
16 achieve its admirable and ambitious aims.

17 So, Chair, I will use the time I have available to
18 me to address you on seven key topics that we urge you
19 to address immediately.

20 The first is transparency. We echo the calls by the
21 families for a clear transparent and achievable route
22 map. This is something that should have been identified
23 from the opening of the Inquiry's hearings but the
24 families and no doubt the public, for reasons
25 highlighted by other counsel, feel that they are no

1 clearer today over a year later than they were at the
2 beginning as to where the Inquiry is going and by when.

3 Core Participants need meaningful insight into the
4 Inquiry's broadest investigative strategy, a clear
5 roadmap and as all counsel have said before me in their
6 oral submissions today, this must integrate the
7 Inquiry's various work strands and identify how the
8 evidence pertaining to each strand will be timetabled
9 and brought together.

10 INQUEST also support the proposal by Ms Sikand KC
11 and Ms Murphy KC that the Inquiry should follow
12 a modular structure which brings the benefits of clarity
13 and focus both to the investigations and to the family
14 and public engagement.

15 We also make the further broader point which chimes
16 with those made about the submissions going into the
17 ether. Correspondence that INQUEST has sent to the
18 Inquiry asking for clarity on key topics has likewise
19 gone unanswered.

20 One key submission was made to you, Chair, in
21 April 2025, highlighting to you the compelling case for
22 an independent body to investigate mental health deaths
23 which INQUEST has identified and campaigned for for over
24 20 years. In those submissions we asked you to look at
25 making a specific and focused recommendation to give the

1 investigations into the death of mental health patients
2 parity to other forms of state custody.

3 Also in helpful meetings with your counsel in July
4 of this year, we underline that this could and should be
5 done through an interim recommendation as the evidential
6 basis has already been established by the Inquiry from
7 the April and May hearings with the evidence of
8 Mr Behrens and Ms Coles and the families themselves
9 highlighting the lack of independence and scrutiny that
10 the deaths of their loved ones had received.

11 These submissions have gone unanswered and therefore
12 no interim recommendations have been made which means
13 that the substantive work of government to respond to
14 a recommendation and to put any such mechanism in place
15 has not started.

16 Given the lack of timescale and clarity on other
17 topics, including the recommendation and implementation
18 forum, INQUEST is concerned that there will still be
19 years lost before this important mechanism is
20 implemented and further lives lost in the interim.

21 We also repeat the calls for the Inquiry as a matter
22 of course to provide proper responses with formal
23 rulings on key matters as an essential part of the
24 transparent operation of the Inquiry's decision-making.

25 My second topic -- the draft investigative strategy.

1 Chair, we have made written submissions in response
2 to the draft Statement of Approach and won't repeat all
3 matters here. We welcome the Inquiry's recognition in
4 the strategy that the Chair may re-examine matters where
5 previous processes lacked system, scope or independence.
6 We make the following observations:

7 In relation to where the Inquiry has provisionally
8 identified categories of cases to form part of its
9 sample, INQUEST asks why the Inquiry is only looking at
10 cases where there was findings of neglect, which for
11 coronial purposes requires there to be a gross failing
12 to provide basic care as opposed to all cases where
13 the coroner or jury have made findings that any act or
14 omission by the provider or Trust has contributed to a
15 death. In such cases, for example, there could have
16 been findings of gross failures even if the test for
17 neglect has not been met.

18 Given the Inquiry is looking here at inpatient
19 deaths, all the deaths that were not natural should have
20 had an inquest process that at least sought to comply
21 with the Article 2 investigative duty and therefore
22 should have been capable of identifying and recording
23 critical findings that either probably or possibly
24 contributed to the death.

25 INQUEST is concerned that if this category of deaths

1 are excluded from the investigation, then the Inquiry
2 may miss illustrations of important causative themes
3 that did not amount to neglect.

4 INQUEST understand there may be practical
5 constraints in relation to obtaining and reviewing all
6 the records of inquests of patient deaths across the
7 time period for the Terms of Reference but would welcome
8 further expansion of the Inquiry's rationale in relation
9 to this category and can also engage with the Inquiry in
10 relation to methods for the selection of relevant cases,
11 including through requests to coroners or through
12 INQUEST's own caseload.

13 INQUEST also ask the Inquiry to provide clarity as
14 to when and how liaison with families and others will
15 take place in order to ensure that the experiences of
16 and expertise of families informs the investigations of
17 relevant cases from an early stage and that importantly
18 families understand when they will be contacted and will
19 be given sufficient time to input meaningfully.

20 INQUEST's experience across decades of working with
21 bereaved families is that this will be a very traumatic
22 process for families and must be approached sensitively.
23 The Inquiry must adopt a trauma-informed approach and
24 appreciate that families are likely to be at risk of
25 re-traumatisation, not only by the Inquiry examining

1 their own loved one's experiences, but also by having
2 shared with them the experiences of others.

3 INQUEST's own experience through managing their
4 caseload supporting bereaved families which seeks to
5 bring together information about a death, including
6 material from post-death investigations, family members
7 and other sources is that it is an incredibly
8 time-consuming and intricate task with a need for
9 constant and sensitive communication with the families
10 and other parties.

11 Given that the Inquiry's investigative strategy is
12 currently only in draft, we are concerned as to how any
13 evidence of any death relating to the illustrative cases
14 could realistically be ready to be heard before the
15 hearing windows in February or even April of next year.

16 The INQUEST welcomes the Inquiry's consideration of
17 defensiveness and lack of candour and urges the Inquiry
18 to make public findings in relation to these important
19 topics.

20 The national profile and significance of this
21 Inquiry means that other Trusts will be aware of its
22 work and monitoring its findings, and if there is to be
23 meaningful cultural change in Essex and nationally, then
24 issues of transparency and candour should be identified
25 at the earliest opportunity.

1 In terms of the details of how the proposals for the
2 illustrative cases are selected and organised, INQUEST
3 echoes the families' concerns about who is included and
4 who is not and the impact and effectiveness of clusters.
5 We also echo the families' concerns in relation to the
6 methodology of identifying illustrative cases and what
7 expert or statistical evidence has informed the
8 selection.

9 Finally on this topic, it is submitted that INQUEST
10 should be cited on case summaries, but that as a minimum
11 where INQUEST had supported a bereaved family within any
12 cluster, that with the permission of that family,
13 INQUEST should be provided with a copy of the initial
14 case summary in order to assist the Inquiry with any
15 factual inaccuracies or areas of further exploration.
16 In this way, INQUEST will be able to assist the Inquiry
17 with its investigative obligations.

18 My third topic, Chair, the importance of a system
19 level investigation.

20 We agree with the submissions made by Ms Murphy KC
21 that the Inquiry must be able to identify the root
22 causes of what she termed the "catastrophic systems
23 collapse" that happened within Essex.

24 As the Inquiry has recognised in opening, forensic
25 scrutiny must be applied ward to board. This is of

1 vital importance not only for this Inquiry to understand
2 what happened in Essex and to ensure local learning, but
3 the Inquiry is clearly also of national importance and
4 failures of governance, regulation, oversight and
5 learning will resonate loudly across other Trusts.

6 As INQUEST has already highlighted in Ms Coles' oral
7 and written evidence, systems failures within mental
8 health Trusts in Greater Manchester and Teesside have
9 led to a significant number of inpatient deaths and have
10 led bereaved families and survivors in those areas to
11 call for a public inquiry and they will look to this
12 Inquiry for findings and recommendations that will drive
13 improvements at a Trust, a regional and a national
14 systems level.

15 My fourth topic is the engagement of the bereaved
16 families.

17 INQUEST hears the concerns raised by all the
18 bereaved families groups, and in particular the concerns
19 of those families who have already given such powerful
20 evidence but without adequate disclosure or information.

21 The Inquiry's requests so far of those families
22 appears to be to focus on their feelings and impressions
23 in the absence of disclosure. They have asked today,
24 not unreasonably, is this it? Is this the sum of their
25 total expected input into their public hearings? At

1 this stage of the Inquiry, this question should be able
2 to be answered with clarity.

3 In addition, there has been a lack of meaningful
4 communication or regular updates from the Inquiry which
5 has meant the families have only learnt what is
6 happening for the first time in public hearings. The
7 families of CPs have had no indication as to who has
8 been asked for Rule 9 statements or what evidence has
9 been gathered from them. There has been no opportunity
10 for Core Participants to make submissions on further
11 lines of investigation. This carries a significant risk
12 not only of families not being at the heart of process,
13 but also the Inquiry not achieving its aim within the
14 timescale currently available.

15 My fifth topic, Chair, the lack of a proper
16 disclosure plan.

17 INQUEST echoes the families' concerns about the
18 broken promises when it comes to disclosure. Lack of
19 proper disclosure prevents a lack of effective
20 participation for families, a key aspect of the
21 Article 2 compliant processes. As INQUEST pointed out
22 in previous written submissions, the families in this
23 Inquiry have had less access to disclosure and less
24 right to question than they did when they were
25 interested persons in their loved one's inquest.

1 This cannot be right. The Inquiry must now issue
2 a disclosure roadmap that gives adequate time for all
3 CPs to receive, assimilate and respond to that
4 disclosure and particularly to the families and
5 survivors in a trauma informed way.

6 Chair, being trauma informed isn't just about
7 empathy, sensitivity and reasonable adjustments. It is
8 about co-designing a process with those who have
9 experienced trauma and a process which embodies respect,
10 parity, clarity, transparency and engagement.

11 My sixth topic is on experts.

12 INQUEST reiterates the concerns raised by other CPs
13 in respect of the Inquiry's approach to experts and
14 despite multiple concerns raised about the expert
15 reports of Dr Davidson and Maria Nelligan, those experts
16 proceeded to give oral evidence, albeit in a curtailed
17 format.

18 CPs have since raised further concerns about what
19 further expert evidence the Inquiry proposes to hear.
20 INQUEST, like other Core Participants, made detailed
21 submissions in September regarding the instruction of
22 experts in neurodiversity from the fields of psychiatry
23 and psychology. No response has been received. Nor it
24 seems has the Inquiry sought to instruct an expert on
25 sexual discrimination and racism in the delivery of

1 mental health services in Essex, despite repeated
2 requests made by both INQUEST and Bindmans.

3 We are still not aware if experts have been
4 instructed and, if so, what they have been asked to
5 address or when their reports will be provided. The
6 Inquiry to date has not shared any letters of
7 instruction for any expert within the investigation, and
8 further to our submissions touching on the investigative
9 strategy, it is not clear how and when further expert
10 evidence fits into any future planning.

11 My final topic then, Chair, touching on the
12 recommendations and implementations forum.

13 INQUEST will be making detailed written submissions
14 in response to the recommendations and implementations
15 forum in line with the Inquiry's deadlines but make the
16 following short headline points:

17 First, in view of the lack of investigative roadmap,
18 it is not clear how the recommendations and
19 implementations forum fits alongside the wider
20 investigations and within what timescales.

21 Second, INQUEST would press upon the Inquiry the
22 need to be bold and ambitious in its approach to
23 recommendations, not just recommend what it knows will
24 be easy to resource and implement. This, we say,
25 would entirely undermine and undervalue the role of the

1 Inquiry in striving for meaningful change. Many of the
2 systemic failures of these Trusts and others are
3 underpinned by years of austerity and cuts to public
4 health funding to mental health services and to simply
5 accept the current situation, not to demand better for
6 patients, would be a failure of this process.

7 Third, INQUEST understands concerns families may
8 have if the focus of the recommendation and
9 implementation forum is to engage with Trusts and
10 stakeholders to determine what is possible, not what is
11 needed. Lawyers are not the only people that the
12 Inquiry should be speaking to and the Inquiry should be
13 mindful of the risk of over-legalising the process.

14 Fifth, INQUEST is supportive of a process of interim
15 recommendations and has already highlighted in a
16 previous submission and today the evidential basis for
17 a number that you, Chair, could consider.

18 The first is an interim recommendation around the
19 need for robust data based on Professor Donnelly's
20 evidence to date.

21 The second, a recommendation INQUEST presses upon
22 you around the need for an independent investigation
23 mechanism into inpatient mental health deaths.

24 Thirdly, INQUEST supports the submission that
25 Ms Campbell makes in relation to the interim

1 recommendation that the use of Oxevision technology in
2 mental health settings should be safely halted.

3 Finally on this topic, INQUEST urges meaningful
4 engagement with the families not just talking shops.
5 Like with other parts of the Inquiry's process, there
6 has to be clarity, planning and transparency in respect
7 of the work of the recommendations and implementation
8 forum.

9 In conclusion, Chair, within the current timetable
10 INQUEST is deeply concerned that the Inquiry cannot
11 deliver the breadth and magnitude of what remains to be
12 explored in the hearing dates that have been allocated
13 between now and the end of October 2026.

14 The families deserve more. Some of the Essex
15 families lost loved ones 25 years ago. INQUEST
16 encourages the Inquiry to reflect on the
17 intergenerational suffering of these families and
18 survivors who have also waited a generation to have the
19 truth established of how their loved ones died and
20 acknowledged publicly and for those responsible to be
21 called to some level of account.

22 Sadly, INQUEST and the public know only too well
23 from other scandals, such as the Horizon scandal and the
24 Infected Blood scandal how delay and obfuscation by
25 investigations only compound in injustice and trauma.

1 As Steve Kelly, who lost his brother Michael Kelly
2 at Hillsborough, said just last week when reflecting on
3 his family's fight for justice over the course of
4 36 years, said that no one should be beaten by the
5 passage of time.

6 25 years after the beginning of the period within
7 your Terms of Reference, Chair, time is passing without
8 meaningful findings or recommendations that can manifest
9 in meaningful change. There is no doubt that this will
10 be taking its toll on the Essex families.

11 Chair, we don't doubt your ambitions or your
12 intentions to deliver your terms of reference, but it
13 will now take grit and grip to ensure that they can be
14 delivered in an effective and timely way and with the
15 families remaining where they should be, not at the
16 sidelines, but at the heart of the process, and INQUEST
17 endeavours to work with the Inquiry to achieve this.
18 Thank you, Chair.

19 MR GRIFFIN: Chair, that is the last of today's oral
20 submissions.

21 THE CHAIR: Thank you very much. Can I thank Ms Morris for
22 her contributions too.

23 Can I also say that I want to thank everybody who
24 has made submissions before me today and I can assure
25 you that I am going to be giving them my deepest

1 consideration. Thank you.

2 (2.30 pm)

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